




SILVIA MONTIGLIO

LOVE & PROVIDENCE

*Recognition in the
Ancient Novel*



VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

Love and Providence

This page intentionally left blank

Love and Providence

Recognition in the Ancient Novel

SILVIA MONTIGLIO

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research,
scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.

Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in
the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by
Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

© Oxford University Press 2013

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights
organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the
Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Montiglio, Silvia, 1960–
Love and Providence: Recognition in the ancient novel / Silvia Montiglio.
pages cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-991604-7

1. Recognition in literature. 2. Greek fiction—History and criticism.

3. Latin fiction—History and criticism. I. Title.

PA3015.R38M658 2012
883'.0109—dc23 2012002818

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

To Gareth

Ubi tu Trimalchio, ego Fortunata

This page intentionally left blank

CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 3

1. True Love and Immediate Recognition 16

CALLIRHOE: SOMETHING IN THE WAY SHE BREATHES 16

THE EPHESIACA: SLOW AND QUICK EYES 47

2. Beauty, Dress, and Identity 65

LEUCIPPE AND CLITOPHON: TEASING EXPECTATIONS 65

DAPHNIS AND CHLOE: TOO BEAUTIFUL TO BE SHEPHERDS 86

3. Reading Identity: Recognitions in the *Aethiopica* 106

FIRST, MISIDENTIFICATIONS 106

THE RECOGNITION OF CHARICLEA 125

READING RECOGNITIONS 152

4. A Gift of Providence? Recognitions in Two Roman Novels 159

THE SATYRICA: RECOGNITION AND CAPTURE 159

THE GOLDEN ASS: RECOGNITION AND RETURN 163

5. From the Pagan Novels to Early Jewish and Christian Narratives:
Refashioning Recognition 190

“TELLING MY WHOLE LIFE WITH HIS WORDS”: RECOGNITIONS IN

APOLLONIUS OF TYRE 190

“WHO ARE YOU?” <i>JOSEPH AND ASENETH</i> , OR IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RECOGNIZE A CONVERT	202
RECOGNITION OF FAMILY AND RECOGNITION OF GOD IN THE <i>PSEUDO-CLEMENTINE RECOGNITIONS</i>	210
DRESS AND RECOGNITION: A NOVELISTIC MOTIF BECOMES CHRISTIAN	222
Epilogue: The Ancient Novel in the History of the Recognition Motif	225
TRAGEDY AND COMEDY	225
FUTURE INFLUENCES: HIGHLIGHTS	230
<i>Bibliography</i>	241
<i>Index</i>	253

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many friends and colleagues have been behind this book. John Morgan encouraged me to pursue the topic at an early stage. Ewen Bowie, Luca Graverini, Judith Perkins, and the anonymous readers for Oxford University Press have read drafts of the whole or individual chapters and offered valuable comments. I also wish to thank, for various reasons, Jeffrey Beneker, Alain Billault, Jenny Strauss Clay, Stephen Harrison, Regina Höschel, Anna Lefteratou, Patrizia Liviabella Furiani, Jim McKeown, John Morgan, Christopher Pelling, Laurence Plazenet, Consuelo Ruiz-Montero, Walter Stephens, Gonda Van Steen, Robert Wagman, Tim Whitmarsh, and Maaïke Zimmerman. Audiences at the Universities of Toronto, Pennsylvania, Thessalonica, and Virginia, at the College of Charleston, and at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen have patiently listened to sections of this project and stimulated my thinking. Thank you. My gratitude also goes to Don Judes, Resources Librarian at The Johns Hopkins University, to the University for granting me a sabbatical leave during which I completed the book, to Stefan Vranka at Oxford University Press for his support and sharp judgments, and to the staff of the Press for their help in seeing this book through to the end.

I have adopted the Latinized spelling of Greek names, and modified translations and citations accordingly. All the Greek and Latin is translated or closely paraphrased. Translations of *Callirhoe*, the *Ephesiaca*, *Leucippe and Clitophon*, the *Aethiopica*, and *Apollonius of Tyre* are borrowed, but sometimes adapted, from Reardon (2008 [1989]). For *Daphnis and Chloe* I have used Morgan (2004), for Petronius Heseltine (revised by Warmington, 1969), and for Apuleius Hanson 1989. I have chosen these translations, though often they are not literal, because of their liveliness, with an eye to readers with no Greek or Latin. Translations of other texts are mine unless otherwise stated.

This page intentionally left blank

Love and Providence

This page intentionally left blank

Introduction

La vieille reparut bientôt: elle soutenait avec peine une femme tremblante, d'une taille majestueuse, brillante de pierreries, et couverte d'un voile. "Otez ce voile," dit la vieille à Candide. Le jeune homme approche; il lève le voile d'une main timide. Quel moment! Quelle surprise! Il croit voir mademoiselle Cunégonde: il la voyait en effet, c'était elle-même. La force lui manque, il ne peut proférer une parole, il tombe à ses pieds. Cunégonde tombe sur le canapé. La vieille les accable d'eaux spiritueuses, ils reprennent leurs sens.

Voltaire, *Candide*, chapter 7

Voltaire stages an overblown recognition scene, punctuated by amazement, loss of voice, swooning.¹ His parody targets French novels close to his own time with their repertory of stock scenes. And many of those stock scenes, recognitions among them, are imitated directly from ancient Greek fictional narratives. Recognitions caught the perceptive eye of the French ironist as a commonplace motif of the love-and-adventure novel, ancient and modern, which he ridicules throughout *Candide*.²

Recognition scenes are coeval with Greek literature itself. The second half of the *Odyssey* could be renamed the Book of Recognitions, for it tells the story of a dispossessed war hero who returns to his kingdom in disguise and orchestrates his revenge against would-be usurpers carefully by timing his self-disclosures. Attic tragedy similarly makes use of recognitions in plots of return and revenge, such as

¹ "The old woman soon reappeared; she was supporting with some difficulty a trembling woman of majestic stature, glittering with precious stones and covered with a veil. 'Remove the veil,' said the old woman to Candide. The young man advanced and lifted the veil with a timid hand. What a moment! What a surprise! He thought he saw Mademoiselle Cunegonde, in fact he was looking at her, it was she herself. His strength failed him, he could not utter a word and fell at her feet. Cunegonde fell on the sofa. The old woman dosed them with distilled waters; they recovered their senses" (translated by Aldington [Voltaire 1992]).

² Though Voltaire's targets are French novels, he also seems to have Greek and Roman ones in mind. See especially his treatment of the motif of the lovers pretending to be siblings in chapter 13: "Il [Candide] n'osa pas dire que c'était sa soeur, parce qu'elle ne l'était pas . . . et quoique ce mensonge officieux eût été autrefois très à la mode chez les anciens, et qu'il pût être utile aux modernes, son âme était trop pure pour trahir la vérité."

that of Orestes, who reappears in his homeland incognito and reveals his identity only to those on whom he can count as allies, his sister especially. Euripides's *Helen*, *Ion*, and *Iphigenia in Tauris* modify the Odysseus-Orestes model by turning recognition from the end result of a homecoming, the expected and even planned outcome for the party who knows the other (Odysseus, Orestes), into an unexpected event for both characters, taking place abroad, during a journey, and suddenly changing their lives. Likewise, comic recognitions are, from the perspective of the characters, unexpected events and a cause of dramatic change in their situations. Whether in epic, tragedy, comedy, or, as we shall see, the novel, recognition always brings about reversal (*peripeteia*).

The climactic quality of recognition is brought out by a widespread pattern, which cuts across literary genres. Recognitions are "scenes" in the narratological sense, that is, the time devoted to their presentation (*récit*) is closer to the story-time (*histoire*) than in a summary account.³ Or, simply put: recognitions are staged in detail. This is true not only for drama but already for the *Odyssey*: episodes of recognition without at least some lines of direct speech are rare.⁴ Later prose narratives show a similar sensitivity to the intrinsic theatricality of recognitions by pausing on the choreography of their unfolding. The novels are a strong case in point, as we shall see. But for now, let me exemplify this in two episodes from Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, a work that shares features with the novels and might have been influenced by them.⁵

Coriolanus, disguised like Odysseus, "entered the enemy city" (*Od.* 4.246). He walks unrecognized to the house of Tullius, where he straightaway appears at the hearth and sits down in silence, as Odysseus does at the hearth of Alcinous. Coriolanus keeps his peace, his head covered. Those present marvel and do not dare raise him up because of the aura that wafts around him, but warn Tullius, who is at dinner. Tullius goes down to ask the stranger who he is and what he wants. And now Coriolanus, uncovering his face, after a pause tells him: "If you do not recognize me yet, Tullius . . . but do not believe what you see, needs be that I become my own accuser. I am Gaius Marcus."⁶ Plutarch records his character's movements, gestures, silences, and words.

The second episode is in a Life devoted to a particularly histrionic character, Antony (10.8–10). To cheer up Fulvia, his wife, the hero goes on stage: he dresses like a

³ On *récit* and *histoire*, see Genette 1980, 86–112.

⁴ One is at *Od.* 4.244–50.

⁵ Readers have often noted novelistic features in Plutarch's writings: for instance, stories of chastity defended at all costs (*Demetrius* 24.2–5; *De mul. vir.* 251 A–C; 257 E–258 C); the preference for heterosexual love (in the *Dialogue on Love*); the prominence of women (in the same dialogue). Ruiz-Montero (2003, 47) and Bowie (2008, 23–24) assume Plutarch's knowledge of the novel. Baker (2005) points out novelistic elements in the *Life of Marius*.

⁶ εἰ μήπω με γνώσκεις, ὦ Τύλλε . . . ἀλλ' ὅρων ἀπιστεῖς, ἀνάγκη με κατήγορον ἑμαυτοῦ γενέσθαι. Γάιος εἰμι Μάρκιος (*Cor.* 23.3–4).

slave and appears in her house at night saying that he has a letter from . . . Antony. Fulvia asks him if her husband is alive. He says nothing but hands her the letter; then, while she is reading it, kisses her. The recognition is wordless because Antony chooses to reveal himself by a silent kiss; but the narrative still dwells on the scene's details, stopping on the actor's gestures.

Another aspect of recognitions in Greek literature at large, and one again geared to highlight their climactic function, is that they tend to build up suspense rather than causing a brief moment of surprise.⁷ It is true that Aristotle speaks of "shock" as the desired effect of recognition: "the best recognition is the one that arises from the facts themselves, when the shock comes through probabilities."⁸ The shock, however, is produced by the unexpectedness not of the event but of the manner in which an expected event happens, as is clear from at least one of the specimens adduced: Sophocles's *Oedipus Rex*. We know that Oedipus will eventually recognize who he is but do not know how, and are "shocked" by the way the recognition unfolds.

As in *Oedipus Rex*, suspense is often increased by dramatic irony, which in turn derives from the discrepancy of knowledge between characters and audience ("If only I could never see my mother!" I tell a woman without knowing that she is my mother and before an audience who knows). Recognitions in Greek literature assume clued-in audiences. An audience to the *Odyssey* knows that Odysseus is Odysseus when Telemachus does not. The spectators of a tragic recognition likewise know who is who. Their knowledge sometimes affords them the titillating pleasure, which has been called *suspens scabreux* (risky suspense)⁹ of watching the characters play with fire unawares: mothers almost killing sons (in *Ion*), sisters almost killing brothers (in *Iphigenia in Tauris*), when the recognition occurs to save them in extremis. Recognitions in comedy likewise tend to assume the audience's knowledge of identities unknown to (some of) the characters.

Novelistic recognitions generally follow this pattern: all in all, they are not surprise-events. Novelists, to be sure, deem the unexpected, *to aprosdokēton*, a major attraction in their plots and wish to surprise readers with their "wondrous" stories, including episodes of recognition. Yet recognition is a fixed ingredient, and as such subject to generic expectations: it may happen unexpectedly and in "shocking" ways, but we expect it to happen. Anticipation whets our appetite for it as if for a *pièce de résistance*. Furthermore, in their handling of recognitions, novelists generally rely on the gap of knowledge between audience and characters or at least on the audience's better intuition, often exposing characters ignorant of

⁷ Lochert (2009, 74) quotes Hitchcock's example of the bomb on the table: if we know it must explode, we experience a sustained suspense, if we don't, an instant of surprise.

⁸ πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δι' εἰκότων (*Poet.* 55a 16–17).

⁹ Boulhol 1996, 50 (regarding Christian hagiography).

each other's identities to tragic or nonnovelistic alternatives. We who know or suspect who is who enjoy the *suspens scabreux* suggested by those alternatives, should recognition not occur (though our enjoyment comes from the expectation that it eventually will) and while it has not yet occurred: a father on the verge of killing his daughter (in the *Aethiopica*), a brother about to enlist his brother as slave (in *Daphnis and Chloe*) or, even more *scabreux* for the novels' ethos, lovers almost failing to recover each other (in *Callirhoe*) and temporarily failing to do so (in *Leucippe and Clitophon*). The grim prospect sketched by the theoretical possibility of nonrecognition provides pleasure itself and augments the pleasure of the happy resolution by configuring the latter as a sudden reversal.

As the episode that ends the lovers' misfortunes, the recognition was as satisfying for those novels' readers as the canonical kiss at the end of a Hollywood movie has been for modern viewers. Ancient consumers of novels would also have agreed with this statement by a seventeenth-century critic: "Mais rien n'est si plaisant si patie ne si dous, / Que la Reconnoissance, au sentiment de tous!"¹⁰ In Chariton's *Callirhoe*, the recognition is consciously treated as the most pleasant development in a narrative fraught with misadventures. When Aphrodite steps in to reunite the lovers, the author steps in to comment on her intervention: "but I think this book will be the most pleasant," *hēdiston* (8.1.4). Rien n'est si plaisant . . .

In spite of their high frequency and thematic importance, however, novelistic recognitions have not been the object of a comprehensive investigation. Aspects of this neglect can be traced as far back as the Renaissance, when the device and concept of *anagnōrīsis*, as described by Aristotle, came into the spotlight in the new wave of discussion on "the art of poetry." Ancient novels do not seem to have fed into that discussion, though several of them were entering the European literary scene, and at least in one case, Heliodorus's *Aethiopica*, contemporary critics (as well as creative writers¹¹) seem to have appreciated the final recognition scene.

The Spanish Alonso López Pinciano, for instance, in his *Poetics* (1596) praises Heliodorus's novel for satisfying requirements set by Aristotle for epic and tragedy: the reader is brought directly in medias res; the action turns in the middle of the book; and there is a recognition scene at the end.¹² Likewise the German philologist M. Curtius, in the dedicatory epistle that prefaces his 1584 epitome of the novel, lauds its *agnoiai* (episodes marked by ignorance) and *anagnōrismoi paradoxoi* (incredible recognitions), employing transparent

¹⁰ De La Fresnaye 1885, 189–90. "But nothing is as pleasant, full of passion, or sweet / As Recognition: that's what everyone thinks!"

¹¹ See the epilogue.

¹² See Hägg 1983, 1.

Aristotelian language.¹³ Some ninety years later, Pierre-Daniel Huet, in his *Traité de l'Origine des romans*, is warmly appreciative of the dénouement of the *Aethiopica* with its pivotal recognition: "it develops from the subject-matter, and nothing is more touching or heart-wrenching. The horror of the sacrifice in which Theagenes and Chariclea, whose beauty and deserts was moving everyone to compassion, were due to be immolated, is replaced by joy at seeing the young girl escape the danger owing to her parents' recognition."¹⁴

These favorable comments, however, did not help novelistic recognitions to enter the canon, to feature in general discussions of the device. For Renaissance and early modern literary theorists, *anagnōrisis* is first and foremost tragic *anagnōrisis*, in line with Aristotle's *Poetics*.¹⁵ One illustration of this bias is Giovanbattista Giraldi Cintio, who deals with the motif in some detail in his *Delle Comedie e delle Tragedie* (1554), based on Aristotle and ancient drama.¹⁶ When critics expand on the range of genres on which Aristotle grounds his analysis, they do include "romances," but by the term they mean medieval verse romances and Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*, which was considered a poetic romance.¹⁷

A general lack of interest in the ancient novels' recognitions also marks more recent scholarship. Bernadotte Perrin's article "Recognition Scenes in Greek Literature" (1909) limits the discussion to epic and tragedy in spite of its broadly encompassing title.¹⁸ A contemporary study, Paulus Hoffmann's *De anagnorismo* (1910), likewise disregards the novels, but for a brief remark (p. 61) that recognitions are present in them as well, together with many more "artifices" borrowed from New Comedy. This dismissive judgment is in line with the contempt

¹³ The text is in Plazenet 2008, 810.

¹⁴ "Il naist du sujet, et rien n'est plus touchant, ni plus pathétique. A l'horreur du sacrifice, où l'on devoit immoler Theagene & Chariclée, dont la beauté & le mérite touchoit tout le monde de compassion, succede la joye de voir cette jeune fille sortir de ce danger par la reconnoissance de ses parens" (1942, 158).

¹⁵ The exemplary *anagnōrisis* for Renaissance theorists, as for Aristotle, is the one in *Oedipus Rex*: see Ugolini 1987.

¹⁶ The seventeenth-century critic René Rapin, in *Les réflexions sur la poétique de ce temps et sur les ouvrages des poètes anciens et modernes*, likewise founds his discussion of recognition on *Oedipus Rex* (1970, 100–101).

¹⁷ Giraldi Cintio's *De' Romanzi* (1554) is essentially a defense of Ariosto. Tasso (1964, 25) considers Ariosto's poem a *romanzo*. On Ariosto as paradigm for seventeenth-century commentators who include "romances" in their treatment of recognition, see Cave 1988, 82. De La Fresnaye, for instance, in illustrating the pleasures of *reconnaissance* draws especially on Ariosto's poem (1885, 197–220); and Rapin, when he mentions "les reconnaissances imprévues" among the episodes adding variety to heroic poetry (1970, 77), is likely to be thinking of Ariosto, on whose poetry he comments profusely.

¹⁸ Perrin 1909. The article aims to analyze recognition scenes known to Aristotle, but still the title is a telltale sign of what "Greek literature" meant in the early 1900s.

for the novel that was commonplace in the early twentieth century, in the wake of Erwin Rohde, on whom indeed Hoffmann leans. Rohde himself does not dwell on recognition scenes in any detail, but when he mentions those in the Latin novel *Apollonius of Tyre* and in Xenophon's *Ephesiaca*, he brands the way they happen, namely by autobiographical narratives, as "the most tasteless" (*das abgeschmackteste Mittel*).¹⁹

Though in the last few decades the ancient novels have been enjoying ever growing attention, their treatment of recognition is still understudied. Welcome contributions are Patrick Robiano's article on *Callirhoe*, a brief overview of recognitions in the Greek novels by Alain Billault, and Terence Cave's *Recognition*, which treats the final recognition scene of the *Aethiopica* in some detail.²⁰ Finally, Anna Lefteratou's recent investigation of the use of myths as narrative patterns in the Greek novel contains a section on the recognition plot, though Lefteratou focuses not on recognition proper but on the recognizing process, the way hidden truths gradually unfold in the narrative until, with the recognition scene(s), the whole truth comes to light.²¹ My efforts follow the lead of these scholars. I attempt to analyze the function of recognitions in each novel's plot structure; to evaluate their significance for each novel's thought-world and themes; and to examine the rapport that the treatments of recognition in the novel entertain with the literary tradition, for a considerable number of citations and echoes demonstrates an intense level of engagement with epic and dramatic specimens of recognition.

But first, what do I mean by "recognition"? A study on recognition needs to define its object with special urgency. Cave draws attention to the problem: "terms like recognition ought always to be understood as a product of their own history."²² Or "the question 'what is or is not a recognition scene?'—the question of the ultimate boundary—is not answerable except in relation to the demands of a particular critical approach." Contemporary critics, he argues, are inclined to underscore moral or psychological meanings of recognition, and subsequently to discard those concerned with material discovery: "The universal privilege given to moral and psychological recognition leads commentators [Cave is arguing specifically for Racine] to focus on examples where a moral quotient can be exhibited, where recognition can be equated with the dignity of a tragic 'illumination.' Signs, tokens, the mechanics of mistaken identity, 'mere

¹⁹ Rohde 1960, 440. The study by Hähnle (1929) does include the novels of Longus and Heliodorus (117–129), but its focus is merely on the objects used to produce recognition, the *gnōrismata*.

²⁰ See Robiano 2008; Billault, forthcoming; Cave 1988, 17–21. Létoublon (1993) deals with the motif "they lived happily ever after" (117–18) and does say, "recognition is . . . one of the *topoi* of the ancient novel, after having been one of epic and tragedy" (125–26); but she does not treat it.

²¹ See Lefteratou 2010, 284.

²² Cave 1988, vii. The next citations are from pp. 242 and 349.

technique’—all these are slighted, as usual, and repressed in favour of nobler abstractions.”

This study will go against the trend Cave describes. It will be concerned mainly with recognition of personal identity (though recognition of personal identity of course involves more than just material discovery; it also invites questions about what constitutes identity and what recognition *does*: confirm sameness? acknowledge change?). This choice, prosaic as it may sound, is driven by a stark fact: moral illumination is not the stuff of ancient Greek novels. There are only three characters in them who show some contrition or blame themselves for their misguided actions.²³

In privileging recognition of personal identity, the novels are firmly anchored in Greek literary practice and criticism. Recognition as a recurrent feature of epic and drama is first and foremost the discovery of one’s kinship or otherwise intimate relationship with a supposed stranger. Surely I would not argue that moral recognition is alien to Greek literature. Quite the contrary: it goes as far back as the double admission of fault by Agamemnon and Achilles in *Iliad* 19. Though Agamemnon wants to blame his actions entirely on *Ate* (“I am not at fault, but Zeus and my Portion and air-wandering Erinys, who in that assembly cast savage blindness into my mind, on the day when I myself took the prize of Achilles”)²⁴ his avowal that “he himself” bereft Achilles of his gift is an implicit admission of responsibility.²⁵ And Achilles says, bluntly: was it better for both of us to fight fiercely for the sake of a girl? (19. 56–58, summarized). Several culminating scenes of tragedy likewise are recognitions of one’s crime or error: Theseus’s desperate self-accusation (in *Hippolytus*), Creon’s belated understanding of the purport of his decisions (in *Antigone*), and Admetus’s awareness that his life is not livable after his wife has died for his sake (in *Alcestis*) are famous examples. And so are Heracles’s and Ajax’s return to reason and realization of their predicament (in the homonymous plays) or Agave’s similar tragedy (in *Bacchae*), in one critic’s assessment “the most terrifying recognition scene in Greek drama.”²⁶

Those specimens of recognition, however, even in tragedy are a minority compared to recognitions of person. This might be a reason they did not retain

²³ Chaereas and Dionysius in *Callirhoe* and Aristippus in the *Aethiopica*: see chapter 1.

²⁴ *Il.* 19. 86–89: ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ αἰτιός εἰμι/ ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡεροφοῖτις Ἑρινύς,/ οἳ τέ μοι εἰν ἀγορῇ φρεσὶν ἐμβαλον ἄγριον ἄτην,/ ἤματι τῷ ὅτ’ Ἀχιλλῆος γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπηύρων.

²⁵ *Il.* 19.89: αὐτός. We have to remember that in Homeric psychology, responsibility is compatible with the intervention of a divine force. See also *Il.* 2. 377–78; 9. 115–16.

²⁶ Culbertson 1989, 43. On the proclivity of the modern critic to consider such cases recognitions, see also Cave 1988, 229. It should, however, be noted that in Heracles’s and especially in Agave’s case recognition is not of a mistake as such, but of the victim’s identity and consequently of the mistake: for Agave, see *Bacch.* 1285.

Aristotle's attention. In spite of defining *anagnōrisis* in general terms, as a change from ignorance to knowledge, in his analysis he focuses on the revelation of "who one is" in a family relation. The best recognition, he claims, is of person. Though theoretically he also envisions recognition of agency, "of having or not having done something,"²⁷ in fact, he does not discuss episodes of sheer realization of one's crime or error such as the ones listed above. Recognition of personal identity is the "most appropriate for the story"²⁸ and takes over the entire species: "since recognition is of somebody" . . .²⁹

Even the recognition of agency, in Aristotle's view, revolves around the discovery of the victim's relation to oneself: one can do something awful in ignorance and then recognize who the victim was, as in *Oedipus Rex* (*Poet.* 53b 29–31), or plan to do something awful and then not do it because the victim is recognized, as in *Iphigenia in Tauris* (*Poet.* 54a 6–7). In these cases, what the agents (would) regret is their ignorance of their relation, and only consequently their action.³⁰

It is fair to dispute, as critics have long done, Aristotle's narrow definition of *anagnōrisis*.³¹ Yet his definition is in keeping with the main role of recognitions in Greek literature, which is to advance the action rather than illuminate aspects of character.³² We can agree with Aristotle when he emphasizes that recognitions in

²⁷ *εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν* (*Poet.* 52a 35–36). Aristotle also mentions recognitions of objects (*ibid.*) and, though in passing, of places (55a 10–12, with Vuillemin 1984, 244).

²⁸ *ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου* (*Poet.* 52a 36–37).

²⁹ *ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστιν ἀναγνώρισις* (*Poet.* 52b 3). I think that Aristotle is dismissing the other kinds of recognition as inferior. For discussion, see Cave 1988, 34–35. On Aristotle's preference for recognition of person, see also Browne 1943, 163–64; Heulot-Petit and Michel 2009, 12; Vuillemoz 2009, 26.

³⁰ Sissa (2006) correctly argues that tragic recognition "encompasses the acknowledgment of an agency" (41). In the Aristotelian view, however, that acknowledgment is always intertwined with discovery of genealogical identity. *Oedipus Rex*, for Aristotle the perfect tragedy, is the best illustration for this: Oedipus's first words after he says farewell to the light are "I who was found to be born from whom I should not have" (1184: *ὅστις πέφασμαι φύς τ' ἀφ' ᾧ οὐ χρῆν*) and only subsequently "I who mingled with whom I should not have, and killed those I should not have" (1184–85: *ξὺν οἷς τ' / οὐ χρῆν ὁμιλῶν, οὓς τέ μ' οὐκ ἔδει κτανῶν*). Agency comes second. See also *Poet.* 53b 29–31: "It is possible . . . to do something awful in ignorance, and then recognize the relationship of friendship, as Oedipus in Sophocles" (*ἔστιν . . . ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πράξαι τὸ δεινόν, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους*).

³¹ Among modern critics, see, e.g., Vuillemin 1984; but earlier theorists already were dissatisfied with Aristotle's definition. In the seventeenth century Jean-François Sarasin reads recognition in moral terms, of one's errors: see Cave 1988, 91–94. Another case Cave discusses (140–41) is that of Henry James Pye, an eighteenth-century translator of the *Poetics* who argued that recognition could be of fact (for instance, that Desdemona was innocent) rather than person. Another kind of recognition Aristotle does not consider is of "who one really is," a person's true character and disposition. Other critics, however, for instance Tasso (1964, 37), are happy with Aristotle's definition and limit *anagnōrisis* even more explicitly to "recognition of persons."

³² See Culbertson 1989, 2; Heulot-Petit and Michel 2009, 17.

Greek drama are not a site for psychological exploration but a function of plot: “the most seductive elements of tragedy, reversal and recognition, are parts of the story”; and: “the said recognition [of persons] is the most appropriate for the story and for the action.”³³

Aristotle’s treatment of *anagnōrisis* was instantly influential: comic recognitions, particularly in Menander, seem to have been inspired by it;³⁴ and they almost exclusively consist in the discovery of someone’s family identity in relation to oneself. George Duckworth begins chapter 6 of his book on Roman comedy with a description of Menander’s plays that emphasizes “mistaken identity, misunderstandings arising from ignorance, a fortunate discovery which clears up the confusion and brings about a happy ending.”³⁵ He refers to Aristotle’s definition of *anagnōrisis* as the transition from ignorance to knowledge and exemplifies this conception on the prologue of *Perikeiromene*, spoken by Ignorance (Agnoia). The “transition from ignorance to knowledge” in that play concerns, again, the relationship of two exposed children to their father.³⁶

Quite possibly, at least in some cases, Greek novelists knew the *Poetics*. Chariton in particular seems to allude to it in introducing the dénouement.³⁷ The eighth and last book will be a *καθάρσιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις σκυθρωπῶν*, that is, it will “cleanse away” the grimness of the previous books or will be “an antidote” to it.³⁸ That Chariton is referring to Aristotle is very likely because he employs *katharsion* to describe, as Aristotle does with *katharsis*, the end-effect of his narrative. (The desired effect, however, is not the same: in the *Poetics*, *katharsis* is produced by means of pity and fear, not through a happy ending. The term in the Aristotelian sense would be appropriate rather for the novel’s earlier books, with their “grimness.”)³⁹ One more reason to believe that Chariton is consciously referring to the *Poetics* is that Aphrodisias, his native city, had a well-established

³³ τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγωδία τοῦ μύθου μέρη ἐστίν, αἱ τε περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις (Poet. 50a 33–35); ἀλλ’ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν (Poet. 52a 36–38).

³⁴ See Webster 1974, 58–59, followed by Cave 1988, 255–60.

³⁵ Duckworth 1967, 139.

³⁶ Two exceptions in Menander are the episode in *Epitrepontes* with Charisius regretting his condemnation of his wife (894–918) and the one in *Perikeiromene* in which Polemon, on realizing that the man on whom his sweetheart lavished her affections was her brother, repents of ill-treating her under the influence of jealousy (985–87). Among the Roman comedies, Terence’s *Heautontimoroumenos* begins with a scene of self-reproach.

³⁷ See Ruiz-Montero 1988, 87–88; 1994, 1018–19; 2003, 50–51; Hirschberger 2001, 161; Tilg 2010, 130–37. Reardon is more skeptical (1991, 29, n. 9). In another area, Brethes (2009) argues that Chariton’s representation of anger is strongly influenced by Aristotle.

³⁸ See the translations in Reardon 2008 (1989) and Goold 1995, respectively. I also like an earlier translation by Reardon (1982, 21): “It will clear out the memory of all those nasty things.”

³⁹ See Ruiz-Montero 1988, 87–88; 1994, 1018–19; 2003, 50–51.

Peripatetic tradition: Aristotle's commentator Alexander (second century CE) came from that city, and so did his father, who was also a philosopher of Peripatetic persuasion. One Adrastus of Aphrodisias was a leading Peripatetic in the first half of the second century.⁴⁰

How then will the final book of Chariton's novel cleanse away grimness? By producing recognition of personal identity: "so I shall tell you how the goddess brought the truth to light and revealed the unrecognized pair to each other."⁴¹ A lack of recognition would have added more grimness: "Fortune was minded to do something as cruel as it was paradoxical: Chaereas was to have Callirhoe in his possession and fail to recognize her."⁴² Chariton ties together recognition and reversal of fortune in a framing statement that matches the happy alternative in the Aristotelian definition of recognition as "a change from ignorance to knowledge, toward either friendship or enmity, of those destined to good or bad fortune."⁴³

Heliodorus as well seems to have had Aristotle in mind for the staging of recognitions, as is suggested at least by one detail in the final scene.⁴⁴ When the hero urges his beloved to disclose her identity to her parents, she holds him back because "a story whose beginnings heaven has made convoluted cannot be quickly resolved."⁴⁵ "Convoluted," *polyplokos*, is almost synonymous with "intricate," *peplegmenos*, the term Aristotle uses for the complex plot, the one ending with recognition (see, e.g., *Poet.* 55b 33). The heroine casts the story of her life—the novel—as a recognition plot in Aristotelian terms.

A more general reason novelists are likely to have used Aristotle's theory is the favor with which it met. N.J. Richardson has shown how ancient critics of Homer read the recognition scenes in the *Odyssey* with Aristotle. For instance, they applied terms like *ekplēktikon* (shocking) or *paradoxon* (incredible) to those scenes.⁴⁶ If Aristotle's discussion of recognition was so well known in later antiquity as to influence Homeric criticism, it is reasonable to assume that novelists, too, took it into account.⁴⁷ Be that as it may, they doubtlessly found recognitions

⁴⁰ See Chaniotis 2004, n. 39, and Sharples 2005, 53.

⁴¹ πῶς οὖν ἡ θεὸς ἐφώτισε τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τοὺς ἀγνωσμένους ἔδειξεν ἀλλήλοις λέξω (*Callirhoe* 8.1.5).

⁴² ἔμελλε δὲ ἔργον ἡ Τύχη πράττειν οὐ μόνον παράδοξον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σκυθρωπὸν, ἵνα ἔχων Καλλιρρόην Χαίρεας ἀγνοήσῃ (*Callirhoe* 8.1.2).

⁴³ ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὀρισμένων (*Poet.* 52a 30–32).

⁴⁴ On Xenophon, see chapter 1.

⁴⁵ ὦν γὰρ πολυπλόκους τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δαίμων καταβέβληται, τούτων ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ τέλη διὰ μακροτέρων συμπεραίνεσθαι (*Aethiopica* 9.24.4).

⁴⁶ See Richardson 1984, followed by Cave 1988, 44–45. Aristotle's classifications and judgments in the *Poetics* also influenced Aristarchus's editorial choices: see Schironi 2009.

⁴⁷ Cicu (1991) argues that novelists, in particular Chariton, follow Aristotle's criteria, but as the only example of recognition he gives Chaereas's repentance. This is inconsistent with his thesis.

of personal identity “the most appropriate for the story and for the action.” As in drama, in the novel recognitions generally do not illuminate aspects of character but are a function of plot.

The recognizer and the recognized are most often the lovers.⁴⁸ A recognition, no matter how brief its unfolding, regularly precedes their reunion. As we shall see, even the recognitions that establish family identity, in Longus and Heliodorus, are woven together with the lovers’ discovery or pursuit of love, of which they are the end-point. This preference for recognitions between the lovers reflects the exaltation of love as a value and, more important, the subordination of family to it. We can compare a typical situation of New Comedy, which, contrary to the novels, privileges recognitions clarifying blood relationships: a father opposes his son’s love for a courtesan and is planning to marry him to someone else, but, as it turns out, the courtesan is the daughter of the man in whose family the father wanted to marry his son, and so he agrees to the wedding. This is the skeleton of Terence’s *Andria*. The recognition of family identity makes the marriage possible by ending the father’s opposition. This does not happen in the novels. Family in the genre sanctions love but is never a serious obstacle to it.⁴⁹ Though Chariton prepares the stage for tensions between two powerful families à la *Romeo and Juliet*, he immediately drops that plotline. The hero’s father does not oppose his son’s passion but discourages it with paternal affection, thinking that his rival, the girl’s father, will not consent to the wedding. In Xenophon the parents not only agree to the wedding, they orchestrate it. In Achilles Tatius the protagonist’s father, after his marriage plans for his son are shattered by external events, betroths him to the selfsame girl his son loves and with whom he has eloped. The novel that comes closest to the comic pattern is *Daphnis and Chloe*, but the tensions between lovers and family in it never reach the high points of comedy. In Heliodorus a putative father does pose a serious threat to his “daughter’s” wishes. He has another husband in mind for her, hence her elopement. Nonetheless, when he reappears on stage toward the end, his marriage plans for the girl have become irrelevant.

The precedence given to the lovers’ recognition, however, invites more questions, which touch on the representation of love itself: what does it mean for the

⁴⁸ Critics do not seem to agree on which episodes in the novels to consider recognitions: Billault (1991, 217–21) limits them to family recognitions, and so does Morgan (2004, 238), whereas Hägg (1983, 13) considers the reunion of Callirhoe and Chaereas an *anagnōrismos*; Fusillo (1989, 53) calls recognitions both the lovers’ and those of family identity. Billault has revised his classification in a recent essay (1998), in which he takes the failed recognition of Leucippe by Clitophon into account. In a forthcoming paper, Billault is even more inclusive. Zimmermann (1984) calls the reunion of the lovers in Xenophon an *anagnōrismos*; Robiano (2008) treats the recognition of the lovers in Chariton.

⁴⁹ See Konstan 1994, 20–21; Brethes 2007, 25, 52, 53–55 (with qualifications).

lovers to recognize each other? What do they see in the other when they meet again? And ultimately, what does it mean to love, if the lovers are asked to recognize each other before being reunited? Do novelists put emphasis on the moment of recognition just to increase the pathos of a climactic scene? Or do they also wish to suggest that love itself is akin to recognition? That it does not change? These questions will occupy us through this book.

Readers will have been waiting for some clarification of what I mean by “novels”; which narratives I am considering in this study, and why. As is well known, the ancient works of fiction we tend to call “novels” (or “romances”) seem to have had no generic name in Greek.⁵⁰ The absence of the term, however, does not necessarily imply the absence of the concept;⁵¹ all the more so because generic names or classifications, a legacy of Hellenistic scholarship, are not attached to other literary innovations of the imperial period either, such as Lucian’s comic dialogues.⁵² At any rate, there are enough thematic and structural similarities between *Callirhoe*, the *Ephesiaca*, *Leucippe and Clitophon*, *Daphnis and Chloe*, and the *Aethiopica* (spanning roughly from the first to the fourth century CE) to authorize their grouping. Perceptions of these narratives as a coherent set were well established in the early fifteenth century, since all of them, except the *Aethiopica*, appear on a manuscript (F) that was in Florence at the time.⁵³ Another familiar modern label for them is “ideal novels.”

Though the Greek ideal novels occupy the largest part of this study (chapters 1–3), I also deal with Petronius’s *Satyrica* and Apuleius’s *Golden Ass* (in chapter 4), the latter of which at least seems to assume knowledge of the Greek novels yet to disregard the happy-ending recognition typical of them. The treatment of recognition in the Roman comic novels reflects a more realistic or pessimistic worldview. On the other hand, closer to the Greek novels in themes, spirit, and vision is the anonymous *Apollonius of Tyre*, in spite of being in Latin. (The perceived similarities have pushed a number of scholars to consider this novel originally Greek.) This narrative occupies part of the final chapter.

In the same chapter I have included a reading of recognition in a Jewish narrative, *Joseph and Aseneth*, and in an early Christian one, the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions*. The reason for this inclusion is twofold. Both narratives seem to be related to the Greek novels, with which they share a number of features. The most evident parallel is the structure: like the pagan novels, the *Recognitions* and *Joseph and Aseneth* involve separation (among family members or a couple), traveling, and reunion (if not return). The interest of including those narratives,

⁵⁰ See especially Reardon 1991, chapter 1.

⁵¹ See Whitmarsh 2005, 588–89; Goldhill 2008.

⁵² See Whitmarsh 2005, 588–89, referencing Bowie 1994.

⁵³ See Reeve 2008, 282.

however, is not just that they are close to the pagan novels in their overall construction. It is also that, specifically in their treatment of recognition, they seem to draw primarily from that tradition (rather than from epic or drama)⁵⁴ while at the same time modifying the meaning, content, and the very unfolding of the recognition to adjust it to the religious message broadcast: recognition of a dear person competes with recognition of God.

A kind of recognition that is markedly absent from the Greek novels is religious illumination, the understanding of a higher truth heretofore unseen. Recognition in them is, broadly speaking, a “horizontal” concept, and is connected to return. A “vertical” recognition, of a religious truth, is dramatized in the last book of Apuleius’s novel, in which the demands of initiation into Isis’s cult conflict with those of family. But whether and to what extent the Roman novelist meant his protagonist’s illumination to bear religious significance is debated. With *Joseph and Aseneth* and the *Recognitions*, in contrast, we witness a dramatic change of existential and ideological parameters, which causes the recognition motif to be reconfigured.

The novels’ significance for the future of the recognition motif is, however, not limited to Christian literature but extends to early-modern treatments of recognition in both narrative and drama. Some features of novelistic recognitions in particular—the role of the voice, personal narratives, or “blood’s call”—find resonances in later texts. I append a brief discussion of those developments as one more piece of evidence for the importance of the ancient novels in literary history.

⁵⁴ Though tragedy and comedy also might have influenced the staging of recognition in the pseudo-Clementine text (see Boulhol 1996, 40), its dependence on the novels is almost certain. For *Aseneth* we are on more slippery grounds: West (1974) argues that the Jewish text inspired Greek novels rather than vice versa. Recent scholarship, however, tends to turn it around: see chapter 5.

True Love and Immediate Recognition

Callirhoe: Something in the Way She Breathes

The Call of Love

In the last book of *Callirhoe*, the retinue of the Persian king falls into the hands of Chaereas, the victorious admiral of the Pharaoh and the novel's hero. An Egyptian soldier reports to him that among the prisoners is an extraordinarily beautiful woman. Chaereas sends the Egyptian for her, but she refuses to follow him in spite of his promises, including marriage with the (unnamed) admiral, and cries out that she would rather die. Later, as Chaereas is walking by the quarters where the prisoners are kept, the soldier pushes him again to meet the beautiful stranger. Encouraged also by his friend Polycharmus, at last Chaereas enters the room. I now will let Chariton tell his story: "So he went in the door. When he saw her stretched out on the ground with her head covered, he felt his heart stirred at once by the way she breathed and the look of her, and felt a thrill of excitement; he would certainly have recognized her had he not been thoroughly convinced that Dionysius had taken Callirhoe for himself. He went up to her quietly. 'Don't be frightened, lady,' he said, 'whoever you are. We are not going to use force on you. You shall have the husband you want.' Before he had finished speaking, Callirhoe recognized his voice and threw the covering from her face. They both cried out at the same time: 'Chaereas!' 'Callirhoe!' They rushed into each other's arms, swooned, and fell to the ground."¹

Chariton quite likely fashioned the scene after Admetus's recognition of his wife in Euripides's *Alcestis*. The parallels are transparent, numerous, and specific

¹ ὑπερβὰς οὖν τὸν οὐδὸν καὶ θεασάμενος ἐρριμμένην καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένην εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ τοῦ σχήματος ἐταράχθη τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μετέωρος ἐγένετο· πάντως δ' ἂν καὶ ἐγνώρισεν, εἰ <μη> σφόδρα πέπειστο Καλλιρόην ἀπειληθέναι Διονύσιον. ἡρέμα δὲ προσελθὼν, "θάρρει," φησὶν, "ὦ γύναι, ἥτις ἂν ᾖς, οὐ γάρ σε βιασόμεθα· ἕξεις δὲ ἄνδρα, ὃν θέλεις." ἔτι λέγοντος ἡ Καλλιρόη γνωρίσασα τὴν φωνὴν ἀπεκαλύψατο καὶ ἀμφότεροι συνεβόησαν, "Χαυρέα, Καλλιρόη." περιχυθέντες δὲ ἀλλήλοις, λιποψυχήσαντες ἔπεσον (8.1.7–9).

enough to suggest that Chariton had that play in mind:² the woman in both scenes is the wife of the man involved in the recognition; both Alcestis and Callirhoe are veiled; both Admetus and Chaereas are mourning;³ both are pushed by a third party, Heracles for Admetus, the Egyptian soldier and Polycharmus for Chaereas, to make contact with the woman; both Heracles and Polycharmus urge their friend to meet the woman because (hopefully) she will heal his heart.⁴ These compositional parallels, however, highlight the different mental dispositions of the male protagonists.

Admetus has no clue about the woman's identity until the very end, when, pressed by Heracles, he unveils her. The whole time he stands in her presence he does not feel that the woman is Alcestis but thinks she is someone else who strangely and painfully resembles Alcestis: a perfect copy of his wife, destined, if let in, to remind him of his loss. ("Oh me, by the gods, take this woman away from my eyes . . . looking at her, I think I see my wife. She confounds my heart. Tears stream from my eyes. Wretched me, how do I taste the bitterness of my fresh grief!")⁵ The sight of the veiled woman meets with the man's resistance, and the recognition, when at last it occurs, is brought about not by Admetus's inclination but by Heracles's pressure. Admetus passively obeys his host's instruction. ("Dare put your hand forward and touch the stranger . . . Are you holding her? . . . Look at her!")⁶ Chaereas, in contrast, has a presentiment that the woman is his wife as soon as he enters the room. He hears love's voice and acts on it. His excited intuition seamlessly leads to the recognition.

Even before Chaereas sees the veiled woman, descriptions of her behavior elicit empathy in him: her horror of marriage makes him think that she might be

² Huch (1989, 69) reads in the scene "starke Anklänge" with the end of *Alcestis* and Robiano (2008, 433) "quelque écho d'*Alceste*." I think that Chariton is consciously using the play. At any rate, the end of *Alcestis* is no doubt brought to bear on the scene by modern readers, and probably was by ancient ones as well. The scene is intertextual if we adopt Morgan's definition (Morgan and Harrison 2008, 218): "Intertextuality is a property of texts when actuated by their readers, and not necessarily consciously deployed by their authors."

³ Chaereas thinks that his wife was allotted to Dionysius, but also that she is dead (7.6.12). After his first victory he alone refuses to celebrate because Callirhoe is not there and might be dead (7.4.10).

⁴ See *Alc.* 1087: "This woman and a new marriage will stop your longing" (γυνή σε παύσει καὶ νέοι γάμοι πόθου); *Callirhoe* 8.1.6: "[Polycharmus] wanted to push Chaereas into a new love affair if at all possible, to console him for the loss of Callirhoe" (βουλόμενος ἐμβαλεῖν αὐτόν, εἴ πως δύναιτο, εἰς ἔρωτα καὶνὸν καὶ Καλλιρόης παραμύθιον). "Hopefully" applies only to Polycharmus: Heracles is certain that the woman will cheer Admetus.

⁵ οἶμοι. κόμμιζε πρὸς θεῶν ἐξ ὀμμάτων / γυναικα τήνδε . . . / δοκῶ γὰρ αὐτὴν εἰσορῶν γυναιχ' ὀρᾶν / ἐμὴν-θολοὶ δὲ καρδίαν, ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων / πηγαὶ κατερρώγασιν. ὦ τλήμων ἐγώ, / ὡς ἄρτι πένθους τοῦδε γεύομαι πικροῦ (*Alc.* 1064–69).

⁶ τόλμα προτείνειαι χεῖρα καὶ θιγέιν ξένης . . . ἔχεις; . . . βλέψον πρὸς αὐτήν (*Alc.* 1117–21).

mourning a husband, as he is mourning his wife. Whereas for Admetus the woman is an unknown reminder of evils (*Alc.* 1045), Chaereas identifies the unknown woman as a kindred spirit, an unhappy lover like himself. (“Perhaps she, *too*, is mourning.”)⁷ Chaereas recognizes the woman as Callirhoe in that he guesses that she is what we readers know she is: a loving wife who is mourning her husband. This is one of the several touches of dramatic irony that fill the entire scene prior to the recognition (again, as in *Alcestis*):⁸ the Egyptian soldier offers Callirhoe marriage to the admiral, that is, her own husband; Chaereas blames the soldier for not knowing the right way to charm a lady, that is, Chaereas’s lady; the soldier confesses to the admiral that he has made up his marriage proposal to the woman, but Chaereas and she are really married.⁹ In picturing the “stranger” as a mourning woman, however, Chaereas not only says about Callirhoe something that we readers know is true. He also shows his sympathetic respect for a condition he himself knows too well.

Chaereas’s sympathy for the woman and almost recognition of her as (one like) his wife are prepared by his erotic curiosity. He is drawn to the unknown woman as soon as he learns of her presence among the Persian prisoners. The lacuna preceding the dialogue between Callirhoe and the soldier at the end of book 7 allows only conjecture, but the soldier’s description of the woman’s extraordinary beauty quite likely has enticed Chaereas into wanting to see her.¹⁰ It is clear from the first words after the lacuna that Chaereas has asked the soldier to persuade the woman to meet him. Though the Egyptian exaggerates when saying to her “he will make you his wife—he has a liking for women,”¹¹ he would not have presented Chaereas in this light if the latter had not shown some interest in her. In that it is prompted by sheer report, Chaereas’s curiosity will remind the readers of this highly formulaic novel of his rivals’ behavior when they also hear of Callirhoe’s beauty and act on the rumor: Artaxerxes asks her to Babylon and Mithridates participates in “Chaereas’s” funeral just because they want to see that celebrated beauty. Most striking is the similarity of Chaereas’s disposition at this juncture to that of Dionysius right before he meets Callirhoe: both are mourning a beloved wife, yet both are enticed by hearing of the stranger’s appearance, and both are called “lovers of women.”¹²

⁷ καὶ αὐτὴ γὰρ ἴσως . . . πενθεῖ (7.6.12).

⁸ On irony in *Alcestis* see most recently Lush 2012.

⁹ See Billault, forthcoming. On dramatic irony in this scene see also Fusillo 1989, 47, and, in Chariton at large, Brethes 2007, 134–43.

¹⁰ This is Goold’s (1995) reconstruction.

¹¹ γυναῖκα ποιήσεται· φύσει γάρ ἐστι φιλογύναιος (7.6.7).

¹² *Callirhoe* 2.1.5; 7.6.7. The last parallel is in Robiano 2008, 428. On the formulaic style of *Callirhoe*, see especially Ruiz-Montero 1988, 83–84.

Chaereas's desire to make contact with the beautiful stranger sets him in opposition to Cyrus in an episode from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* that quite likely is another subtext for the lovers' recognition in Chariton: Panthea's arrival at Cyrus's camp and his refusal to see her in spite of, or rather because of, the rumors he hears about her beauty.¹³ Cyrus's friend Araspas voyeuristically dwells on the woman's appearance: "And then most of her face appeared and her neck and arms appeared. And I will tell you . . . Cyrus, it seemed to me, as to all those who saw her, that there never was so beautiful a woman born from mortal men in Asia. But absolutely . . . you must see her for yourself."¹⁴ By clustering verbs of seeing and appearing, Araspas brings Panthea's beauty before Cyrus's eyes. Cyrus, however, refuses to meet the woman because the power of beauty, he knows, cannot be kept at bay. (Araspas holds the opposite view, which predictably proves wrong as soon as he is put in charge of Panthea and falls in love with her.)

To my knowledge, Ben Edwin Perry was the first to suggest that this episode shaped the description of Chaereas's behavior.¹⁵ This critic draws attention to significant parallels between the two scenes: one of Cyrus's soldiers attempts to console the captured Panthea by telling her that the commander will marry her, just as the Egyptian does with Callirhoe; both women, when marriage with another man is prospected to them, gesture like mourners (*Callirhoe* 7.6.7; *Cyr.* 5.1.6). We can add more parallels: both Callirhoe and Panthea lie on the ground, covered; and both Chaereas and the soldier who addresses Panthea begin their speech with "be of good courage, lady"! (*θάραρει, ὦ γυναῖκα*, *Callirhoe* 8.1.8; *Cyr.* 5.1.6). The identical phrase in an identical context seems to me compelling evidence that Chariton is alluding to the episode in the *Cyropaedia*.¹⁶ The novelist, in the test of Eros, sets his hero apart from the martial and philosophical protagonist of his model, reminding us that Chaereas is the hero of a love story, tender and hypersensitive rather than a paragon of self-control, the

¹³ Scholars agree that the *Cyropaedia*, especially the love story of Abradatas and Panthea, is an important reference for the novelists: see, recently, Capra 2009; Létoublon 2009.

¹⁴ ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐφάνη μὲν αὐτῆς τὸ πλείστον μέρος τοῦ προσώπου, ἐφάνη δὲ ἡ δέρις καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ εὖ ἴσθι . . . ὃ Κύριε, ὡς ἐμοὶ τε ἔδοξε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν τοῖς ἰδοῦσι μήπω φθῖνα μηδὲ γενέσθαι γυνὴ ἀπὸ θνητῶν τοιαύτη ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ· ἀλλὰ πάντως . . . καὶ σὺν θέασαι αὐτήν (*Cyr.* 5.1.7).

¹⁵ Perry 1967, 169–170.

¹⁶ Though the phrase recurs in *Callirhoe* (see 5.9.3 and 8.1.8). Apart from this specific scene, that Chariton thought of Panthea for Callirhoe is strongly suggested by the choice of a line from the scene of Panthea's and Abradatas's farewell (6.4.3: "though she tried to conceal it, her tears poured down her cheeks" [καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν ἐπειράτο, ἐλείβετο δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ δάκρυα κατὰ τῶν παρειῶν]) to describe Callirhoe's demeanor at her first encounter with Dionysius in 2.5.6). The line is also applied to Chaereas at 5.2.4. The novella of Abradatas and Panthea as a whole "has the form of a romance: a loving married couple are separated when the woman is captured by a king" (Stadter 1991, 482). This outline fits particularly well the section of Chariton's novel that begins with the war and ends with the recognition.

lover whom passion alone spurred to become an “epic” figure.¹⁷ After his military feat in book 7 his curiosity about the beautiful stranger reconnects him to the world of women and of romance, thus preparing for his reconnection with his wife.

If, however, Chaereas gave free rein to his erotic curiosity, what would the readers be led to think? Since we know that the woman in question is Callirhoe, we want him to meet her, but at the same time we feel that the whole ethos of the novel is in danger: how could the faithful and lovesick Chaereas resolve to make overtures to “another” woman? That Callirhoe had accepted marriage with another man, Dionysius, was an extraordinary development in a Greek novel, but after all Chariton gave her a serious reason (her pregnancy); presented her choice as morally acceptable, no worse than the alternative of disposing of the child and staying loyal to Chaereas; and stressed her utter loatheness to act as she has decided she must. Chaereas has no reason to meet the woman other than her alleged beauty. If he is to preserve his novelistic fidelity, his curiosity must be curbed.

It is the woman’s obstinacy that saves Chaereas. After hearing of her refusal and proud nature, he gives orders to treat her kindly, for “self-respect deserves my respect.”¹⁸ Readers again are both satisfied and frustrated: that Chaereas honors chastity is what we expect, but his morally good choice might now jeopardize the equally expected recognition and reunion. To make it happen without sully Chaereas, Chariton forces him into the room, so to speak, by entrusting the Egyptian soldier and Polycharmus with the active role. Yet without Chaereas’s original curiosity about the woman the reunion would not have happened at all, whereas Admetus’s readmission of Alcestis into his house does not, at least not consciously, respond to his desire.¹⁹

Looking Back: Voice and Recognition in Epic and Drama

Another major difference between the recognition scene in *Alcestis* and the one in Chariton is that the decisive factor in the latter is a voice. Callirhoe, who does not see Chaereas, recognizes him as soon as he speaks. The exploitation of the voice as the revealing sign of identity in a formal recognition scene seems to be unknown to classical Greek literature. Neither epic nor tragedy nor comedy

¹⁷ Alvares (1997) points out that Chaereas’s heroism is the result of his devotion to the value of love.

¹⁸ *πρέπει γάρ μοι σωφροσύνην τιμᾶν* (7.6.12).

¹⁹ Of course it could be argued that Admetus subconsciously is attracted to the woman, and that by vocally rejecting her “he doth protest too much.” On this reading, however, he still differs from Chaereas, who acts on his erotic curiosity instead of repressing it.

developed the motif of the voice as *gnōrisma*.²⁰ We might find this absence surprising, since we tend to consider the voice an ineffaceable mark of identity.²¹ No two voices are identical, and the voice is more difficult to camouflage than appearance. Didn't the ancient Greeks appreciate the highly individual quality of the voice?

The *Odyssey* may suggest a negative answer, for it presents us with a striking dismissal of the voice as mark of identity. In book 13, Athena takes pains to change Odysseus's appearance into an old man's, but leaves his voice as it is. (In the very detailed account of his transformation, which includes the dimming of his eyes, no voice change is mentioned.) She assumes that even Odysseus's most intimate relations will not recognize him by his voice; that once his appearance is so utterly changed, his voice alone is unlikely to give him away. We are sent back to a biblical story in which the voice does not provide the same compelling evidence of identity as more tangible features. The dying and blind Isaac believes that Jacob is Esau, his older son, in spite of recognizing the boy's voice: "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau" (Gen 27:22). Though Isaac thinks he hears Jacob's voice, he trusts the feel of the boy's hands (as hairy as Esau's, because they are covered with animal skin) and the smell of the clothes he wears (Esau's). Jacob does not need to counterfeit his voice to deceive his father, as a modern reader might expect for the ruse to work.

In addition to being somewhat intangible, one's voice could be forgotten or remembered imperfectly. Antiquity did not know tape recorders, telephones, and the other devices that now can help keep the memory of one's voice alive even after years of separation. As late as the sixteenth century, the man who passed for Martin Guerre in a village of southern France, if indeed he was an impostor, was able to carry out his deception in spite of his voice, which could not possibly have been the same as Martin's (his appearance did not quite correspond either, but appearance is more subject to change). Martin's absence of at least eight years caused the exact timbre and intonation of his voice to be forgotten, even by his close relatives (his wife might have been an accomplice of "Martin," but Martin's sisters, too, believed the man to be their brother).

The members of Odysseus's household likewise seem to have forgotten his voice. A partial exception is Euryclea, who has known Odysseus since he was born and tells the old beggar in front of her that no other visitor resembled

²⁰ *Il.* 2.807 is no exception, in spite of appearances, for Hector recognizes not the voice but the word (*ἔπος*) of a goddess (Iris) who had made her voice (*φθογγήν*) like that of Polites (791). On Odysseus and Helen in *Odyssey* 4, see below.

²¹ A personal anecdote: at a high school reunion twenty-five years after graduation, as soon as I arrived and said, "Hello everybody!" a couple of fellows exclaimed, "This is Silvia!" They had not yet seen me, and we had not met for all those years.

Odysseus as he does, in appearance, voice, and feet (*Od.* 19.380–81). Her intuition is in keeping with the maternal tie that connects her to Odysseus and with her warm sympathy for the guest.²² Still, even Euryclea does not go all the way to recognizing Odysseus by his voice. Only the scar persuades her of his identity.

At the same time, however, more evidence from literature suggests that Greek authors and their audiences were sensitive to the individuality of the voice. So does the very scene from the *Odyssey* in which Euryclea hears in the stranger's voice echoes of Odysseus's. In the same epic Helen counts on the power of a dear voice to stir its listener when she tries to lure the Greek warriors out of the Wooden Horse by imitating the voices of each of their wives (*Od.* 4.277–89). Only Odysseus is not fooled. Only he is capable of piercing through sensorial impressions, of dissociating the sound of a known and loved voice from the identity of the speaker.²³ All the other warriors mistake imitation for reality and would follow the voices they know so well.

Still in Homer we find it specified that characters in dreams speak with their voices, that a god can borrow a hero's voice to urge warriors to fight, and that a leader's voice is "longed for."²⁴ The phrase *δέμας ἡδὲ καὶ αὐδήν* (in form and voice), which in the *Odyssey* describes a god taking up the semblance of a mortal, demonstrates heightened awareness of the uniqueness and recognizable quality of one's voice. Both Odysseus and Diomedes "perceive" Athena's voice.²⁵ Likewise, dramatic characters hear the unmistakable ring of a known voice.²⁶ A sharp attentiveness to individual vocal nuances is to be expected from a culture that put a premium on the power, beauty, and richness of sound.

We then must look elsewhere for reasons why classical Greek literature does not use the voice as *gnōrisma*. One could be aesthetic. Greek audiences seem to have preferred long-lasting and complex recognition scenes. Simple, spontaneous recognitions had little appeal, as proven by their small number in both epic and drama.²⁷ Dramatists in particular are very keen on staging elaborate recognitions, which often unfold as a contest in reasoning between the parties involved.

²² Murnaghan shows how Euryclea is "a doublet for Odysseus' mother" (2011, 28).

²³ We cannot tell, though, whether Odysseus recognizes Helen's voice for what it is, her act, or simply suspects a trick.

²⁴ *Il.* 5.234. Characters in dreams: see, e.g., *Il.* 23.67; gods: see, e.g., *Il.* 2.791; 13.216; 20.81; 22.227.

²⁵ See *Il.* 2.182; 10.512.

²⁶ See Soph. *Aj.* 14; *Ant.* 1214; *El.* 1224; *Phil.* 976. See also Eur. *Hipp.* 86; *Bacch.* 178. The Sophoclean passages as well as *Il.* 2.182 and 10.512 seem to challenge the claim that tragedy or epic does not use the voice as *gnōrisma*, for Odysseus and Diomedes recognize Athena, unseen, by her voice, Creon his son, and Philoctetes Odysseus. The episodes in question, however, are not recognition scenes: the recognized characters are not hiding their identities (Odysseus, Athena) or they are expected to be who they are (Haemon). There is no true transition from ignorance to knowledge.

²⁷ See the classification of recognition scenes in the *Odyssey* and in tragedy by Perrin (1909).

With its unmistakably individual character, one's voice, if known, would instantly give one's identity away and rush the scene. One solution, the *Odyssey's*, is to disregard the uniqueness of one's voice, to pretend that it is just not heard. We call this fact an "epic convention"; and we do not challenge it because epic can dispense with verisimilitude. Even an audience that heard poetry performed could easily accept that Odysseus's voice was neither artificially changed nor recognized (ancient critics, including Aristotle and the scholiasts, have no issue with this)²⁸ because the *Odyssey's* medium allows for much freedom in introducing unbelievable facts and scenes. An ancient audience would hear a continuous narrative, no matter how mimetic the performer. It did not hear individual impersonations of the characters in action: not Odysseus played by an actor who spoke at length to Penelope played by another actor, but a minstrel who recited both Odysseus's words to her and hers to him. Quite likely such an audience was not led to think "Oh, isn't it Odysseus's voice that I hear"? but forgot all about that voice, just as Athena did not bother to change it.

Things sit differently with drama. As Jules Vuillemin puts it in an essay on tragic and epic recognition, "theater forces us to believe; epic asks us to dream."²⁹ True, Greek drama, because of its nonnaturalistic staging and acting style, relies heavily on the imagination of the spectators, who are asked to see and hear what they do not. When I say "hear," I am thinking especially of the least naturalistic fact in Greek acting: that the actors were all male. If we can accept that Alcestis's agony is interpreted by a man singing in falsetto, in theory we could as easily accept that a character's voice remains unrecognized because the voice we hear can be two removes from the character's: it is that of an actor, and often of a man playing a woman. Imagine, for instance, the recognition of Helen and Menelaus in *Helen*, in which neither party apparently recognizes the other by his or her voice, though both speak at length. On the Athenian stage the scene featured two male actors one of whom played Helen. This configuration makes Menelaus's failure to recognize Helen's voice not as counterintuitive as it might be if the acting were truer to life.

Yet tragedians, contrary to Homer, have taken much care to avoid recognition scenes with characters who should know each other's voice, or, on the rare occasions on which this happens, they have managed to keep the voice out of the way. The recognition scene in *Helen* is the only one in extant tragedy in which the playwright brings two characters face-to-face who should be familiar with each other's voice and allows them to speak freely and yet not to identify each other

²⁸ There are no objections by ancient commentators to Athena neglecting Odysseus's voice in *Odyssey* 13. Eustathius, however, thinks that Odysseus's features as well had not been altered to the point of being unrecognizable (*Commentary on the Odyssey* 2.206.42–47).

²⁹ Vuillemin 1984, 272.

by voice. But there is a thematic reason for their implausible deafness: Euripides is putting all the weight of the recognition on the visual, as is fitting for a play that deals with illusion, delusion, and (stage) phantoms.

The scene draws its complexity from Helen's and Menelaus's opposite responses to the other's appearance. Helen, who lives in terror, threatened with an unwanted marriage, at first fears that the beggarly-looking man who has suddenly materialized before her will do her violence but soon recognizes him not just as one who looks like Menelaus but as Menelaus himself (*Hel.* 566). For her, identity of looks is identity of person. Her confidence matches her desire to see her husband, whom she has just heard is alive and about to come to her. Menelaus, on the other hand, thinks he already has a Helen: just contemplating the possibility that the one he now sees is the real Helen would endanger his sanity (575). In addition, Menelaus does not have any warm feelings for "Helen" (he calls the woman he took from Troy "the first cause of my ills").³⁰ Thus, he walls himself behind the defensive reasoning that identity of looks is not identity of person (577–81; 591), whereas Helen urges him to take what he sees as evidence for who she is: "Who else will teach you [that I am your wife] rather than your eyes"?³¹ Menelaus's incredulity and Helen's failure to persuade him point to abstract questions of both philosophical and theatrical relevance: how are appearances and reality connected? Can we believe our eyes?³² Or, is what we think a semblance the real thing and what we think the real thing a semblance? (Recall Menelaus's first reaction to Helen's avowal that she is his wife: "O Hecate, bearer of light, send me benevolent apparitions":³³ the real thing is taken for a magical fabrication.) To throw these issues into bold relief, Euripides has given so much prominence to the visual as to make us forget that Helen and Menelaus have been speaking to each other all along and should, for plausibility's sake, recognize each other's voice.

Or should they? Not necessarily, if the recognition is meant to evoke another fictional recognition rather than to be checked against real life. An ancient spectator is likely to have found the disregard for the voice in that scene unimportant also because Menelaus's role, as several critics have pointed out, is closely fashioned after the returning Odysseus³⁴—for our purposes, the disguised hero whose voice remains unchanged and yet undetected. If Odysseus on Ithaca has the appearance of a stranded wanderer, a beggar who asks for bread, Menelaus is made to play the same part. Though in his case dress and condition are not a

³⁰ γυναικα τὴν κακῶν πάντων ἐμοὶ ἄρξασαν (425–26).

³¹ τίς οὖν διδάξει σ' ἄλλος ἢ τὰ σ' ὄμματα; (580). See Alt 1962.

³² See Wright 2005, 299–305.

³³ ὦ φωσφόρ' Ἑκάτη, πέμπε φάσματ' εὐμενῇ (569).

³⁴ See, e.g., Foley 1992 (with more bibliography in n. 10).

fake, the contrivance of a cunning goddess, but a predicament imposed on him by fate, he perceives them as untrue to his kingly self (415–17; 501–4). The very way Menelaus talks about his need for food (510–14) recalls Odysseus's down-to-earth admissions of "belly's tyranny." That Euripides intended his Menelaus to play an Odysseus role becomes apparent in Menelaus's own self-presentation as the Sacker of Troy whom every land knows, just as Odysseus's fame reaches the sky (*Hel.* 503–4; *Od.* 9.20); and, previously, by Teucer leaving out Odysseus, the victor in the contest for Achilles's armor, from his account of Ajax's suicide: "Another took the arms; he ceased from life."³⁵ Odysseus is wiped off the map of Troy and replaced by Menelaus in his role as "the glorious warrior trying to reach his home."³⁶

Menelaus does not know that a faithful wife is longing for him, a wife who, like Penelope, shared precious secrets with her husband and would rely on them to foster recognition: "If my husband lived, we would recognize each other by tokens known to us alone."³⁷ To Helen, Menelaus is like Odysseus to Penelope: long lost, then (when she learns he is alive) long gone, intimately known and loved with constancy. And, like Odysseus, after many years (seventeen) Menelaus appears before his wife with changed appearance (more precisely: clothes, for his features are recognizable enough) but voice unchanged; yet, like that of Odysseus, his voice remains unrecognized. The scene is not realistic if measured against life; but for an audience that measured it against literature, and literature with the prestige of Homeric epic, it is.³⁸

Helen is, however, exceptional in building a recognition scene that does not account for the voices of those involved. At the end of *Alcestis*, which also stages a reunion of husband and wife, Euripides shows himself very much concerned with checking the recognition against real life, for just as he covers Alcestis (and even so Admetus comments on the striking similarity of the woman's body to his wife's: 1062–63), he binds her to silence. Alcestis's silence prevents her not

³⁵ ἄλλου λαβόντος ὅπλ' ἀπηλλάχθη βίου (102).

³⁶ Menelaus's glory, however, is challenged when he discovers he fought a war for an illusion: see, e.g., *Hel.* 706 and the discussion in Foley 1992.

³⁷ εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔξη πόσις, ἀνεγνώσθημεν ἄν, / εἰς ζυμβολ' ἐλθόντες ἃ φανερά μόνους ἂν ἦν (290–91). Foley (1992, p. 153, n. 11) asks why Euripides does not make use of those tokens in the actual recognition. Wright (2005, 302–305) suggests a possible answer: Helen's confidence in secret tokens is undermined by her husband's failure to recognize her even by her appearance.

³⁸ Apropos the ancient novel, Morgan (1982, 264) observes that readers, if they ever thought about realism, would not say "this is unrealistic because it does not happen to anyone I know" but "this is realistic because I have read about very similar things happening in other cases." The sixteenth-century critic Giraldi Cintio formulates a similar idea speaking of poetry (1864, 61): "non solo verisimile si può chiamare quello che può avvenire verisimilmente, ma quello anco che dall'uso è accettato nei poeti per verisimile [not only that which can happen with verisimilitude can be said to be truth-like, but also that which is accepted as such from poetic usage]."

only from being recognized but also from expressing her own recognition of Admetus by *his* voice, which obviously has occurred as soon as she has heard him speak.

To make Alcestis's silence plausible, Euripides gives it a ritual reason: the woman is still consecrated to the dead; some days must elapse until she is allowed to speak again. Bound as she is to silence by ritual constraints, Alcestis does not speak even when she is uncovered. This lack of correspondence between seeing and hearing has a surprise-effect: since in Greek literature and iconography, silence is often accompanied by veiling,³⁹ the unveiling of Alcestis's face creates expectations of hearing her voice. Euripides plays against shared sensibilities by countering such expectations. But the prolongation of Alcestis's silence beyond her unveiling might also be owing to Euripides's concern with (real-life) verisimilitude: if Alcestis had spoken as soon as she was uncovered, why then not before? And if she had spoken before, the recognition would have happened instantly, and Admetus would not have been given a chance to show his loyalty to Alcestis by declining the offer to take in the veiled woman.⁴⁰ Euripides, in short, sees the voice as an obstacle to the unfolding of the recognition and deftly removes it.

There is evidence otherwise that ancient audiences had issues with dramatic recognition scenes whose protagonists would know each other's voice yet not recognize it. Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 52.5–6), commenting on Aeschylus's lost *Philoctetes*, says that Philoctetes's failure there to recognize Odysseus even though he was not transformed by Athena is convincing, if not because of the lapsed time (ten years), at least because of the solitude and suffering that beset Philoctetes in all those years, and that could easily make him forget Odysseus's features. Dio's objection to criticism of Philoctetes's failure to recognize Odysseus suggests that such criticism was either current or conceivable. Though he does not mention Odysseus's voice explicitly, we can be fairly confident that he had it in mind because of the comment that closely follows on the appearance of Odysseus in Euripides's *Philoctetes*. Unlike Aeschylus, Euripides did introduce Athena to disguise Odysseus (*Or.* 52.13).⁴¹ And the goddess took care of changing also his voice (*Or.* 59.3: τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν φωνήν). A detail that did not bother the epic poet bothered the tragedian.

In sum, the voice could pose problems in the staging of recognitions if a playwright aimed both to sustain the scene and to preserve a minimum of verisimilitude. Plautus, among the dramatists one of the least interested in verisimilitude, plays with this fact as with fire at the beginning of *Rudens*, where two friends,

³⁹ See Montiglio 2000, 176–80.

⁴⁰ For bibliography on this line of interpretation, see Lush 2012, p. 9, n. 25.

⁴¹ See Müller 2000, 295–96, 318–19.

Palaestra and Ampelisca, who are looking for each other after a shipwreck, at hearing each other's voice without yet seeing each other, "analyze" it step by step so as to proceed to the recognition gradually and prolong the scene: "Whose voice sounds nearby"? "I am scared! Who is speaking here nearby"? "Kind hope, I beg you, help me"! . . . "It is definitely a woman's voice that I have heard." "It is a woman; it is the voice of a woman I have heard." "Pray, she cannot be Ampelisca, can she"? "Is it you, Palaestra, I am hearing"? "Why don't I call her by name, so that she can hear me? Ampelisca"! "Oh, who is this"? "I, Palaestra."⁴² This long-drawn-out auscultation produces an implausible and melodramatic scene.⁴³

The Voice of the Beloved

Whereas *Alcestis* dodges the obstacle of a recognizable voice to sustain the recognition, Chariton turns the voice into the very means to it. Why this choice? What does the novelist gain by giving prominence, against tradition, to the voice in the climactic recognition scene?

There are, I think, at least two orders of reasons for Chariton's choice. The novelist is keen on recording vocal nuances and the voice's emotional effects. This may be related to his direct experience of rhetorical deliveries: as the secretary (*hypographeus*) of a lawyer, he must have noticed how orators played with their voices. Indeed, his description of an oratorical performance at a trial demonstrates attentiveness to vocal postures as much as to other aspects of the delivery. To summon Chaereas's appearance, Mithridates "raises his voice" as if under divine inspiration (5.7.10: *φωνῇν ἐπήρε*). On other occasions as well, Chariton notes the sound of utterances, so that we do not just read but hear what a character says. Chaereas's voice is "thick" from anger (1.3.5: *παχεῖ*), then "weak" when he is told that Callirhoe is unfaithful (1.4.7: *ὀλίγην*). Callirhoe supplicates Theron in a "faint" voice (1.9.5: *λεπτῇν*), and speaks "softly" to Dionysius (2.5.5: *ἐρήμια*). Dionysius, after one of his formulaic fits of fainting, recovers a "weak" voice (3.1.4: *ἀσθενεῖ*). Chaereas's voice is "loud and piercing" when he sees the funeral offerings that were buried with his wife

⁴² "Quoianam vox mihi prope hic sonat? / Pertimui, quis hic loquitur prope? / Spes bona, obsecro, subventa mihi, / . . . / Certo vox muliebris auris tetigit meas. / Mulier est, muliebris vox mi ad auris venit. / num Ampelisca obsecro est? en, Palaestra, audio? / Quin voco, ut me audiat, nomine illam suo? / Ampelisca. Hem quis est? Ego, Palaestra" (229–37).

⁴³ We shall contrast Menander's care for verisimilitude in dealing with the difficulties involved in a recognition scene that should account for a known voice. When, toward the end of *Aspis*, Cleostratus unexpectedly returns, his devoted servant seems not to recognize his voice. For his failure to be plausible, however, the exchange is kept short: Cleostratus says only four words (500–505) and then goes inside the house and is recognized by his appearance.

(3.3.15: μέγα καὶ διολύγιον), and so is Callirhoe's cry when Chaereas appears to her in a dream (3.7.4).

Perhaps more important, Chariton attributes to the voice strong erotic powers. Love does not find its way only through the eyes, as is the norm in the Greek novels.⁴⁴ Callirhoe is a marvel to behold; but she is also music to a lover's ears: "As she spoke, her voice seemed the voice of a god to Dionysius; it had a musical sound, with the effect of a lyre's note."⁴⁵ Together with her appearance, her voice is in Dionysius's, and later in Artaxerxes's, burning memory of her (2.3.3; 6.7.1).

Attention to the eroticism of the voice goes back to Sappho's fragment 31.⁴⁶ In that poem, the girl's sweet talking (ἀδὼ φωνείσας) and laughing to the "man similar to the gods" makes the speaker's heart tremble and again paralyzes her own voice and hearing. It is a scene that destroys her; but its sight includes the auditory experience as imagined for the happy man and perceived by her herself. Hearing fills her with a more devastating pleasure than seeing. The stranger is godlike because he is able to sustain the girl's vocal—not visual—charms. Contrast Catullus, in his remake of the poem (51): there the stranger is godlike because he can remain imperturbable as he both watches and hears, *spectat et audit*. Note also Sappho's emphasis on the beauty of pure sounds, with no sense attached. The girl has a sweet voice just as she has a lovely laughter: what that voice says does not matter.

In other fragments Sappho sings the voice's power of seduction, inventing for her girls this additional ornament.⁴⁷ The motif becomes common in Hellenistic poetry, where the beloved's voice, regardless of whether singing or speaking, is systematically recorded as a source of delight.⁴⁸ The voice of Eros himself is like honey, sings Moschus (1.9: ὡς μέλι φωνά). And a novelist will add: such as neither the swallow has nor the nightingale nor the dying swan (*Daphnis and Chloe* 2.5.1). Chariton's emphasis on the charm of Callirhoe's voice is inscribed in this tradition.

⁴⁴ The protagonists always fall in love by sight alone except in *Daphnis and Chloe*, where touch in addition to sight plays into the arousal of Chloe's love for Daphnis (1. 13. 2; 1. 13. 5), and he falls in love from kissing her (1. 17. 2).

⁴⁵ λαλούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ φωνὴ τῷ Διονυσίῳ θεία τις ἐφάνη· μουσικὸν γὰρ ἐφθέγγετο καὶ ὥσπερ κιθάρας ἀπεδίδου τὸν ἦχον (2.3.8).

⁴⁶ Though already Helen's attempt to lure the warriors out of the Horse by imitating their wives' voices (in *Odyssey* 4, above) plays up the eroticism of the voice.

⁴⁷ See Paradiso 1995.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Apollonius of Rhodes 3.457–58; 5.70; 5.94 (where hearing ranks higher than seeing); 5.121; 5.137; 5.141 (with Hörschele 2009, 114); 5.241, 5–8. Petronius as well imagines the enraptured Encolpius to hear the Sirens' song when Circe speaks: "such a sweet sound was caressing the air that felt its touch" (127: "tam dulcis sonus pertemptatum mulcebat aëra").

True, the man who falls in love with Callirhoe's voice is Dionysius, not Chaereas (at least not explicitly in the text). This might signal that Dionysius's love will be unrequited (and so will Artaxerxes's, who also is deeply affected by Callirhoe's voice). That the novels generally privilege sight over hearing as the channel of love's first onslaught fits the ideal of reciprocity espoused in the genre. Sight can be perfectly mutual: I see you as you see me, eyes meeting eyes in the same instant to carry each other's image into each other's soul. Novelists highlight the reciprocity of the lovers' gaze at their first encounter.⁴⁹ Hearing, on the other hand, cannot be simultaneously mutual. You speak, I listen.⁵⁰ Dionysius's rapture at hearing Callirhoe's voice, just as his marveling at her godlike epiphany, might foreshadow the loneliness of his love.⁵¹

Nonetheless, Chariton's attentiveness to the modulations of the beloved's voice and its power to kindle love is in keeping with the paramount role he attributes to the voice in the recognition. Recognition of a loved one by her voice appears already in Ovid, in what is perhaps the first episode in Greek and Roman literature to employ the voice as *gnōrisma*. When Cephalus unwittingly wounds his wife Procnis, he identifies her by her scream: "It was Procnis, and, wounded in the middle of her breast, she cries out, 'ah me!' When I recognized the voice of my faithful wife, I ran to that voice headlong, out of my mind."⁵² Chariton's sensitivity to the uniqueness of the beloved's voice comes to the fore again in his description of Chaereas's dream-image: to appear to Callirhoe, it borrows the voice of the real Chaereas along with his stature, eyes, and garments (2.9.5, citing *Il.* 23.66–67). The voice of the loved one cannot be missed or its call mistaken.

A second reason I would suggest for Chariton's choice of the voice as *gnōrisma* is thematic and compositional: the novelist is not concerned, as Euripides is in *Alcestis*, with prolonging the recognition but with idealizing the force of love. The playwright finds a clever way of silencing Alcestis's voice because he needs the scene to last, not just for the sake of virtuosity or suspense but also, as

⁴⁹ To stress the mutuality of seeing, Greek novelists could rely on optical theories that conceptualized seeing as touching, allowing for a "potential intertwining of viewer and viewed" (Jay 1993, 30 [non vidi], cited by Morales 2004, 29). Morales sees a major difference between ancient and modern optics, in that the modern, by decorporealizing vision, postulate distance between viewer and viewed, which "leads to mastery, not mutuality" (p. 30).

⁵⁰ Speaking and hearing in turn can convey the reciprocity of erotic passion, as in Xenophon, *Ephesiaca* 2.4.1: "He had no other business than loving Anthia and being loved by her, than talking to her and hearing her talk" (Τῷ δὲ ἄρα οὐδὲν ἔργον ἦν ἢ φιλεῖν Ἀνθίαν καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνης φιλεῖσθαι καὶ λαλεῖν ἐκείνη καὶ ἀκούειν λαλούσης.). This passage, however, describes the lovers' intimacy, not the onset of passion.

⁵¹ On Dionysius's response to Callirhoe's beauty, see below.

⁵² Procnis erat medioque tenens in pectore vulnus / "ei mihi" conclamat! Vox est ubi cognita fidae / coniugis, ad vocem praeceps amensque cucurri (*Met.* 7.842–44).

we have seen, to reiterate Admetus's fidelity as he is about to be reunited with his wife. At the same time, the slow unfolding of the recognition points up Admetus's deafness to the call of love, his lack of intuition. Chariton, on the other hand, by the instant happening of the recognition conveys love's infallible guidance and dispels the ambivalence he had suggested in Chaereas's inclinations: respect for the woman who seems to be mourning her husband and yet originally a strong desire to see her. Chariton saves Chaereas from dwelling curiously, even voyeuristically, on the unknown veiled woman and instead makes him run to his wife, guided by a lover's instinct.

With its immediate happening, the couple's recognition seems to play against another, drawn-out, recognition between husband and wife: Helen and Menelaus in *Helen*. As noted, this tragedy is an important subtext for Chariton's novel, structurally and thematically.⁵³ Both the play and the novel involve a couple separated by circumstances undesirable for both and happily recovering each other toward the end. One of the numerous echoes observed occurs soon after the protagonists' recognition: both Helen and Callirhoe urge their recovered husbands to hide a perilous truth: Menelaus his very presence, and Chaereas a military defeat.⁵⁴ Another possible echo, which has passed unnoticed, is in the recognition scene itself: while Helen at the appearance of Menelaus fears that she might suffer violence and be handed over to the tyrant she abhors marriage to (550–52), Callirhoe instantly knows that she will not suffer violence from the man who turns out to be Chaereas, that she will have the husband she wants. If Chariton is alluding to *Helen*, he changes the voice from an opaque feature to the revealing sign. In *Helen* the recognition is slow, initially unilateral, and the voice plays no role in it; in *Callirhoe* it is instantaneous, reciprocal, and brought about by the sound of a loved voice and by the soundless voice of love.

Another Wedding

The recognition scene in *Callirhoe* is a reenactment of the lovers' first encounter and their wedding. Their rediscovery harks back to their discovery of each other, while the immediacy that marks the recognition matches and reproduces the immediacy of the onset of love. The connection of the two events is underscored by their settings: the lovers, who first met as she was on her way to the temple of Aphrodite (1.1.4–5), recognize each other on an island that has a shrine of Aphrodite (7.5.1). Linguistic echoes bring the connection into sharp focus: just as at the beginning Aphrodite showed (ἐδείξας) Chaereas to Callirhoe (1.1.7), at the

⁵³ See especially Laplace 1980, 84–120.

⁵⁴ See *Hel.* 817 and *Callirhoe* 8.2.4, with Laplace 1980, 118.

end she “brought the truth to light and showed the unrecognized pair to each other.”⁵⁵ She “yoked” again the lovers as she did, in her own words, “at the beginning,” ἐξ ἀρχῆς (8.1.3, with ζεύγος repeating 1.1.3). A new wedding (8.1.12: γάμοι)—celebrated, like the first one, with a shower of flowers and wreaths, with wine and myrrh—greet the couple’s public appearance after the recognition.⁵⁶

The original wedding is itself marked by recognition: “His parents brought the bridegroom in to the girl. Well, Chaereas ran to her and kissed her; and when she recognized the man she loved, Callirhoe, like the flame in a lamp that is on the point of going out and has oil poured into it, at once grew bright again and bigger and stronger.”⁵⁷ This episode bears close resemblance to the final recognition: Callirhoe in both scenes lies veiled and dejected; in both, Chaereas goes to her; in both, she recognizes him immediately. (In the wedding scene we do not know by which feature, but considering this novel’s attentiveness to the “call of love,” perhaps Chariton’s omission is intentional: it does not matter, for lovers recognize each other anyway. We can surmise that Chaereas’s kiss is the “token,” and not because they have kissed each other before, of course not, but because to the lovesick Callirhoe that kiss could be only Chaereas’s. Alternatively, it is possible that she discovers who her groom is when he uncovers her face.)⁵⁸ Another parallel connects the early days of their passion and the final reunion: when Chaereas, mad with jealousy, rushes into his house to kill Callirhoe’s alleged lover, she is the first to identify her husband by his breathing (1.4.11), just as at the end he almost recognizes her by the same means. The symmetrical correspondence, while it confirms that the recognition repeats the wedding, conveys both the perfect reciprocity in the couple’s feelings and the identity of their feelings from beginning to end.

The celebration of a new wedding subsequent to the recognition repeats the “second wedding” of Odysseus and Penelope (after Odysseus kills the suitors, we shall recall, the villagers believe that a marriage is being celebrated at his palace). This time the reference is explicit. As we have seen, the possible allusions to *Alcestis* and to the *Cyropaedia* are detectable only through detailed parallels in the construction of the scene, not citations (except, perhaps, for θάρρει, ὦ γύναι). Readers are invited to do their own work of recognition, to identify the

⁵⁵ ἐφώτισε τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοουμένους ἔδειξεν ἀλλήλοις (8.1.5).

⁵⁶ The only celebratory object missing from the second wedding are torches (see 1.1.13).

⁵⁷ οἱ δὲ γονεῖς τὸν νυμφῖον εἰσήγαγον πρὸς τὴν παρθένον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαιρέας προσδραμὼν αὐτὴν κατεφίλει, Καλλιρρόη δέ, γνωρίσασα τὸν ἐρώμενον, ὥσπερ τι λύχνον φῶς ἦδη σβεννύμενον ἐπιχυθέντος ἐλαίου πάλιν ἀνέλαμψε καὶ μείζων ἐγένετο καὶ κρείττων (1.1.15).

⁵⁸ Robiano (2008, 432, n. 22) thinks that in both scenes Callirhoe, as soon as she recognizes Chaereas, unveils herself, but in the wedding scene the unveiling is not specified and might as well have happened before Callirhoe recognizes Chaereas.

possible subtexts and appreciate the originality of Chariton's scene against its literary background. As if to relax the intellectual tension along with the emotional tension experienced by characters and readers prior to the recognition, after its occurrence Chariton plays against a much more easily recognizable model, and he helps the reader identify it by citing the famous line: "And they with joy came to the rite of their old-time bed."⁵⁹

The reference to the *Odyssey* prompts us to read parallels between Chaereas and Odysseus on the one hand, Callirhoe and Penelope on the other, at this crucial turning point in the narrative. In both the *Odyssey* and *Callirhoe*, the recognition follows the "Iliadic" section of the story, the chapter filled with fighting rather than traveling. Both recognitions reward the hero's *aristeia*: Odysseus's slaughter of the suitors and Chaereas's victorious battles (in which the impulsive lover learns from Odysseus and his associate Diomedes how to be a cunning leader, and is already connected to Odysseus slaughtering the suitors by means of a citation).⁶⁰ As for Callirhoe, the allusion to Odysseus's reunion with Penelope dispels the Helen-like aura that wafted around her.

If Callirhoe is Helen in character, she is not, to be sure, the adulteress of Homer but the faithful wife of Euripides's *Helen*: though forced to remarry, she does not feel erotic passion for her second husband at any time. Her predicament, however, and especially her irresistible desirability connect her to the heroine of the *Iliad*, as is pointed up by her image as Helen on the rampart of Troy (5.5.9 = *Il.* 3.146)—an image in which the desirable Helen merges with the desirable Penelope, whose appearance, like Helen's, stirs the beholders: "When they saw her, there was marveling and silence, 'and all prayed to lie by her side in bed.'"⁶¹ Regardless of Callirhoe's reiterated constancy of feelings, her beauty is a centrifugal force: it causes her to be kidnapped by robbers after her "death," to remarry, and to be taken farther and farther away from home. The line from the *Odyssey* that seals her reunion with Chaereas stops that centrifugal movement by associating her with a mythic paragon of fidelity as she recovers her husband in her home: Callirhoe is symbolically brought back home even before she physically returns to Syracuse, and cleared of any hint of Helen-like bigamy.

⁵⁹ ἀσπάσιοι λέκτροιο παλαιοῦ θεσμὸν ἔκοντο (*Od.* 23.296, at 8.1.17). In addition, the bed in which Callirhoe and Chaereas celebrate their reunion is reminiscent of Odysseus's: see Guez 2009, 34.

⁶⁰ See 7.4.6, citing *Od.* 22.308 (in part); *Od.* 24.184; *Il.* 10.483 (Diomedes's *aristeia*). On the reference to Odysseus, see Cueva 2004, 31.

⁶¹ ὀφθείσα δὲ θάμβος ἐποίησε καὶ σιωπήν, "πάντες δ' ἠρήσαντο παρὰ λεχέεσσι κλιθῆναι" (5.5.9. The citation is *Od.* 1.366 = 18.213). In another passage Chariton describes Callirhoe by means of allusions to lines of the *Odyssey* in which Penelope's fidelity is not granted (15.21, at 4.4.5): see Biraud 1985. Hirschberger (2001, 167) likewise shows that a main reference for the depiction of Callirhoe is "Penelope the Beauty."

Epiphany and Unrequited Love

There is a meaningful difference, though, between Odysseus's recognition by his wife and Chaereas's by his: Odysseus already knew who the person in front of him was. Perhaps Penelope recognized him in the long night in which he made her cry with his "lies similar to the truth," and her fastidious testing of him might be seen as her way of paying him back for his lack of trust; but we cannot be sure of this.⁶² And even if it is indeed the case, Odysseus knew more than she did: perhaps she divined his identity, but he was certain of hers. In the novel, by contrast, the recognizer is at once the recognized and vice versa. A joining of voices marks the simultaneous occurrence of the mutual recognition: while Chaereas was still speaking, Callirhoe uncovered herself, and "both cried out together" (*ἀμφότεροι συνεβόησαν*) the other's name.

The mutuality of the novelistic recognition is yet another feature that sets it up against the end of *Alcestis* (as well as the recognition scene in *Helen*). Because *Alcestis* is not allowed to speak, the recognition is signed only by Admetus's exclamation of joy (1133). Only he says "I hold you" (1134: *ἔχω σ'*). The woman cannot celebrate the remarriage with the man for whom she has sacrificed her life.⁶³ Nor do husband and wife celebrate together with an embrace, as is customary in recognition scenes (dramatic ones in the first place). Compare, again, Chaereas's and Callirhoe's simultaneous exclamation "I hold you!" (8.1.10: *ἔχω σε*) and the embrace (8.1.8: *περιχυθέντες δὲ ἀλλήλοις*) that follows their recognition.

While the protagonists' identical love is epitomized by the immediacy and perfect mutuality of their recognition, Dionysius's unrequited passion is from the start signified by the manner of his first encounter with Callirhoe: for him it is the uncanny encounter with a goddess. That Callirhoe looks like a goddess is one of the novel's refrains: the Syracusan people at her first wedding (1.1.16), those inside the house where the pirate Theron takes her (1.14.1), Dionysius's followers (2.3.10), the crowd assembled at Miletus to see her at her second wedding (3.2.15–16), the sailors who escort her there (3.2.14), the Persians she meets (5.3.9), and many more, all respond to her appearance with amazement

⁶² Whether Penelope recognized Odysseus was discussed already in antiquity (as in Seneca *Ep.* 88). For modern interpretations see, for example, Austin 1975, 200–238; Felson 1994, 4 and 61; Murnaghan 2011, 100–103. Russo et al. (1992, 99) point out that *Od.* 19.478–79 militate against Penelope's awareness of the stranger's identity. A modern novel that assumes her recognition of him and her "revenge" is Malerba 1997.

⁶³ Foley (1992, especially 142–43) demonstrates how *Alcestis*'s silence pushes her back to domestic obscurity and to the norm of gender roles, which her glorious death and Admetus's humiliation had destabilized. *Alcestis* participates in an abnormal wedding ritual, since she does not greet the groom when he unveils her.

and adoring gestures, dazzled by the light she radiates, her *marmarygē* (4.1.9; 5.3.9).⁶⁴ But only Dionysius responds with love.⁶⁵

As he suddenly catches sight of Callirhoe in the temple of Aphrodite, Dionysius cries out “Be propitious, Aphrodite.”⁶⁶ There follows a rewriting of an episode in the *Odyssey* centered on the mystery of Odysseus’s identity, with Callirhoe playing Odysseus, the steward Leonas in the role of the suitor Antinous, who insults Odysseus, and Dionysius impersonating the “proud youth” who rebukes the suitor, reminding him that the wretched wanderer could be a god. As Leonas summons Callirhoe to go meet her master, Dionysius strikes him and calls him blasphemer: how dare you talk to gods as you would to humans? You say she is a bought slave? Hasn’t Homer taught us that “the gods, in the guise of strangers from afar, come watch the insolence and the righteousness of men”?⁶⁷ Dionysius, however, is not even suggesting a possibility, like the young man in the *Odyssey*: he does not say “what if” she is a goddess,⁶⁸ but (ostensibly at least) he is certain that she is. Yet he falls in love with her (2.3.8). His passion announces itself to be like the impossible pursuit of a goddess by a mortal.⁶⁹

Callirhoe’s response recalls Odysseus’s to his son when, bewildered by the old beggar’s transformation into a tall and beautiful man, he thinks that man is a god. Odysseus replies, “I am your father, believe it! After much suffering and much wandering I have come back home” (*Od.* 16.204–6, paraphrased). Callirhoe likewise insists on her humanity and her suffering: “Stop making fun of me! Stop calling me a goddess—I am not even a happy mortal!”⁷⁰ But the effects of the

⁶⁴ The motif of epiphany in Chariton’s novel is studied by Hägg 2004b. See also Zeitlin 2003, 77–79. I am interested specifically in the intersection and semantic opposition of epiphany and recognition.

⁶⁵ Seemingly, so does Mithridates (4.1.9), though in truth he knows who Callirhoe is (4.1.8).

⁶⁶ Ἰλεως εἴης, ὦ Ἀφροδίτη (2.3.6).

⁶⁷ καὶ τε θεοὶ ξείνοιον οἰκότες ἀλλοδαποῖσιν / ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶσι; (*Od.* 17.485, 487, at 2.3.7). What is incongruous in Chariton’s exploitation of the Homeric episode is that Callirhoe does not look like a goddess in disguise but is taken for a goddess precisely because of her appearance. Chariton was careless here: see Hägg 2004b, 144.

⁶⁸ εἰ . . . που: *Od.* 17.484.

⁶⁹ Since mortals do not fall in love with gods, we could read Dionysius’s emphasis on Callirhoe’s godliness as just a metaphor for her extraordinary beauty: Dionysius would not really think she is, or even might be, a goddess, but would be responding hyperbolically to her inconceivable beauty. It seems to me, however, that Dionysius is truly struck down by the apparition, at least in the first encounter. The point is precisely that he falls in love with a godlike woman: their relationship will never be equal. See Hägg’s general observation (2004b, 145): “The spectators readily believe that hero and heroine are gods appearing on earth; there is a constant oscillation in the novels between metaphor—‘divine beauty’—and religious awe.” Zeitlin (2003, 77–79) goes further: she thinks that Callirhoe is fully mistaken for a goddess when she reaches Ionia, and connects the mistake to the spreading belief in divine epiphanies in Chariton’s time.

⁷⁰ παῖσαί μιν καταγελῶν καὶ θεὸν ὀνομάζων τήν οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπον εὐτυχίῃ (2.3.7).

disclosure are not the same: whereas Telemachus at last accepts that the godlike man in front of him is his father, Dionysius is frozen, as it were, in his amazement at the godlike apparition—to the point that he does not even seem to listen to Callirhoe's words but only to the sound of her voice, which confirms him in his delusion that she is a goddess. Dionysius's eyes and ears are overpowered by unmanageable beauty. Callirhoe's voice in particular has paralyzing effects: Dionysius can speak no more, and leaves (2.3.8).

Because his intellect is drugged, Dionysius, unlike Telemachus, ends his encounter in ignorance of the stranger's identity. The mystery around her keeps troubling him (2.4.7) and is prolonged for a whole day and night, again in an Odysseus-like fashion. The reference this time is to Odysseus's elusiveness about himself at the court of Alcinous, as becomes clear when Callirhoe, at last, discloses her name and country, asking Dionysius-Alcinous to give her conveyance (2.5.11–12).⁷¹ But even then, Callirhoe passes over her marriage and the reason for her apparent death. The relationship begins asymmetrically also as far as knowledge of the other: "Everything about me is known to you,"⁷² Dionysius tells Callirhoe on their second encounter, and even so he introduces himself again. He is from the start doomed not to know his wife, to have for wife a godlike stranger.

Whereas Dionysius mistakes Callirhoe for Aphrodite, Chaereas recognizes his beloved even in a statue that closely resembles one of Aphrodite. Launched on their search for Callirhoe, he and Polycharmus come upon the temple of the goddess on Dionysius's estate, the same temple in which Dionysius had his epiphany. After paying homage to Aphrodite, Chaereas looks up and sees next to the goddess's statue an image of Callirhoe, at which sight he faints. The shrine attendant misreads the reason for his fainting, taking it to be a true divine epiphany, and reassures him that to see the goddess brings good luck: "You see that golden image? That woman was a slave, and Aphrodite has made her the mistress of all of us."⁷³

This passage is a small jewel of literary sophistication, subtly playing as it does on the identity of Aphrodite, her statue, and the goddess's mortal copy.⁷⁴ What concerns me specifically is the infallibility of Chaereas's eye, which recognizes his beloved in an artifact that imitates the statue of Aphrodite herself. The newly bought Callirhoe, before she met her master, was urged to visit Aphrodite's

⁷¹ Dionysius's question, *τίς ἡ γυνὴ καὶ πόθεν* (2.4.10), might echo the question repeatedly asked of Odysseus, including by Alcinous's wife, *τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδράν;* (*Od.* 7.238; see also 10.325; 14.187).

⁷² *τὰ μὲν ἐμὰ δηλὰ σοι, γύναι, πάντα* (2.5.4).

⁷³ *ὁρᾷς εἰκόνα τὴν χρυσοῦν; αὕτη δούλη μὲν ᾗν, ἡ δὲ Ἀφροδίτη πάντων ἡμῶν κυρίαν πεποιήκεν αὐτήν* (3.6.4).

⁷⁴ See Zeitlin 2003, especially p. 81.

shrine and offer her a prayer because “The goddess appears in these parts . . . she listens particularly to Dionysius’s prayers; he never passes her shrine without stopping. . . . Lady, when you look at Aphrodite, you’ll think you are looking at a picture of yourself.”⁷⁵

For the second-time reader, these words prepare for Dionysius’s and Chaereas’s contrasting responses to the appearance of Callirhoe or her statue. The mention of Aphrodite’s customary epiphanies and of Dionysius’s privileged connection to her foreshadows Callirhoe’s epiphany to Dionysius and his prayer to his “Aphrodite.” The statement that Callirhoe’s features are identical with those of the goddess’s statue suggests that Callirhoe’s own statue, which Dionysius dedicates in the temple soon after their wedding (3.6.3), resembles Aphrodite’s very closely, just as Callirhoe herself does. For him they are identical. When he learns of the young men’s visit to the temple, he asks: “Why were they paying homage to *my* Aphrodite?”⁷⁶ Who is Dionysius’s Aphrodite? The goddess whose statue stands next to Callirhoe’s or Callirhoe herself and her statue?

The likeness of the two images is brought to light by the shrine attendant’s contradictory readings of Chaereas’s fainting. When she first witnesses the event, she thinks that Aphrodite herself struck him down as she did others, for “she appears in person, you see, and lets herself be distinctly seen.”⁷⁷ But later when Callirhoe cries in the temple, she tells her, “Why are you crying? . . . Why, foreigners are actually worshiping you as a goddess now. The other day two handsome young men sailed by here, and one of them almost fainted when he saw *your image*. So like a goddess on earth has Aphrodite made you.”⁷⁸ The double explanation of Chaereas’s fainting highlights the collapse of all distinctions between woman and goddess both in their persons and in their images. Callirhoe is “epiphanic”;⁷⁹ to see her or her statue is the same as to witness Aphrodite’s appearance. This merging of goddess and woman throws into bold relief Chaereas’s immediate recognition of his wife in a statue that could have been the goddess’s, and was carved on the orders of a man who saw in the same woman a goddess.

⁷⁵ ἐπιφανὴς δέ ἐστιν ἐνθάδε ἡ θεός . . . μάλιστα δὲ ἐπὶ κόως Διονυσίῳ· ἐκεῖνος οὐδέποτε παρήλθεν αὐτήν . . . δόξεις, ὦ γύναι, θεασαμένη τὴν Ἀφροδίτῃν εἰκόνα βλέπειν σεαυτῆς (2.2.5–6).

⁷⁶ διὰ τί δὲ τὴν ἐμὴν Ἀφροδίτῃν προσεκύνουν; (3.9.5).

⁷⁷ ἐπιφανὴς γάρ ἐστι καὶ δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν ἐναργῶς (3.6.4).

⁷⁸ τί κλάεις . . . ; ἤδη γὰρ καὶ σὲ ὡς θεὰν οἱ ξένοι προσκυνοῦσι. πρῶτην ἦλθον ἐνθάδε δύο νεανίσκοι καλοὶ παραπλέοντες· ὁ δὲ ἕτερος αὐτῶν θεασάμενός σου τὴν εἰκόνα μικροῦ δεῖν ἐξέπνευσεν. οὕτως ἐπιφανῇ σε ἡ Ἀφροδίτῃ πεποιήκεν (3.9.1).

⁷⁹ Hägg (2004b, 147) notes the polysemy of ἐπιφανής, which appears in the translations: “that is how famous Aphrodite has made you” (in Reardon 2008 (1989)); “so like a goddess on earth has Aphrodite made you” (Goold 1995). I think the second meaning is more prominent in this passage.

Chariton's exploitation of the motif of divine epiphany to introduce a story of unrequited love and of a marriage that will not last points up the ideal of love espoused in his novel, and in the genre at large. Ideal love is not a one-sided pursuit of unattainable beauty and bliss but is the shared sentiment of knowing the other from the start, and of being, with only slight exaggeration, identical with the other. When the hero and heroine fall in love, they do not see in the loved one a god but another self: to love for them is to recognize (themselves in) the other.

Dionysius's Recognition of His Errors: *Paideia* and Tragedy

Callirhoe is a partial exception to the Greek novels' tendency to disregard recognitions of agency.⁸⁰ The whole plot develops from Chaereas's recognition of the mistake he made when he kicked his wife in a fit of jealousy (or, better, from his friend's canalization of his feelings, for if Chaereas had followed his instinct subsequent to the recognition of his deed, he would have killed himself right on the spot, and there would be no plot at all). Chariton introduces potential for episodes of moral contrition or tragic illumination from the start of the action.

Chaereas, however, turns out to be no self-reflective agent. He hardly engages in self-probing or self-chastising. The sequence "hero kicks his wife to death, finds out she is innocent, and regrets his action" could have developed into, say, repeated laments (in the style of the novels, Chariton's in the first place) in which Chaereas would recognize his fault. The angry hero who kicks his wife has invited comparison with Charisius, the protagonist of Menander's *Epitrepontes*, who raves and rages and leaves his wife when he discovers that she has given birth to a child conceived before their wedding.⁸¹ Charisius, however, at discovering that he himself has fathered a bastard child (or so he thinks, mistakenly), turns his rage against himself for having rejected his wife while he is as guilty, and engages in merciless introspection (894–918). A self-critical and contrite Chaereas could have said, in Charisius's vein, "How could I fall into the trap set by jealous suitors and believe a slanderous accuser of my wife, and even suspect the loving and pure Callirhoe of unfaithfulness"? Instead, once he decides to live, he seems to live well enough with what he has done: writing to Callirhoe he only says, "I was jealous, but this is typical of lovers."⁸² He can be credited with some effort to reform himself if he actually tries to curb his jealousy; but the text is not

⁸⁰ Another exception is an episode in the *Aethiopica*: Aristippus, as soon as he exiles his son, the victim of his stepmother's maneuvers, regrets his decision and retires to the country to live in isolation, "eating his heart" like the Homeric Bellerophon (another victim of a Potiphar's wife). Aristippus's recognition, however, is not developed.

⁸¹ See Brethes 2007, 31, referencing Hunter 1994, 1080, n. 120.

⁸² ἀλλὰ ἐζηλοτύπησα. τοῦτο ἴδιόν ἐστι φιλοῦντος (4.4.9).

explicit. On learning from Callirhoe of her life in Miletus, he “felt the urging of his innate jealousy.”⁸³ If he does not act on it, it can be that he has learnt how to subdue it; but also that the happiness of the present circumstances prevails.⁸⁴ Though in the same episode he admits to having been unfair and impulsive in going to war against the King (8.1.16), the thought, again, does not bother him longer than the wink of an eye: oh, well, he tells his wife, I have not shamed you, my love, for I have accomplished many great deeds.

While Chaereas shows little introspective inkling, Dionysius, his rival and in many ways his opposite, is strikingly (for a Greek novel) self-reflective (and paranoid).⁸⁵ As soon as he leaves Miletus for Babylon, he stops to ponder and would go back. The many compliments he receives about his wife’s beauty worry him. How to guard her? On a journey through all of Asia this is harder than in Miletus. And don’t the poets and the sculptors teach us that love is fickle? That beautiful women like change? These thoughts push Dionysius to see rivals everywhere, and to “regret” (*μετενóει*) his rash decision to disclose to Pharnaces his suspicions about Mithridates’s plot to corrupt his wife, which caused the journey, while he could have enjoyed her embraces in bed (4.7.6–7).

As he approaches Babylon, Dionysius engages in another monologue in which he again regrets his decision: if Helen could be corrupted in sober Sparta, imagine what will happen in Babylon, which is full of “Parises.” “Don’t you see the prelude to the danger? We are welcomed by cities, entertained by satraps!”⁸⁶ His regrets grow stronger, as Mithridates had anticipated (*μετανοήσεις*, 5.7.7), when Chaereas turns out to be alive. Talking to “his” child, Dionysius says plainly: “It was a disastrous journey: we should never have left Miletus. Babylon has been our ruin!”⁸⁷

Dionysius’s regrets culminate in self-accusation. Whereas the typical novelistic hero blames his trials on Fortune, Dionysius curses (*κατηράτο*) himself, and himself alone: “Miserable wretch! . . . You will have to put up with this disaster—it is you who are responsible for what is happening.”⁸⁸ Dionysius clearly sees the

⁸³ *τῆς ἐμφύτου ζηλοτυπίας ἀνεμνήσθη* (8.1.15).

⁸⁴ Callirhoe is still wary of his jealousy: see 8.4.4.

⁸⁵ Their contrasting behavior is foreshadowed by a correspondence: onlookers congratulate both Chaereas and Dionysius for Callirhoe’s beauty (1.1.16: *εὐμακάριζον*; 4.7.6: *μακαρίζόμενος*) on the day of their weddings. Chaereas, though, has no suspicion that Jealousy is invited to the wedding, whereas the words of praise set Dionysius off on his thoughts.

⁸⁶ *οὐχ ὀρᾷς τοὺς κινδύνους, οὐ τὰ προόμια; πόλεις ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶσι καὶ θεραπεύουσι σατράπαι* (5.2.8).

⁸⁷ *κακὴν ἀποδημίαν ἤλθομεν-οὐκ ἔδει Μίλητον καταλιπεῖν-Βαβυλῶν ἡμᾶς ἀπολώλεκε* (5.10.3).

⁸⁸ *φέρε . . . ὧ τλήμων, τὴν ἐκούσιον συμφορὰν-σαντῶ γὰρ αἴτιος τούτων* (6.2.5).

real cause for his predicament just as he sees the real reason Artaxerxes is delaying the trial, namely, that he is in love with Callirhoe (6.2.7). His lucid assessment of the situation and of his role in it is immediately followed, in sharp contrast, by Chaereas's unrestrained lamentation after yet another suicide attempt. Chaereas blames his friend Polycharmus for preventing him from joining Callirhoe in death and instead forcing him to live and meet with so many sufferings: enslavements, chains, the cross, and now the King (6.2.10). He is incapable of admitting "It is my fault," as Dionysius does again when he learns that Callirhoe is forever lost to him: "I shall live all alone. I am the only one responsible for what is happening! It is my futile jealousy that has ruined me—and you, Babylon!"⁸⁹

Dionysius's ability to recognize his mistakes is an aspect of his *paideia*. When regrets start to haunt him, they are fed by his supposed knowledge of how love works, which he holds from art and poetry, as the cultured man he is. His second movement of introspection occurs toward the end of a long monologue that is framed by two authorial comments emphasizing the conflict, in the mind of a man gifted with "stability of character" (*φύσεως εὐστάθειαν*) and "disciplined good breeding" (*παιδείας ἐπιμέλειαν*), between the efforts to stay firm, to follow reason, and burning love (5.9.8–10.6). Finally, when he learns that Callirhoe is gone forever and again blames only himself, he has just shown off his "excellent upbringing" (8.5.11: *παιδείαν ἐξαίρετον*). *Paideia* encourages mental habits of self-restraint and self-awareness that are characteristic of Dionysius as much as they are alien to the impulsive Chaereas.

Dionysius's keenness on self-scrutiny, however, contrasts him and Chaereas not only as psychological types but also in their narrative trajectories: it substitutes for the recognition of Callirhoe that is allotted to the more fortunate protagonist. The "deuteragonist" instead is granted recognition of what he did to lose her.

Chariton's novel is the only one that introduces a second husband and involves him like the first in an adventurous journey motivated by love. How will that journey end? The opening of book 8 announces that a "legitimate marriage" will take the place of the manifold misfortunes of the previous books. But there are two husbands, both sympathetic characters, and both, it might be argued, deserving of a happy ending if the novel is to satisfy the requirements of poetic justice, or to be the tragicomedy we might label it, drawing on Chariton's announcement that the last book will be an "antidote to grimness." Yet only one husband can have Callirhoe, that is, a truly happy ending.

⁸⁹ ἐγὼ δὲ ἔρημος βιώσομαι, πάντων αἴτιος ἐμαντῶ γενόμενος. ἀπώλεσέ με κενὴ ζηλοτυπία καὶ σύ, Βαβυλών (8.5.15).

The contrasting destinies are pointed up by a correspondence in reverse: in both cases Chariton draws the prospect of a “counterfactual narrative,” an alternative bound not to be.⁹⁰ When Aphrodite steps in at the beginning of book 8, it is to prevent the “incredible and grim” plan of Fortune, which was to keep Chaereas ignorant of Callirhoe’s presence and depart, a new Theseus abandoning his Ariadne. By alluding to the dreary alternative when the recognition is about to happen, Chariton makes it more cathartic in the sense he gives to the term, as “cleansing grimness”: the possibility of a new calamity surfaces but is immediately swept away, to increase the pleasure of the novel’s “most pleasant” book—and to highlight the happy ending to Chaereas’s story.

And now to Dionysius: the prospected counterfactual narrative in his case is the happy ending normally bestowed on the hero in love.⁹¹ “If I could have restored Callirhoe to you,” Artaxerxes tells him, “I would have done so” (8.5.12, paraphrased). By mentioning a contrary-to-fact happy development as he shapes the end of Dionysius’s journey, Chariton suggests that Dionysius is as worthy as Chaereas of being the novel’s hero, but also that this cohabitation of heroes cannot continue to the end. Thus, while Chaereas will enjoy the mutual recognition that threatened not to happen and will depart with his wife for their homeland, Dionysius will travel home alone—as foreshadowed by episodes of self-recognition, a milder version of the tragic recognitions that plunge their protagonists into utter solitude and lucid despair. The “tragicomedy” remains imperfect.

Chariton apparently felt that Dionysius’s “tragedy” cast a shadow on the novel’s programmatic intent to replace grim events with “just loves,” for he mitigates Dionysius’s despair with consolation prizes. Artaxerxes cannot give him Callirhoe; but he shows gratitude to his devoted subject by rewarding him with honors and an important political appointment. We last meet Dionysius as he makes preparations to travel home, “thinking he would find great consolation in a long journey, authority over many cities, and the likenesses of Callirhoe in Miletus.”⁹² Dionysius is left with the satisfaction, though pale, of power and with images, though lifeless, of his love. He will not be happy but will still find reasons to live, and not end tragically in the fashion of the stage heroes who, like him, recognize their fatal errors when it is too late.⁹³

⁹⁰ “Counterfactual narrative” is Whitmarsh’s formula (2009, 145). The following observations elaborate on his.

⁹¹ See Whitmarsh 2009, 143.

⁹² *μέγα νομίζων παραμύθιον πολλήν ὁδὸν καὶ πολλῶν πόλεων ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν Μιλήτῳ Καλλιρόης εἰκόνας* (8.5.15).

⁹³ Ruiz-Montero (2003, 52) calls Dionysius a tragic hero. He is, but in a mitigated version. Rear- don (1982, 23) adds among Dionysius’s consolation prizes the child whom Callirhoe humanely leaves with him, though Dionysius knows that he will lose the child, too, and though the child is a

Two More Recognitions, or Toward the Grand Finale

The framing of the lovers' recognition prepares the readers for a strong closure. Stepping in to replace Fortune as the novel's "writer," Aphrodite announces the end of wandering (8.1.3), that is, of the virtually endless succession of paratactic episodes and centrifugal journeys engineered by Fortune.

We appreciate the finality of the recognition also because we read it against an episode of uncompleted recognition, when the lovers, at the trial in Babylon in book 5, most unexpectedly saw each other yet could not embrace or kiss. The recognition in book 8 calls that episode to mind with a telling reversal. In book 5, subsequent to the discovery that Chaereas was alive, the King decided to give Callirhoe in custody to Statira, who consoled her with almost the exact same words that trigger the recognition in book 8: "Be of good courage . . . lady, and stop crying. The king is a good man. You will have the husband you want."⁹⁴ These words open up the narrative by raising a new question: which husband does Callirhoe want? Though we think we know, we are not told but are made to wonder: the author says that those present at the trial "were at a loss" (ἡπόρουν) as to her feelings (5.8.3); that she was indeed divided between love for Chaereas and respect for Dionysius (5.8.6); and that she did not answer Statira's question (5.9.7). The lovers' brief encounter resulted in confusion, suspension of judgment, even suspense. In book 8, in stark contrast, the words "be of good courage, you will have the husband you want" are instantly answered by the recognition, which does not raise any new question.

More important, the scene carries a strong sense of finality because it ends with lovemaking. Chariton borrows Odysseus's and Penelope's reenacting of "the ancient rite of the bed" but gives the ancient rite the last word: whereas in the epic the couple go to bed before relating past events, in the novel the joy of telling stories comes first, love last. Readers are fully satisfied now that they have "watched" the canonical kiss as at the end of the "movie."

But the narrative opens up again, abruptly and aggressively, with renewed war dangers. The model is again the *Odyssey*, in which Odysseus's and Penelope's reunion marks neither the end of the story nor the end of dangers. As is well known, the Hellenistic scholar Aristarchus thought the *Odyssey* had its telos with the couple's lovemaking after their reunion (at 23.296). "Telos," however, is likely to mean not the physical ending of the poem but its culmination, its "goal,"

reminder of his unhappy love (5.10.3). Reardon also observes that Chariton "cannot bear to leave him [Dionysius] in the cold altogether. Sophocles would have borne it." The point is precisely that Chariton finds himself caught in a narrative predicament because he does not want to write tragedy yet has introduced a potentially tragic situation into his novel's plot.

⁹⁴ θάρρει . . . ὦ γύναι, καὶ παῦσαι δακρύουσα· χρηστός ἐστι βασιλεύς. ἔξεις ἄνδρα ὃν θέλεις (5.9.3).

in Aristotelian terms.⁹⁵ Even if it does not, Chariton seems to interpret it this way in his own rewriting of the *Odyssey's* ending, for he gives to his own narrative, as its chief goal, the lovers' recognition and their renewing of "the ancient rite of the bed"; but then continues. After the climactic telos, the narrative moves on to tie up other threads, and it does so with two more recognitions, just as the *Odyssey* adds to Penelope's recognition of Odysseus two more: first Laertes's and then Dolius's and his sons' (24.391–92).

Dionysius is the only "tragic" character in the novel: he cannot enjoy recognition of his loved one but engages in self-recognition in a tragic manner, when the deed done cannot be undone. There is, however, another character who would wish to keep Callirhoe for himself: Artaxerxes. His wish cannot come true; and in this case poetic justice requires that it should not, for he has a wife whom he would not even leave for Callirhoe. Artaxerxes is not as worthy a competitor of the protagonist as Dionysius. Perhaps to emphasize that the appropriate ending to his story—appropriate ethically as well as narratologically—is reunion with his wife, Chariton builds a highly theatrical scene to make it happen. But he also shows the King only half-satisfied with the reunion.

To comply with Callirhoe's wishes, Chaereas sends Statira back to Artaxerxes. Artaxerxes does not know this. Dejected, convinced that Aradus, where he had left the women, has been sacked and that everything, including the queen, is lost, he rushes to the island. Egyptian ships are seen, one flying the royal flag. The Persians, thinking of an enemy attack, prepare for battle. As they are getting the weapons ready and some are even about to attack, Statira shows herself. The King "cannot hold back" (οὐ κατέσχευ) but runs to her and, embracing her, weeps from joy (8.5.3–5).

Though the moment of recognition is not captured, the episode shares significant features with recognition scenes. Statira's appearance brings about a sudden change from bad to good fortune for the King,⁹⁶ and a last-minute skirting of violence against a loved one in the fashion of Euripides's happy-ending plays. Artaxerxes's highly melodramatic response to his wife's recovery, which displeased eighteenth-century readers,⁹⁷ likewise recalls the standard responses to recognitions with their outburst of emotions. Finally, the emphasis on the incredibility of the events (ἄπιστα) resonates with the common perception of recognitions as quintessentially unbelievable.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ A recent advocate of this interpretation is Schironi 2009.

⁹⁶ The *metabolē* has already been brought about by Callirhoe's generosity (8.3.6), but Artaxerxes does not know this.

⁹⁷ Hägg (1983, 211) mentions a German translation in which the King does not weep but "sighs heroically."

⁹⁸ See chapter 3.

Artaxerxes's joy, however, does not last. The tears of happiness and the embrace are instantly marred by the dissonant sounds of negative feelings. As soon as he finds out that his wife is Callirhoe's gift to him, he is stung afresh by the old passion. After reading Chaereas's letter and learning that Callirhoe is forever lost, jealously rages in him. His last sentence, "Blessed Chaereas, luckier than I,"⁹⁹ does not show him rejoicing in his recovery of his wife but brooding in solitude. Statira is downgraded to a consolation prize, not unlike the prize Artaxerxes himself will mete out to Dionysius in the scene that immediately follows.

Now that Chariton has disposed of the side characters by allotting them as happy an ending as he can, considering the crucial role of Callirhoe in their happiness, he brings the protagonists' happy ending to a triumphant completion by staging one more *anagnōrisis*, in grand style. The scene of the lovers' reunion with their families repeats, in an amplified version, that of Artaxerxes's and Statira's reunion. The parallels are transparent, detailed, and manifold: the ships sailing into the Syracusan harbor are also thought to be enemy vessels; the leaders are also informed by those who see the ships, and with the same verb introducing their words;¹⁰⁰ both scenes place great emphasis on the onlookers' ignorance;¹⁰¹ in both, what turns out to be true appears incredible;¹⁰² both Statira and Callirhoe are in a tent;¹⁰³ and in both episodes, the discovery meets with joyful tears.¹⁰⁴

The second scene, however, is emphatically one of recognition, because Chaereas and Callirhoe contrive to keep their identity hidden: staying out of sight, they send an Egyptian to explain who they "are" (8.6.4). The Egyptian is primed to make up the story that they are merchants bringing goods that will please the Syracusans. This lie worthy of Odysseus—who also is taken for a merchant (*Od.* 8.161–64)—puts Chaereas in the role of the prototypical hero of disguises, who hides behind such lies when he comes home to be recognized. Chaereas thus prepares the readers for a recognition scene. The pathos that precedes it is conveyed by the description of the crowd "straining" its eyes when suddenly the curtain is dropped ("the tapestries were drawn aside") and the couple appears.¹⁰⁵ The careful stage-management of the disclosure also calls to mind the theatricality, according to some sources,

⁹⁹ μακάριος Χαιρέας, εὐτυχέστερος ἐμοῦ (8.5.8).

¹⁰⁰ See 8.5.4: ἐμήνουν Ἀρταξέρξη and 8.6.3: μὴνύσωμεν Ἑρμοκράτει, ἐμήνυσσε.

¹⁰¹ See 8.5.3; 8.6.6–7.

¹⁰² See 8.5.5 (ἄπιστα) and 8.6.6 (ἄπιστον).

¹⁰³ See 8.5.5 and 8.6.6.

¹⁰⁴ See 8.5.5 and 8.6.8.

¹⁰⁵ Lefteratou (2010, 303) notes that "the focalisation this time is through the inset audience's eyes."

of Alcibiades's return to Athens from exile.¹⁰⁶ The response to the unexpected appearance of the couple, "a spectacle more powerful than words can tell,"¹⁰⁷ is the loudest cry we hear in a novel so much filled with sound: "Thunder never so stunned the ears, nor lightning the eyes of those who beheld it, nor did anyone who had found a treasure of gold cry out as did that crowd then."¹⁰⁸

Callirhoe thus ends with three episodes of recognition. An indication that they are to be read in a sequence is the presence in all of them of narratives that are told by one party so as to share his or her experiences with the other and to celebrate the recognition: Callirhoe's and Chaereas's first night is "full of narratives" (διηγημάτων μεστή);¹⁰⁹ Statira "narrated" (διηγείτο) to her recovered husband what happened in Aradus and Cyprus; and of course the final recognition is followed by "the narratives of the journey" (τὰ τῆς ἀποδημίας διηγήματα), the comprehensive recapitulation of the novel.

Beyond the Narrative: Another Recognition?

Callirhoe ends in a prayer, from the protagonist to Aphrodite: I beg you, don't separate me from Chaereas ever again! The prayer makes for a less definitive ending than those in Xenophon, Longus, and Heliodorus.¹¹⁰ Readers are likely to expect that the prayer will be fulfilled, but a halo of uncertainty looms over the novel's ending because a prayer has a question mark. And will Aphrodite answer, given her prior aloofness and unresponsiveness to Callirhoe's prayers? Though the goddess is now reconciled with the couple, she might flare up again: what if Chaereas has another attack of jealousy, for instance?¹¹¹

Matters remain unsettled also, and more crucially, because Callirhoe has left a child behind, in Miletus. Chaereas explains to the citizens of Syracuse that to raise his child, she had to marry Dionysius, and that the child will inherit the largest patrimony in Ionia. What will happen to him? The novel suggests a possible plotline: he will be recognized by his family and reunited with it.

¹⁰⁶ Plut. *Alc.* 32 relates versions of Alcibiades's return that emphasize its histrionic choreography (though Plutarch himself rather believes that Alcibiades was afraid of the Athenians). Since Chariton compares Chaereas with Alcibiades (1.1.3), it is possible that he is thinking of those stories for his hero's return.

¹⁰⁷ θέαμα λόγου κρείττον (8.6.8).

¹⁰⁸ οὔτε βροντή ποτε οὕτως ἐξέπληξε τὰς ἀκοὰς οὔτε ἀστραπή τὰς ὄψεις τῶν ἰδόντων, οὔτε θησαυρὸν εὐρών τις χρυσίου τοσοῦτον ἐξεβόησεν, ὥς τότε τὸ πλῆθος (8.6.8).

¹⁰⁹ See also, in the same section, διηγέσθαι, διήγημα, διηγίσαστο, διηγημάτων.

¹¹⁰ See Fusillo 1997, 217.

¹¹¹ The possibility is not remote: see 8.1.15; 8.4.4.

As soon as Callirhoe discovers her pregnancy, she thinks of aborting the unborn child, but then stops to ponder: what if he is a boy? What if he resembles his father? Think of the royal children born in slavery, such as Amphion, Zethus, or Cyrus, who have recovered their estate. Perhaps my child will go to Syracuse and tell Chaereas what happened to me. He will be the one to bring his parents together again (2.9.4–5, summarized).

Shortly afterward Callirhoe, pressed to choose between abortion and marriage with Dionysius, talks to her unborn child: surely you would prefer to live, and having as fathers the first citizen of Sicily and the first of Ionia! When you grow up you will be easily recognized (*γνωρισθήσῃ*) by your relatives, for you will certainly look like your father. You will sail to Syracuse, and Hermocrates will receive you with joy, already fit to be a general (2.11.2, summarized).

Callirhoe imagines that her child's life will follow a familiar comic or mythic pattern:¹¹² though born in adverse circumstances, his unmistakably noble origin will be printed on his features. He will look like his father, as Cyrus looked like his grandfather, and therefore, like Cyrus, he will be recognized and reintegrated in his parents' world, where he will inherit the leadership to which he is entitled by birth.

Or so his parents hope. When the child was born, Callirhoe prayed to Aphrodite that he be even more valorous than his grandfather and worthy to be his successor (3.8.8). She leaves him behind yet demands that he come to Syracuse. In her farewell letter to Dionysius, she reiterates that the child is his, asks him not to take another wife and to marry the child to his daughter by his first wife, and then to send the child to Syracuse to see his grandfather (which Dionysius intelligently interprets: to live forever there). This arrangement could hint at gloomy happenings beyond the novel's ending: the child and Dionysius are the victims of a lie, no matter how humane to Dionysius, and by the time the child comes to Syracuse, he will have contracted an alliance with his stepfather's daughter.¹¹³ The child, both the heir to Dionysius's fortune and a Syracusan citizen, as Chaereas calls him (8.7.11–12), has a complicated pedigree. Chaereas takes for granted that he will come back to Syracuse as a leader: "Another fleet of yours," he tells the Syracusans, "will come from Ionia, and its leader will be the descendent of Hermocrates."¹¹⁴ But what kind of leader will he be? What if he and Dionysius find out the truth? If the child's appearance, as Callirhoe hopes and as seems to be the case (3.8.7), will confirm him to be Chaereas's, will Dionysius not see that he is not his? The Greek assumption that a son should resemble his

¹¹² Brethes (2007, 38; 2009, 81) sees New Comedy as the main reference.

¹¹³ Whitmarsh (2011, 67 and 167) describes Callirhoe's arrangement as "a significant loose end, an unarticulated narrative 'aftermath,'" and observes that Callirhoe cannot fully break away from her past.

¹¹⁴ ἐλεύσεται καὶ ἄλλος στόλος ἐξ Ἰωνίας ὑμέτερος· ἄξει δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους ἔκγονος (8.8.11).

father¹¹⁵ holds true for the Greek Dionysius as well. If the child's paternity is revealed, perhaps he will come to Syracuse as an enemy and seek to avenge himself for having been left behind by his mother and thus deprived of his rights.

To be sure, we can take Chaereas's words to be a prediction of what will happen, as does Catherine Connors.¹¹⁶ Following those critics who see adumbrated in the child Dionysius the First, the tyrant who succeeded Hermocrates and earned an infamous reputation for violence,¹¹⁷ she argues that Chariton is rewriting the story of Dionysius's rule in an optimistic key: the child's eventual seizing of power will be legitimate because, as the son of Callirhoe and Chaereas, he is a Syracusan by right. The grandson of Hermocrates will continue his line and line of government. No violent rupture will occur.

This bright forecast, however, is Chaereas's. Readers might or might not share his optimism. Some will consider that in the aftermath of the highly formulaic novel they just read, "two fathers" might not last, just as "two husbands" did not, and imagine that, as Callirhoe's bigamy was ended by war, so perhaps will the child's double paternity. Others will find in the ring-composition that ties the protagonists' return at the end to their marriage at the beginning a possible indication of open-endedness and more trouble to come: if the marriage caused a chain of disastrous events, the return could have similar results.¹¹⁸ How readers envision the novel's aftermath depends also on the references the child's story activates in them. In the mind of a contemporary reader, Chaereas's optimistic rewriting of Dionysius's tyranny could easily clash with the damning portrait of the tyrant that was common currency.¹¹⁹ A reader with such a portrait in mind might take Chaereas's announcement of the child's future peaceful arrival in Syracuse not as a prediction but as wishful thinking; even more so if the child's predicament reminded that reader of Telegonus, Odysseus's child by Circe.¹²⁰ The narrative pattern of the two stories is identical: Telegonus is a child brought up abroad, who leaves to go find his father when he comes of age—but kills him unawares. The tragedy is caused by nonrecognition. The reader might factor in this myth with its tragic outcome and wonder whether Callirhoe's child will indeed be recognized, as she hoped when she decided to give him birth. Which mythic plotline will be realized, Cyrus's or Telegonus's? That a last recognition

¹¹⁵ Telemachus resembles Odysseus even in the way he speaks (*Od.* 3. 122-25); Hesiod (*Op.* 235) identifies the just city as one in which children resemble their parents; and Aristotle (*Gen. an.* 735a17-19) claims that the function of a perfect (*τελείου*) living being is to generate another like oneself (*οἷον αὐτό*). The belief is also Roman: see Guastella 1985, 82-83.

¹¹⁶ See Connors 2002, 17.

¹¹⁷ See Naber 1901, 98-99; Alvares 2001, 136; Livibella Furiani 2010, 633; Tilg 2010, 46.

¹¹⁸ See S. D. Smith 2007, 190-91 (connecting 1.1.13 and 8.7.2) and de Temmerman 2010, 471.

¹¹⁹ See Connors 2002, 17, n. 10.

¹²⁰ See Lefteratou 2010, 291.

will happily tie up the loose ends of the story is in the horizon of expectations of the novel, but remains uncertain.

The *Ephesiaca*: Slow and Quick Eyes

A Strangely Protracted Recognition

The reunion of Anthia and Habrocomes in Xenophon of Ephesus's novel is preceded and prepared for by a very long recognition scene,¹²¹ which can be divided into five sequences.

First episode: Leucon and Rhode, the couple's servants, arrive in Rhodes. They go to the temple of Helios, dedicate a stele inscribed in golden letters in honor of their masters, and sign it. Next to the stele is the golden armor Habrocomes and Anthia dedicated to Helios at the beginning of their journey. Habrocomes, who also arrives in Rhodes, goes to the temple to pray to the god. He reads and recognizes (*ἀναγνοὺς οὖν καὶ γνωρίσας*) the names on the stele, sees the armor, and weeps over his fate. The sight of the armor reminds him (*εἰς ἀνάμνησιν*) of his misfortunes, which he pours out in a lament. Enter Leucon and Rhode, to pray to the god as is their custom. They see Habrocomes sitting next to the stele and looking at the armor; they do not recognize him (*γνωρίζουσι μὲν οὐχί*) but wonder who he could possibly be to sit near their dedication. Leucon asks him what those offerings have to do with him. It is for him, replies Habrocomes, that Leucon and Rhode have dedicated them. After Anthia, it is they whom Habrocomes wants to see. The servants are agape (*ἄχανεῖς*). When at last they recover, "little by little, [they] recognize him by his appearance and voice, from what he said, from his mention of Anthia."¹²² They fall at his feet, tell him their story since they were parted from him, and take him to their house. But in spite of all their attentions, he keeps weeping over the loss of Anthia.

Second episode: enter Anthia, who has arrived in Rhodes with Hippothous, Habrocomes's former companion and now her master. During the festival of Helios, Hippothous takes her to the temple, where, seeing the offerings, she is reminded of the past (*ἐν ἀναμνήσει τῶν πρότερον γενομένην*) and, like Habrocomes in the previous sequence, laments her fate. Having obtained Hippothous's permission, she offers a lock of hair to the god with this dedication: "On behalf of her husband Habrocomes, Anthia dedicated her hair to the god."¹²³ She prays and leaves.

¹²¹ It is surprising to read, in Rohde's summary, "bald wird Habrocomes erkannt" (1960, 416).

¹²² κατὰ μικρὸν ἐγνώριζον ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος, ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγεν, ἐξ ὧν Ἀνθίας ἐμέμνητο (5.10.11).

¹²³ ΥΠΕΡ. ΤΟΥ. ΑΝΔΡΟΣ. ΑΒΡΟΚΟΜΟΥ. ΑΝΘΙΑ. ΤΗΝ. ΚΟΜΗΝ. ΤΩΙ. ΘΕΩΙ. ΑΝΕΘΗΚΕ (5.11.6).

Third episode: Leucon and Rhode return to the temple, see the offering, recognize (γνωρίζουσι) the names of their masters, kiss the hair and weep, “as though seeing Anthia” (ὡς Ἀνθίαν βλέποντες), and finally leave the temple to look for her. They do not find her, but they tell Habrocomes of the dedication. He is more hopeful.

Fourth episode: the next day Anthia and Hippothous go back to the temple (conveniently for the dénouement, bad weather keeps them from leaving). She sits before the offerings and weeps. Leucon and Rhode arrive. They see Anthia but do not yet recognize her (ἄγνωστος); “then they put everything together: that love, her tears, the offerings, the names, and the appearance.”¹²⁴ Little by little they recognize her (κατὰ βραχὺ ἐγνώριζον αὐτήν). They fall at her feet, and she wonders who they are. Amazed by their explanation, at last (μόγισ) she recovers and recognizes (γνωρίσασα) them, hugs them, and hears Habrocomes’s story.

Finale: Everyone in Rhodes is happy that the lovers have found each other, except . . . Habrocomes, the *pars in causa* who does not know yet. But as soon as he finds out, he runs like a madman crying out Anthia’s name until, next to Isis’s temple, he meets her: “When they saw each other, they recognized each other at once, for this was their souls’ desire.”¹²⁵ As is customary in such scenes, they embrace and fall on the ground.¹²⁶

To the taste of a modern reader, this string of episodes is clumsy. First, it is exceedingly repetitive, satisfying the author’s penchant for doublets and parallelisms.¹²⁷ The two recognitions unfold almost identically: both Habrocomes and Anthia are discovered, examined, and eventually recognized by the servants. “Formulaic” recurrences of words in the two episodes point up the doubling.¹²⁸ Second, the players’ lack of perceptiveness seems ridiculously unrealistic. As suggested earlier, dramatists privilege recognitions between characters who do not know each other’s features, or if they do, as in *Alcestis*, the playwright takes care to cover one character’s face and keep her quiet. The only recognition scene in drama in which the two parties know each other’s appearance and voice and

¹²⁴ συμβάλλουσι δὲ πάντα, <τὸν ἔρωτα>, <τὰ> δάκρυα, τὰ ἀναθήματα, τὰ ὀνόματα, τὸ εἶδος (5.12.3).

¹²⁵ ὡς δὲ εἶδον ἀλλήλους, εὐθὺς ἀνεγνώρισαν· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐβούλοντο αἰ ψυχαί (5.13.3).

¹²⁶ My distribution is slightly different from Zimmermann’s (1984, 324), who divides the narrative of the recognition into three main “acts.”

¹²⁷ On Xenophon’s weakness for the number 2, see Schmeling 1980, especially 91–93; Ruiz-Montero 1988, 154.

¹²⁸ O’ Sullivan (1995, 142, n. 88) notes ἔκειντο Ἀχανεῖς (5.12.4), of Leucon and Rhode about to recognize Anthia, and Ἀχανεῖς ἐγένοντο (5.10.11), as they are about to recognize Habrocomes. Though the formula is sprinkled throughout the text (O’ Sullivan lists 2.4.5; 1.16.6; 4.2.2), the proximity of the repetition in the recognition scenes reinforces the impression that one repeats the other.

yet one persists in his misgivings about the other's identity is in *Helen*; but, as we have seen, Menelaus's failure to recognize Helen is both psychologically justifiable and thematically relevant. Xenophon's disregard for verisimilitude, to be sure, is less striking than it would be on the stage because he narrates, like Homer. The epic poet, however, does not go as far as to put an undisguised Odysseus in front of Euryclea and yet assume that for long she does not realize his identity. The paradoxes of the recognition scene(s) in Xenophon are unacceptable to a reader looking for even a minimum of plausibility, and at first seem to have no thematic justification. How can we possibly believe that the two servants, who have lived with the young couple for some time and not long before the reunion occurs, do not immediately recognize them? And how can we accept that Habrocomes likewise does not recognize his servants, and that they take some time (κατὰ μικρόν) to recognize him even after he has explained who he is? And again, we cannot believe that Anthia in the same fashion needs time to recognize the servants after they have explained themselves to her. Was Xenophon so sloppy a writer as not to notice these problems?¹²⁹

Harking Back to Tradition

This reader's spontaneous answer is yes, Xenophon was sloppy. But I will not yield to my prejudice, and instead will play Xenophon's advocate and give him credit, imagining what good reasons he might have had to build the recognition as he did. While to our taste its total lack of verisimilitude is offensive, it probably did not bother ancient readers in the same way, because it is balanced by the scene's drawn-out choreography, a most attractive feature for readers steeped in a tradition that gives sustained preference to elaborate recognitions. Though playwrights are sensitive to plausibility in constructing recognition scenes, they do not, for all that, sacrifice complexity to plausibility. As we have seen, by avoiding recognitions between characters who should recognize each other instantly, or, as in *Alcestis*, by removing such telltale marks of identity as appearance and the voice, they show themselves concerned with producing highly structured and long-lasting recognition scenes.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ With the majority of scholars, I assume that the text we have is the original, not an epitome: see especially O'Sullivan 1995 and Hägg 2004a. Whatever the case, the main advocate for the epitome theory, Bürger, did not consider the recognition sequence abridged in any of its parts. See his list of the allegedly epitomized sections in Hägg 2004a.

¹³⁰ An instantaneous recognition by appearance occurs in Menander's *Epitrepontes*, by the courtesan Habrotonon of the mother of the child she is holding (857–60). This immediate recognition, however, does not take away from the complexity of the scene: it is only one step in a long process of reconstruction, which starts with the discovery of a traditional token (a ring), continues with

Xenophon seems to be playing up traditional patterns of recognition. In particular, he seems to have dramatic recognition scenes in mind, in that he alludes to the games of reasoning typical of some of them in the final stretch of his, where he says of the servants “they put everything together,” all the elements of the “puzzle.” His emphasis on reasoning in the process of recognition might also echo Aristotle’s classification of types of *anagnōrisis*.¹³¹ The philosopher identifies recognitions “by reasoning” (ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ) as a major category, and one that has his approval because the recognition comes about through pure inferences: an example is Orestes’s in *Choephoroe* (in Aristotle’s biased reading: “someone similar to me [Electra] has come; only Orestes is similar to me; therefore Orestes has come”).¹³² In the Aristotelian classification, Xenophon’s recognition would fall between those with tokens (the worst kind) and those relying on reasoning (the second best).

Another feature of the scene that fits both traditional patterns and the Aristotelian analysis is its resorting to memory. Aristotle identifies recognitions “by memory” as those in which the character to be recognized is moved by some happening—the sight of an object, the hearing of a story—to remember events of his life and betrays his emotion, thus prompting the recognition (*Poet.* 54b 37–55a 4). A well-known example, given by the philosopher, is the episode in the *Odyssey* in which Demodocus’s songs cause Odysseus to weep and consequently Alcinous to suspect that his guest is somehow connected to the events sung by the bard. (Likewise, Menelaus’s reminiscing about Odysseus provokes Telemachus’s tears and involuntary self-disclosure.) In Xenophon both Anthia and Habrocomes, as always identical in their experiences and feelings, at the sight of the offering they dedicated at the beginning of their journey and of their former servants’ inscription, weep and lament their fate, remembering their past happiness and present misfortune. Their emotional breakdowns facilitate the recognition: in the case of Habrocomes, though the servants do not recognize him as soon as they see him, they are encouraged by his behavior to ask him what he is doing, and from his answer eventually understand who he is also because he remembers Anthia. In Anthia’s case, her recollection of the past stirs her into dedicating her hair, which gesture sets off the chain of events leading to her recognition. Neither

Habrotonon’s search for the mother, and is complicated by the shared belief that Habrotonon herself is the mother. In addition, the token remains in the foreground even after Habrotonon has recognized the child’s mother (866–67), and the chief figure involved, the father, does not yet know the truth.

¹³¹ It is quite possible that Xenophon knew the *Poetics*: see 5.7.4 with Tilg 2010, 87.

¹³² *Poet.* 55a 2–6. Cave (1988, 247) points out that the actual process of recognition in this scene runs quite differently, and that Aristotle purifies it of all material signs and reduces it to sheer reasoning.

Anthia nor Habrocomes, to be sure, are trying to keep their identity hidden, as Odysseus is. Their reminiscing is given free rein. There is no tension between the character's attempt at restraint and the uncontrollable force of an emotion that gushes out. But as far as results, memory in all these cases favors recognition.

Rather than finding the scene offensive to his taste, a reader of Xenophon's time might have taken it as a parody of canonical recognitions or at least have been amused by it. Its length and overall structure do not simply hark back to familiar recognitions, especially from drama, but single out and distort some of their features. For instance, the active role of the servants in bringing about the recognition may be reminiscent of Euripides's *Electra*, in which likewise a servant, Agamemnon's old pedagogue, causes Electra to recognize her brother by examining him attentively (283–84). (This pattern is also used in comedy, for instance at the end of *Menaechmi*, in line with the inventiveness of slaves typical of the genre.)¹³³ Except that Euripides's servant quickly understands that it is Orestes he has before his eyes, and this even though Orestes was taken away at a very young age. Leucon and Rhode, in contrast, are awkwardly obtuse, and their denseness is all the more laughable that they have been severed from their masters for a relatively short time. In addition, though Xenophon, like the tragedians, makes use of reasoning as a means to recognition, the reasoning is a basic one, not the complex chain of deductions we find in, say, *Oedipus Rex* or, in Aristotle's selective interpretation, *Choephoroe*. The reasoning is so poor and deals with the obvious: a reader used to the sophisticated inferences drawn in some tragic recognitions smiles at the stupidity of Xenophon's characters in the face of such blatant evidence.

One more indication that Xenophon might be singling out and playing with features of tragic recognition scenes lies in the central role of Anthia's hair as token. Since in earlier literature, at least from what we can judge, hair functions as *gnōrisma* only in the various versions of Orestes's recognition by Electra,¹³⁴ it is quite possible that Xenophon is consciously referring to it. Already in the late fifth century the role of Orestes's lock as token was proverbial. "Now this Comedy," we read in Aristophanes's *Clouds*, "like that famous Electra, has come to see if somewhere She can find spectators as smart. For She will recognize, if She sees it, Her brother's lock."¹³⁵ Specifically, Aristophanes's joke alludes to

¹³³ Vuillemin (1984, 244–45) contends that the first playwright to devolve the recognition to an interpreter is Sophocles in *Electra*, where Chrysothemis reads her finding of Orestes's lock to Electra (871–919). But, apart from raising chronological problems (Euripides's *Electra* could be earlier), this argument disregards the fact that Electra does not believe her sister.

¹³⁴ Before Aeschylus, the lock appeared in Stesichorus's *Oresteia*: see Solmsen 1967, 31.

¹³⁵ νῦν οὖν Ἡλέκτραν κατ' ἐκείνην ἥδ' ἡ κομφοδία/ζητοῦσ' ἦλθ', ἣν πού 'πιτύχη θεαταῖς οὕτω σοφοῖς/- γνώσεται γάρ, ἥνπερ ἴδῃ, τὰδελεφού τὸν βόστρυχον (534–36).

Aeschylus's version of the recognition, in which Electra is all aflutter when she sees the lock and instantly believes it to be Orestes's, yet she is not willing to accept that the man she has before her in flesh and bones is Orestes, and earns his reproach for trusting the lock more than his presence and words.¹³⁶ The behavior of Leucon and Rhode is redolent of that scene, since they also look at Anthia's hair thinking to see Anthia herself, but when she appears before them, they hesitate to recognize her: the lock inspires more certainty than physical presence, and in this case not of someone unknown to the recognizer, as Orestes is to Electra. Xenophon seems to be exaggerating, or even perhaps parodying, the signature-trait of a well-known tragic recognition scene.

Finality

The slowness of the recognition process is matched by the slowing down of the narrative tempo. This *rallentando* contrasts sharply with the normally fast pace of Xenophon's novel, which rushes on from episode to episode with little care for particulars, perhaps owing to the author's "insufficient imagination."¹³⁷ If Xenophon had limited resources, he apparently saved them for the recognition, which he stages in great detail. The slow pace of the recognition and its drawn-out choreography satisfy the readers' much-whetted appetite for the lovers' reunion. For in the pages preceding their arrival in Rhodes, Anthia and Habrocomes seem to pursue a breathless chase in each other's footsteps all along the Mediterranean shores, and regularly to miss each other. The unsuccessful chase builds up expectations for the couple's reconnection;¹³⁸ and those expectations are finally rewarded by a protracted account of it.

Moreover, the prolongation and slow pace of the recognition scene alert the readers that the novel is reaching its climax and, with it, its end. The finality of recognition is, to be sure, a generic pattern: whether by family or between the lovers, recognitions in the novels tend to be the most decisive factor for the story's ending. In this respect, novelistic recognitions are akin to those in comedy rather than tragedy, for the typical comic recognition brings the plot to its resolution, whereas tragic recognitions, though they always mark an emotional high point and close a chapter, often relaunch the action. In several tragedies the culminating recognition is followed by a new development (caused or encouraged by the reversal that the recognition determines in the relation between characters and in one character's individual position): Orestes plans for the murder of

¹³⁶ As Solmsen (1967, 6) notes, however, Electra does not quite see Orestes in the lock but hopes it is his. In Sophocles it is Chrysothemis who sees Orestes in the lock (*El.* 878).

¹³⁷ See Hägg 1983, 21, and 2004a, 162.

¹³⁸ See Zimmermann 1984, 320–23.

Clytemnestra;¹³⁹ Iphigenia and Orestes must find a way to flee; and so do Helen and Menelaus, who are in the grip of the direst uncertainties (will the prophetess Theonoe save them by her silence or denounce Menelaus's presence to her brother?). In some cases the playwright turns the page and prepares for the building of new momentum by silencing the emotional expressions that follow the recognition and asking its protagonists to move on (in the recognitions involving Orestes and his sisters).¹⁴⁰ Conversely, in comedy as in the novel, recognitions generally do not build a new *noeud* but accelerate the *dénouement*.¹⁴¹

Novelistic recognitions, however, do not have the same degree of finality. As we have seen, in Chariton the lovers' recognition, in spite of the "Hollywood kiss" that signs it and of the frame announcing closure, does not mark the end of their troubles. In a way, their position is similar to that of Orestes and Iphigenia or of Helen and Menelaus, whom an uncertain journey home awaits. As in Orestes's and Electra's case, a third party, Polycharmus, warns the lovers who have just recognized each other not to overindulge their happiness because to do so would not be safe: "Remember that you are not at home but in an enemy country."¹⁴² Chariton spells out that his narrative does not end with the lovers' reunion by introducing two more recognitions, the last of which marks the culmination of another climactic episode. The journey back to Syracuse is followed by the couple's reintegration into their society, and a return to the world of the opening pages. Chaereas offers a detailed recapitulation of the novel's highlights to all the Syracusans¹⁴³ in the same theater where the crowd assembled at the beginning to plead for the couple's marriage. At the very end, Callirhoe prays in the same temple where she had prayed when she had met Chaereas, and asks for the same favor she had asked then ("Give me the man you showed me!" "Don't part me from him!"). By harking back to the beginnings of the story Chariton tells the reader that the novel has come full circle with the lovers' *nostos*, that this is where it ends.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ The place and importance accorded to the recognition, however, is different in the three tragedies that stage it. It occurs soon in the action of *Choephoroe* and of Euripides's *Electra*, which culminate with the murder, whereas it is the climax in Sophocles's *Electra*. See Hoffmann 1910, 13–17; Solmsen 1967; Zeitlin 2012.

¹⁴⁰ See Aesch. *Cho.* 264–68; Soph. *El.* 1322–23; Eur. *El.* 596–99; *IT* 902–906. See also Eur. *Hel.* 776.

¹⁴¹ Duckworth (1967, 153) notes that in most comic plays "the solution of the plot depends upon the *anagnōrisis*, not upon the successful outcome of the deception." He lists *Heautontimoroumenos* and *Phormio* as exceptions, in which "the revelation of identity complicates the action and increases the fears of the characters" (p. 160. See also pp. 155, 157, 389; Webster 1974, 58–59).

¹⁴² μέμνησθε δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι ἐστέ, ἀλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ γῆ (Callirhoe 8.1.9).

¹⁴³ Chaereas had recounted his adventures to Callirhoe in detail on the night of their reunion (8.1.17: ἀκριβῶς διηγήσατο), but we are given only the author's summary report.

¹⁴⁴ For more parallels between the beginning of the novel and its closure in Syracuse, see Ruiz-Montero 1988, 84. See also S. D. Smith 2007, 190–91.

By contrast, Xenophon truly ends his narrative with the couple's reunion. The circle is drawn uncompleted, not in Ephesus, the lovers' homeland, but on Rhodes. Rhodes is the narrative equivalent to Aradus in Chariton insofar as both islands host the recognition but are not the lovers' homeland or their intended final destination. However, whereas Chaereas and Callirhoe have never been on Aradus before, the temple of Helios in Rhodes, the setting of the recognition in Xenophon, is the same that Anthia and Habrocomes visited on their journey out;¹⁴⁵ and to the offerings presented then respond the offerings presented now. In addition, an unusually slow pace marks both the recognition scene and the opening of the novel, which dwells in detail on the lovers' first encounter, the growth of their passion, the puzzlement of their families, the consultation of the oracle, their marriage, and their departure. These correspondences highlight the climactic finality of the recognition.

Another indicator that the story truly ends in Rhodes is the active presence there of the crowd with its cheering role: whereas in Chariton a crowd not only applauds the couple's reunion in Aradus (8.1.11) but also welcomes them home with shouts never heard before and rushes to the theater to listen to their story, in Xenophon the crowd vocally celebrates only the lovers' recovery of each other: "The Rhodians cheered and shouted in their excitement, hailing Isis as a great goddess and exclaiming, 'Now once again we see Habrocomes and Anthia, the beautiful pair!'"¹⁴⁶ We are again sent back to the beginning, when a crowd vocally praised the beauty of the protagonists (1.2) and their union (1.7.3–4). In contrast, the crowd's participation in the lovers' return is unmarked and muted. Though the "whole city" of Ephesus knows that they are alive and well even before they disembark (5.15.2), their arrival does not provoke resounding acclamations like those that fill the harbor of Syracuse in *Callirhoe*. The people's presence is to be assumed but remains unheard: they are not even reported to cheer or to share the sacrifices with the couple. And because the protagonists' parents are dead, there is no further reunion; nor is there any sharing their story with their native community. Whereas in Chariton the importance of filling the gap that separated the protagonists (*Callirhoe* especially) from their community is reflected in the configuration of the return episode as a second recognition-reunion, in Xenophon the prominence of the lovers' recognition of each other suggests that stronger emphasis is placed on the restoration of marriage, on "getting back one's own," rather than on reintegration into the community.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Schmeling (1980, 33) notes that the return to the same temple alerts the readers that the reunion is near.

¹⁴⁶ ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ Ῥοδίων ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ ἀνωλόλυξε, μεγάλην θεὸν ἀνακαλοῦντες τὴν Ἴσιν, "πάλιν" λέγοντες "ὁρῶμεν Ἀβροκόμην καὶ Ἀνθίαν τοὺς καλοὺς" (5.13.3–4).

¹⁴⁷ "Getting back one's own" is Whitmarsh's formula (2011, 147). While I agree with his point that the restoration of marriage overrides the recovery of community, I find it incompatible with his reading of the return as "culminating" (p. 49).

The Quickness of a Lover's Eye

The slow tempo of the recognition scene, then, structurally signals the momentous importance of that scene as the truly final episode of the novel. No more pressure is put on the characters to embark on a new adventure, or on the readers to find out the rest of the story.

There is, however, also a thematic rationale to the slowness of the scene: it brings out, by contrast, the immediacy of its final stretch, the lovers' recognition of each other. Xenophon stresses the self-evident fact that "as soon as they saw each other, they immediately recognized each other." How could they not? They have not been separated for decades, they do not wear disguises, they have even been informed about each other, and Habrocomes on his way to Anthia has been crying out her name like one possessed. Xenophon's emphasis on the obvious suggests that we are supposed to read the reunion as an *anagnōrismos* in due form, the last recognition of the series;¹⁴⁸ and it is one that sets the lovers' quick gaze off against the dense gaze of those surrounding them, both the servants and, for the reader who remembers two previous episodes, Hippothous.

Before he bought her and took her to Rhodes, Hippothous had dealings with Anthia on two occasions, when his band captured her, intending to sacrifice her, and when he snatched her from an Indian prince. Curiously Hippothous and Anthia do not recognize each other the second time around (4.3.6), and she lies about her name. The name change makes little sense from Anthia's point of view, since she does not recognize Hippothous. A reader who would wish to endow her behavior with psychological meaning could perhaps attribute it to shyness, fear, or "feminine modesty," a defensive recoiling in response to Hippothous's unabashed question "Who are you and from where?"¹⁴⁹ Be that as it may, her made-up identity is to the advantage of the author, for Hippothous would have recognized her by her name (Habrocomes, or perhaps Anthia herself, had told it to him: see 3.3.4–5). As Perry puts it,¹⁵⁰ the name change helps Xenophon "to get his protagonists into more trouble by their telling of lies about themselves, thereby thickening the plot of their adventures." More specifically, a likely reason for this implausible lack of recognition and unmotivated change of name is that the reader has already had indications that Hippothous will serve as an agent reuniting the lovers. He told Habrocomes of Anthia's whereabouts, accompanied him in his search, and looked for him when he left the band. Xenophon

¹⁴⁸ So does Zimmermann (1984, 327): "Unmittelbar, nachdem beide Partner einander ansichtig geworden, erfolgt der *ἀναγνωρισμός*."

¹⁴⁹ *ὅποτε δέ αὐτῆς πύθοιτο ἥτις τε εἶη καὶ πόθεν* (4.3.6). Editors of the text have been puzzled by Hippothous's question and have put it in someone else's (τις) mouth.

¹⁵⁰ Perry 1967, 289.

possibly felt that a recognition between Hippothous and Anthia at this point risked short-circuiting the story and bringing the novel to a premature closure; and in order for more adventures to happen, he blinded Anthia to Hippothous's identity and vice versa and added the name change to secure the mistake.

When the story is ripe for an end, Anthia and Hippothous meet again: this time he recognizes her and rescues her by buying her from a pimp (5.9.5). The scene recalls comic recognitions occurring in a brothel and foreshadows Christian narratives with a similar motif.¹⁵¹ There are two main variants of it: either, as in Christian texts, the man goes to the brothel in disguise with the expressed intention to rescue a woman he already knows; or he does not know that the girl in the brothel is who she is, as in comedy. This scene follows the latter model more closely, for Hippothous finds Anthia accidentally, but contaminates it, so to speak, with the former by having him recognize her *and then* buy her, as in the Christian texts in which the savior buys the woman's services to get her out of the brothel.

From a naturalistic viewpoint, this scene is even weirder than the previous failed recognition. Hippothous this time recognizes Anthia as soon as he sees her and he asks her whether she has ever visited Egypt, where they had been together. Remembering (*ἀναμνησθεῖσα*) all her toils there but not recognizing Hippothous, she tells him of her suffering in a summary fashion, and at the same time asks him how he has heard of her misfortunes. Hippothous recognizes her for sure as his Egyptian captive, by her words: again, reminiscing leads to recognition. But how can she not recognize him, especially at hearing his voice? After he takes her to his house he discloses his identity to her, and she asks for forgiveness for having killed his fellow brigand, Anchialus, who wanted to rape her, and tells him how she was saved from the fierce dogs that were put in the pit with her. Hippothous, who seems to have identified the woman only as his former captive, not as Anthia (or Habrocomes's wife), gradually falls in love with her and presses her to yield to his desire. She then reveals all she has kept secret so far: "She spoke of Habrocomes, of Ephesus, their love, their oaths, her misfortunes, the pirates, and kept weeping over Habrocomes."¹⁵² At last Hippothous realizes that she is Anthia and treats her with every attention.

Weird though it may seem, this slow recognition process fosters the episode's development. Hippothous's failure to identify the woman as Anthia makes his

¹⁵¹ The reference to comic equivalents is in Ruiz-Montero 1988, 141, adducing Thompson 1955, H 11, Plautus's *Poenulus*, and Arist. *Poet.* 54b37–55a. Christian stories of recognition of a prostitute are *The Life of Abraham and Mary* and *The Story of Symeon and Salome* (though in the fragments of the latter the recognition is missing): see Boulhol 1996, 75–76; 169.

¹⁵² λέγει τὸν Ἀβροκόμην, τὴν Ἑφεσον, τὸν ἔρωτα, τοὺς ὄρκους, τὰς συμφοράς, τὰ ληστήρια καὶ συνεχῆς Ἀβροκόμην ἀνωδύρετο (5.9.12).

falling in love with her less blamable (the reader recalls that he has a strong affection for Habrocomes, quite possibly one that borders on erotic attraction),¹⁵³ thus assuring the reader that Hippothous is a good fellow, worthy of helping the lovers as he indeed is about to do. With a touch of delicacy he refrains from asking Anthia to disclose her identity: “Hippothous felt pity for her and had not yet asked her who she was.”¹⁵⁴ His respect for the woman’s privacy contrasts sharply with his directness in their previous encounter, when he behaved aggressively as the captor he was. By pointing up the contrast with verbal echoes,¹⁵⁵ Xenophon refashions his Hippothous as a thoroughly sympathetic figure in preparation for his role as agent in the lovers’ reunion.

This note of characterization, however, is also a narrative ploy, again to the author’s advantage. By “allowing” Hippothous to fall in love, his ignorance gives rise to a situation bordering on those in tragedy in which something awful is about to happen because of ignorance when recognition occurs and forestalls violence. In the novel’s romantic rewriting of that kind of tragic situation, the threat of sexual assault (Hippothous is pressing) is the equivalent to the threat of murder; as in tragedy enmity is converted into friendship subsequent to the fortunate recognition, in this scene *epithymia*, desire, turns into *epimeleia*, loving care.¹⁵⁶

Hippothous’s ignorance provides the novelist with yet another advantage: it causes Anthia to tell the rest of her story and especially about her love for Habrocomes, thus correcting a “fault” of asymmetry. Hippothous knew only that Habrocomes loved Anthia to distraction; now he learns also that Anthia loves Habrocomes in the same way. The delayed recognition satisfies Xenophon’s taste for doublets by pushing Anthia to tell Hippothous her story as Habrocomes had told him his—a story that repeats Habrocomes’s by putting emphasis on love and misfortunes (see 3.3.1 and 5.9.12).

Perhaps more important, however, Hippothous’s slowness in identifying Anthia and her failure to recognize him have the effect of setting Habrocomes’s true love off against Hippothous’s fickle and superficial erotic interest, as well as Anthia’s rejection of him. Hippothous did not fall in love at first sight or even the second time around; and he still finds it easy to renounce his desire as soon as he discovers Anthia’s love for Habrocomes. The reader knows that Hippothous’s erotic preferences, even after the death of his darling Hyperanthes, go to boys: when he buys Anthia from the pimp, he is sharing his life and wealth with a

¹⁵³ Schmeling (1980, 52, n. 254) contends that Habrocomes and Hippothous might have had an intimate relationship.

¹⁵⁴ κατ’ὥκτειρεν αὐτήν ὁ Ἱππόθοος καὶ ἥτις μὲν ἦν ἐπέπυστο οὐδέπω (5.9.11).

¹⁵⁵ See 4.3.6: ὅποτε . . . πύθοιτο ἥτις ἦν, and 5.9.11: ἥτις . . . ἦν ἐπέπυστο οὐδέπω.

¹⁵⁶ Another parallel are comedies in which a brother falls in love with his sister without knowing their relationship and incest is avoided at the last moment by recognition.

handsome lad (5.9.3). He is also so strongly attached to Habrocomes that, when he recognizes Anthia in the woman he “loves,” he calls her “the wife of the man . . . the dearest [to me].”¹⁵⁷ If Hippothous falls for Anthia, it is because Xenophon cannot help draw yet another symmetrical sequence in the adventures of the two lovers, all the more so now that Hippothous is about to play the intermediary in their reunion. The man attached or attracted to Habrocomes “must” for a moment become attracted to Anthia in order to fulfill his role of helper with an equidistant, or equally involved, disposition.

To these episodes of failed or delayed recognition we can oppose not only the lovers’ immediate recognition of each other but also Habrocomes’s promptness in recognizing Anthia even without seeing her, just from Hippothous’s description of a girl he met: “She was very beautiful, Habrocomes, and simply dressed; her hair was golden, and she had lovely eyes.’ While he was still speaking, Habrocomes exclaimed: ‘It was my Anthia you saw!’”¹⁵⁸

Xenophon’s emphasis on the sharpness of a lover’s eye takes us back to Chariton. The two novels share a worldview in which love cannot make mistakes in identifying its object. Chaereas recognizes his beloved in a statue, Habrocomes in a description. In both novels the lovers recognize each other instantly just as they fell in love at first sight. Their recognition replicates their first encounter: their first recognition of each other’s perfection.¹⁵⁹ To stress the immediacy of love and the uniqueness of the beloved, in staging the lovers’ recognition both novels go against tradition by disposing of the paraphernalia that dress up recognition scenes. Xenophon transfers those paraphernalia to the long preamble, the recognition of Anthia and Habrocomes by the servants, leaving the road to the lovers’ recognition of each other clear of all artificiality. Chariton disposes of tokens altogether, choosing instead two intangible and natural signs of identity, breathing and the voice, as the means to recognition. In the literary tradition that begins with the *Odyssey*, the characters’ behavior in recognition scenes tends to be marked by diffidence or incredulity, which thematically justifies the testing that builds the episodes’ complexity.¹⁶⁰ In Chariton’s and Xenophon’s novels, the couple’s direct recognition of each other unfolds quickly and simply because lovers need no other proof of identity than their love.

¹⁵⁷ γυνή τοῦ πάντων . . . φιλάτου (5.9.13).

¹⁵⁸ “ἦν δὲ καλὴ πάνν, Ἀβροκόμη, καὶ ἐσταλμένη λιτῶς· κόμη ξανθή, χαρίεντες ὀφθαλμοί.” ἔτι λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ἀνεβόησεν Ἀβροκόμης “τὴν ἐμὴν Ἀνθιανέωρακας” (3.3.5).

¹⁵⁹ See Létoublon 1993, 141: in the Greek novel “l’amour est la reconnaissance dans l’autre d’une perfection dont on est soi-même un représentant, perfection que l’autre aussi est obligé de déceler immédiatement.”

¹⁶⁰ When the addressee’s loyalty is not in doubt, as in Laertes’s case, the multiplication of tests is symbolic, acting as a confirmation of integrity: see Gainsford 2003, 49.

You Are the Same!

Though in both Chariton's and Xenophon's novels the recognition celebrates the lovers' intensity and identity of feelings, in Xenophon's it is also a denial of change. A complex issue in a person's recognition of another is its relationship with the passing of time. Whom do I recognize when I say that I recognize a man as my husband or father? In the most literal sense, recognition of someone's identity is a movement backward: knowing again, recovering the past. This also means denying change. The person who is recognized may have changed, but what the other recognizes is only what he can fit into his knowledge of that person: that person is recognized in spite of the change. Greek literature points up this "regressive" character of recognitions by associating them with return, as in the *Odyssey*, in Euripides's recognition plays, and in the novels.

It can surely be objected that returning is not tantamount to wishing to efface the passing of time. As a matter of fact, that wish is not inscribed in all the Greek texts that combine recognition with return. A hero's return to his native country can result not only in his reinstatement, as in the *Odyssey*, but also in his accession to a new position in society subsequent to its recognition of his transformation. This pattern can be detected in the novels, which, as Sophie Lalanne has shown,¹⁶¹ tell the story of a "rite of passage," at the end of which the grown-up pair are ready to assume adult roles and responsibilities in their native community. In Xenophon's novel, however, the recognition is regressive, for the protagonists recognize each other for exactly and only what they were before the separation, and their community does not acknowledge their trials publicly by listening to their story.¹⁶² In this respect Xenophon's novel significantly differs from Chariton's, which places special emphasis on the couple's coming-of-age in connection with their recognitions, both of each other and by their fellow citizens.

In Chariton, the lovers' recognition incorporates the hero's achievements. It happens only after Chaereas has proven himself on the battlefield and because he occupies a position of authority, as chief commander. I have suggested that this pattern calls to mind Odysseus's recognition by Penelope, which also occurs after the hero has proven himself, by killing the suitors. But there is a crucial difference: Odysseus must prove to be as he was before he left for Troy. Because his predicament is owing to the passing of time, to his long absence and the rising of a younger generation, the suitors', he can hope to gain the upper hand only if he still is the Odysseus he was twenty years earlier.¹⁶³ As Sheila

¹⁶¹ Lalanne 2006.

¹⁶² The inscription Anthia and Habrocomes dedicate with the story of their adventures is in thanksgiving to the gods, and does not involve the community in the same way as Chaereas's speech.

¹⁶³ See Murnaghan 2011, 10. See also Cave 1988, 23: Odysseus, by slaughtering the suitors, goes through "a second puberty rite" before he can have Penelope again.

Murnaghan notes, for Penelope to recognize Odysseus, he has to recover the appearance he had when he left Ithaca.¹⁶⁴ Chaereas, in contrast, to be recognized must prove that he has matured and grown into an efficient leader and a brave warrior.¹⁶⁵ An underlying model for his *aristeia* is Diomedes (7.3.5; 7.4.6), the young hero who undergoes a military initiation. And, like Diomedes, Chaereas earns authority as a speaker from his feats of arms (8.2.10–13). Chariton spells out that the lovers' recognition includes the recognition of Chaereas's accomplishments by showing his hero overeager to tell his recovered wife all about those accomplishments on the very night of their reunion. The newly minted epic warrior wants to display a detailed narrative of his feats: "I have not disgraced you. I have filled land and sea with trophies of victory." And he gave her an exact account of it all, taking pride in his successes."¹⁶⁶ Chaereas is not in a hurry to finish his story.

Nor is he at the end, when he narrates his deeds again, this time before the people of Syracuse. This last recognition of the novel, too, is an acknowledgment of change within permanence. As Lalanne notes, Chaereas is greeted by "the ephebes of his class" (συνέφηβοι), Callirhoe by "women" (γυναικες), to whom she appears even more beautiful.¹⁶⁷ These details emphasize the protagonists' readmission into their society as adults. Just as Chaereas's recognition of and by his wife concludes and rewards his military achievements, the couple's recognition by the people of Syracuse enthrones them, as it were, subsequent to the tests they have successfully passed. Chaereas's political debut consists in the public recounting of those tests, which thus become the "official documents" of the couple's achieved adulthood. The adventures are integrated into the lovers' recognition, reunion, and return.

Not so in Xenophon's novel. The lovers there take no pleasure in telling their stories to each other. Though they share their adventures with their friends (5. 13. 5), they devote their first night after the recognition not to a more intimate or extensive exchange of stories but to reassuring each other that in spite of all that happened, they are the same as when they left. Anthia lists only the "temptations" she has resisted ("No one persuaded me to go astray: not Moeris in Syria, Perilaus in Cilicia, Psammiss or Polyidus in Egypt, not Anchialus in Ethiopia, not my master in Tarentum") so as to come back "the same as when I first left you in

¹⁶⁴ *Od.* 23.175–76, with Murnaghan 2011, 11. Murnaghan, however, also notes that Penelope, at the moment of recognition, acknowledges that time lost cannot be made up for mortals (p. 106: see *Od.* 23.210–12).

¹⁶⁵ See Lalanne 2006, 90–92.

¹⁶⁶ "ἀλλ' οὐ κατήσχηνά σε. πεπλήρωκα γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν τροπαίων." καὶ πάντα ἀκριβῶς δηγήσατο, ἐναβρυνόμενος τοῖς κατορθώμασιν (8.1.17).

¹⁶⁷ See 8.6.11 with Lalanne 2006, 94–95.

Tyre for Syria.”¹⁶⁸ Habrocomes is even less expansive. He only tells Anthia, “no maiden pleased my eyes”—which is all she wants to know—“but you have found Habrocomes as pure as you left him in the prison in Tyre.”¹⁶⁹ Their adventures are recalled only negatively, as testing boards against which the lovers have asserted their unchanged feelings for each other. Their eyes have “seen always the same objects,” as Anthia wished on their wedding night.¹⁷⁰

The Lovers’ Passivity and the Mode of Their Recognition

Hippothous, once turned from a pressing suitor of Anthia to her friend, can play the role of go-between to bring the couple back together. Rhode and Leucon serve a similar function in the recognition scene, though as interpreters, not initiators. While Hippothous takes Anthia to the temple and allows her to cut her hair, whereby he sets off her recognition (5.12.1), the servants read the evidence. I have suggested that their role in the recognition process might be reminiscent of dramatic treatments, especially Euripides’s *Electra*, in which the recognition of Orestes by Agamemnon’s old servant brings about the siblings’ reunion.

This possible literary reminiscence highlights the protagonists’ passivity even in the decisive act of their drama. As Barbara Goff has shown, Euripides’s choice of token for Orestes’s recognition, a scar, harks back to the scar of Odysseus but does not signify a coming-of-age, as Odysseus’s does. Rather, it signals a regression. The scar is the reminder of a childhood fall, in the paternal house, and of a failed attempt to kill a relatively tame beast, a deer.¹⁷¹ The manner of Orestes’s recognition further brings out his inability to take control. Orestes is exposed by the ambulatory scrutiny of the old servant, while he stands still (*El.* 561–76). The servants’ activity in Xenophon’s novel likewise confirms the protagonists in their role as objects, more than subjects, of their adventures.

It is commonplace to say that the protagonists of the Greek novels as a whole tend to lack initiative, especially the young men.¹⁷² Though this judgment is too sweeping, to a great extent it applies to Habrocomes.¹⁷³ He is the only novelistic

¹⁶⁸ ἀλλ’ ἤκω σοι τοιαύτη . . . οἷα τὸ πρῶτον ἀπηλλάγην εἰς Συρίαν ἐκ Τύρου· ἔπεισε δέ με ἁμαρτεῖν οὐδεὶς, οὐ Μοῖρις ἐν Συρίᾳ, οὐ Περίλαος ἐν Κιλικίᾳ, οὐκ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Ψάμμις καὶ Πολύιδος, οὐκ Ἀγχιάλος ἐν Αἰθιοπία, οὐκ ἐν Τάραντι ὁ δεσπότης (5.14.2).

¹⁶⁹ οὔτε παρθένος ἐμοὶ τις ἔδοξεν εἶναι καλή . . . ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον εἰληφας Ἀβροκόμην καθαρὸν, οἷον ἐν Τύρῳ κατέλιπες ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ (5.14.4).

¹⁷⁰ ἀεὶ βλέποιτε ταῦτά (1.9.8).

¹⁷¹ See Goff 1991.

¹⁷² See especially Hägg 1983, 210, n. 4; Konstan 1994, chapter 1.

¹⁷³ See the qualifications in Plazenet 1997, 380–81; Brethes 2007, 202–3. On the application to Habrocomes, see Lalanne 2006, 159–61.

hero who at the onset of love does not confess his devouring passion to anyone, either a parent (as do Chaereas and eventually Daphnis) or a friend (as do Clitophon and Theagenes). He is even less enterprising than his closest equivalent, Chaereas, whose formulaic response to misfortune is suicide, from which he is either deterred by his friend or prevented by circumstances. Yet the suicidal Chaereas, in addition to disclosing his love to his father, takes up a number of responsibilities in the name of it: he embarks on a search in grand style for Callirhoe twice, and in the end becomes an epic hero to punish the King. Habrocomes, in contrast, does nothing memorable. Though the largest part of his journey is in pursuit of Anthia, which goal gives impulse and structure to almost all of his movements and motivates his actions,¹⁷⁴ toward the end he grows more and more despondent, and eventually he gives up his search. His movements lose focus. After spending “a long time” (*χρόνος πολὺς*) in Syracuse, he is seized with “discouragement . . . and terrible despair” (*ἀθυμία . . . καὶ ἀπορία δεινή*), thinking that he will neither find Anthia nor reach his homeland, and decides to leave for Italy and then, if he should find nothing, to make the “unhappy journey” (*πλοῦν δυστυχῆ*) to Ephesus (5.6.1–2). When he arrives in Italy, he goes around looking for Anthia, the reason for his wandering (5.8.2), but soon loses hope and thinks her dead (5.8.4). At last, he decides to go back to Ephesus: the “unhappy journey,” the alternative to the search. Though “he hoped in the long navigation also to find something out about Anthia,” the search is no longer his goal but has become an afterthought.¹⁷⁵ As he reaches Rhodes, he has no more hope or energy to look for Anthia: he will go to Ephesus, mourn her, and kill himself (5.10.4–5). His movement is now purposeless: “He wandered around the city, in distress, despondent over Anthia, and destitute.”¹⁷⁶

Anthia is more inventive, but her initiatives are aimed exclusively at the preservation of chastity:¹⁷⁷ to keep herself for Habrocomes, she puts on a spectacular pretence of being epileptic (at the brothel) and even kills a man (Anchialus). She is right to boast that she has practiced “every device of virtue”¹⁷⁸—but only of virtue. She does not make momentous decisions otherwise (as do Callirhoe, Leucippe, or Chariclea). She does not even decide on her movements but is

¹⁷⁴ See 2.10.3; 2.12.2; 2.14.1; 2.14.4; 3.3.5; 3.9.2; 3.10.3; 4.4.2; 5.1.1–2; 5.8.1; 5.10.3.

¹⁷⁵ ἤλπιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ μακρῷ πλῶ καὶ περὶ Ἀνθίας τι πυνθέσθαι (5.10.2). A lack of single-mindedness characterized his movement already at 2.14.4, when he took up with Hippothous: “He also hoped . . . to find Anthia in the long wandering” (ἤλπιζε δὲ καὶ . . . ἐν τῇ πολλῇ πλάνῃ τὴν Ἀνθίαν εὕρῃσεν).

¹⁷⁶ περιήκει τὴν πόλιν ἀλύων, ἀπορία μὲν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀνθίαν, ἀπορία δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων (5.10.5).

¹⁷⁷ See Panayotakis 2002, 107.

¹⁷⁸ πᾶσαν σωφροσύνης μηχανήν (5.14.2).

always taken along, as prisoner or slave. (Contrast Leucippe and Chariclea when they choose to elope, or Chariclea when she sets out to search for Theagenes.) After killing Anchialus to keep her purity, she does not resolve on any action concerning her life, either suicide or escape, but resigns herself to “bear whatever will please god.”¹⁷⁹ Both she and Habrocomes are more “sufferers” than “doers,” as they themselves acknowledge at the end of their adventures by including in their story, in epic style, “all they suffered and did” (ὅσα τε ἔπαθον καὶ ὅσα ἔδρασαν: 5.15.3).¹⁸⁰ Readers will appreciate the telling reversal of Odysseus’s “doing and suffering” (ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη: *Od.* 4.242, 271), which brings out the gulf separating the epic hero, who creatively succeeds in getting the upper hand in difficult circumstances, and his novelistic counterparts, who, faced with comparable dangers, tend to let themselves be dragged by events.¹⁸¹

Given the protagonists’ lack of initiative, it is thematically appropriate that the recognition be the work of a third party. Just as at the beginning the lovers needed their parents in order to be brought together in marriage (had their parents not taken action to save them, they would have died in silence), now they need external agents to be reunited, with perfect circularity. The servants’ and Hippothous’s active role in the recognition is foreshadowed by their spirit of initiative in taking up the search for Anthia that Habrocomes abandons, and the search for Habrocomes that Anthia never undertakes. Thus Hippothous inquires everywhere about his friend (5.9.13) and then plans to go to Ephesus both to restore Anthia to her family and to try to find something out about him (5.11.1). Likewise, Rhode and Leucon go to the festival of Helios in Rhodes in the hope of finding something out about Anthia (5.11.3) and, after discovering her lock, “wander around” to see whether they can find her in person.¹⁸² Their purposeful inquiries prepare for their stage-management of the recognition.

Conversely, the protagonists are remarkably passive even in the recognition scene. When Leucon and Rhode recognize Habrocomes, he does not react. The recognition, though obviously mutual, is presented as one-sided: while they fall at his feet and tell him their story, he says nothing, lets himself be taken away, and

¹⁷⁹ φέρειν ὅτι ἂν τῷ δαίμονι δοκῇ (4.5.6). On one occasion Anthia flees, though only to a temple and not away from the man who is pressing her (5.4.6).

¹⁸⁰ On the epic flavor of the phrase see Hunter 2005b, 159, followed by Capra 2009, 42.

¹⁸¹ Though Xenophon, contrary to Chariton, does not cite Homer (or other authors), I think we can assume that he is alluding to *Odyssey* 4 in this passage because he seems to be alluding to the opening of the epic at 1.10.3, where the couple is sent on its journey to “see other lands and cities”: see Graverini 2007, 88, 159. An allusion to Odysseus at the end of the journey would be a fitting complement to one at the beginning, especially for a lover of symmetry such as Xenophon.

¹⁸² See 12.1.1: περιήεσαν, εἴ που κάκείνην εὐρεῖν δυνήσονται, picking up Habrocomes’s aimless περιήγει (5.10.5).

keeps weeping over Anthia. Enter Anthia, led by Hippothous. Her subordinate position reflects her status as slave, but also conveys her own passivity in the recognition about to occur (though Anthia at least takes the initiative of cutting a lock of hair for Habrocomes, whereas he, at the discovery of his servants' dedication and of the gift he and Anthia offered, only weeps). Finally, Habrocomes is the last to find out the happy ending of his own story—an ending to which he has contributed the least.

Beauty, Dress, and Identity

Leucippe and Clitophon: Teasing Expectations

Not Just to Help the Plot

Misidentifications and failures to recognize a character mark pivotal moments in Achilles Tatius's novel: Callisthenes arrives in Tyre with the plan of abducting Leucippe but kidnaps Calligone instead, taking her for Leucippe; Clitophon takes a dead woman for Leucippe and mourns "her," dearly embracing the stranger's body; finally, he fails to recognize Leucippe, who is standing before him in a slave's outfit and pleading to Melite, his wife-to-be.

These episodes of misrepresentation of identity play a paramount role in the advancement of the plot by causing decisive, unexpected, and otherwise inconceivable developments. Callisthenes's mistake, with the force of a *deus ex machina*, cancels Clitophon's marriage with Calligone, to whom he was betrothed; Clitophon's delusion that the dead woman is Leucippe prepares the terrain for his marriage with Melite while allowing him to keep a minimum of novelistic propriety, which would be entirely lost if he thought Leucippe to be alive; and his failure to recognize his beloved saves him from a likely show of emotions that would endanger his prospect of recovering her, since Melite loves him and Leucippe is her slave. In fact, Clitophon's inability to restrain himself when he discovers that Leucippe was the girl standing before him prompts Satyrus, his servant, to warn him not to rush to action, for "the woman you see [Melite] is the first lady of the Ephesians, madly in love with you, and we are all alone, surrounded by snares."¹ The shock of the discovery and subsequent rejection of Melite show on Clitophon's countenance (5.21.2). How much stronger would the shock of a face-to-face recognition have been!

In addition to advancing the plot by removing obstacles, however, these episodes of misidentification have a thematic significance, for they share a feature

¹ γυναῖκα ὁρᾷς πρώτην Ἐφεσίων μαινομένην ἐπὶ σοί, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐρήμους ἐν μέσαις ἄρκυσιν (5.5.19.4).

that can hardly be anodyne in a world, that of the ideal novel, where love is thought to be an unfailing guide: the author of the mistake is always a man in love, and the mistake always concerns the beloved. How can love miss the truth? A review of the episodes suggests that Achilles Tatius is playfully challenging novelistic stereotypes.²

Recognition and Self-Presentation

Before tackling Achilles Tatius's treatment of recognition, we have to remember that *Leucippe and Clitophon* is a layered narrative: Clitophon, the protagonist, recounts his own adventures to an unnamed listener who, in turn, reports them to us, apparently in the narrator's own words. A layered narrative always begs questions about point of view, focalization, and reliability: whose voice do we hear? And: is that voice telling us the "real story," what "really" happened to the acting characters?

The reporter or primary narrator invites the reader to disregard his presence because he overtly disappears after framing the narrative, and, once he has finished sharing Clitophon's story, he does not revert to the original frame in his own voice. The author stays out of the narrative altogether (there is no "this is the story I, Achilles Tatius, have composed," as in Chariton or Heliodorus). Thus, the answer to the question Whose voice do we hear? seems to be simple: Clitophon's. We should keep in mind, though, that his voice is at least one remove from the original: the primary narrator, no matter how self-effacing, might have filtered the narrative to adjust it to his taste and sensibility. Tim Whitmarsh has noted that, as befits one "under the influence of Eros" (1.2.1: *ἐρωτικός*), the primary narrator eroticizes the description of the landscape that frames the narrative.³ Whether and to what extent he filters Clitophon's report, however, is unanswerable, because he does not comment on or otherwise participate in it.⁴ Grant, then, that we hear Clitophon. But we still face the question: which Clitophon? The narrating I or the experiencing I? How close are they? Or, to put it plainly, is Clitophon a faithful reporter of his own experience?

No, is the scholarly consensus.⁵ Critics draw attention to Clitophon's care to doctor the narrative in order to put himself in a favorable light, to look good. For instance, when he reports how he presented his affair with Melite to Leucippe

² Critics have read *Leucippe and Clitophon* as a parody of the ideal novels (see especially Durham 1938) or a pastiche (Fusillo 1989, 98–109). Its comicality is often noticed.

³ See Whitmarsh 2011, 89–90.

⁴ Morgan (2007a, 494) sees no suggestion that the primary narrator doctored Clitophon's narrative.

⁵ See, e.g., Whitmarsh 2003; Morgan 2007a, 2007b; Brethes 2007, 191–212; Whitmarsh 2011, 89–93.

and her father, he unabashedly admits to whitewashing his image: “I modified the account of my behavior to emphasize my chastity,”⁶ and he goes so far as to censure not just the facts but his own perceptions of them: “I omitted only one scene from my synopsis, the fact that I subsequently discharged my obligation to Melite.”⁷ Even as he is speaking internally, with himself, Clitophon turns adulterous sex into an act of respect, *aidōs* (just as in his previous recounting of the episode he turned it into medicine compassionately offered to the sick Melite).⁸

In generic terms, “to look good” is “to play the hero according to the romantic protocol.” John Morgan and Romain Brethes have independently proposed that Clitophon rewrites his experiences, which in the “real story” would diverge from the ethos of an ideal novel, as if they were fitting to belong in one. Brethes points out that Clitophon’s self-portrait as a young man in love is geared to inspire sympathy in his interlocutor with his own amorous leanings and in the readers of a novel with their generic expectations.⁹ He also makes the intriguing suggestion that Clitophon is knowledgeable of the novelistic codes, at least if the book he carries as he is walking in the garden to eye Leucippe is a novel.¹⁰ Along similar lines Morgan argues that Clitophon seeks to “commemorate an approved version of himself.”¹¹ This involves both romantic self-refashioning and, as befits the hero of a Sophistic author, cultural display. The *pepaideumenos* regularly dresses up his experience by references to art and myth, showing off his *paideia*. At the same time, however, the “hidden author,” as Morgan calls Achilles Tatius in the wake of Conte’s book on Petronius, allows us to glimpse the “real” Clitophon: not the hero of an ideal novel but an ordinary guy, interested in sex (with his girlfriend and more), cowardly, and self-serving.¹²

Though Achilles Tatius remains hidden, his presence is indeed felt in the irony that surfaces at times in the description of Clitophon’s behavior. Tomas Hägg attributes it to “the author’s own ironical distance from his ‘hero’” (notice: ‘hero’ in quotation marks).¹³ On this reading, the author would be looking down and with a smile on his character, subtly undermining his self-presentation.

How does all this play into Clitophon’s accounts of recognitions? We might expect them to be shaped by his desire to look good, because heroes of novels, those of Chariton and Xenophon at least, never fail at recognizing their girls.

⁶ ἐξῆλλον τὸ πρᾶγμα ἑμαντοῦ πρὸς σωφροσύνην μεταποιῶν (8.5.2).

⁷ ἐν μόνον παρήκα τῶν ἑμαντοῦ δραμάτων, τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς Μελίτην αἰδῶ (8.5.3).

⁸ Clitophon’s account is not to be taken earnestly: see Ormand 2010, 174–75.

⁹ Brethes 2007, 192–212.

¹⁰ 1.6.6. See Brethes 2007, 210.

¹¹ Morgan 2007b, 107.

¹² See Morgan 2007a, 501; 2007b.

¹³ Hägg 1971, 126.

“Recognition of the loved one” is a test that Clitophon does not seem to pass, however. He admits as much. (In this domain, as when he doctors his love affair, he tells no positive lies, at least not big ones.) Nonetheless, in the recounting of this test he might wish to do his best to make his errors romantically acceptable.

Care for self-presentation is traceable indeed in the two episodes in which Clitophon mistakes another woman for Leucippe and then Leucippe for another woman. The first occurs after Leucippe is kidnapped by pirates and dragged onto a ship. Clitophon, who is pursuing the pirates on another ship, witnesses “her” decapitation, screams to have the body brought on board, and, when he reaches the shore, performs this dirge, holding the body tight: “This time, Leucippe, you truly have died a double death, divided between land and sea. I hold the remnants of your body; you I have lost. Oh, what an unfair division between land and sea: I have been left the smaller part of you in the guise of the greater, whereas the sea, in a small part of you, possesses all of you. Yet now, since Fortune denies me the kisses of your lips, come then, let me kiss your butchered neck.”¹⁴

What we have here is a rhetorical showpiece to dress up an unromantic blunder. The attack, “you have died a double death,” is both an intratextual echo and an intertextual allusion. It repeats the alleged lament of Charicles’s father on the dead body of his son: “you have died a double death, in soul and body,”¹⁵ which in turn harks back to Circe’s address to Odysseus and his companions who will have gone twice to Hades: “you, twice dead.”¹⁶ Clitophon cannot possibly be reproducing his on-the-spot words. It is true that this scene is narrated from the limited perspective of the experiencing I, who does not know the end of the story. The narrator’s choice, however, here only aims to make the reader share the emotion of the acting character: it is not an indication that the narrative is “true to life.” On the contrary, this scene demonstrates that even a narrator who adheres to the limited knowledge he had as character can manipulate the details, for a grief-stricken Clitophon would hardly have been in a position to mimic another character in the novel (Charicles’s father) and allude to Homer. Clitophon’s performance agrees with Morgan’s contention that he is displaying Sophistic *paideia*. The contrivance of the dirge cannot escape readers who reach

¹⁴ νῦν μοι, Λευκίππη, τέθνηκας ἀληθῶς θάνατον διπλοῦν, γῇ καὶ θαλάττῃ διαιρούμενον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λείψανον ἔχω σου τοῦ σώματος, ἀπολώλεκα δὲ σέ. οὐκ ἴση τῆς θαλάσσης πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἡ νομή· μικρόν μοι σου μέρος καταλέλειπται ἐν ὧφει τοῦ μείζονος· αὕτη δὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὸ πᾶν σου κρατεῖ. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μοι τῶν ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ φιλημάτων ἐφθόνησεν ἡ Τύχη, φέρε σου καταφιλήσω τὴν σφαγὴν (5.7.8–9).

¹⁵ μοι τέθνηκας θάνατον διπλοῦν, ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι (1.13.4). This lament of course could also be made up.

¹⁶ δισθανέες (Od. 12.22). See Whitmarsh and Morales 2001, at 1.13.

Leucippe's "third death" in book 7, for the lament, "you have died a double death," appears again then (7.5.3). The phrase turns out to be Clitophon's signature in his account of his responses to Leucippe's false deaths: and a signature, I will now add, aimed at romantic embellishment.

The embellishment is provided by the collapse of Clitophon's "experience" with that of a father faced with the real and tragic death of his son. The narrator's care to be identified with (his picture of) Charicles's father is detectable not only in the *incipit* of his dirge. Following the citation is a structurally similar phrase with only slight variation: Charicles's "double death, in soul and body," on the occasion of Leucippe's second "death" becomes "a double death, shared by land and sea" (and of the third, "a double death, of soul and body.") Content-wise, the words of Charicles's father, "Your soul has fled, and I cannot find you in this corpse," are echoed in "I hold the remnants of your body; but you I have lost."¹⁷ Clitophon's strategy of assimilating himself to Charicles's father seems intended to minimize his mistake. For Charicles, the narrative equivalent of "Leucippe," was utterly disfigured: "Other cadavers preserve at least the trace of recognizable features,"¹⁸ whereas "you have lost even the shadow of [your] likeness."¹⁹ Clitophon is identifying himself with someone who mourned a truly unrecognizable body. By referring back to his narrative of Charicles's tragic death, he embellishes his experience both stylistically and romantically.

Clitophon, however, does not entirely succeed in pushing his self-serving image. The "hidden author" is smiling at him, for the scene is not romantic but comical from its opening words: "You *truly* have died a double death." That "truly" sends readers back to Leucippe's prior *Scheintod*, now recognized as "false," and has antiphrastic effects, reinforcing their disbelief, which they already entertain because of generic conventions, that Leucippe is dead this time around as well. Readers may grant Clitophon-the-character the liberty to commit the same mistake again (a character is not asked to know the rules of the genre he inhabits, though Clitophon might);²⁰ but the efforts of Clitophon-the-narrator to make it acceptable and his flowery language surely draw attention to that mistake more than would a spontaneous and unapologetic lament. In addition, Clitophon's assimilation of his experience to that of Charicles's father for the reader has rather different resonances from the ones Clitophon might have intended: it does not acquit him but brings out the gulf separating the tragedy of a father face-to-face with the mangled corpse of his son from the ridicule of a lover mistaking

¹⁷ See 1.13.4 (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ σου πέφευγεν, οὐχ εὐρίσκω δέ σε οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι) and 5.7.8 above.

¹⁸ τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις τῶν ἀποθανόντων τὸ ἔχνος τῶν γνωρισμάτων διασώζεται (1.13.3).

¹⁹ σου τέθνηκε καὶ τῆς εἰκόνης ἡ σκιά (1.13.4).

²⁰ See Brethes 2007, 210.

a more or less sound body for his beloved's, and only for a negative reason: that its head is missing.

A telling detail shows the author smiling at his character's self-styling. Toward the end of the novel we find out (from Leucippe) not only who the decapitated woman was but also that there had been a swapping of clothes: she wore Leucippe's and vice versa (8.16.2). Clitophon is not allowed to give this piece of information when he recounts his mistake, which of course would have made it more understandable. Instead, the readers watch a lover embracing his beloved in a headless body of which they do not know whether it bears any resemblance, even superficially, to Leucippe's.

The second mistake is far more serious. As Melite is taking Clitophon around her property in Ephesus, suddenly a girl dressed in rags and with shaven head throws herself at their feet. She pleads with Melite to grant her surety until she finds the money for her freedom; explains that Melite's bailiff, who bought her, tortured her because she would not yield to his lust; and ends her plea by displaying her scarred back: "When we heard her plea, I was profoundly shaken, for she seemed to have something of Leucippe."²¹ The stirring, though, stays at that.

Or did Clitophon have a stirring at all? It could as well be made up (a small, but positive, lie).²² It could be his main attempt (among others) to beautify himself. We can postulate a prenarrative scene in which the "real" Clitophon failed to recognize Leucippe because he was utterly convinced she was dead and perhaps also because he was becoming involved with Melite (to whom he was attracted as soon as he saw her, and whose beauty he could not help describing with enchantment even in his doctored account of his relationship with her). The apologetic words he puts in his servant's mouth encourage this reading. If in the previous episode of misidentification Clitophon himself took care of minimizing his mistake by superimposing his experience on that of Charicles's father, now he entrusts the role of apologist to Satyrus: no one else, the servant says, would have recognized Leucippe either, looking like a boy as she did. Her haircut alone so much changed her. Like Clitophon's emotional stirring, Satyrus's emphasis on the inevitability of the mistake could be an after-the-fact fabrication, meant to fatten the narrative with self-serving remarks.

But the author again challenges his hero's self-presentation. First, he puts a limit to Clitophon's rewriting of his "real" experience, and a most serious limit: the narrator has no explanation why he failed to recognize Leucippe's voice. By not allowing a further apologetic manipulation of reality, the author produces a comical episode that invalidates Clitophon's aspiration to be seen as a model

²¹ ὥς οὖν ταῦτα ἠκούσαμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν συνεχύθην· καὶ γάρ τι ἑδόκει Λευκίππης ἔχειν (5.17.7).

²² See König 2008, 131.

novelistic hero.²³ The narrator could have editorialized further, for instance by reporting Leucippe's words in indirect speech to keep readers from "hearing" her voice, or by claiming (or having Satyrus claim) in retrospect that her voice had been altered, say, by a strong emotion, by fear of bad treatment, or by the shocking discovery that her beloved had another woman. (Heliodorus, as we shall see, in a similar scene blocks the heroine's voice to make her lover's failure to recognize her more acceptable.) Instead, by having Clitophon expound Leucippe's plea in her own voice, Achilles Tatius exposes him to the charge of ridicule and of novelistic impropriety.

In fact, it is hardly conceivable that a reader of novels would empathize with Clitophon's mistake. In Xenophon it is the uncommitted Hippothous, not Habrocomes, who fails to recognize Anthia by her voice (as by her appearance). Clitophon himself, in narrating his reunion with Clinias, is sensitized to the recognizable quality of the voice. In order to increase the pathos of the unexpected encounter, he emphasizes that Clinias neither showed himself nor spoke (*οὐδὲν εἰπῶν*) but just grabbed his friend and kissed him (5.8.2–3). Clitophon also says repeatedly that a lover wants to hear his beloved speak (4.7.8; 4.17.3) and pontificates that the voice is one of the most beautiful things coming from the mouth (4.8.3). How then can he be deaf now to the sound of Leucippe's? A reader familiar with earlier novels will be reminded of Callirhoe's immediate recognition of Chaereas by his voice, in spite of him being invisible to her and speaking only a few words. Clitophon will strike that reader as funnily dense.

Satyrus's words do not do a better job to convince readers that Clitophon's error was inevitable, that even a Chaereas would have made it. Not only do they draw attention to the mistake: they also undermine the keenness of a lover's vision, going against a sacred rule of novelistic love. No reader familiar with the ideals and values expressed in Chariton and Xenophon would be sympathetic to Satyrus justifying Clitophon's blunder on the grounds that Leucippe was dressed like a slave, her hair was shaven, and her back scarred. The eye of perfect love should pierce through demeaning disguises. The reader trained in the genre will not be able to help smiling at the phrase "no one else, seeing her, could have recognized her"²⁴—as if the hero of an ideal novel were like anyone else, rather than a special person, with regard to the beloved. We smile all the more because in the same circumstance even Melite saw through Leucippe's degrading appearance a beauty that proclaimed her noble birth (5.17.4).²⁵

²³ Billault (1998, 190) stresses the comicality of this scene: "Au mépris de la vraisemblance, Achille Tatius détourne ici vers la comédie la péripétie pathétique de la reconnaissance."

²⁴ οὐδ' ἄν ἄλλος αὐτὴν ἰδὼν γνωρίσειεν (5.19.2).

²⁵ See Brethes 2007, 231.

Whether Satyrus's words are his own or Clitophon's, his apology is steeped in the contemporary elite emphasis on the importance of dress and bearing for one's image²⁶ rather than in the ideology of the novel as codified by Clitophon's predecessors. It is not that Xenophon and Chariton dismiss dress: the introductory description of Anthia, with its close attention to the girl's studied toilette, is strong evidence to the contrary. Likewise, Callirhoe wears fancy clothes when she marries the second time, is carefully appareled when she buries "Chaereas," and is all done up when she appears in court. In her Asian travels she acquires a taste for luxury, which she displays at her arrival in Syracuse: she "could be seen . . . reclining on a couch of beaten gold, dressed in Tyrian purple."²⁷ How she is dressed, however, plays no role in the recognition: on the contrary, Chaereas recognizes her when she is fully covered. Perhaps things would sit differently with Habrocomes, who once recognizes Anthia in a description in which her golden hair and "simple dress" are mentioned alongside her beauty. In addition, Habrocomes is never challenged by an encounter with a covered Anthia or with one, like Leucippe, in a demeaning outfit. Xenophon might have intentionally skirted a situation that he felt could have posed problem. But this is speculation. The overt textual evidence from the earlier novels casts Clitophon's blindness, in spite of his self-styling, as inadequate for an ideal lover in the genre's mold. If the argument of dress and hair is made up, its fabricator himself seems to be embarrassed by its inadequacy because he puts it in Satyrus's mouth, not his own.

Clitophon was not able even to perceive the beauty of Leucippe's eyes, in spite of the enraptured praise he lavished on them when he first saw her: intense, voluptuous, they have the dark brightness of the violet (1.4.3 and 1.19.1). Leucippe's eyes are the first feature to catch his own eye (1.4.3). When later he imagines her threatened by Thersander, he dwells on the comeliness of her eyes in tears, and pontificates that "in the beautiful their beauty resides in their eyes."²⁸ His insensitivity to the unmistakable light in those eyes is all the more striking because the Greeks seem to have thought that beautiful eyes could not remain undetected. Athena, who takes care to "dim" (κινύζωσεν) Odysseus's eyes so beautiful (περικαλλέ) before (*Od.* 13.433), knows this. In an episode of misrecognition that closely resembles Clitophon's, the hero of the *Aethiopica* nonetheless goes along with Greek belief and pays respect to the unique beauty of his beloved's eyes: though belatedly, he recognizes their flashing light.²⁹ The hero of Achilles Tatius has no such epiphany.

²⁶ See König 2008, 131–32 (commenting on a similar episode in Heliodorus, on which see chapter 3). On the role of culture in Achilles Tatius's representation of the body, see Liviabella Furiani 2000, 136–37.

²⁷ ὥφθη . . . μὲν ἐπὶ χρυσελάτου κλίνης ἀνακειμένη, Τυρίαν ἀμπεχομένη πορφύραν (8.6.7).

²⁸ εἰς τὰ ὄμματα τῶν καλῶν τὸ κάλλος κάθηται (6.7.5; see also 6.6.3).

²⁹ See chapter 3.

Clitophon's blindness also qualifies his self-presentation as a lover who falls in love in the right way, by sight. Achilles Tatius fleshes out this requirement by introducing, as a negative counterpart, a character who apparently falls in love just by hearing: Callisthenes. In the world of the novel it is not abnormal that the report of the hero's or (more commonly) heroine's beauty kindles erotic curiosity; but the norm is that the enticed hearer becomes eager to see the reportedly beautiful person. Hearsay alone does not make one fall in love. Anthia and Habrocomes "quickly learned each other's reputation. Anthia longed to see Habrocomes; and Habrocomes, up till now impervious to love, wanted to see Anthia."³⁰ Likewise, Chaereas's rivals, especially Mithridates, Pharnaces, and Artaxerxes, burn to see Callirhoe after hearing of her famed beauty and fall in love only after seeing her. Chaereas himself desires to see the rumored beautiful captive, but not in the least to marry her just because of her rumored beauty (in spite of the Egyptian's made-up overtures, "he will make you his wife").³¹ Conversely, Callisthenes becomes a lover by hearsay (ἐξ ἀκοῆς ἐραστής: 2.13.1) and asks Leucippe in marriage though he has not caught the slightest glimpse of her. Denied, he suffers like a true novelistic lover, but from sheer fantasizing (φανταζόμενος: 2.13.2).

Callisthenes is introduced as an extravagant spendthrift. His manner of falling in love is an aspect of his intemperance, his *akolasia* (2.13.1). As Helen Morales notes, "Callisthenes' intemperance lies in his privileging of the wrong sensory organ and his denial of the eye as the primary instrument of desire."³² Callisthenes resembles no other than the most intemperate suitor of Leucippe, Thersander, who also breaks the novelistic protocol by falling in love on the basis of sheer hearsay. When his servant asks him to believe his praise of Leucippe's beauty as if he were seeing her (6.3.5: ἀκούων, ὡς ἰδών), at hearing a "theatrical rhapsody" of it he is indeed "filled with a kind of vision of beauty, a natural beauty."³³ Both Thersander and Callisthenes fall in love with their fantasies of Leucippe.³⁴

³⁰ ταχὺ μὲν δὴ εἰς ἑκατέρους ἢ περὶ ἀλλήλων ἦλθε δόξα· καὶ ἥ τε Ἀνθία τὸν Ἀβροκόμην ἐπεθύμει ἰδεῖν, καὶ ὁ τέως ἀνέραςτος Ἀβροκόμης ἤθελεν Ἀνθίαν ἰδεῖν (*Ephesiaca* 1.2.9).

³¹ See chapter 1.

³² Morales 2004, 88.

³³ καταπραγδοῦντος αὐτῆς τὸ κάλλος, μεστὸς γενόμενος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὥσει κάλλους φαντάσματος, φύσει καλοῦ (6.4.4). I borrow Whitmarsh's translation (2001), which renders φύσει by "natural," pointing up the effectiveness of artifice in creating an illusion of reality. Though Thersander, when he finally sees Leucippe, is struck by lightning (6.6.3), he had readied himself and was planning to go to her as a lover. The servant has a point in telling Leucippe that Thersander's love for her is his doing (6.11.4).

³⁴ A third (and last) character to fall in "love" from sheer hearsay is Oroodontates (*Aethiopica* 8. 2. 1–3), a despot who also acts on his lust.

The lover who does not need the eyes to fall in love fails to recognize the girl he “loves.” When Callisthenes is denied marriage with Leucippe, he resolves to kidnap her, but mistakes another girl (who turns out to be Calligone, the one destined to Clitophon) for his beloved because he recognizes (ἐγνώρισε) Leucippe’s mother at her side (2.16.2). His error results not even from a misapplication of his fantasy, onto the wrong girl, but from an arbitrary inference he draws from the recognition of a different object: he does not see the girl but Leucippe’s mother, recognizes her but misreads the signs, concluding that the girl walking by the woman’s side must be her daughter.³⁵

Callisthenes thus provides the negative exemplar of a lover who does not use his eyes or does not use them properly.³⁶ His misidentification questions his manner of loving. Clitophon sets himself off against this negative model not only by pointing up the paramount role of vision in kindling his own passion (“there appeared on the left a young maiden. Her face flashed on my eyes like lightning”; “as soon as I had seen her, I was lost”)³⁷ but also by lecturing us, as he is narrating how he fell in love by sight, about the power of beauty to wound the soul through the eyes (1.4.4).

We might, however, ask whether Clitophon is telling the whole truth about Callisthenes. Tomas Hägg notes that the narrator here loses touch with the acting character and grants him knowledge that at best he could have acquired after the fact: that of Callisthenes’s thoughts and fantasies.³⁸ At the same time, Hägg also thinks that Callisthenes’s true thoughts have reached Clitophon without being misrepresented. This is quite possible: Clitophon could know Callisthenes’s motives from a postnarrative time, when supposedly the two became close friends. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that he reworked the facts to his advantage. We may suspect manipulation for at least one reason. After recounting that Callisthenes became a lover by hearsay, Clitophon grows judgmental: “Such is the insolence of men with no restraints on them! They are led to love by their ears.”³⁹ From this moralistic outburst we might infer that Clitophon has a vested interest in telling Callisthenes’s story as he does.

Be that as it may, Clitophon does not succeed in coming across as the opposite of Callisthenes, as one who sees, for even in his self-presentations his vision

³⁵ See Morales 2004, 91.

³⁶ A parallel is the story of Zariadres and Odis in Athenaeus 13.575: like Callisthenes, Zariadres kidnaps the girl he loves without having ever met her. But in his case the girl is the right one and his love is true because he has seen her in a dream, as she has seen him. Bowie (2008, 30) thinks that this story was influenced by the novel. He also mentions Philostratus *Heroicus* 54.4–5, where Helen and Achilles fall in love from hearing of each other’s beauty.

³⁷ ἐν ἀριστερῇ παρθένος ἐκφαίνεται μοι καὶ καταστράπτει μου τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῷ προσώπῳ (1.4.2); ὡς δὲ εἶδον, εὐθὺς ἀπωλώλειν (1.4.4).

³⁸ Hägg 1971, 131.

³⁹ τοσαύτη γὰρ τοῖς ἀκολάστοις ὕβρις, ὡς καὶ τοῖς ὦσιν εἰς ἔρωτα τρυφᾶν (2.13.1).

becomes dimmer and dimmer as far as Leucippe goes. On the occasion of her first “death” he claimed to have recognized her straightaway (3.15.3: ἐγνώρισα). This detail, while it points up the pathos of Clitophon’s experience, because of the emphasis it puts on his correct vision, will be recalled when Leucippe “dies” again and Clitophon sees her in another. He himself highlights his mistake in his review of the two episodes on the occasion of Leucippe’s third “death”: “though I seemed [δοκῶν] not to have your head” (meaning: I had neither head nor body; 7.5.3).⁴⁰ Finally, in the scene on Melite’s property he is blind to Leucippe’s very presence. Clitophon meets Callisthenes, in that both fail at one of the novels’ most sacred commandments: “Thou shalt see thy love.”⁴¹

The parallel runs more deeply. If it is true that Callisthenes falls in love by hearing, without needing to see, Clitophon recovers his vision only when Leucippe is no longer there and he finds out by other means, her letter, that she is alive and on the premises: “I went through it again, as if I saw her in it . . . When I got to the scourges and tortures Sosthenes inflicted on her, I wept as if I could see her tortures. My reasoning fixed the eyes of the soul on the message of the letter, enacting what I saw before my eyes.”⁴² Like Callisthenes, Clitophon is ultimately guilty of misapplying the senses because he sees Leucippe in the words he reads while he was unable to see her in the woman who stood face-to-face with him. His imagination converts letters into images and images into actions, whereas his physical eyesight could not even penetrate further than the thinnest surface.

Clitophon’s superficiality of vision is underscored by yet another reference to Charicles’s father lamenting over his son’s unrecognizable dead body. This time, an almost literal repetition brings that episode to bear on Clitophon’s behavior: Charicles’s body is so disfigured “that no one, seeing it, would recognize it”;⁴³ likewise, “no one else, seeing her [Leucippe], would recognize her” in her outfit.⁴⁴ The pairing of Clitophon and Charicles’s father, however, again strikes an ironic note: it makes the reader realize the incommensurable difference of the two situations and again the ridicule of a lover unable to recognize his girl owing to mere cosmetic changes.

As a remote precedent of Clitophon’s blindness, we might invoke Orestes’s failure to identify his sister (in Sophocles’s *Electra*) until she sings her lamentation

⁴⁰ See Vilborg 1962, 119.

⁴¹ I cannot agree with Brethes (2007, 234) that in the scene on Melite’s property Clitophon should have believed his eyes. I think that he does believe them, but that his eyes do not see enough.

⁴² αἰθῖς ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς γράμμασιν, ὡς ἐκείνην δι’ αὐτῶν βλέπων . . . ὡς δὲ εἰς τὰς μάστιγας καὶ εἰς τὰς βασάνους ἐγενόμην, ὡς ὁ Σωσθένης αὐτῇ παρετρίψατο, ἔκλαον ὥσπερ αὐτὰς τὰς βασάνους βλέπων αὐτῆς. ὁ γὰρ λογισμός, πέμπων τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν τῶν γραμμάτων, εἰδείκνυ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὡς δρώμενα (5.19.5–6).

⁴³ ὥστε οὐκ ἂν αὐτόν τις ἰδὼν οὐδὲ γνωρίσειεν (1.12.6).

⁴⁴ οὐδ’ ἂν ἄλλος αὐτὴν ἰδὼν γνωρίσειεν (5.19.2).

over the urn of her “dead” brother. His response to her sorrowful outpouring—“Do I see in you here the noble figure of Electra”?⁴⁵—in addition to expressing his bafflement, suggests a reason for his inability to recognize her earlier. Orestes could not, in this suffering, worn-out woman, “find anything like the κλεινὸν εἶδος of his sister.”⁴⁶ Though he knows about her unhappy life, he still imagines her to be of splendid appearance, as befits the daughter of a queen.⁴⁷ Orestes, however, does not inspire laughter but sympathy and compassion for his misgiving, because he has hardly known his sister, and she has gone through long years of suffering that undoubtedly have caused in her a deep physical transformation. Orestes’s mistake adds to the pathos of the scene; Clitophon’s to the scene’s hilariousness.

Running and Stop Signs

Shortly after Clitophon has been condemned to death for his alleged murder of Leucippe, Sostratus, Leucippe’s father, arrives in Ephesus as *theōros*, the leader of a sacred embassy in honor of Artemis. The two men have just come face-to-face, to the distress of both (Clitophon is embarrassed, while Sostratus thinks him the murderer of his daughter and even cuffs him), when a keeper of Artemis’s temple also makes his entrance, running, to tell the priest of the goddess that “a girl, a foreigner, has taken refuge with Artemis.”⁴⁸ Clitophon, from bashful and dejected, grows all aflutter (*ἀναπτεροῦμαι*) with hope and is revived. His friend Clinias asks the keeper: “Is she not beautiful”? Answer: “I never saw such another, except Artemis.” At which words Clitophon jumps up and screams “You are speaking of Leucippe.”⁴⁹ Of course this is the case; the girl has told her name, her country’s, and her father’s.

Clitophon again seems to be fashioning himself according to novelistic guidelines. Now he allegedly lives up to them by recognizing Leucippe even in a description, in the manner of Habrocomes—and a description that mentions only her “godlike beauty,” no hair or dress. He also proves himself, if not a Sophistic rhetorician as in the threnody in book 5, at least an expert at the clichés of recognition scenes, novelistic ones in the first place, and a skilful handler of them.

⁴⁵ ἤ σὸν τὸ κλεινὸν εἶδος Ἥλέκτρας τόδε; (1177).

⁴⁶ See Solmsen 1967, 27. Whether Orestes does not recognize Electra earlier is, however, debated. Zeitlin (1012) thinks he does.

⁴⁷ Even after the recognition he cannot cope with her dishonored appearance (1181) and visible suffering (1187–89).

⁴⁸ κόρη τις ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν ξένη κατέφυγεν (7.15.1).

⁴⁹ “μὴ καλή”; “οὐκ ἄλλην τοιαύτην” ἔφη, “μετὰ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν εἶδον.” πρὸς τοῦτο ἐγὼ πηδῶ καὶ βοῶ. “Λευκίππην λέγεις” (7.15.1–2).

To begin with, enter the typical savior deity. Artemis appeared to the people of Byzantium during the war in which Sostratus was the commander, and personally to Sostratus himself in a dream (7.12.2–4). In emphasizing the presence of the goddess in the final recognition, Clitophon-the-narrator seems primarily to be showing off his knowledge of novelistic patterns rather than adhering to his personal experience. For recognitions in the novels are gifts from the gods: they come from Aphrodite in Chariton; in Xenophon they are under the aegis of Helios and Artemis; the recognition of Daphnis and Chloe is the work of Eros; and Chariclea's is encoded in a cryptic oracle and felt as an act of providence when on its way to happening (*Aethiopica* 8.17). The Greek novels adopt an optimistic teleology, one governed by poetic justice, of which the deities who engineer the recognitions are the instruments and the recognitions the demonstration.

Clitophon, however, is somewhat heavy-handed in pressing the role of Artemis in the final recognition. This keeps us from taking the goddess's intervention too seriously, as a "real" fact in every detail. Artemis's intrusion is sudden, inflated, and exceptional in a narrative otherwise governed by Fickle Fortune.⁵⁰ We can read Clitophon's emphasis on divine intervention as yet another self-serving move to suggest that he fits the model of the novelistic hero protected by a god. We are not duped, though, but again spot irony in the exaggeration. Clitophon's stress on Artemis's guidance sends us back to another amusing scene in which the goddess appears to give directions, that one conveniently placed toward the beginning of the adventures as this one is toward the end: when in a dream she binds Leucippe to chastity and promises her the happy ending as a reward (4.1.3–5). Artemis asks for abstinence but at the same time implicitly gives her imprimatur to the lovers' elopement, which was ultimately caused by lust. Her request, moreover, allegedly leaves Leucippe lukewarm ("I was vexed by the postponement") and forces itself on Clitophon: if he agrees, it is because he remembers a parallel dream he had, but his memory seems to be awakened only by Leucippe's account of hers. Clitophon's narrative of the final stretches of the action likewise betrays a less than religious hero, one who makes a travesty, as it were, of the providential frame of the typical novelistic recognition by giving Artemis a presence as loud as it is unwarranted. The fortuitous coincidence that saves Clitophon from torture (as the scourges were being readied, the priest of Artemis appeared) is dressed up as a god-willed happening in a full-blown celebration of Artemis's benevolence and powers (7.14.6).

Just as he presses, with ironic effects, the providential hand in novelistic recognitions, Clitophon plays up their closural quality and their pathos by alternatives

⁵⁰ The tyranny of Fortune in this novel is often noted: see, e.g., Sandy 1994, 1557–58.

of acceleration and deceleration, the former to build up expectations for closure and the latter to defer it. Clitophon's emphasis on Artemis's intervention is itself a closural narrative ploy in the manner of Chariton's emphasis on Aphrodite's. And so is his account of Sostratus's arrival, which harks back to Callisthenes's journey to Tyre in the same capacity, as *theōros*, toward the beginning of the novel (2.15.1). This sketch of a ring-composition creates momentum toward the canonical recognition and reunion, and not only because "this is how novels end" but also, more specifically, in light of Callisthenes's own *theōria*, which had the opposite results: misrecognition and a kidnapping.

As described, Callisthenes was not fit to be a *theōros*. The intemperate lover who did not need his eyes to fall in love was hardly entitled to lead a pilgrimage that involves watching religious sites and ceremonies. On a mundane level his unfitness as a *theōros* resulted in his failure to "see" the girl, in his getting the wrong one. In contrast, Sostratus is a legitimate *theōros*, sent by Artemis herself.⁵¹ He also has the goddess's promise that he will find Leucippe and Clitophon in Ephesus (7.12.4). We expect him to be soon reunited with his daughter and instrumental in the lovers' own reunion, and the novel to reward the hopes shared by Clitophon, his friend, Leucippe, and her father. This emotional synergy further builds momentum toward the grand finale.

Clitophon plays up the closural quality of recognitions by speaking from a higher vantage point than the acting character. The narrator this time does not hide that he knows the end. His accounts of his misidentifications in book 5 overtly conform to the documentary protocol: Clitophon-the-narrator pretends to know nothing more than Clitophon-the-agent did.⁵² Conversely, the final recognition is "reported" with hindsight, by a narrator who knows much more than the agent. After-the-fact knowledge builds entire sequences: Clitophon recounts that Leucippe fled from the hut where Thersander kept her to the temple of Artemis, and dwells even on her thoughts and hopes (7.13); he tells us that the leader of the sacred embassy was Sostratus, even before he appears, and knows no less than Sostratus's dreams (7.12), in addition to following his movements when he is out of sight and recording that he almost met his daughter in the temple (7.13). This narrator has a panoramic vision. His care to retroject knowledge suggests that the ending is near, for it conjures up Chariton's omniscient perspective as he announces the happy ending on the opening page of book 8. We arrive prepared for the recognition not only because we expect it according to generic patterns but also because we realize that Clitophon must have been reunited with Leucippe and her father to be able to know what he does. "All will soon end well," we are implicitly told.

⁵¹ The dream Sostratus apparently had is of the kind Artemidorus calls *theopemptos*: see MacAlister 1996, 72.

⁵² See Hägg 1971, 132–33, and above.

But the actual narrative defers that desired ending by means of the uneven tempo of the narrated action and of leaving the recognition incomplete, as it were. Clitophon's identification of Leucippe in the godlike beauty who took refuge in the temple immediately results in his mad running (*μαινομένου*) with all his chains, for his feet have wings (7.15.3–4). We are again reminded of Habrocomes running like a madman to meet Anthia after their servants have recognized them separately. Clitophon's narrative builds up speed toward the climax: Sostratus recognizes him "at once" (*ταχύ*);⁵³ the messenger from the temple "runs his fastest" (*σπουδῇ μάλα θέων*); Clitophon literally flies. His account whets our appetite for the reunion, which in Xenophon and Chariton is simultaneous with the recognition. But, just as we are flying to the temple with Clitophon, he stops this forward movement. Guards block him, beat him, and try to drag him to prison. When his innocence is revealed, people surround him to prevent them from taking him (7.16.1–2). The guards object, and the priest defends him. We have the sketch of the preliminaries for yet another trial scene, with retarding effects.

The pace quickens again, though. Running resumes, even faster, and involving not just Clitophon but Sostratus and . . . rumor as well: "I quickly pressed on to the temple. Sostratus was at my heels—I would suppose with joy similar to my own. Yet no one can run so fast that the wings of rumor will not outrun him. In this case, too, she reached Leucippe before us."⁵⁴ So both lovers now know about the other. We want them to run into each other's arms, kiss, and fall on the ground in a swoon, as is customary. But Clitophon's report leaves us hungry. Though the girl runs, she does not fall into his arms: "Seeing us, she leaped from the temple and embraced her father, keeping her eyes the while on me. Shame before Sostratus keeping me from leaping on her, I stood there looking all the time into her face. Thus we fondly greeted each other with our eyes."⁵⁵

Sostratus functions as obstacle, preventing a satisfactory (for lovers and readers) completion of the reunion. His very presence is a transgression in the novelistic pattern of recognition, for nowhere else in the extant novels does a

⁵³ 7.14.2. *ταχύ* is Hercher's emendation of *τάχα* (perhaps), which in the context makes little sense. In saying that Clitophon and Sostratus recognize each other (*γνωρίζει, γνωρίσας*), however, Achilles Tatius commits a mistake, because Clitophon at the beginning of his story did not say that they had met, as he now claims.

⁵⁴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ταχὺ μάλα ἡπενγόμεν· καὶ ὁ Σώστρατος κατὰ πόδας, οὐκ οἶδα εἰ τὰ ὅμοια ἐμοὶ χαίρων. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὕτως ἄνθρωπος δρομικώτατος, ὃν οὐ τῆς φήμης φθάνει τὸ πτερόν· ἢ καὶ τότε ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Λευκίππην προὔλαβεν (7.16.2–3).

⁵⁵ ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐξεπήδησε τοῦ νεῶ καὶ τὸν μὲν πατέρα περιεπτύξατο, τοὺς δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς εἶχεν ἐπ' ἐμέ. ἐγὼ δὲ εἰστήκειν, αἰδοῖ τῇ πρὸς τὸν Σώστρατον κατέχων ἐμαντὸν (καὶ ἅπαντα ἔβλεπον εἰς τὸ ἐκεῖνης πρόσωπον) ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἐκθορεῖν. οὕτως ἀλλήλους ἡσπαζόμεθα τοῖς ὄμμασιν (7.16.3–4).

father witness the lovers' recovery of each other. Sostratus's exceptional role is in keeping with the importance of family (as opposed to community) in the protagonists' identity.⁵⁶ They fall in love in a private house and, if they are reunited in a temple, it is under the surveillance of the girl's father, who has been crucially instrumental in the reunion and allegedly mandated by the goddess of that temple.⁵⁷ Not only does Sostratus feature in the tableau of the lovers reunited: he replaces the male lover himself as the target of the girl's excited run and effusions. His presence, however, blocks the predictable (for a reader of novels) course of the reunion by causing "shame" (7.16.4), which stops all movement and inhibits speech: Clitophon just "stood" (7.16.4) looking at Leucippe. The narrative has taken the lovers and the readers on an eventful drive in which shortly after hitting the gas pedal Clitophon hits the brake, and at the end of which there are no kisses or embraces to reward the weary riders.

Shame lingers on even after the reunion: "I was unable to look Sostratus straight in the eyes, knowing what I had put him through. And Sostratus as well, noticing the scratches around my eyes that I had suffered at his hands, felt embarrassed to look at me. Leucippe, too, stared on the ground most of the time. Our entire symposium was embarrassing."⁵⁸ The aftermath of the lovers' recognition again runs contrary to traditional patterns: prolonged and collective shame keeps the characters from telling their stories, against the stereotypical sequence of recognition, reunion, and storytelling that goes back to the *Odyssey* and is found again in Xenophon and especially in Chariton.⁵⁹ Clitophon is reinventing the recognition motif.

Narrator and Author: Achilles Tatius's Iconoclastic Treatment of Recognition

In reinventing the recognition motif Clitophon is aligned with Achilles Tatius himself, who plays with clichés of the Greek novels. By making his character posture as a romantic hero, yet not without slips, and by poking fun at him, the

⁵⁶ See Whitmarsh 2011, 73 and 91 (though not specifically on this episode).

⁵⁷ Notice also that a great number of characters are related by blood. Even the loyal friend of the protagonist, Clinias, is a cousin, whereas no family-relation ties friend and hero in Chariton or Xenophon.

⁵⁸ ἐγὼ δὲ εἰς τὸν Σώστρατον ὀρθοῖς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἰδεῖν οὐκ ἠδυνάμην, συνειδώς οἷα αὐτὸν διατεθείκειν· καὶ ὁ Σώστρατος δὲ τὰς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρῶν ἀμύξεις τῶν ἐμῶν, ὥς ἔτυχον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παθὼν, ἀντησχύνετό με βλέπειν· καὶ ἡ Λευκίππη δὲ τὰ πολλὰ εἰς γῆν ἔβλεπε· καὶ ἦν ὅλον τὸ συμπόσιον αἰδώς (8.4.1).

⁵⁹ The protagonists of the *Ephesiaca* are not ashamed of telling their stories to their friends. Chariton's heroine and hero are initially silenced by shame but on separate occasions (8. 1. 15 and 8. 7. 4), and without causing a generalized narrative paralysis.

author composes an ironic narrative with his character's connivance. The identification of character and author as narrators comes to the fore in an identical narrative choice, which shows both Clitophon and Achilles Tatius challenging a pattern of the ideal novels.

Clitophon's narrative, after detailing another lengthy court trial, does not come to a full stop but loosely ends in movement, with the lovers visiting Byzantium and marrying there, then moving on to Tyre, with the prospect for them of returning to Byzantium again. This lack of closure in the secondary narrative is prolonged by the novel's own failure to come full circle: the primary narrator does not take over again to go back to the original frame, and leaves Clitophon on his way to Byzantium, whereas he had encountered him in Sidon. Interpretations of this weak closure as a sign of carelessness are no longer advanced. The trend is rather to view the open ending as a conscious literary ploy with illustrious precedents (especially Plato's *Symposium*), countering the strong closure of the ideal novels.⁶⁰ The reader is not granted the satisfaction of seeing the often evoked and long-deferred amorous pleasures fulfilled.

Clitophon's narrative of the recognition matches the author's strategy of indefinite deferral, for it leaves the recognition itself unfulfilled and open not only by denying the lovers the expected "seals" of recognition, kisses and embraces, in its immediate aftermath but also by omitting any mention of such effusions all the way to the very last line, even after the lovers have won every trial and celebrate their wedding. Because the recognition remains uncompleted, the novel, in a way, does not end. At least, it does not end as happily as the others; and perhaps we are even to imagine that the marriage, so hastily described, turned out to be unhappy.⁶¹ Be that as it may, the loose ends in the recognition scene are in line with the novel's lack of closure, and can therefore be taken to reflect the author's own playing with canonical novelistic motifs and expectations.

The same holds true for another episode of recognition, one with no equivalent in the ideal novels. Shortly after Clitophon recognizes Leucippe as the writer of the letter, Melite, in return for the hour of love he gives her, sends him off to recover his beloved. He will stay at a house where Leucippe will reach him. Melite dresses him in her clothes to help him remain undetected as he flees from the cell in which he was thrown (and in which he and she have had sex). A new Achilles, more beautiful than ever in the love-distraught eyes of his helper, he evades capture successfully until he is spotted by Thersander and his servant, who recognizes him first (6.5.1: *γνωρίσας*). After showering him with insults, Thersander hales him off to prison again.

⁶⁰ See Fusillo 1997, 220–21; Morales 2004, 143–51; Repath 2005.

⁶¹ See Repath 2005.

Surely Clitophon's recognition, as he narrates it, does nothing to make him look good at either erudition or romance. This time he does not dress up his experience by references to myth, but literally dresses up as a mythological hero. And the "hero" is not Achilles the brave fighter but the aspiring deserter wearing a woman's clothes. Clitophon points up his own cowardliness both by mentioning his Achilles-like dress and by his account of his behavior. He does not claim, say, that he ran as fast he could to try to reach his hiding place in spite of seeing the enemy, but puts the responsibility of his capture on the boy who was escorting him, and who disappeared without taking the time to warn him when he saw the danger coming. Rather than telling us something about Clitophon's flattering self-styling, this episode is one more game played on him, as the hero of a "romantic" narrative, by the author, who involves him in a grim kind of recognition that no other novelistic lover seems to have suffered. The unfortunate recognition happened to the "real" Clitophon as the protagonist of a less than ideal novel.

As a key manifestation of poetic justice, novelistic recognitions normally help the protagonists. The character who suffers most wretchedly from recognition is the archvillain Theron, in *Callirhoe*. As he tries to hide behind his Odysseus-like lie—that he is a Cretan and was on his way to see his brother when his ship left him behind, and so on—recognition by a fisherman causes him to be put on the rack and subsequently condemned to death. The recognition is the job of a *daimōn* avenging Callirhoe and preventing "the most wicked thing" from taking place.⁶² Providence (Πρόνοια), just as it wants the villain to be punished by recognition, wants the hero and heroine to be saved by it, not to meet with more trouble.

There are, to be sure, two more instances of novelistic recognitions that harm the hero, but in neither case is the recognition utterly unfortunate or the reversal as radical as in Clitophon's. When Chaereas recognizes Callirhoe in the statue erected by Dionysius, he makes the unhappy discovery that she is married to another (3.6.4–5).⁶³ But he also finds out that she is alive and in the area. Contrary to his habit, he does not attempt suicide. And in his final evaluation, the recognition was a fortunate one: it gave him hopes (8.8.1). The second episode involves Theagenes, whom the son of Arsace's *entremetteuse* identifies as the war prisoner he was in charge of handing over to Arsace's husband. Heliodorus puts emphasis on the process of recognition by showing the recognizer first as he interrogates his

⁶² See *Callirhoe* 3.4.7–10 (τὸ σχετλιώτατον . . . πάντων πραγμάτων). More on this scene in chapter 4.

⁶³ See Billault, forthcoming. I think this is the recognition that best fits Reardon's definition of the novelistic *anagnōrisis*: "[it] involves no radical change of spiritual condition; it merely evokes from the hero another despairing cry of 'What do I do now?' as the screw is turned yet tighter" (1991, 81). Most novelistic recognitions, however, bring happiness.

eyes (which have been giving him trouble) and then as he gradually becomes certain of the young man's identity (*Aethiopica* 7.16.2–3; 7.19.4). The recognition harms Theagenes because it allows Arsace to treat him as her slave. But at the same time, his status also grounds her husband's request that he and Chariclea be delivered into his hands, and thus affords the couple their escape from Arsace's prison.⁶⁴ (Alternatively, it could be argued that Theagenes's recognition has no real impact on his destiny. Arsace would have acted with escalating violence regardless of the young man's status, and her husband likewise was going to demand the couple's delivery whether they were slaves or free.) Moreover, neither Theagenes nor Chaereas are in happy circumstances when suddenly the recognition plunges them into misfortune: Chaereas had just arrived in Asia and was feeling lost; Theagenes was already Arsace's prisoner.⁶⁵ In contrast, Clitophon was on his happy way to his beloved. Rather than matching situations in other Greek novels, his predicament resonates with that of the ass in Apuleius's, each time he tries to escape from nasty owners and is recognized and recaptured.⁶⁶

Clitophon, indeed, introduces the account of his detection by attributing it to his usual wicked fortune, with a comment that calls to mind the ass's invectives against Fortuna when he is spotted against his will:⁶⁷ "Fortune, as usual, set her sights on me once again and arranged a novel drama to undo me."⁶⁸ That the hero of an ideal novel blames Fortune for his misfortune is nothing new. What is new is that Clitophon's misfortune comes from recognition, and that recognition is a trick of Tychē. In the novels, recognition is not in the hands of Fortune, as it often is in New Comedy. Chariton emphatically dramatizes the incompatibility of Tychē with recognition by exiling Tychē from the narrative and giving it over to a goddess when recognition is about to occur.⁶⁹ Whereas the typical novelistic recognition is choreographed by a benevolent deity and brings about the lovers' reunion, Clitophon's is devised by bad luck and sets the lovers further apart when they were about to be reunited. The "novel drama" is not only a new turn

⁶⁴ Both claims are made: Oroodontates demands his "captives" and "prisoners of war" (8.3.1) while Arsace considers them her possessions (8.3.8).

⁶⁵ Another recognition that could be said to harm Theagenes is the one by Charicles at the end of the novel, for it denounces him as Chariclea's kidnapper. But even on this occasion Theagenes was in no better shape before (he was about to be sacrificed), and ultimately this recognition, by revealing his connection to Chariclea, brings about the happy ending.

⁶⁶ See chapter 4.

⁶⁷ See chapter 4.

⁶⁸ ἔμοι δὲ ἡ συνήθης Τύχη πάλιν ἐπιτίθεται καὶ συντίθεται κατ' ἐμοῦ δράμα καινόν (6.3.1).

⁶⁹ At *Aethiopica* 7.6, *tychē* is mentioned as one of the alternative powers behind a scene of recognition (a divine force, *daimonion*, being the other). This might be the perspective of the ignorant spectators but is not that of the main actor, Calasiris, who has received a prophecy and rushed to Memphis accordingly.

of events in Clitophon's adventures. It is also an original way of dealing with novelistic motifs, by using recognition to disjoin the lovers.⁷⁰

Clitophon's failure to recognize Leucippe is also a game played on ideal novels. Achilles Tatius might be targeting specifically the recognition of Chaereas and Callirhoe.⁷¹ Like Clitophon, Chaereas thinks his beloved to be lost to him, or perhaps even dead; both heroes are (or Clitophon claims to be) strangely moved by the woman's *je ne sais quoi*. But Chaereas's excitement leads to immediate recognition, whereas Clitophon stops at deceptive appearances.

More parallels support the possibility that Achilles Tatius is responding to Chariton, namely parallels between this scene and another one in *Callirhoe* that also brings the lovers together without reuniting them: their unexpected encounter in Babylon.⁷² The conflicting emotions Chariton attributes to the crowd watching the encounter (5.8.2–3) reappear, though relocated in Clitophon's internal forum (5.19.1) in accordance with the crowd's less vocal presence in Achilles Tatius's novel. In addition, both episodes occur in book 5 and in a novel of eight books; in both, one of the lovers thinks the other dead; both feature a triangle, with the third party (Dionysius and Melite) in control of the person they love; both Callirhoe and Leucippe later regret that no kisses were exchanged (*Callirhoe* 5.9.5; *Leucippe and Clitophon* 6.16.4); and in both episodes the discovery that one of the protagonists is alive revives the other's hopes while complicating their marital situation. In Chariton, however, the lovers have no misgivings. It is the rival who prevents their reunion.

One objection against reading the two scenes together could be that Callirhoe does not wear demeaning clothes as Leucippe does; on the contrary, she has beautified herself for the trial. Chaereas, however, is capable of guessing her identity even when she is entirely covered, while Clitophon is misled by a haircut. A contrast can be drawn also with the lost novel *Parthenope*, in which the heroine shaved her hair, perhaps to keep off unwanted suitors.⁷³ Yet her plan

⁷⁰ *δρᾶμα κακόν* is almost a *terminus technicus* of ancient literary criticism, and one perhaps exploited also by Longus in connection with an "inconceivable" use of recognition: see below. Tilg (2010, 190–91) reads in "new drama" a metaliterary reference, but to the entire adultery story about Melite and Clitophon, which is novel in the genre. The phrase, however, specifically introduces Clitophon's narration of his detection.

⁷¹ Lalanne (2006, 169–70) assumes that Achilles Tatius imitates Chariton extensively. Whitmarsh (2011, 165) notes that Leucippe's letter parallels Chaereas's at 4.4.7–10.

⁷² A third scene Achilles Tatius seems to have in mind is Callirhoe's sale to Leonas: see Brethes 2007, 231.

⁷³ See schol. on Dionysius Periegetes 358 and Eustathius's commentary on the same, in Hägg 2004c, 253. The heroine cuts off her hair, presumably to stay loyal to her husband (Stephens and Winkler 1995, 78) and to steer clear of lovers (Hägg 2004c, 255). Eustathius says: ἀκοσμίαν ἐαυτῆς καταψηφίζομένη.

failed a first time; and a second time, Persian soldiers sent out to abduct her recognized her by her beauty.⁷⁴ In emphasizing the power of the heroine's beauty, this novel was germane to Chariton's rather than to the less idealistic *Leucippe and Clitophon*.⁷⁵

Clitophon's error thus makes the reader reconsider another novelistic stereotype: the incomparable beauty of the heroine, which should shine through boyish haircuts, like Parthenope's, or the most humbling outfits, like Callirhoe's (2.2.4; 5.9.7). The uniqueness of the heroine's beauty was apparently questioned in Iamblichus's *Babyloniaca*, a lost novel that we know through a Byzantine summary, and one generally considered less than ideal. In it a girl was mistaken for the heroine also because of her beauty: "The farmer's daughter goes off to the goldsmith. When he sees how beautiful she is and recognizes the segment of chain that he himself had fashioned and notes that her hair is shorn, he suspects that she is Sinonis."⁷⁶ This misidentification, though caused by the heroine's beauty, undermines it by making it transferable. It is perhaps for this reason that the novels generally do not exploit for their plots the rich possibilities that could be drawn from the protagonists' physical resemblance to other characters: the idea that someone could look like the hero or the heroine is at odds with the exaltation of their inimitable beauty.⁷⁷

It is true that the protagonists' beauty does not always exert its power; that its beams not always have an unmistakable light. Take Anthia in Xenophon: her beauty does not help Hippothous recognize her the second time around. Nor do Leucon and Rhode immediately see that unique beauty, or the even more extraordinary beauty of Habrocomes, as they stand face-to-face with them in the temple of Helios. Achilles Tatius, however, goes further: the mistake is made not by an emotionally uninvolved highwayman or buyer (Hippothous), not by servants, but by the lover himself.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ See the reconstruction of the plot by Hägg 2004c, 258–59.

⁷⁵ Hägg (2004c), followed by Tilg (2010, 95–105), situates *Parthenope* close to Chariton or even attributes it to him. The loveliness of the heroine's voice also brings Chariton to mind, if it was in *Parthenope* as it is in the Christian martyrdom (*Passio SS. Eustathii*) that is likely to have been influenced by it (par. 1.8–9, in Hägg 2004c, 66).

⁷⁶ καὶ ἄπεισι πρὸς τὸν χρυσοχόον ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ θυγάτηρ. καὶ ἰδὼν ἐκεῖνος τὴν τε ὄψιν τῆς κόρης καλὴν καὶ τῆς ἀλύσεως τὸ μέρος, ἧς αὐτὸς ἐργάτης ἐτύγχανε, καὶ τὴν κόμην περιηρημένην, ὑπονοεῖ Σινωνίδα εἶναι (Photius *Bibliotheca* 94.76b3–7, translated by Stephens and Winkler 1995, 195).

⁷⁷ In the *Babyloniaca* there were also brothers who closely resembled the hero. Stephens and Winkler note: "The misapprehension of a character's identity through actual physical resemblance to someone else is virtually Iamblichus' signature" (1995, 184). See also König 2008, 131.

⁷⁸ Konstan's observation (1994, 48) that "beauty is the beginning of *eros*, and remains its emblem, even when the hero and heroine are so transformed in looks that they are unrecognizable" would be true for Chariton's and Xenophon's novels (if the protagonists were transformed in looks) but, in my opinion, is not for Achilles Tatius's.

Because Clitophon does not immediately recognize Leucippe, the plot moves further away from the lines of an ideal novel. After his encounter with the slave girl, Clitophon retires to dine with Melite and does not seem to be troubled by the recent episode, in spite of the stirring he allegedly felt. We wonder what will happen between the two after dinner and may entertain the possibility that they will consummate their marriage then. Achilles Tatius is playing with fire. If Satyrus had brought the letter a little later, the romantic reversal in Clitophon's life would have materialized only after a hot night with Melite. The situation is saved by serendipity and in the nick of time.

The belated recognition, however, ultimately restores the novel-like order that its initial failure to happen put in jeopardy. It causes a commotion and disrupts the course the plot was taking: a course that, if pursued, would make *Leucippe and Clitophon* a text irreversibly at odds with an ideal novel, one in which the hero would marry another woman not under duress but because he is attracted to her and she has earned his affection. Achilles Tatius stretches even the most cardinal generic conventions to the breaking point; but does not break them.

Daphnis and Chloe: Too Beautiful to Be Shepherds

Not a True Story

"My lord, hear a true story from an old man. I swear by Pan and the Nymphs that I shall tell no lies. I am not Daphnis's father, and Myrtale never had the fortune to be a mother. Other parents abandoned him as a baby, maybe because they had enough older children, and I found him abandoned and being suckled by one of my goats. When she died, I buried her in the kitchen garden, because I loved her for acting as a mother. I found recognition tokens abandoned with him as well, Master, I admit, and I have kept them safe, because they are signs of a higher station than ours."⁷⁹

So does Lamon, Daphnis's foster father, reveal to Dionysophanes, his master, what he knows of the child he has raised. Lamon's main worry is that he might not be believed. That is because the story could easily be a lie to protect his interests, since its aim is to prevent Daphnis from being taken away. Dionysophanes

⁷⁹ ἀκουσον, ὦ δέσποτα, παρ' ἀνδρὸς γέροντος ἀληθῆ λόγον· ἐπόμενι δὲ τὸν Πᾶνα καὶ τὰς Νύμφας ὥς οὐδὲν ψεύσομαι. οὐκ εἰμι Δάφνιδος πατήρ, οὐδ' εὐτύχησέ ποτε Μυρτάλη μήτηρ γενέσθαι. ἄλλοι πατέρες ἐξέθηκαν τοῦτον, ἴσως παιδίων πρεσβυτέρων ἄλις ἔχοντες· ἐγὼ δὲ εὔρον ἐκκεείμενον καὶ ὑπὸ αἰγὸς ἐμῆς τρεφόμενον, ἣν καὶ ἀποθανοῦσαν ἔθαψα ἐν τῷ περικήπῳ φιλῶν ὅτι ἐποίησε μητρὸς ἔργα. εὔρον αὐτῷ καὶ γνωρίσματα συνεκείμενα· ὁμολογῶ, δέσποτα, καὶ φυλάττω· τύχης γάρ ἐστι μείζονος ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς σύμβολα (*Daphnis and Chloe* 4.19.3–5).

is skeptical indeed: though struck by what he hears, he questions Lamon and urges him “to tell the truth and not to invent myth-like tales in order to keep his son.”⁸⁰ Dionysophanes’s wife, Cleariste, is more inclined to believe the story, perhaps also because in the meantime Lamon has sworn an oath and offered himself for torture. Why would he lie, she asks, since he has been promised two goat-herds in return for one? And “how could a bumpkin have made up such a story? Wasn’t it unbelievable at the first glance that such a good-looking son should be born to an old man like him and a nobody of a mother?”⁸¹

From within the novel’s plot, Lamon is not lying. But the novel’s plot is itself a made-up story, of which Lamon’s tale provides some of the essentials. Dionysophanes’s refusal to believe the tale, his rejection of it as “a fabricated story similar to a myth” is, in John Morgan’s words, “a self-referential comment recognizing the book’s literal implausibility and reaffirming its claim to mythic status.”⁸² Lamon lies in the sense that he is summarizing a fictional plot. Cleariste’s question, “how could a bumpkin make up such a tale,” while within the plot it counters her husband’s skepticism, confirms the tale’s “literal implausibility” and “mythic status” by intimating that only an educated person—like the author—has the culture to invent *plasmata* of that kind, to come up with a plot similar (*ὅμοια*) to those in myth and literature. The choice of *plattein* for Lamon’s alleged invention is also a self-referential allusion to the work’s fictional status, for the verb denotes the Greek novels’ own fictionalizing: to stay with *Daphnis and Chloe*, a compound of *plattein* describes the plot contrived by Eros, the internal “author,” to make Chloe fall in love with Daphnis and thus launch the story (1.11.1).⁸³

By highlighting his novel’s mythic status as the stage is being readied for the recognition, Longus highlights the fictional quality of the recognition itself. He emphatically sets it in the train of its literary predecessors, against which he asks us to read it, rather than against real life. Surprising as it may seem, the recovery of exposed children did happen. An important study on the subject has produced substantial proof of this.⁸⁴ There is enough evidence that in some cases parents of abandoned children tried to find their offspring. For instance, they

⁸⁰ τὰ ληθῆ λέγειν μὴ δὲ ὅμοια πλάττειν μύθοις ἐπὶ τῷ κατέχειν τὸν υἱόν (4.20.1).

⁸¹ πῶς δ’ ἂν καὶ ταῦτα ἔπλασεν ἄγρικοις; οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἦν ἄπιστον ἐκ τοιοῦτου γέροντος καὶ μητρὸς εὐτελοῦς υἱὸν καλὸν οὕτω γενέσθαι; (4.20.2).

⁸² Morgan 2004, p. 237. See also Hunter 1983, 47.

⁸³ Photius (*Bibliotheca* 166.111b) calls several novels *πλάσματα*. On this term in connection to the genre, see, e.g., Reardon 1991, 7; Holzberg 2003, 15–17; Ruiz-Montero 2003, 32. On Eros as the writer of Longus’s novel, see below.

⁸⁴ See Boswell 1988, 122–26 (but qualified by Harris 1994). On the realities of children’s exposure, see also Harris 1982; Patterson 1985. For a classification of the reasons given for children’s exposure in literature, see Redford 1967.

consulted astrologers, believing certain stars to be more propitious than others for the endeavor.⁸⁵ Longus gives a realistic coloring to his treatment of the motif of exposure by attributing the abandonment to realistic enough reasons: poverty in Chloe's case, a numerous family in Daphnis's.⁸⁶ But at the same time, through Lamon's disclosure and Dionysophanes's reaction, he is reminding the reader that the recognition about to happen is a *plasma*, or even that it epitomizes the fictional character of his novel.⁸⁷

A parallel can be drawn with the *Aethiopica*, which likewise draws attention to the fictional status of recognitions. Like Lamon's speech, Chariclea's disclosure to her parents in the final recognition scene is dismissed as made up: even before she speaks, her father calls what she will say *plasmata* (10.10.4). If Lamon is accused of trying to keep his son by *plattein* a story, so is Chariclea charged with inventing outrageous fictions (*παρατόλμοις πλάσμασι*) to save her life (10.12.2) and, later, to *anaplattein* men who do not exist (10.22.3). The most telling reference to the fictional quality of (this) recognition frames the recognition itself, as in Longus: Chariclea's lover tells her that the tokens she carries will prove that she and he are "neither a made-up story nor a deception" (*ὅτι μὴ πλάσμα ἐσμὲν μηδὲ ἀπάτη*: 9.24.7)—which of course is exactly what they are.

Longus underscores the "literal implausibility" of his recognition scenes by another detail. Cleariste's second question "Wasn't it incredible that such a handsome lad should be the son of those two"? has its reference in myth, not in reality. We must assume that in reality it could happen then, as it does now, that beautiful or high-minded children were born of ugly or lowly parents and vice versa. Aristotle was bothered by such transgressions to the "rule" that children should look like their parents (at *Gen. an.* 735a 17–19 he claims that *perfect* living beings should give birth to others like themselves), while Plato was aware that parents belonging to the "golden race" could beget "silver" children and vice versa (*Rep.* 415a-c). In Euripides's *Electra*, Orestes observes that "human natures are confounded: I have already seen a nothing of a man born of a noble father, and good children born of base people."⁸⁸ It is in Greek myth that such a mismatch would be "incredible," for it never occurs. The paradox of Cleariste's statement is that, although she is defending the factual veracity of Lamon's speech, she points up its mythic substance.

⁸⁵ See Kudlien 1989.

⁸⁶ Rich parents as well as poor ones exposed children, though for different reasons: see the contrasting evidence of Polybius 36.17 and Plutarch *On Affection for Offspring* 497E.

⁸⁷ A detail that highlights the fictionality of the recognition is Daphnis's still cheerful countenance after his father unabashedly tells him that he exposed him intending him to die.

⁸⁸ ἔχουσι γὰρ παραγμὸν αἱ φύσεις βροτῶν. / ἤδη γὰρ εἶδον ἄνδρα γενναίου πατρὸς / τὸ μηδὲν ὄντα, χρῆστὰ δ' ἐκ κακῶν τέκνα (368–70). See already Hom. *Od.* 2.276–77.

Recognition, Erotic Initiation, and Marriage

Longus's story is "fiction similar to myth" because it employs the widespread mythic motif of abandoned children of high status (Daphnis's parents are the wealthiest in town, and in Chloe's case wealth flows into her family immediately after her exposure), miraculously nurtured by animals, raised by poor folks, and finally discovered by their parents thanks to the tokens left with them. The literary *plasma* that informs the novel's staging of recognition, however, is comedy. In particular, there are remarkable similarities with Menander's *Perikeiromene* and *Epitrepontes*: the exposure of a baby girl is caused by her father's poverty, as in *Perikeiromene* (802–12); the tokens left with Daphnis and Chloe closely recall those left with the girl in that play (822–23);⁸⁹ and the people summoned to arbitrate in Daphnis's recognition, Cleariste and Dionysophanes, turn out to be the child's parents, just as in *Epitrepontes*, the arbitrator of a dispute concerning recognition tokens is revealed to be the grandfather of the child to whom the tokens belong.⁹⁰ The same play might be in the background of Lamon's initial resolve to take only the tokens.⁹¹ For the thought of robbing an exposed child seems to have no other echo in Greek literature than in the arbitration scene of that play, the bone of contention there being precisely whether the tokens by right belong with the foundling or whether it is permissible to keep the ones without the other.⁹²

The comic inspiration for the recognitions underpins the urban origin of Longus's hero and heroine. Since comic characters mostly (though not always) operate in a city and, more important, are always recognized as natives of a city, the allusion to the comic pattern exposure-recognition at the beginning of this uniquely pastoral novel announces that the city will nevertheless break into the country, and that the narrative we have started to read will negotiate Theocritus and Menander.⁹³

In the timing of the recognition, however, Longus's novel resembles more closely those comedies in which the revelation of hidden identities occurs simultaneously for readers and characters alike, rather than those (the majority) in

⁸⁹ See Hunter 1983, 119 and n. 33.

⁹⁰ See Morgan 2004, 238.

⁹¹ 1.3.1. Chloe's father imagines that something similar might have happened to his exposed daughter (4.35.1).

⁹² See Hoffmann 1910, 6. Hunter (1983, p. 119, n. 33) adduces as a parallel Euripides's *Ion*, where the Pythia first thinks of removing the child from the temple and then is won over by pity (43–49). There is, however, no intimation that she would steal the tokens (and I doubt whether we are supposed to imagine the priestess of Apollo to nurture such a thought).

⁹³ The comic imprint is the strongest in book 4, when the children discover their city origins: see Zeitlin 1990, 427–28; Hunter 2003, 375.

which the spectators know the identity of the characters from the outset (or very early on) while the characters themselves do not.⁹⁴ In *Daphnis and Chloe* we know a little more than the protagonists⁹⁵ but no more than the protagonists' foster fathers: that the children have been exposed with precious tokens, that they are more beautiful than one expects of shepherds' offspring, and that animals have suckled them. Thus, we are eager to discover both how the recognition will come about and who Daphnis and Chloe truly are.

But we must wait. The question of the protagonists' origin is moved to the back burner as soon as it is raised.⁹⁶ There are a few sparse hints—namely, at their beauty—that remind the reader of the couple's high birth; but no work is done to retrace it, no pieces of information are gathered until the final act, when the lovers are ready to marry. Only then does the mystery of their origin claim full attention.

The acceleration toward the recognition, in other words, occurs after Daphnis and Chloe have found out the name of their "illness" and its cure. Their discovery of who they are is tied up with their discovery of their love for each other, or, rather, their discovery that what they feel is love and that love demands certain procedures. Because the recognition by family serves to bring the initiation into love's ways to fulfillment, the prospect of the *anagnōrismos* remains in the background as long as the lovers do not know that they love and what to do about it.

Let me go into detail. The general interest (of writer, characters, and readers) in the family history of Daphnis and Chloe is instantly swept away by the emergence of the couple's erotic awakening as the major theme.⁹⁷ The awakening is not spurred by recognition, as it is for the protagonists of the *Aethiopica* when they first set eyes on each other. As we shall see, Chariclea's and Theagenes's souls Platonically recognize their kinship and call that recognition "love" without difficulty (the trouble is emotional, especially for Chariclea, but not cognitive).⁹⁸ Daphnis and Chloe, by contrast, "wanted something, but what they

⁹⁴ Examples of the latter type are Menander's *Aspis*, *Perikeiromene*, and probably *Epitrepontes*, as well as Plautus's *Cistellaria* and *Rudens*; of the former, Terence's *Andria*. As is well known, Terence prefers not to disclose his characters' identity in a prologue, whereas Plautus does, which enables him to exploit the gap of knowledge between spectators and characters for dramatic irony. See Duckworth 1967, 212–18; Hunter 1985, 29–30.

⁹⁵ Daphnis finds out that Chloe is not a rustic in the course of the narrative, from the Nymphs (see below), but Chloe does not seem to know any such thing about Daphnis.

⁹⁶ See Billault 1991, 218 (though it is not quite true that the question disappears until the end. In a forthcoming article Billault states almost the opposite: "Longus never permits the reader to forget about the mystery of their birth.")

⁹⁷ See Lefteratou 2010, 319.

⁹⁸ See *Aeth.* 3.17.1–2; 4.6.1; 4.10.2–3.

wanted they did not know.”⁹⁹ This passage, like Heliodorus’s description of Chariclea and Theagenes falling in love, is redolent of Plato, namely *Phaedrus* 255d: the soul “loves, but whom, it has no clue; it does not know or is able to say what it suffers.”¹⁰⁰ In Heliodorus, however, the lovers’ recognition ignites a mnemonic effort (they try to remember whether they had seen each other before) and a longing for being forever reunited,¹⁰¹ whereas Longus puts emphasis on the initial ignorance that agitates a lover unaware of his state. The search is for the very understanding of the experience. Another passage from the *Phaedrus* can illustrate the difference in emphasis: “Few [souls] are left that have an adequate memory [of the divine sights]; but these, when they see any likeness to the things of that other world, are stricken with amazement and can no longer restrain themselves, but do not know their condition because they do not perceive it adequately.”¹⁰² While Heliodorus’s picture of love’s beginnings chimes with Plato’s description of love as a psychic commotion caused by a yet blurred reminiscence, Longus’s conjures up the image of the lovers who “do not know their condition.” The onset of love is such an utterly novel experience that those who go through it are not reminded of anything they might have encountered before. Love lacks references by which to navigate: flowers and the voice of the nightingale are beautiful, but their beauty does not help Chloe understand the excitement caused in her by Daphnis’s sight and music (1.14.2). Daphnis remembers having kissed young animals, but Chloe’s kiss is something new (1.18.1).

It is the old shepherd Philetas who teaches the couple the name and power of Eros, while also instructing them in the ways to channel erotic passion. Philetas is the instrument of the god. Though Eros never appears in person to the protagonists,¹⁰³ he measures their progress in their erotic journey by disclosing his identity to their helper. At the beginning of the novel, their putative parents dream of a boy stringing his bow, touching both children with the same arrow, and commanding that they be sent to the fields. Neither parent recognizes the boy, who remains unnamed. In contrast, when Philetas instructs the couple in love’s mysteries, he prefaces his lesson with the announcement of an epiphany: “I have come to tell you what I have seen and pass on what I have been told,”¹⁰⁴ and ends it with naming Eros and explaining his power. Daphnis and Chloe now

⁹⁹ ἤθελόν τι, ἡγνόνουν ὅτι θέλουσι (1.22.4).

¹⁰⁰ ἐρᾷ μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ ἀπορεῖ· καὶ οὐθ’ ὅτι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδ’ ἔχει φράσαι. The reference has long been noted. It is in Dalmeyda 1934, at 1. 22. 4.

¹⁰¹ See chapter 3.

¹⁰² ὀλίγαι δὲ λείπονται αἷς τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν· αὐταὶ δέ, ὅταν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα ἴδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ’ αὐτῶν γίνονται, ὃ δ’ ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς δαισθάνεσθαι (*Phaedrus* 250a-b).

¹⁰³ See Liviabella Furiani 1999.

¹⁰⁴ ἤκω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅσα εἶδον μηνύσων, ὅσα ἤκουσα ἀπαγγελῶν (2.3.2).

realize that the boy who appeared to their fathers was the same god (2.8.4). The couple's acquired knowledge deepens, as it were, in their dreams, when they dare do what they did not while awake: lying together naked (2.10.1). This episode, in turn, leads to another step in their erotic initiation: the next day, as they accidentally lie together in a tight embrace, they "recognize" (*γνωρίσαντες*) the dream they had, and, following its guidance, they cling together for a long time (2.11.2).

These first steps toward the understanding of love are followed shortly afterward by a reminder, the first in some time, of the mysterious origin of one of the protagonists. When Chloe is kidnapped by the Methymnian youths, Daphnis pours out his despair to the Nymphs, who apparently have not protected the girl in spite of her unwavering devotion to them. In response the Nymphs tell him in a dream that they do care for Chloe now as they did when she was born and abandoned in their sanctuary, for Chloe has nothing to do with rustics; this time again she will be saved (2.23). Until this revelation, both Daphnis and Chloe, though they knew that she was raised in the grove of the Nymphs (1.14.3), read the vicissitudes of their births as signs of their strong connection to the fields: when first they were sent to shepherd the flocks, they felt affection for them, remembering that animals had saved their lives (1.8.3). They took the role of animals in their lives to mean that they belonged with animals. Conversely, after the Nymphs appear to Daphnis, he knows that for Chloe it is otherwise. Recognition of family identity is thus tied together with erotic initiation early on in the narrative. Whereas in the other novels actual travels and separation are the precondition for the lovers recognizing each other and being recognized by their community, the Nymphs' revelation to Daphnis announces that in this novel it is the metaphorical journey to Eros that will allow them to be recognized for who they are. Daphnis learns more about Chloe's origin now that they have both learnt (something) about love.

Daphnis soon learns more about love, thanks to the practical lesson he receives from the sly Lycaenium. Toward the end of the lesson, he no longer needs her guidance because "nature herself . . . taught what had to be done."¹⁰⁵ A similar authorial comment later punctuates Daphnis's recognition. As the youth cannot be severed from his parents' embrace, Longus observes: it is as if he had always known them, for "nature is easily believed."¹⁰⁶ The analogous statements, both stressing nature's guiding power, point up the dependence of Daphnis's recognition on his sexual initiation.

It is indeed because Daphnis knows more about love than Chloe that he is the first to be recognized.¹⁰⁷ The precedence of his recognition is further indication

¹⁰⁵ αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ φύσις . . . ἐπαίδευσε τὸ πρακτέον (3.18.4).

¹⁰⁶ φύσις ταχέως πιστεύεται (4.23.2). See Morgan 2004, 239.

¹⁰⁷ See Morgan 2004, 238.

that discovery of family identity marks the end-point of the children's erotic journey. It is not quite true, I think, that for either Daphnis or Chloe the recognition brings out "a return to the order of their lives."¹⁰⁸ Though it restores order to their lives, and though it reinstates them into their original families and birth-rights, it does not simply accomplish a return but rather completes and brings into the public eye a process of personal growth.

The dependency of the children's recovery of their families on their erotic maturation is spelled out most emphatically by the parallel role of Eros as the initiator of both their apprenticeship of love and something not as intuitive or predictable: Chloe's recognition by her father. Just as the god, armed with darts and quiver, appears in a dream to both putative fathers to urge them to send the youngsters to the fields (1.7.2), so does he appear again, this time putting down his weapons, to Daphnis's true father after he has recognized his son, to urge him to call the first citizens of Mytilene for dinner and to show them Chloe's tokens (4.34.1). Eros enters the stage as *deus ex machina* because he himself has written the story and is now bringing it to an end (as suggested visually by the deposition of the bow and darts), binding together the children's erotic initiation and their reunion with their families.¹⁰⁹ The neat parallels and reversals in the two dreams, one at the beginning, one at the end of the novel, the first with an aggressive Eros, the second with a pacified one, the first directed to the couple's foster fathers, the second to Daphnis's natural one, with Eros both times giving orders (*κελεύσαι*) to his addressees,¹¹⁰ highlight the interconnection between the couple's journey of knowledge and their final recognition of and by their parents: Eros governs both.

A significant detail in the god's appearances further connects family recognition and erotic initiation: as mentioned, when Lamon and Dryas dream of Eros touching Daphnis and Chloe with one dart, they cannot tell his name (1.8.2: *τὸ γὰρ ὄνομα λέγειν οὐκ εἶχον*) and call him a "little boy" (*παιδίῳ*). Conversely, Dionysophanes knows that the god he sees laying down his weapons is Eros and calls him by name (*τοῦ Ἐρωτος*). The different response depends on the dreamers' different level of education:¹¹¹ Lamon's and Dryas's is so poor that, though they are ancient Greeks, they fail Mythology 101. But the order in the dreams suggests an additional reading: the last dreamer's recognition of Eros reflects the protagonists' acquired knowledge of love. This is supported by their

¹⁰⁸ So Billault 1991, 220.

¹⁰⁹ On Eros as the novel's writer, see especially 2.27.2. See Zeitlin 1990 and 1994; Liviabella Furiani 1999 (though this critic also observes that the Nymphs are the original motor of the story: they ask Eros to take care of it); Morgan 2004, 245.

¹¹⁰ See Liviabella Furiani 1999, 79.

¹¹¹ See Morgan 2004, 245.

own identification of the boy in their fathers' dreams as the god Philetas described to them (2.8.4). The identification happens along with the recognition of their state; it translates their erotic awareness. Daphnis's father brings the identification to full light by naming the boy, who asks him to set the stage for the final recognition.

Eros's open intervention as an agent of recognition only after the protagonists' erotic growth has reached its upper limit (short of consummation) seems to suggest, with Froma Zeitlin, that "true love is most 'true' only when it comes to being without regard for genetic and social origins."¹¹² On this reading, the love story in *Daphnis and Chloe* would be a purer, more innocent version of, say, the one in the *Barber of Seville* between Count Almaviva and Rosina, with the Count passing for a poor student to make Rosina fall in love with himself, not his wealth (Longus's protagonists are purer and more innocent because they do not lie about their origins, which they do not know, but their ignorance still frees the onset of love from awareness of social identity). This interpretation, though, appealing as it is to modern sensibilities, alone does not quite fit the thought-world of the Greek novels, in which high social origins and "true" love belong together. Recognition of family identity is necessary for true love to be the love of a novelistic hero and heroine, for only if Daphnis and Chloe are from the upper crust of society can they love as they do. In other words, family recognition *has* to follow the discovery of love to reveal whose love it is and for whom. It also demonstrates the novelistic imperative that "love requires the seal of society";¹¹³ or "erotic passion is fulfilled in marriage, and marriage can happen only in the presence and with the approval of the lovers' families."

As long as the children's origins remain a mystery, their marriage cannot happen. This is made clear in the plot by the numerous obstacles that the prospect of their marriage encounters, which, in addition to delaying the climax, save a story that flirts with the possibility of marriage in a foster family from ending in that way. The foster fathers' sentiment that the foundlings come from a higher background, and that discovery of their origin could benefit their adoptive parents, holds them back from marrying "their" children off not only to other suitors but to each other as well. Suspicions about Chloe's origins keep Dryas from deciding on marriage with the rustic Dorcon (1.19.3) and with many more country folks (3.25.3). But he would not deem marriage with Daphnis any worthier were it not that Daphnis lavishes 3,000 drachmas on him (3.30.1).

As to Lamon, he tells his wife that in no way will he accept marriage with the shepherdess Chloe for his foster son, whose tokens bespeak a higher origin (3.26.3). Lamon's wife, out of sympathy for Daphnis, lies to him, but the lie is nonetheless geared to avoid the marriage: we are poor, she says, and Chloe's

¹¹² Zeitlin 1990, 427.

¹¹³ On this requirement, see Perkins 1995, chapter 2, especially 50–51, 62–63.

parents are rich. See if you can convince Dryas to give you Chloe for nothing. The woman speaks thus thinking that Dryas would never accept the deal (3.27.1)—and indeed he would not without the sum he unexpectedly receives. Later, Lamón finds a new pretext to dodge, or at least postpone, the marriage, namely, that he is a slave and his master needs to approve his choice (3.31.3).

As the marriage approaches, the mystery of the foundlings' identity is brought center stage. The *gnōrismata*, which crowd the narrative of the children's discovery at the beginning of book 1,¹¹⁴ multiply again on the scene as soon as there is talk of marriage: when Lamón first opposes Daphnis's marriage with Chloe (3.26.3); when Dryas, to hide the 3,000 drachmas, chooses the same place where he keeps Chloe's tokens (3.30.2); and when, after Lamón gives him hopes that Daphnis will marry Chloe but also tells him that the youth is of higher stock than they, Dryas wonders whether Daphnis also is a foundling and was exposed with costly tokens like Chloe, and wishes for him to recover his own parents and then find something out about Chloe, too (3.32.1–2). This repeated reminder of the foundlings' family origins in connection with their marriage discourages the thought, variously suggested, that the lovers' union might happen in an unorthodox fashion and context—unorthodox with respect to both social and generic rules. The revelation of family identity will complete the protagonists' erotic maturation by recognizing it in the strongest sense of the term: as acknowledging its legitimacy.

Growing Beauty

The recognition is prepared by increasing indications that the protagonists do not look like country folks. This manner of foreshadowing recognition follows a familiar pattern of myth and, in literature, especially of comedy: characters about to be recognized as the offshoots of parents of good stock send signals, so to speak, of the upcoming discovery by appearing noticeably better educated and more magnanimous, beautiful, and pure than would be expected of someone of their alleged status.¹¹⁵ A good example is Selenion in Plautus's *Cistellaria*: though destined to be a courtesan, she loathes the profession, falls in love, and remains faithful to the man she loves.¹¹⁶ It will turn out that she is a free woman, worthy

¹¹⁴ See 1.3.2; 1.5.3; 1.6.1; 1.8.1.

¹¹⁵ See Harsh 1936, 34–55; Duckworth 1967, 158; 219–20. Duckworth (219) notes the higher frequency of identity-hints in plays that do not have a prologue, and comments: "The spectator may not grasp the full significance of the passage at the time but certainly his curiosity will be aroused about the girl's identity." This is not the case for *Daphnis and Chloe*: readers (as well as the foster parents) know that the protagonists are foundlings and that their parents are wealthy.

¹¹⁶ Selenion's character contrasts with that of "true" (socially speaking) courtesans, like her friend and especially her friend's mother, who wants her daughter to support both with her "daily marriages."

of marrying the man for whom she has kept herself.¹¹⁷ This topos is spelled out in the great metatheatrical scene of the arbitration in Menander's *Epitrepontes*, where the slave who has raised the exposed child claims its tokens back also because they might help find its natural parents, who of course are imagined to be of better stock than the foster parents: "Just suppose this child is above our class. / Brought up with working folk, he may despise / That, veer to his true nature, steel himself / For high endeavor—big-game hunting, bearing arms, / Olympic running."¹¹⁸ The pleader adds a couple of mythic illustrations, from tragedy, of how nobly born children who appeared noticeably better (*κρείττονας*) than their supposed parents discovered their true origins thanks to tokens.¹¹⁹

In *Daphnis and Chloe*, however, "better" almost exclusively means "more beautiful." Beauty is the signal of their origins that the protagonists send as the recognition approaches,¹²⁰ and this in spite of the fact that *Daphnis and Chloe* all in all does not lavish hyperbolic praise on the lovers' appearance in the manner of the other novels.

Both hero and heroine, to be sure, are equated to gods: Chloe appears to Daphnis as one of the Nymphs in the cave (1.24.1), then as beautiful as Aphrodite appeared to Paris (3.34.2–3); Daphnis appears like Dionysius to the women helping in the vintage (2.2.1), and when he shows himself with the full gear of a goatherd, he conjures up the image of Apollo the Shepherd, the tender of Laomedon's flocks (4.14.2). The mystery that long shrouds the children's origin and the detail that animals suckled them leave their very status blurred: perhaps they are gods indeed, or at least (as will turn out to be true) god-favored mortals.¹²¹ At the same time, however, references to their godlike appearance smack of literary ornament and do not convey a sentiment of awe before truly extraordinary beauty. Daphnis and Chloe do not have the "epiphanic" powers of a Callirhoe, a

¹¹⁷ Likewise in *Heautontimoroumenos*, an exposed child of free birth is raised to be a prostitute but remains pure; in *Curculio*, Planesion is pure even with respect to her beloved, with whom she has only exchanged kisses. In *Andria* the protagonist, who is believed to be the sister of a courtesan, nonetheless is of strikingly noble and distinguished appearance (122–23: "forma praeter ceteras/ honesta ac liberali"). Outside of comedy, see also the recognition of Cyrus in Herodotus (1.116): "while the boy was speaking thus, Astyages came to recognize him: the features of his face seemed like his own, his thought and his manner of answering were of a quite free man."

¹¹⁸ Ἰσως ἔσθ' οὐτοσί / ὁ παῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶς καὶ τραφεὶς ἐν ἐργάταις / ὑπερόψεται ταῦτ', εἰς δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν / αἴξας ἐλευθέρων τι τολμήσει πονεῖν / θηρᾶν λέοντας, ὅπλα βαστάζειν, τρέχειν ἐν ἀγῶσι (320–25, Arnott's translation in the Loeb edition).

¹¹⁹ Menander's character adds that recognition tokens have prevented violence between family members and brothers from marrying their sisters. Hunter (1983, 68) thinks that Longus has this scene in mind and is teasing us with the possibility that Daphnis and Chloe will turn out to be siblings.

¹²⁰ But see already 1.2.3; 1.7.1; 1.28.2.

¹²¹ See Hunter 1983, 16.

Habrocomes, or a Chariclea. They do not trigger religious *thambos*, stupefaction, or adoring gestures.¹²²

Even the lovers, in admiring each other's beauty, do not speak dithyrambic language. When first Daphnis and Chloe see each other as beautiful, Longus tries to identify with their world and way of seeing by picturing the couple's beauty through their own eyes—that is, as shepherds would. The first time Chloe finds Daphnis handsome (which is the first time Longus describes his body), she resorts to an image that fits the landscape: his skin seems to have drawn its dark hue from his thick dark hair (1.13.2). We see a leafy tree projecting its shadow. Later, Chloe likens his hair to the myrtle (1.24.3). Daphnis admires Chloe's hair, the color of fire, her skin as white as goat milk and her cow-like eyes (a feature that belongs also to Homer's Hera but sounds just right in the mouth of a herdsman; 1.17.3).¹²³ Chloe's face reminds him of an apple (1.24.3). Seen through the eyes of country folks, her beauty inspires no such rhapsody as does the beauty of the other novelistic heroines.

In the second half, however, and especially in connection with the mystery of the youngsters' origin and the wedding dependent on it, we are insistently reminded of their telltale beauty. A review of the episodes by its very repetitiousness will convey Longus's obsession with the motif. When Lamon is asked to consider Chloe as Daphnis's bride, he compliments her as "a fine pretty girl, without a fault."¹²⁴ As soon as Dryas hears that Daphnis is of good stock, he muses: "He is good looking, with no likeness to an old man with a squashed nose and a woman whose hair is falling out."¹²⁵ The first time Daphnis appears in front of (his not-yet-known father) Dionysophanes, because of his beauty he evokes the image of a god (4.14.2). Gnathon, the parasite of the young master Astylus, falls in love with Daphnis because his beauty is "of a kind not to be found even in the city" and shortly afterward defends his passion for a smelly and lowly goat-herd by pontificating, on a mock Stoic note, "I love the body of a slave, but the beauty of a free man"¹²⁶—which of course Daphnis is. He goes on to praise that

¹²² Significantly, Létoublon in her book on novelistic *topoi* (1993, 122–24), under the rubric "Belle comme une déesse," does not list any passage from *Daphnis and Chloe*.

¹²³ See Hunter's comment: "the echo of the epic epithet *βοῶπις* is appropriate here because Daphnis is one person who would know what the eyes of a *βοῦς* look like" (1983, 62). We might, however, smile at the enforcement of the aesthetic mandate that women's skin be white: is the sun tanning only Daphnis? As a modern iconographical equivalent, I am thinking of *The Interrupted Sleep*, by François Boucher (mid-eighteenth century), in which the sleeping shepherdess gleams with snow-white skin whereas her lover has a darker hue.

¹²⁴ καλὴ καὶ ὡραία κόρη καὶ πάντα ἀγαθή (3.31.3).

¹²⁵ ἔστι δὲ καλὸς καὶ οὐδὲν ἑοικὼς συμῶ γέροντι καὶ μαδῶσῃ γυναικί (3.32.1).

¹²⁶ κάλλος οἶον οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως (4.11.2); ἐγὼ δὲ σώματος μὲν ἐρῶ δούλου, κάλλους δὲ ἐλευθέρου (4.17.4).

beauty in detail: hair like hyacinth, eyes like jewels in settings of gold, flushed cheeks, teeth as white as ivory (notice how Ganthon's main reference for his description are precious materials, as befits one from the city). Eudromos, a slave sympathetic to Daphnis, mentions his great beauty as a reason to save him from becoming Gnathon's sex toy (4.18.2). Astylus, pleading with his father to let him take Daphnis along, calls him "handsome, and too good for the country" (4.19.1: *καλόν τε ὄντα καὶ ἀγροικίας κρείττονα*), a phrase that harks back to this observation at the beginning of the novel: "and in them was to be seen a beauty too fine for the countryside" (1.7.1: *κάλλος αὐτοῖς ἐξεφαίνετο κρείττον ἀγροικίας*). The echoing announces the imminence of the recognition, which will explain the reason for that puzzling beauty. Even Astylus's slaves rejoice at acquiring such a "beautiful" fellow servant.¹²⁷ Finally, both Daphnis's and Chloe's beauty is in the spotlight shortly before their recognitions. His soon-to-be-discovered mother comments: "That Daphnis is a foundling is credible, for how could such a beautiful son be born of those two"? (4.20.2, paraphrased). Dryas, in disclosing what he knows of Chloe's birth, takes as evidence (*μαρτυρεῖ*) of her high status her beauty even before the tokens (4.30.4). The first time Chloe's beauty receives hyperbolic praise in a manner reminiscent of the other novels is when she is about to be recognized: aided by the ornaments she wears, her beauty shines as never before, to the point that tokens are deemed unnecessary indeed to prove her status. One could swear she was not the daughter of Dryas (4.32.1–2).

The prominence given to beauty in connection with the recognition is not an anodyne detail. By alerting us repeatedly to the protagonists' beauty as their wealthy families are about to be discovered, Longus reminds us that Daphnis and Chloe, though they have followed an unusual plotline, are novelistic lovers, that is, *both* incredibly beautiful *and* socially eminent. Their beauty authenticates their origin by visible proof of it. That the nobly born is beautiful is a leitmotif in the novels as a whole.¹²⁸ But *Daphnis and Chloe* exploits it more than the others, with the possible exception of the *Aethiopica*, which also keeps the origin of the main protagonist hidden for a long stretch of the narrative but "asks" her to fill in the missing information, and this as soon as she is born, by gleaming with extraordinary beauty: when Sisimithres finds her exposed, he is struck by the godlike light that shines in her eyes (2.31.1).¹²⁹ Likewise, Daphnis and Chloe

¹²⁷ See 4.19.3 (though *kalos* here does not describe purely physical beauty but also ways, as at 4.19.5).

¹²⁸ See Perkins 1995, 53–54. Baslez (1990, 119) thinks that the belief is unique to the novels. Curiously, she draws examples from all of them except Longus's.

¹²⁹ Callirhoe's beauty also declares her noble. It is not, however, a reminder of her unknown origin to the readers but an indication of it for the characters who do not know who she is.

have to demonstrate their high origin, suspected but not known for certain, by irradiating beauty. Even more so in their case, because they have lived their whole life in humble surroundings, which they prove ready to leave by sending bright signals of their true origin as the recognition approaches.¹³⁰

Thus Daphnis, in addition to announcing the recognition by emanating beauty, when recognized draws admiration again for his beauty, which earns his father warmer compliments than if just a son (rather than a remarkably handsome one) had been found for him (4.33.3). As to Chloe, emphasis on her socially symbolic beauty is even greater. She steps forth once again incomparable in her splendor when she reaches Mytilene shortly before the recognition: her appearance strikes the onlookers with amazement (ἐξέπλησσε) as has never happened before, with almost Callirhoe-like powers. The women who see her hope that she is of a stock worthy of her beauty, and many of them, among the wealthiest, wish to be believed the mothers of such beauty (4.33.4). There could hardly be a more telling way of binding together physical appearance and social status.

Another detail completes the recognition of Chloe as a beautiful upper-class heroine of an ideal novel: dress. As she advances to meet her true father, she is “very beautifully attired” (4.36.1: *πάννυ καλῶς κεκοσμημένην*). Chloe until a few days earlier has been dressed like a shepherdess (when dressed at all). It seems that the recognition cannot happen without the heroine putting on the right amount of jewelry that qualifies her as a high-status young woman. In Chloe’s case, to be sure, adornment is all the more imperative because she is about to be recognized as a city girl.¹³¹ Her attire as she first appears in Mytilene foreshadows her admission into elite urban circles. But it also confirms her in her generic role, for novelistic heroines always come from elite urban circles.

Already in the first stages of her recognition, after Dionysophanes has seen the tokens that identify Chloe as high-class, his wife adorns her as Daphnis’s bride-to-be (4.31.3). The cosmetic treatment elicits this comment: “Then you could see what beauty is like when it is enhanced by ornament. For when Chloe was dressed, with her hair braided and her face washed, she appeared to them all so much lovelier that even Daphnis hardly recognized her.”¹³² Longus reverses the motif, which we encountered in Achilles Tatius and will encounter again in Heliodorus, according to which the heroine’s beauty, if she wears shabby clothes,

¹³⁰ Though Daphnis and Chloe will live most of their life in a pastoral style (4.39), they abandon their rustic ways when first they are recognized and will enjoy the wealth of their urban families.

¹³¹ See Morgan 2004, 244.

¹³² ἦν οὖν μαθεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κάλλος, ὅταν κόσμον προσλάβῃ. ἐνδυθεῖσα γὰρ ἡ Χλόη καὶ ἀναπλεξαμένη τὴν κόμην καὶ ἀπολούσασα τὸ πρόσωπον εὐμορφότερα τοσοῦτον ἐφάνη παῖσι, ὥστε καὶ Δάφνις αὐτὴν μὲν ἐγνώρισεν (4.32.1).

apparently does not shine, or not brilliantly enough to prevent misidentification. In Longus, by contrast, the opposite gesture, of dressing her up, makes her so beautiful as to mystify even her lover. In both cases, dress transfigures the heroine; it has the power of making her other than herself—or should we rather say, for Chloe, of bringing her true self, heretofore unrevealed, to full light?

Nothing of the sort happens to the hero, in this novel or any other. The object of a misrecognition caused by a misleading dress is always the heroine: Leucippe, Chloe, and, as we shall see, Chariclea. Dress has no such transfigurative power when worn by the male protagonist.¹³³ Daphnis radiates beauty as the recognition approaches; but dress plays no decisive role in it. When he looks like Apollo the Shepherd, he is wearing garments freshly made, to be sure, but still those of a goatherd (4.14.1). Contrary to Chloe, he is recognized while he is still in a rustic outfit. Though subsequent to the recognition he puts on expensive clothes (4.23.2), as his class requires, his new apparel receives no further attention and remains inconspicuous.

On another level, the difference in the treatment of the protagonists' appearance in connection with the recognition signals the different significance of marriage for each. Daphnis does not undergo the same change as Chloe because marriage does not change a man as much as it does a girl. The heroine's transfiguration while she is on her way to her recognition foreshadows her upcoming metamorphosis: from virgin to woman, and into a greater beauty. Recall: as soon as Chloe is revealed to be of good stock, Cleariste adorns her *as her son's wife* (4.31.3: *ὡς υἱοῦ γυναικα*). The former shepherdess does not simply wear a dress appropriate to her newly discovered status, but a "wedding gown." Her enhanced beauty is that of a young bride, a *νύμφη* (4.33.3).

Critics have argued that Chloe's marriage in book 4 substitutes for the inserted tales that, in the preceding books, each tell of a metamorphosis undergone by a musical maiden (the nameless cowgirl who became the wood-dove, Syrinx, and Echo) subsequent to male violence (so Syrinx and Echo, the victims of Pan's lust) or a defeat in a music contest by a man endowed with greater vocal strength (in the case of the cowgirl, who lost cattle to a shepherd boy because his singing had a louder ring).¹³⁴ Though those maidens suffer from male dominance, because of it their music is made eternal, and its perennial delight glosses over the violence it cost them.¹³⁵ Chloe likewise will be changed, by marriage, into new beauty. The splendor she radiates on the eve of the recognition announces

¹³³ The one exception is Calasiris in Heliodorus (see chapter 3), though he is not the young hero.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., Hunter 1983, 54–57; MacQueen 1990, chapter 6; Wouters 1994; Bowie 2004; Morgan 2004, 13–14.

¹³⁵ See Wouters 1994, 151, n. 62: "Longus met l'accent sur l'évolution de la musique vers un phénomène primordial et éternel."

her upcoming metamorphosis, likewise glossing over the violence of the defloration that will change her from virgin to woman.¹³⁶

Tragic Tensions and Comic Reconciliation

The comic inspiration for the recognitions emerges unambiguously in their aftermath: a wedding party, and one in which all the characters participate, even those who played the villain beforehand. In Chariton, Xenophon, and Achilles Tatius the rivals of the lovers are disposed of before the recognition occurs or, if they know that it has occurred, are hurt by it.¹³⁷ Conversely, in *Daphnis and Chloe* a chief rival, Gnathon, becomes reconciled with the newly recognized Daphnis. When Chloe is attacked by Lampis, Gnathon sees an opportunity to earn Daphnis's forgiveness: he rushes to rescue her, and as a result Daphnis considers him a "benefactor" (4.29.5). Lampis as well, who not only tried to rape Chloe but also vandalized Lamon's garden, participates in the wedding feast, and in his case without having redeemed himself by a good action: the need for total reconciliation overrides the weighing of individual deserts.¹³⁸ The invitees also include relatives of Dorcon, a former suitor of Chloe, now dead, and Lycaenium, the woman who initiated Daphnis into love's deeds. The wedding feast is a celebration of friendship among all parties. We think of Plautus's *Rudens*, where even the hateful pimp is invited to the wedding dinner; or, in more general terms, of Aristotle's comment that in comedy Orestes and Aegisthus leave the stage as friends.¹³⁹

The conciliatory function of the recognitions extends to the two parental couples, whose harmonious coexistence is part and parcel of the novel's idyllic

¹³⁶ The emphasis on Chloe's beauty seems to challenge interpretations of the novel as a denunciation of elite values and education, and in particular of the socialization of eros, such as J. Winkler 1990. I agree with Swain 1996, 116: "to announce that one's text is part of a programme of *paideia* is to situate it precisely within elite society, not to question its validity." The treatment of the three inset tales pertaining to Chloe encourages this line of interpretation: they tell of male violence but ultimately invite us to "enjoy the music," which that violence has not destroyed but immortalized. For critique of Winkler's reading see Goldhill 1995, 30–50; Bowie 2004; Lalanne 2006, 144–45.

¹³⁷ Dionysius and to a lesser extent Artaxerxes (in Chariton) are hurt by the lovers' recognition. In Xenophon all the rivals have disappeared (with the exception of Hippothous, who is no true rival), and in Achilles Tatius some have disappeared while others, namely Thersander, are doomed by the recognition and its consequences.

¹³⁸ Bowie (2009, 14) observes that Lampis's participation in the feast is not related to merit.

¹³⁹ Hunter (1985, 42) speaks of "the healing power" that in comedy is manifested in general forgiveness (Aristotle's passage is *Poet.* 53a 36–39). Differently, Lalanne (2006, 140) thinks that the presence of former enemies at the wedding of Daphnis and Chloe shows that the offences perpetrated against Chloe do not matter. Among the invitees, however, are also offenders against Daphnis (Gnathon, Lampis).

world. We can contrast the darker picture that emerges from rhetorical declamations, a number of which stage fierce disputes between natural and adoptive parents. Though we should not take those declamations to reflect reality, they are steeped in a grimmer world, both real and fictional, one in which, as in comedy but with no happy ending, family members are at odds with each other and paternity issues create tensions.¹⁴⁰ A *Controversia* by Seneca the Elder (9.3), for instance, features a foster father and a natural one quarrelling over the latter's right to recover both of his twin sons. The foster father had promised to reveal where the children were on the condition that he could keep one of them, and now the natural father wants both. Similar conflicts appear also in the *Major* and *Minor Declamations* attributed to Quintilian (but of a later date).¹⁴¹

No such tension is even hinted at in *Daphnis and Chloe*. It is clear that a main reason for Lamon and Dryas to pick up the exposed children and raise them is the hope to become rich should the children find their natural parents (3.25.3; 3.26.3; Daphnis and Chloe are educated above their station because their foster parents have high hopes for them: 1.8.1).¹⁴² Thus, it is to be expected that there will be no conflict in the end, when the two parental couples face each other after the recognition. The putative parents are happy indeed to have found the real ones, for they do become wealthier as a consequence. And though the natural parents get the children back, the foster parents are not severed from them: the wedding feast in the country honors the foster parents and brings all the parents together. The accommodation of the rural "parents" into the protagonists' lives respects their newly recognized double identity, urban and rural.

The cloudless conciliation of all parties, however, is the end result of a protracted aftermath to Daphnis's recognition, filled with tragic elements. Though Longus draws on comic models of recognition, he also plays with them by intimating the possibility of alternative endings. A parallel can be made with Heliodorus, who likewise suggests gloomier alternatives to the predictably happy ending.¹⁴³ In both novels, the recognition process unfolds in two stretches: recognition of Chariclea, then of Theagenes as Chariclea's lover; of Daphnis, then of Chloe as both his lover and the daughter of Megacles. (In Longus we have two recognitions in the strictest sense, as the establishment of family identity.) The double recognition allows for extensions, delays, and uncertainties about the turn events might take in between.

¹⁴⁰ On the relationship that declamations entertain with reality and fiction, including the novel, see Mal-Maeder 2007.

¹⁴¹ See, e.g., *Minor Declamations* 278 and 338.

¹⁴² This, however, does not mean that the foster parents are unloving. On the contrary, they exhibit a degree of philanthropy unknown to the natural parents, who expose their children for selfish reasons. Nape immediately loves Chloe (1.6.3).

¹⁴³ See Morgan 1989a, and chapter 3 here.

Longus in fact shows little interest in the recognitions themselves, that is, the workings of their unfolding.¹⁴⁴ Both recognition scenes are simple and rushed. The tokens, which have played no role in the narrative except as a repetitive and static reminder of the children's upper-class origins, in both scenes are mechanically exhibited. As soon as Dionysophanes sees Daphnis's tokens, he cries out "Lord Zeus!" and calls his wife to look. Her response is immediate: aren't these the objects we left with our baby? Daphnis is our child! (4.21.2–3, summarized). Dionysophanes and Cleariste instantly believe that the tokens have been lying legitimately with their child all the while, that they have not been stolen or otherwise misplaced—which sounds reckless to the readers, who know that Lamón had thought of taking only the tokens and leaving the child behind.

Chloe's recognition is conducted with even less care. When Megacles recognizes the tokens, Dionysophanes, who has circulated them, asks him: "First tell me of the exposure." After hearing the story, he immediately produces Chloe. Though the story, with its wealth of detail, proves Megacles to be Chloe's father, Dionysophanes's assurance in producing Chloe does not prove to Megacles that she is his daughter. Yet he is instantly persuaded; and even though, at recognizing the tokens, he wondered whether they were not stolen (4.35.1). If Dionysophanes believes the tokens to have stayed with his child, Megacles accepts as child the girl who is presented to him. The hasty treatment of the recognitions suggests that the technical details of their staging did not excite Longus's imagination.

Rather than in the unfolding of the recognitions, Longus is interested in what happens in the middle. He rushes off, as it were, from the site of Daphnis's recognition to produce a new climax, filled with unsettling violence. Daphnis's family has recognized him in his absence, following, again, a pattern of comedy. But this comedy for a moment takes a tragic turn. When Astylus runs to fetch his newly found brother, Daphnis—who does not yet know he has been recognized—thinks that the purpose of the pursuit is to take him away to town as Gnathon's toy, and so heads off toward the sea to hurl himself from a cliff. The narrator's comment, "Daphnis might have been lost in being found—an event without precedent—had not Astylus realized . . ."¹⁴⁵ points up a potential reversal of the comic and novelistic pattern of recognition: this one could have failed to reach fulfillment and resulted in death, rather than rescue, for one of the parties involved; and in death for love.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ See Morgan 2004, 238. The observations in this paragraph expand on Morgan's insights.

¹⁴⁵ καὶ ἵσως ἂν, τὸ καυνότατον, εὐρεθεὶς ἀπωλώλει Δάφνις, εἰ μὴ συνείη ὁ Ἄστυλος. . . . (4.22.3).

¹⁴⁶ This is suggested by the allusion to the legend of Sappho's suicide as well as to Theocr. 3.25 and 5.14–16, in which lovesick shepherds threaten to kill themselves in the same way as Daphnis: see Morgan 2004, 238.

This prospect is labeled τὸ καινότερον, literally “the newest.” The choice of term is intriguing not only because of its polysemy (“novel” as well as “strange” in a negative sense) but also because καινός is frequently applied to literary matters. Longus is sketching “a most weird/unprecedented literary innovation”: he is conceiving of a comic sort of recognition that will kill rather than save its protagonist.¹⁴⁷ But at the same time, the novelist informs the reader that he will not follow this extraordinary plotline; his novel will stay within generic parameters.¹⁴⁸ *To kainotaton* refers to an impossible alternative route, if *Daphnis and Chloe* is to be an ideal novel.

Nonetheless, after the conventional party to celebrate Daphnis’s recognition, and one more sacrifice the next day for him to say farewell to life as a goatherd, more trouble begins. Though discovery of his family has saved him from impending disaster (from being given away to Gnathon), it also has the immediate result of separating him from Chloe. Her feeling of being abandoned (4.27.1–2) is justified, for Daphnis’s recognition by his family for a brief moment makes him forget his beloved (4.23.2), as he himself admits to her (4.29.5). Daphnis’s abandonment of Chloe even translates into yet another kidnapping: she thinks of suicide (4.27.2), and as she is absorbed in such thoughts, Lampis, now hopeful because he assumes, like Chloe herself, that Daphnis will no longer be interested in a country girl, comes upon her and drags her to his house (4.28.1). The comedy has again turned to tragedy. When he finds out about the kidnapping, Daphnis loudly laments, regretting the reversal of fortune, “Unhappy recognition! . . . How much better it was for me to be a herdsman! How much better off I was when I was a slave! Then I could look at Chloe.”¹⁴⁹ Daphnis’s sentiment is at odds with the commonplace, of comedy, that recognition of one’s higher status improves one’s fortune in love.

Indeed, even when Chloe is rescued, knowledge of Daphnis’s origin is for them an impediment to their wedding: they decide to keep their love secret and to see each other in secret.¹⁵⁰ Likewise, in Heliodorus, Chariclea’s recognition jeopardizes her union with Theagenes because her parents instantly promise her to a kinsman. The different reasons the union is in danger, however, reflect the

¹⁴⁷ Morgan (2004, 238) compares the immediate result of this recognition with that of Chariclea’s, which likewise does not ipso facto save her. I think, however, that Daphnis’s recognition risks having even more tragic effects: it does not just fail to avert death but would cause it, for Astylus runs after Daphnis *only* because he has been recognized.

¹⁴⁸ See Morgan 2004, 239.

¹⁴⁹ ὦ πικρᾶς ἀνευρέσεως . . . πόσον ἦν μοι κρεῖττον νέμειν. πόσον ἤμην μακαριώτερος, δοῦλος ὢν. τότε ἔβλεπον Χλόην (4.28.2–3).

¹⁵⁰ ἔχειν κρύφα τὴν Χλόην (4.30.1) means “to take Chloe secretly as a lover” (Morgan 2004, 243, at 4.30.1), not “to hide Chloe in some hole or other,” as Thornley (1916 ad loc.) would like in his effort to sanitize the text.

different ethos and concerns of the two novels: whereas Longus flirts with the possibility of sex without marriage, in Heliodorus that option is (almost) banned, since Chariclea swears Theagenes to chastity;¹⁵¹ hence the couple could not conceive to meet in secret outside marriage, as Daphnis and Chloe plan to do after his recognition. It takes Chloe's own recognition to bring their secret love to light. Dryas in his greed (the discovery of Daphnis's high class obviously appeals to the man whom 3,000 drachmas already made amenable to the marriage) pushes for the union and to this purpose initiates Chloe's recognition (4.30.3–4), thus dispelling for good the possibility of sex without marriage, which again has loomed at the horizon even after Daphnis's recognition, or rather because of it.

That disquieting possibility is emphatically swept away by the public nature of the final recognition. In comedy, the recognition between parents and children very often happens offstage, behind closed doors.¹⁵² Not so in Chloe's case. She is recognized during a public banquet put on by the first citizen of Mytilene for that purpose, and to which all the other most visible citizens are invited. The public staging of this recognition is in keeping with the high status of those involved: whereas in comedy the parents who recognize their exposed children normally belong to the middle class and have no social visibility, in *Daphnis and Chloe* they are the *crème de la crème*, known and appreciated by the entire citizenry.¹⁵³ At the same time, however, the public happening of the final recognition silences the couple's private whispers, their agreement to meet and love each other in secret, by putting on their love the stamp not only of family but of the entire community.

¹⁵¹ "Almost" banned, because Chariclea leaves a door ajar in demanding that Theagenes refrain until they reach her fatherland or, if this should be impossible, until she gives her full consent: see chapter 3. The second alternative, however, remains a remote possibility.

¹⁵² See Duckworth 1967, 128.

¹⁵³ Longus takes care of specifying that Chloe's father was of high rank even when poor. The alleged reason for his poverty was his generosity in performing liturgies (4.35.3), which were the burden of the wealthy.

Reading Identity: Recognitions in the *Aethiopica*

First, Misidentifications

Who Is That Girl?

As the sun is rising, brigands appear on the stage of a fresh slaughter and try to make sense of what they see—dead bodies amid the remains of a feast—but cannot. The inexplicable spectacle is complicated further by a new sight, the discovery of a girl “of such indescribable beauty that one might have taken her for a goddess.”¹ The robbers keep their eyes on her and her movements, as she bends over a young man awfully wounded, exchanges loving words with him, and then leaps up from the rock on which she was sitting: “When she stood up, she seemed to them larger and more godlike, her weapons rattling at the sudden movement, the gold thread in her robe flashing in the sun, the hair tossing under her crown like a bacchante’s and cascading . . . over her back. They were terrified; but their incomprehension of the scene caused them greater terror than the mere sight of it. Some said she must be a god—the goddess Artemis, or the Isis they worship in those parts; others said she was a priestess possessed by one of the gods and that she was responsible for the carnage before them. That is what they thought, but they did not yet know the truth.”²

¹ ἀμήχανόν τι κάλλος καὶ θεὸς εἶναι ἀναπείθουσα (*Aeth.* 1.2.1).

² μείζον γάρ τι καὶ θεϊότερον αὐτοῖς ὀρθωθεῖσα ἔδοξε, τῶν μὲν βελῶν τῇ ἀθρόα κινήσει κλαγγάντων, χρυσοῦφοῦς δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον ἀνταυγαζούσης, καὶ τῆς κόμης ὑπὸ τῷ στεφάνῳ βακχεῖον σοβουμένης καὶ τοῖς νώτοις . . . ἐπιτρεχούσης. τοὺς μὲν ταῦτα ἐξεδειμάτου καὶ πλέον τῶν ὀρωμένων ἢ τῶν γνωμένων ἄγνοια· οἱ μὲν γὰρ θεὸν τινα ἔλεγον, καὶ θεὸν Ἄρτεμιν ἢ τὴν ἐγχώριον Ἴσιν, οἱ δὲ ἱέρειαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεῶν ἐκμεμνηνῖαν καὶ τὸν ὀρώμενον πολλὸν φόνον ἐργασαμένην. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον, τὰ ὄντα δὲ οὐπω ἐγίνωσκον (1.2.5–6).

The *Aethiopica* opens with a puzzle, which soon centers on the girl on whom the “camera” focuses in a close-up.³ The novelistic commonplace of the godlike heroine is exploited to point up the interpreters’ lack of understanding. Because of their inability to pin down even her human status, some of the brigands are at the opposite end of the spectrum from the wise men described later in the narrative (3.13.2), who recognize even the gods through their mortal disguises, by the unblinking intensity of their gaze and their method of locomotion. When the girl throws herself again on the wounded body, however, the robbers finally conclude that she cannot be a goddess, for “How could a god behave like that?” “How could a divine being kiss a corpse with such passion?”⁴ They read the girl’s affection for a dying man as evidence for her humanity—and so do the novel’s readers, who are reminded of the leitmotif that gods, no matter how much they love a mortal, leave him when he dies.

The interrogative mode of the opening scene brings to the fore Heliodorus’s interest in the process of interpretation, particularly, as Jack Winkler put it, “in the forms of misapprehension and failed understanding.”⁵ The same interest shapes the sequence of failed personal identifications in books 1–7. Again in the opening scene, the girl wonders out loud whether the robbers are the ghosts of those she killed or are living men. If they are ghosts, she blames their death on them and their attack on her chastity. If living men, she asks them to put an end to her life and her companion’s. But the robbers, just as they could not understand the loving words she exchanged with the wounded boy, now cannot understand what she says and thus leave her. Linguistic barriers prevent them from pinning down the girl’s identity further.

Soon thereafter, language thwarts identification again, this time as a misleading sign.⁶ To keep Chariclea, whom he loves, safe for him during a raid, Thyamis orders his prisoner Cnemon to hide her in a cave while he goes off to fight, taking along Theagenes, who to his knowledge is Chariclea’s brother. Convinced the battle is lost, Thyamis then rushes back in a fury to the cave, to kill Chariclea in order to prevent the enemy from enjoying her. He jumps down, “shouting loud and loud in the Egyptian tongue. Just by the entrance he came upon a woman who spoke to him in Greek. Guided to her by her voice, he seized her

³ Hägg (1983, 55) uses the term. Critics often borrow cinematic language to describe this scene: see also, e.g., Paulsen 1992, 54. A bold but convincing “screenplay” is offered by M. Winkler (2000), who compares the scene with the opening of Orson Welles’s *Touch of Evil* and of Alfred Hitchcock’s *Psycho*.

⁴ ποῦ ταῦτ’ ἂν εἴη θεοῦ τὰ ἔργα . . . ποῦ δ’ ἂν νεκρὸν σῶμα φιλοῖ δαίμων οὕτω περιπαθῶς (1.2.7).

⁵ J. Winkler 1982, 101. See also Hunter 1998b, 40.

⁶ See Saïd 1992, 177.

head in his left hand and drove his sword through her breast, close to the bosom.”⁷ It will turn out that the woman is not Chariclea. Thyamis is misled by blind passion, by his assurance that Chariclea is in the cave, and especially, as the text emphasizes, by the language he hears, Greek, of which he has only limited knowledge.⁸ The timbre of the woman’s voice offers him no help to identify her as someone else: on the contrary, he follows precisely her voice, that is, the sound of Greek. By representing him as deaf to the specific tones of his beloved’s voice, Heliodorus lights upon the truth that people who have little or no knowledge of another language are unlikely to recognize the individual voices of speakers of that language.⁹

Meanwhile Cnemon, who has hidden Chariclea, has been reassuring her beloved Theagenes that she is alive. Comforted, Theagenes follows him to the cave, only to discover that “Chariclea” is dead! Cnemon takes the woman just killed by Thyamis for Chariclea (as Thyamis did), weeps, “covering his eyes,” and leaves Theagenes the floor for his desperate last embrace (2.3.3–2.4.4). Heliodorus seems concerned with making the mistake realistic and especially with not sullyng Theagenes’s perfect love. Cnemon hardly sees the woman because, in addition to putting his hands over his eyes, he drops the torch he carries. And even so the one responsible for the mistake is he, not Theagenes—which saves the lover who time and again had proclaimed the uniqueness of Chariclea’s beauty from blasphemous misidentification (whereas in a parallel episode in Achilles Tatius, we shall recall, there is precisely such a misidentification). This staging is geared to make Theagenes fully forgivable for not realizing that he is embracing another woman (though later Cnemon in jest reproaches this to him: 2.7.2).

While Theagenes despairs, he hears a faint voice calling him. It is Chariclea’s, but he is too shaken to believe that she is alive and instead thinks that it is her ghost, summoning him to join her to the netherworld. It falls on Cnemon, who has come back from fetching light, to recognize the voice of the living Chariclea. But who, then, is the dead woman? We do not know. Heliodorus produces an

⁷ ἔμβοῶν τε μέγα καὶ πολλὰ αἰγυπτιάζων, αὐτοῦ που περὶ τὸ στόμιον ἐντυχὼν τινὶ Ἑλληνίδι τῇ γλώττῃ προσφθεγγομένη, ἀπὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἐπ’ αὐτὴν χειραγωγηθεὶς ἐπιβάλλει τε τῇ κεφαλῇ τὴν λαϊὰν χεῖρα καὶ διὰ τῶν στέρνων παρὰ τὸν μαζὸν ἐλαύνει τὸ ξίφος (1.30.7).

⁸ See Perkins 1999, 204–5; Slater 2005, 108.

⁹ When Chariclea pretends to accept marriage to Thyamis, he is “charmed by her words, as if she were a Siren” (1.23.2): by her words (λόγων), not her voice (whereas Odysseus finds the Sirens’ voice irresistible). The novelist sensitive to linguistic barriers also notes that to nonspeakers of a language, its sound is pure noise, as is Greek to the Egyptian Thermoutis: *θροῦν τινα καὶ βόμβον* (2.12.5). Saïd (1992, 176) observes that Greek is treated here as the Greeks treated so-called barbarian tongues.

unusual (in ancient literature) kind of recognition, one that does not assume even the slightest gap of knowledge between characters and readers. The novelist had kept his readers in ignorance about the identity of the dead woman in the previous scene, when Thyamis mistook the Greek-speaking woman for Chariclea and killed her. Unlike the characters, the readers must expect the woman not to be Chariclea because the heroine cannot die, and in this regard they have more clues. Since, however, Chariclea is the only Greek-speaking woman in the area as far as they can tell, their thoughts are suspended about the dead's identity.¹⁰ This generalized ignorance goads the curiosity of all those involved, inside and outside the narrative, even after the discovery that Chariclea is alive, when an anticlimax might be expected. The tension instead does not slacken until readers and characters find out that the dead woman is Thisbe, the courtesan responsible for Cnemon's misfortunes (2. 5). The final effect of the recognition is, as is customary, to bring about a reversal: now it is Cnemon who "stands speechless" (*ἀχανὴς εἰστήκει*) and Theagenes who revives him.

That Thisbe is killed because she is misidentified fits her role in the story we have just heard from Cnemon, for she ruined both him and his stepmother, Demainete, by dramatic productions based on intentional equivocations of identity. In her first invention she persuaded Cnemon that Demainete, whose advances he had rejected, was unfaithful to his father, and she lured the boy into the room where allegedly the unfaithful woman was receiving her lover, so that he could catch them in the act and kill them. The lover turned out to be . . . his father. Exit Cnemon, sent into exile. At this point, Thisbe feared for herself and turned against Demainete, using the same strategy: as the woman's love for Cnemon grew fiercer, she promised her to arrange for them to meet in secret at a friend's house. Thisbe would pretend to be in love with Cnemon, would invite him to her bed, and instead of her, Demainete would sneak in and enjoy her beloved to her heart's content. But, instead of Cnemon, Thisbe brought back . . . his father, who caught the adulteress, if not in the act, in its aftermath (or so he thought, for the alleged lover never materialized).

Thisbe behaves like the typical slave of New Comedy, inventing plots around misrepresentations of identity.¹¹ With a difference, though: whereas the comic slave puts his inventiveness to good use by helping the lovers, Thisbe schemes to ruin all those around her while pretending to act for their good. In the dramas she performs, the problematic object of knowledge is not her identity but her

¹⁰ See Sandy 1982, 7. Saïd (1992, 177) maintains that "tout est fait pour que nous partagions l'erreur de Thyamis." Perhaps this is an overstatement, at least for readers familiar with the conventions of the genre (see Fusillo 1989, 128); but there is no doubt that we are left in ignorance.

¹¹ See Paulsen 1992, 96; 209.

disposition to the recognizer.¹² Within the optimistic teleology typical of the novels, what death could be more appropriate for such a character than one caused by misrecognition? Thisbe's weapon has turned around against herself.¹³

The Ears and the Eyes

Chariclea is the victim of the next error.¹⁴ Her adoptive father, Calasiris, has entertained Cnemon with his story well into the night when Nausicles, their host, comes back from an expedition with a woman. They will know the details the next day; for now, he only tells them that he found "a better Thisbe." At hearing this name Cnemon, all in a frenzy, wanders through the passages of the unknown house while the others are asleep, until "he heard the sound of a woman's voice, softly and sadly sorrowing in the darkness, like a nightingale's song of grief in springtime. Her lamentations guided his steps to her room, where he put his ear to the crack between the doors and listened."¹⁵ She has been robbed of her beloved, the woman weeps, with whom even a wandering life would have been sweet! When imprisoned on an island, her predicament was easier because he was with her. The hope that he is alive is the only reason she endures life. "I pray that one day you will see your Thisbe; for by that name must you call me, detest it as you may!"¹⁶

¹² This type of recognition is frequent in detective novels: see Cave 1988, 233. We also find it in Attic tragedy, for instance in *Hecuba* (when Polymestor discovers that Hecuba is an enemy) and *Philoctetes* (when Philoctetes discovers that Neoptolemus is not the friend he thought).

¹³ I agree with the ancient commentator Philip the Philosopher (test. 13.67–68 Colonna) that the grim manner of Thisbe's death illustrates what happens to those who "weave deceit against others." Hunter (1998b, 42–43) thinks that we only hear Cnemon's story, and that the tablet Thisbe carries, which tells a different story (2. 10), invites readers to consider that there is always more than one story. It seems to me, however, that readers are led to suspect the veracity of what Thisbe has written, because of their repeated exposure to her lies and of the longtime tradition of deceitful letters: think of Phaedra, whose story is a subtext for the saga of Demainete, Cnemon, and Thisbe, and who writes a slanderous letter before killing herself; or of this statement in Plaut. *Curc.* 551: "stultior stulto fuisti, qui tabellis crederes" (you have been a bigger idiot than an idiot, since you have believed a letter); and especially of Apul. *Apol.* 32, on women using letters to lie in erotic matters. What we learn about Thisbe—that she became Nausicles's girlfriend not long before she asked Cnemon, in her letter, to take her back—does not present her as a committed lover. Paulsen (1992, 87) draws a comparison with Phaedra's nurse, who fails to help her mistress but is devoted to her, whereas Thisbe shifts allegiances according to her personal interest. Morgan (1989b) reads Thisbe as the selfish antiheroine; Fusillo (1989, 142) sees in her characterization hints of the commonplace attacks on courtesans.

¹⁴ I am echoing Liviabella Furiani 2003 in the title of this section.

¹⁵ ἦσθετο γυναικὸς λαθραῖόν τι καὶ γοερὸν οἶον ἡρυνῆς ἀηδόνας αἴλωνον ᾠδὴν ἐν νυκτὶ μυρομένης, ἐπὶ τε τὸ δωμάτιον ὑπὸ τοῦ θρήνου χειραγωγούμενος ὥρμησε καὶ ταῖς θύραις καθ' ὃ συνέπιπτον ἀλλήλαις τὸ οὖς παραθέμενος ἐπηκροῶτο (5.2.6).

¹⁶ θεάσαιό ποτε Θιάβην τὴν σὴν· τοῦτο γάρ με καλέσεις καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος (5.2.10).

Readers quite likely suspect the truth from the outset, especially if they recall that Thisbe was earlier mistaken for Chariclea: they now expect a reversal.¹⁷ If not before hearing her lament, however, they guess the woman's identity in the course of it, when she says, "my predicament was made easy by the presence of him whom I love more than all the world,"¹⁸ and at the end, when she distances herself from the name "Thisbe." The reader's intuition of the girl's identity points up Cnemon's paranoia, which paralyzes his understanding. Of course, more possibilities are open to a character than to a reader, whose horizons of expectations are limited by generic patterns. Cnemon cannot know that a character in a novel who loves with such intensity is likely to be the heroine (though he has witnessed the fire of Chariclea's passion). Possibly he is misled by the vagueness of the lament.¹⁹ His conviction that the woman's beloved is he himself may be justified, for Thisbe wrote that she loved him in the letter he found on her dead body, and asked him to rescue her from her master. Yet how can he think the woman to be Thisbe from her words "you will have to call me Thisbe, as much as you may not like it"? Thisbe would not disparage her own name, suggesting that it is forced on her or that her passionate lover might hate it. Cnemon's misrepresentation of identity has comic effects, for of course Thisbe's name is indeed hateful to him: he is the least willing to call the woman by that name—even as he is doing it.²⁰

We shall now investigate another element of the scene, which should have helped the recognition: Cnemon follows the sound of a *voice* softly lamenting, "like a nightingale's song of grief in springtime." How can he miss the particular ring of this nightingale's song? There are no linguistic barriers between him and Chariclea, and the two have shared long hours of talking and weeping. Indeed, it was Cnemon who recognized Chariclea's voice in the cave, even when he thought her dead. Now that he does not think her dead, and therefore should be more disposed to seeing her, why does he fail to recognize her voice? Since Heliodorus is sensitive to the individual quality of the voice and generally careful to account for it,²¹ Cnemon's failure calls for interpretation.

¹⁷ See Paulsen 1992, 117.

¹⁸ ἐπεκούφιζε καὶ ταῦτα παρὼν ὁ πάντων ἐμοὶ φίλτατος (5.2.9).

¹⁹ For Sandy (1982, 15), Heliodorus describes Chariclea's misfortunes "vaguely so as to extend Cnemon's (and the reader's) belief that Thisbe has indeed somewhat escaped death." I think this works for Cnemon but not for the reader. Paulsen (1992, 117 and 250, n. 119) also points out that the details of Chariclea's lamentation could suggest Thisbe, though not her longing for her beloved. To the reader, who has been exposed to Thisbe's inconstancy, the passionate tone of the lamentation can only suggest Chariclea.

²⁰ Curiously, Amyot does not translate καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος, perhaps to increase the credibility of Cnemon's mistake: "vivez, afin qu'une fois vous puissiez encore voir votre Thisbé: car ainsi m'appellerez vous." (1575, 120)

²¹ See below.

All atremble, Cnemon goes back to bed, has a seizure, and is revived by Calasiris. At daybreak both go inquire of Nausicles about his expedition. As soon as they hear of the woman's extraordinary beauty, they suspect the truth. "They implored [Nausicles] to command the girl to be brought straightaway, for this indescribable beauty they recognized as that of none other than Chariclea."²² Cnemon, who could not recognize Chariclea by her words and voice, recognizes her by the sheer mention of her beauty. Her appearance confirms the recognition: "She was brought to them and at first stood with her head bowed and a veil covering her eyes, but when Nausicles assured her that there was nothing to be afraid of, she raised her head a little. She saw them; they saw her."²³ Amid sobs and tears she and Calasiris embrace, while Nausicles, puzzled, watches.

This scene has been taken to emphasize the greater power of sight over hearing to reveal beauty.²⁴ It is words that make Cnemon suspect the truth; but those words serve to convey, but cannot, the extent of that beauty and are immediately replaced and surpassed by the vision of it. Nausicles produces before spectators a beauty that defies speech: "Her beauty was beyond compare and beyond his power to describe in words—particularly as she was in the house, and he could easily show them her."²⁵

The scene, however, brings to the fore not only the power of sight to reveal beauty but also the power of the heroine's beauty to reveal her identity, both as this particular heroine, Chariclea, and as the character-type of the genre. Though Chariclea is a magician of words, a Siren (1.23.2), it is her extraordinary beauty that unmistakably defines her. Thus, while mention of her appearance is enough to foster recognition, her voice has no such exceptional quality and her words can remain opaque.

Calasiris's (Mis)recognition: A Theatrical Spectacle

Chariclea's recognition is labeled a "theatrical *anagnōrismos*": Chariclea and Calasiris are the main characters, Nausicles the spectator. The next two recognition scenes likewise are the culminating point of a theatrical performance that is being played before the eyes of the citizens of Memphis and of readers turned spectators.

²² *ἰκέτεόν τε προστάττειν ὥς ὅτι τάχιστα παρῆναι τὴν κόρην, τὸ γὰρ ἄφραστον κάλλος Χαρικλείας ἐγνώριζον* (5.11.1).

²³ *ὥς δὲ ἤχθη καὶ τὰ πρῶτα κάτω νεύουσα καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον εἰς ὄφρυν σκέπουσα τοῦ Ναισυκλέους θαρρεῖν παρακελευομένου μικρὸν ἀνένευσεν εἶδέ τε καὶ ἄφθη* (5.11.1).

²⁴ See Liviabella Furiani 2003.

²⁵ *οὕτως οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ κάλλους ὑπερβολὴν οὐδὲ αὐτῷ δυνατόν εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ φράζειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξὸν παροῦσαν ἐπιδεκνύναι* (5.10.2).

Calasiris's children, Thyamis and Petosiris, are about to fight each other over inheriting the priesthood formerly held by their father, whom they think dead. Heliodorus describes the preparation for the duel as a spectacle, enhancing the visibility of two famous Homeric episodes by converting them into stage action. The first allusion is to the duel of Menelaus and Paris in *Iliad* 3. In the epic, as in the novel, it is decided that only the two individuals competing for the prize (Helen) will fight, while the others will watch the combat.²⁶ Homer, however, puts at least as much emphasis on the armies' gladness to stay at repose as on their eagerness to watch, by specifying that they are "seated" (132–43; 326), a posture that, though of course conducive to watching ("amazement held the Trojans breakers of horses and the Achaeans well geared with greaves, as they saw . . ."),²⁷ primarily indicates, both literally and symbolically, ceasing from fighting: "Beforehand they were bringing Ares, the cause of many tears, against each other on the plain, keen on baneful war. And now they sit in silence. The war has ceased, they lie on their shields, and have stuck their long spears near them."²⁸ The citizens of Memphis, in contrast, are not at rest but stand (*περιεστῶσα*) around the wall and strain their eyes. They behave like discriminating spectators to a dramatic performance, "watching like the presiding judges in a theater."²⁹

The second Homeric episode Heliodorus exploits is the pursuit of Hector by Achilles before their duel. Petosiris, a degraded Hector, flees along the city walls, with Thyamis relentlessly chasing him like a self-confident Achilles. In Homer the chase has its spectators: all the gods, enjoying the sight of human tragedy as if it were a game.³⁰ Aristotle, however, felt that the pursuit of Hector could only be narrated; shown on the stage, it would be ridiculous, with all the other warriors standing there instead of running after Hector and with Hector refusing to fight (*Poet.* 60a 14–17). Heliodorus seems to have this remark in mind and both to subscribe to it and to play against it by producing, from the safe tower of a narrative, not just a spectacle in the manner of Homer but a specifically *theatrical* spectacle with material that Aristotle deemed unfit for the stage (the comment "watching like the presiding judges in a theater" glosses precisely the account of the pursuit). The novelist consciously takes advantage of the greater freedom afforded by the narrative form. He knows, with Bryan Reardon, that "anything can happen in romance; not just a debate in Babylon, which might perhaps be

²⁶ Paulsen (1992, 165) sees also an allusion to Eur. *Phoen.* 1225–30.

²⁷ θάμβος δ' ἔχεν εἰσροδώντας / Τρώας θ' ἵπποδάμους καὶ εὐκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς (342–43).

²⁸ οἱ πρὶν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι φέρον πολὺδακρυν Ἄρηα / ἐν πεδίῳ ὀλοοῖο λυλαϊόμενοι πολέμοιο / οἱ δὲ νῦν ἕταιρ σιγῇ, πόλεμος δὲ πέπανται, / ἀσπίσι κεκλιμένοι, παρὰ δ' ἔρχεα μακρὰ πέπηγεν (132–35)

²⁹ ὥσπερ ἐκ θεάτρων . . . ἡθλοθέτει τὴν θέαν (7.6.4).

³⁰ *Il.* 22.166. On the gods as spectators, see Griffin 1983, chapter 6 and, recently, Clay 2011, 5.

staged, but a bullfight in Ethiopia, which only Hollywood could stage”;³¹ and he asks his readers to watch an action that, if they knew their Aristotle, they might have identified as prototypically untheatrical. The recognition that follows these theatrical preparations for the duel is the culmination of the drama, or rather, to paraphrase Heliodorus, a new tragic episode, added to the action being played.³²

Calasiris and Chariclea have left Nausicles to look for their loved ones. They have disguised themselves as beggars, playfully reenacting the scene in *Odyssey* 13 in which Athena disguises Odysseus. On the first night of their journey, Calasiris receives the prophecy that he will prevent his children’s murder, if only he rushes to Memphis. He indeed reaches the city as fast he can, and suddenly bursts into the scene of the fratricidal duel, “as if from a machine” (ὥσπερ ἐκ μηχανῆς), to introduce this new tragic episode. He, who has exiled himself to avoid the spectacle of that combat, is brought back by “god or chance” to be the “unhappy spectator” (οὐκ εὐτυχῇ θεωρόν) of it.

This spectator, however, soon becomes the main actor in the drama’s new episode. He runs to stop the fighters, crying out “My children, what do you do?”³³ They do not recognize him, think him a vagabond or a lunatic, and pass him by. At last he understands that his disguise causes him to be unrecognizable, throws off his rags, lets his priest’s long hair down his shoulders, and stands, a venerable sight. Then he slowly bends down and stretches his hands in supplication, shouting again: “My children . . . I am Calasiris, your father.”³⁴ The two, astonished, fall to clasp his feet, look at him hard to make sure they are not mistaken, and as they recognize him, are seized by all manners of feelings.

Calasiris’s sons fail to identify him by his voice. In the overheated climate of the scene, this failure is unremarkable, especially because Calasiris is shouting. The children, however, are first unable to recognize their father also by his appearance. Explanation: they are all caught up with the fight, and he looks like a beggar. Their vision is cognitively deficient because it stops at the most superficial and unreliable sign: dress.

This emphasis on dress sends us back both to the narratives of (mis)recognition we have encountered in Achilles Tatius and Longus and to Odysseus’s recognition by Telemachus. That “clothing makes the man”³⁵ is true already in that episode, for Athena takes care to change Odysseus’s clothes even before changing his natural features.³⁶ In point of fact, that recognition scene is a likely subtext for

³¹ Reardon 1991, 105.

³² *καὶ τὸν ἐπεισὸδιον ἐπετραγῶδει τοῖς δρωμένοις* (7.6.4).

³³ *τί ταῦτα, ὦ παῖδες;* (7.7.1).

³⁴ *ὦ τέκνα . . . οὗτος ἐγὼ Καλάσιρις, οὗτος ἐγὼ πατὴρ ὁ ὑμέτερος* (7.7.2).

³⁵ This is the title of Block 1985.

³⁶ *Od.* 16.173–74. See Block 1985, 4.

Heliodorus:³⁷ both Odysseus and Calasiris announce to their children “I am your father” (*Od.* 16.188; *Aeth.* 7.7.2); in both episodes, the father is recognized by his son(s) only when he abandons his beggarly accoutrement; in both, the children do not immediately believe the revelation (though Odysseus needs to explain the reasons and workings of his sudden transformation, whereas Calasiris’s appearance eventually is enough evidence of identity).

The main reference for this scene, however, matches its theatricality: it is the fratricidal battle of Eteocles and Polynices, more specifically in the version of Euripides’s *Phoenician Women*. In that play Jocasta, like Calasiris but without having to prove her identity, tries to stop her children’s fight by appearing on the battlegrounds—in vain, for the fighters are already dead.³⁸ Calasiris is fashioned like a successful Jocasta. The tragedy is first suggested and then avoided, as in other episodes in this novel, whose characters play tragic roles even while the author frames the performance with remarks on its happy outcome.³⁹

Heliodorus’s allusion to and reversal of Jocasta’s role is brought to light by a detail: the insistence on the punctuality with which Calasiris makes his appearance. Jocasta arrives too late, following a typically tragic pattern (*Phoen.* 1432–33). Calasiris, on the contrary, enters at the right time, as goes the novelistic pattern (“at that very day, at that very hour”),⁴⁰ “forcing his aged body to a spurt of speed remarkable for a man of his years in the hope of forestalling their fatal conflict. Now he had caught up with them and was running alongside them.”⁴¹ Calasiris’s haste, in addition to creating anticipation, in light of Jocasta’s untimely lateness, foreshadows the successful results of his efforts.

Calasiris’s success is also related to the recognition his appearance elicits. Again, readers will appreciate the contrast with Jocasta. Jocasta is who her children know she is; but such knowledge weakens her influence on them. She has already attempted to placate her sons’ hostility before the battle by means of her mediating maternal presence and has failed. True, Euripides possibly sensed that Jocasta’s *timely* intervention on the scene of the slaughter could have complicated the outcome, and he might have delayed her entrance for this reason. But Greek literary history also suggests that Calasiris’s intervention, as opposed to Jocasta’s, is effective in its quality as recognition, for recognition always produces reversal.

³⁷ See Fusillo 1989, 31.

³⁸ For the allusion, see Fusillo (1989, 41–42), Paulsen (1992, 157), Alaux and Létoublon (1998, 162, n. 46). Marino (1991, 208–9) is less certain. Paulsen (1992, 166) and Telò (1999, 71–87, 85) see also an allusion to Aesch. *Sept.* 718–19, where Eteocles, contrary to Thyamis, says he is ready to kill his brother.

³⁹ See Alaux and Létoublon 1998.

⁴⁰ εἰς ἡμέραν καὶ ὄραν ἐκείνην (7.6.5). See Fusillo 1989, 41.

⁴¹ συντονωτέροις ἢ καθ’ ἡλικίαν δρόμοις ἐπὶ τῷ φθῆναι τὴν εἰς τέλος αὐτῶν συμπλοκὴν καὶ τὸ γῆρας βιασάμενον. ὥς δ’ οὖν ἐπέστη καὶ πλησίον ᾗδῃ συμπαρέθει (7.6.5–7.1).

In addition, Calasiris emanates charismatic energy when he is recognized as the father of the fighters. We again think of Odysseus's recognition by Telemachus. Just as Odysseus is so radically changed that at first he looks like a god to his bewildered son, Calasiris's self-revelation has the effects of a god's disclosure of identity: his children's "strength failed them, and they very nearly swooned."⁴² The scene also resonates with Odysseus's epiphany to the suitors, as suggested by Heliodorus's choice of the verb *ἐγυμνώθη* (he stripped himself), which describes Odysseus's gesture of throwing off his rags, for Calasiris's similar action.⁴³ The reference to that episode, however, casts a shadow on the expected happy outcome of the recognition, for Odysseus's self-disclosure signals hostile intentions.

The outcome indeed remains uncertain for some time. In its immediate aftermath, Calasiris's recognition does not result in a happy resolution but in a nervous halt. After he supplicates his sons to stop the fight and they fall at his feet, they still keep their eyes intently on him to make sure he is their father—literally, to "examine the recognition with accuracy" (*διηκριβοῦντο τὸν ἀναγνωρισμὸν*). The object of their incredulity shifts from the identity of the man before them to the nature of the apparition: a phantom (*φάσμα*) or the true thing (*ἀλήθειαν*)? This question, while it points up the theatricality of the scene, draws out the recognition and keeps the participants and the spectators suspended. The suspense lasts even after Calasiris's sons become assured that the apparition before them is not a phantom, for the discovery fills them with conflicting emotions: "Joy at the unexpected restoration of their father, sorrow and shame at the business in which he had surprised them, and finally anguish over the uncertainties of what might ensue."⁴⁴ Heliodorus does not allow the pathos to drop or the *peripeteia* fully to unfold; he withholds the usual expressions of love and happiness that conclude such scenes and instead prolongs the climax by leaving the emotional pitch high and confused, with a prevalence of negative tones (sorrow, shame, anguish). The internal spectators are not granted the liberating experience of a reunion but stand there baffled, paralyzed in body and mind: "And before the people of the city could recover from their amazement, as silent as if they had been struck dumb with bewilderment, as still as figures in a painting, so engrossed and moved were they by this spectacle, the drama was interrupted by another unexpected entry: Chariclea!"⁴⁵ The focus shifts to another climactic episode even while the

⁴² οἱ μὲν παρείθησαν καὶ κατενεχθῆναι μικρὸν ἀπολιπόντες (7.7.3).

⁴³ See Whitmarsh 1998, 112.

⁴⁴ ἦδοντο ἐπὶ τῷ φύντι σωζομένῳ παρ' ἐλπίδας, ἐφ' ἣ κατελαμβάνοντο πράξει καὶ ἡνιώντο καὶ ἡσχύνοντο, τῆς ἀδηλίας τῶν ἀποβησομένων εἰς ἀγωνίαν καθίσταντο (7.7.3).

⁴⁵ καὶ ταῦτα ἔτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως θαυμαζόντων καὶ λεγόντων μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ πραττόντων, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀχανῶν ὑπ' ἀγνοίας καὶ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις παραπλησίως πρὸς μόνην τὴν θέαν ἐπτοημένῳ, ἕτερον ἐγένετο παρεγκύκλημα τοῦ δράματος—ἡ Χαρίκλεια (7.7.4).

audience, both internal and external, has not yet recovered from the turmoil caused by this one and does not quite know, but only imagines, what will come of it.

Pitting Social Proprieties against Platonic Love

Among the spectators is Theagenes, who has accompanied Thyamis to Memphis. Chariclea recognizes her beloved from afar, “for a lover’s eyes are so quick to recognize the object of their love, and often the merest movement or gesture, even if seen from a great distance or from behind, is enough to suggest an imaginary resemblance.” She rushes to him, as if maddened by his sight, and embraces him tightly, “tearfully sobbing out her greeting.” But Theagenes does not recognize her: because of the filth disfiguring her face and of her clothes in tatters, he thinks her a lunatic, “as is plausible,” and tries to kick her away. As she clings on to him, blocking his view of what Calasiris is doing, he even cuffs her. “‘O Pythian,’ she then whispered, ‘have you forgotten the torch?’ Her words pierced Theagenes’s heart like an arrow, for he recognized the torch as one of the signs that they had agreed on. He gazed hard at Chariclea and was dazzled by the brilliance of her eyes, as if by a shaft of sunlight shining out between the clouds. He took her in his arms and held her tight.”⁴⁶

This recognition scene is a doublet of the previous one.⁴⁷ Just as Calasiris realizes already from afar (*πóρρωθεν*) that the fighters must be his sons, so Chariclea recognizes Theagenes from afar (*πóρρωθεν*); both rush in; both are in rags, and in both cases the rags prevent the recognition; both are taken for vagabonds, in almost identical words.⁴⁸ If Calasiris’s sons imitate Telemachus, Theagenes imitates Penelope, who fails to recognize her husband because of his rags (*Od.* 23.94–95).⁴⁹ And again, both recognitions are impeded also by the distracting

⁴⁶ ὁ δὲ γάρ τι πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν ἐρωτικῶν ὄψις καὶ κίνημα πολλάκις καὶ σχῆμα μόνον κἂν πόρρωθεν ἢ κἂν ἐκ νώτων τῆς ὁμοιότητος τὴν φαντασίαν παρέστησεν, ὥσπερ οἰστρηθεῖσα ὑπὸ ὄψεως ἐμμανὴς ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἵεται καὶ περιφύσα τοῦ αὐχένος ἀπριζ εἶχετο καὶ ἐξήρτητο καὶ γοεροῖς τισι κατησπάζετο θρήνοις. ὁ δὲ οἶον εἰκὸς ὄψιν τε ρύπωσαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ αἰσχυρότερον ἐπιτετηδευμένην ἰδὼν καὶ ἐσθῆτα τετρυχωμένην καὶ κατερρωγυῖαν, ὥσπερ τινὰ τῶν ἀγειρουσῶν καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀλῆτην διωθεῖτο καὶ παρηγκωνίζετο· καὶ τέλος ἐπειδὴ οὐ μεθίει, ὡς ἐνοχλοῦσαν καὶ τῇ θεᾷ τῶν ἀμφὶ Καλάσιριν ἐμποδὸν ἵσταμένην καὶ διερράπισεν. ἡ δὲ “ὦ Πύθιε,” ἔφη πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡρέμα “οὐδὲ τοῦ λαμπάδιον μέμνησαι”; καὶ τότε ὁ Θεαγένης ὥσπερ βέλει τῷ ῥήματι βληθεὶς καὶ τῶν συγκεμένων αὐτοῖς συμβόλων τὸ λαμπάδιον γνωρίσας, ἐνατενίσας τε καὶ ταῖς βολαῖς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τῆς Χαρκλείας ὥσπερ ὑπ’ ἀκτίνος ἐκ νεφῶν διαττούσης κατανασθεῖς, περιέβαλλέ τε καὶ ἐνγκαλίζετο (7.7.5–7; partly translated, partly paraphrased).

⁴⁷ On doublets in the *Aethiopica*, see Morgan 1998 (p. 77 specifically on recognitions).

⁴⁸ See 7.7.1: *τινα τῶν ἀγυρτῶν*, and 7.7.6: *τινα τῶν ἀγειρουσῶν*.

⁴⁹ The last parallel is in Paulsen 1992, 52. See also Fusillo 1989, 31.

excitement caused by another activity: Calasiris's sons and Theagenes are entirely absorbed, the former in fighting, the latter in watching the fight, when Calasiris, and then Chariclea, suddenly burst in. These parallels enhance the bonding between Chariclea and Calasiris, joint in their search and experiencing similar narrative vicissitudes.

Chariclea's recognition, however, reaches a higher dramatic climax than the twin episode that precedes it, because the recognition is not timely enough to forestall violence. In addition, the victim is the most sacred human being in the universe of the novel, the loved one; and the perpetrator is a lover who should follow a Platonic script, that is, a script according to which to love and to recognize are identical.

The gnomic meditation on the quickness of a lover's eyes that introduces the scene echoes a belief that both Chariclea and Theagenes expressed when they planned their flight from the cave. Disguised though they would be, "If they were reunited, it would be enough, they said, simply to lay eyes on one another, for all eternity would be too short a time to efface the tokens of recognition that love had engraved on their hearts."⁵⁰ This conception of *ἐρωτικά γνωρίσματα* that cannot be dimmed matches the description of the protagonists' falling in love as a recognition, through the eyes, between kindred souls: "At the moment when they set eyes on one another, the young pair fell in love, as if the soul recognized its kin at the very first encounter and sped to meet that which was worthily its own. For a brief second full of emotion they stood motionless; then slowly, so slowly, she handed him the torch and he took it from her, and all the while they gazed hard into one another's eyes, as if calling to mind a previous acquaintance or meeting."⁵¹

The Platonic inspiration of this description has often been noted.⁵² Love is not discovery but rediscovery; it is recognition igniting recollection.⁵³ Heliodorus invests the novelistic commonplace "Love is recognition of each other's perfection" with philosophical significance. As the soul of the Platonic lover,

⁵⁰ εἰ δὲ εἰς ταὐτὸν γίνωιντο, ἀρκεῖν μὲν ἑτέρῳ τὸν ἕτερον καὶ μόνον ὀφθῆναι, οὐδένα γὰρ χρόνον εἶναι ὅσος ἀμαυρῶσαι αὐτοῖς τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ ἐρωτικά γνωρίσματα (5.5.2).

⁵¹ ὁμοῦ τε γὰρ ἀλλήλους ἑώρων οἱ νέοι καὶ ἥρων, ὥσπερ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ πρώτης ἐντεύξεως τὸ ὅμοιον ἐπιγνώσους καὶ πρὸς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν οἰκεῖον προσδραμούσης. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἀθρόον τι καὶ ἐπτοημένον ἔστησαν καὶ τὴν δᾶδα ὀλκότερον ἢ μὲν ἐνεχείριζεν ὁ δὲ ὑπεδέχετο, τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀτενεῖς ἐπὶ πολὺ κατ' ἀλλήλων πῆξαντες ὥσπερ εἰ που γνωρίζοντες ἢ ἰδόντες πρότερον ταῖς μνήμας ἀναπεμπάζοντες (3.5.4–5).

⁵² See, e.g., Feuillâtre 1966, 125–28; Sandy 1982; J. Winkler 1982, 125; Fusillo 1989, 199; Dowden 1996, 279, n. 35; Morgan 2003, 453; Graverini 2010, 72–73. Scholars, however, discuss the extent to which we should take Heliodorus's Platonizing images seriously. I am inclined to agree with those, like Dowden, who read in the novel an earnest endorsement of Platonic ideals.

⁵³ On the successful history of this motif, see Rousset 1981, chapter 5; Dolar 1996.

awakened to the memory of past sights, “runs with longing wherever it thinks it will see the one in whom beauty dwells,”⁵⁴ so do the souls of Chariclea and Theagenes “speed” to each other as to something already known. A crucial difference from the conception of love expressed in the *Phaedrus*, however, is that love there is, initially at least, one-sided, and so is recollection. The beloved is instrumental to the lover’s quest: by his beauty he causes the lover’s soul to grow feathers, but does not grow his own (his affection is weaker and purely responsive; 255a–56a). In Heliodorus, there is no separation of roles between the two lovers: they are two souls who look at each other and instantly love each other because they recognize each other as kin, or as each other’s other half.⁵⁵

Heliodorus’s lovers function less as two separate individuals than as the two sides of the same coin: the two halves of Aristophanes’s myth of love in the *Symposium*.⁵⁶ But in the scene of their encounter in Memphis, only Chariclea abides by the Platonic rules assigned to them. Her behavior is a living demonstration of the ineffaceable nature of love’s marks. Maddened like the Platonic soul in love,⁵⁷ goaded on like that soul,⁵⁸ she runs to her beloved, whom she has recognized instantly and from afar. Not so Theagenes. Instead of being Platonically drawn to Chariclea as to his *symbolon* (*Symp.* 191d), the tally his severed self should immediately recognize as his other half,⁵⁹ he needs conventional *symbola* to recognize the very *symbolon* of himself.⁶⁰

In arranging their departure, the lovers decided on tokens in case they were separated, both as directions for the other and as secondary evidence for their recognition—the strongest proof being, of course, “the engravings of love” in their soul (5.4.7). As it turns out, the terms are reversed: Theagenes recovers the keenness of a lover’s eye only after he recognizes agreed tokens.⁶¹ The enraptured lover to whom Chariclea’s sight once gave wings (4.2.3), the fastest of all to see her because “a lover is so swift to espy the object of his desires,”⁶² now cannot

⁵⁴ θεῖ δὲ ποθοῦσα ὅπου ἂν οἴηται ὄψεσθαι τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος (*Phdr.* 251e).

⁵⁵ Another difference, noted by Fusillo (1989, 199), is the equal power of feminine and masculine beauty.

⁵⁶ See Paulsen 1992, 42. In embracing “as if of one flesh” (οἷονεῖ συμπεφυκότες: 5.4.5), Chariclea and Theagenes imitate the two halves in Aristophanes’s speech, who desire to be “joined together into one” (συμφυσῆναι εἰς τὸ αὐτό: *Symp.* 192f; see also 192bc).

⁵⁷ ἐμμανής is used for both Chariclea and the soul in the *Phaedrus*.

⁵⁸ See οἶστρεψ in *Phdr.* 251d and οἶστρηθεῖσα in Heliodorus.

⁵⁹ The term *symbolon* originally denotes a recognition token: one half of a knucklebone of which the other person owned the other half. See, in connection to Plato, Carson 2000, 75.

⁶⁰ See 5.5.2; 7.7.7.

⁶¹ Theagenes recognizes Chariclea not by language (Slater 2005, 110) but by the words she utters, identical in truth-value with material tokens.

⁶² ὁξύς γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὁ ἐρώων τὸ ποθοῦμενον (4.1.2).

recognize the uniqueness of her beauty through her rags—a beauty that could not be hidden even when she was still a child (2.31.3). Her captor Mithranes shows more perceptiveness than her lover, for he is “struck by her loveliness, which shone forth even in her shabby garments like a moonbeam from behind a cloud.”⁶³

Theagenes initially fails to perceive even the glitter in Chariclea’s eyes, which could not possibly be disguised like her face⁶⁴—and this in spite of the rhapsodic praise he lavished on those eyes when he thought her dead: “Those eyes that dazzled everyone with their beauty have lost their light; your murderer did not see them, of that I am sure.”⁶⁵ Nor does Theagenes now. With the question “have you forgotten the torch”? Chariclea reproaches him for both not recognizing her and not loving her, since the torch is their agreed *symbolon* for the very reason that it illumined their first encounter, when their eyes met and their souls, as if receiving light from that torch, recognized each other (3.4.6–3.6.1). On that occasion, the torch passed from Chariclea to Theagenes, in a gesture of transference that signified the mutuality of their recognition, their identical illumination.⁶⁶ The choice of the torch as token is a reminder that love should be a guiding light, and that to love and to recognize are one and the same: a Platonic truth that Theagenes for a long moment has forgotten.

Theagenes’s failure to recognize Chariclea can be set off against Cnemon’s and Calasiris’s readiness to recognize her just from hearing of her beauty, even before they see her (in the scene at Nausicles’s house). Through these opposites, Heliodorus dramatizes the same tension I have noted in Achilles Tatius between asserting the heroine’s unique beauty (as when Clitophon toward the end claims to have recognized Leucippe in “the prettiest girl ever”) and qualifying its powers (as when he fails, like Theagenes, to see it). Heliodorus plays conflicting ideological forces against each other: on the one hand, the extraordinary beauty of the heroine, joint with the exaltation of reciprocal love at first sight typical of the novel, and, in this particular novel, the rendition of that motif in Platonic terms, calls for immediate recognition between lovers. But on the other, since the perfect love exalted in the novel only exists among the elites and since the

⁶³ ἔξεπέπληκτο μὲν τῆς ὥρας, ἀπ’ εὐτελοῦς γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐσθῆτος οἶον νέφους αὐγὴ σεληναίας διεξέλαμπεν (5.8.5).

⁶⁴ Only the onset of passion can put out the fire in Chariclea’s eyes (3.19.1). They have a unique radiance, which marks her quasi-divine status: see 2.31.1, and Hilton 1998, 87. I cannot agree with Hilton, however, that “the brilliance of Chariclea’s eyes are all that enable Theagenes to penetrate her disguise at the reunion in Memphis.”

⁶⁵ ὀφθαλμοὶ δὲ ἀφεγγεῖς οἱ πάντας τῷ κάλλει καταστράμναντες, οὓς οὐκ εἶδεν ὁ φονεύσας, οἶδα ἀκριβῶς (2.4.3).

⁶⁶ On the torch as a symbol of recognition, see also, from a different angle, Lefteratou 2010, 350, and here below.

elites of the time show uttermost care for their self-presentation and appearance, recognition, even between lovers, apparently needs visible evidence of social status. Chariclea's improper outfit and filthy face deceive the noble descendant of Achilles, no matter how keen his love.⁶⁷

Heliodorus, however, is not sympathetic to Theagenes's mistake but treats it ironically. This emerges from the comment that introduces the narrative: "But he, as is plausible (*οἶον ἐϊκός*), seeing that dirty face . . . thought she was truly a vagabond."⁶⁸ To be sure, on a first reading the comment might be taken to suggest that Heliodorus is justifying Theagenes's error, for in the great majority of cases, *eikos* in this novel means "natural," "to be expected," and is employed to support suppositions or interpretations, to build up credibility by appealing to shared experiential beliefs. As Richard Hunter puts it, the term aims "to create the impression that what is being told accords with our experience of the way the world works."⁶⁹

In this scene, Heliodorus seems to strive for plausibility in dealing with Chariclea's voice. As noted, Achilles Tatius in a somewhat similar episode—when Leucippe, dressed in rags, pleads with Melite in Clitophon's presence—has no concern for verisimilitude and instead abuses, as it were, the pattern of disregarding the voice as sign of identity in recognition scenes by stretching it further than a reader looking for some plausibility might be willing to accept. The result is a playfully comical episode that mocks the hero's attempts at idealistic self-styling. Heliodorus, in contrast, is generally sensitive to the recognizable quality of a person's voice. For instance, when Thisbe lays out her plan to the lovesick Demainete, she urges her to satisfy her desire in silence (1.17.2–3), presumably in order not to be recognized by her voice. In the staging of Chariclea's recognition in book 5 it is Nausicles, whom the heroine does not know, who talks to her before she uncovers her face: had Cnemon or Calasiris spoken, she would have recognized them by their voices, and the scene would have been rushed. In the episode in book 7 the novelist, moved by a similar concern for plausibility, silences Chariclea's voice. Overwhelmed by emotion, she can only "tearfully sob out her greeting" (literally: she "greeted him with mournful lamentations"). To dispose the reader to accept Theagenes's denseness, to consider it *eikos*, Heliodorus blocks Chariclea's voice.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ See König 2008, 132: "Theagenes fails to recognize Chariclea partly because her beggarly appearance is incompatible with his view of what a properly brought up young lady ought to look like." Perkins (1999, 201) takes Theagenes's error to demonstrate the fragility of identity, which is not fixed but is defined in performance.

⁶⁸ This kind of authorial evaluation is unusual in Heliodorus, who normally speaks in his own voice only to state a lack of certain knowledge: see Morgan 1982, 261.

⁶⁹ Hunter 1998b, 56, n. 60.

⁷⁰ Something similar happens, as we have seen in chapter 1, already in *Alcestis*, though the reason for Alcestis's silence is not as natural.

Yet, in spite of his concern for plausibility, Heliodorus suggests that *to eikos* might not be an effective criterion to interpret (events in) a work of fiction. Chariclea, at discovering that the dead woman in the cave where she also was hidden is Thisbe, is astonished and wonders: how could it be *eikos* that she has been catapulted here from the center of Greece, “as if from a machine” (κάθ'απερ ἐκ μηχανῆς) (2.8.3)? Chariclea cannot make sense of the situation because she applies *to eikos* to the unbelievable events occurring in a novel, and in a novel that resorts to all kinds of theatrical machinery to advance its plot.

A similarly misleading reliance on *to eikos* later prevents Hydaspes, Chariclea's Ethiopian father, from making sense of the girl's birth: how could it be possible for black parents to have a white daughter? It would be against *to eikos* (10.14.5). As Hunter notes, however, Hydaspes is “a reader who applies inappropriate models of interpretation, in his case ‘probability,’ *to eikos*.”⁷¹ Hunter adds that Chariclea's paradoxical existence calls into question, “not perhaps without an authorial smile, the appropriateness of *to eikos* as a reading criterion for any kind of ‘fiction,’ or perhaps prompt[s] us to revise our notions of just what *to eikos* might be.” As soon as Chariclea discloses her identity, Hydaspes responds (10.12.2) that she is inventing her role as his daughter “to resolve a hopeless situation” (ἐξ ἀπόρων) “like a *deus ex machina*” (οἶον ἐκ μηχανῆς). His abidance by common sense prevents him from appreciating the marvelous quality of Chariclea's birth and of the very story he is in, in which time and again hopeless situations are resolved by a *deus ex machina*.⁷²

Like Chariclea's paradoxical birth, recognition scenes defy the reader's reliance on *to eikos* as commonsensical plausibility. When Aristotle claims that recognitions should happen “through probabilities” (δι'εἰκότων; *Poet.* 55a 17), he means that they should arise with verisimilitude from within the story, not that they should match our life experience. From an experiential perspective, recognition scenes are implausible, even “scandalous,” as Terence Cave calls them: “a stumbling block, an obstacle to belief”; “a shock.”⁷³ In Aristotle's evaluation, a good recognition has a strong and sudden shock effect (ἐκπληξίς; *Poet.* 55a 17).⁷⁴ Cave continues: because it exhibits the marvelous, recognition epitomizes the working of literature itself with its capacity to astound us.⁷⁵ Greek novelists,

⁷¹ Hunter 1998b, 56. The next citation is from the same page.

⁷² Paulsen (1992, 77) says that Hydaspes was wrong not to believe that events fit for the theater can be true to life, for in this case “apparent fiction turns out to be reality.” Things are, however, more complex, for Hydaspes is a character of fiction. Is Heliodorus saying “We should believe that the unbelievable can happen”? or rather, “We should not read fiction as we read life”?

⁷³ Cave 1988, 1–2.

⁷⁴ On ἐκπληξίς in this context, see Cave 1988, 44.

⁷⁵ Cave 1988, 2–3.

Heliodorus in the first place, would endorse this statement, for they label their recognition scenes “fictions,” *plasmata*. Heliodorus repeatedly underscores the paradoxical nature of recognitions by recording the wonderment they cause. His recognitions happen *ek mēchanēs*, and leave the spectators struck dumb with amazement.

Back to Theagenes’s error: if *anagnōrismoι*, and those in the *Aethiopica* above all, do not match our experience of the way the world works, if they are the quintessential locus of fiction, Heliodorus, rather than justifying Theagenes by appealing to the *eikos*, might suggest that he, like Hydaspes, is not an adequate interpreter of the fictional universe he lives in, that he is not playing his part as he should. When he finally recognizes Chariclea, the bystanders marvel before the “miraculous deeds of theatrical art” (σκηνογραφικῆς . . . θαυματουργίας). Heliodorus’s emphasis on the wondrous quality of the scene counters his appeal to the *eikos* as justification for Theagenes’s mistake. By staying within the bounds of common experience, Theagenes fails in the role of Platonic lover that Heliodorus has assigned to him: a role greater than life, defying life’s set of probabilities. The writer himself seems to be embarrassed, as it were, by Theagenes’s un-Platonic blindness, for he rushes to hypercorrect it by expounding at some length the belated effects of Chariclea’s eyes on her lover: “He gazed hard at Chariclea and was dazzled by the brilliance of her eyes, as if by a shaft of sunlight shining out between the clouds.”

A False Ending

When this second recognition is completed, Heliodorus comments: “So this sinful war between brothers was at an end, and the struggle, which had seemed to be settled by the spilling of blood, changed at its dénouement from tragedy to comedy.”⁷⁶ The drama, at last, ends happily, as we expected. The sustained emotional tension relaxes into a joyful celebration, with the crowd surrounding the protagonists of these wondrous scenes and forming a procession. If one did not know that the young pair must finish their journey in Ethiopia, one would think that the novel was coming to its end.

The double recognition, of Calasiris and of Chariclea, enhances this sense of closure both because recognitions as such tend to be final, especially in the novel, and, more specifically, because these two scenes feature as their protagonists the heroine and her closest narrative equivalent: Calasiris and Chariclea, besides being kindred spirits, live parallel “novels.”⁷⁷ Like Chariclea, Calasiris

⁷⁶ λέλυτο μὲν ἄθεσμος ἀδελφῶν πόλεμος καὶ ἄγῶν ὃ δι’ αἵματος κριθήσεται προσδοκώμενος εἰς κωμικὸν ἐκ τραγικοῦ τὸ τέλος κατέστρεφε (7.8.1).

⁷⁷ See Paulsen 1992, 152–53. Some of the following parallels are in Paulsen.

makes his fatal encounter, with Rhodopis, in a temple; if Chariclea elopes because she falls in love, so does Calasiris; just as Chariclea has another reason to elope, the desire to recover her family, so does Calasiris, and that reason, too, is a family matter, the predicted mutual slaughter of his children. If we take Chariclea's journey to have started in Meroe, before the beginning of the novel, her journey is circular, as is Calasiris's; and both begin and end in Africa. At the same time, however, Calasiris's novel is an antinovel: he leaves because of love, but to be severed from, rather than forever united with, the object of his love.⁷⁸ Calasiris's recognition certifies him, as it were, in his role as modified novelistic hero: it brings him a happy ending and ends his journey, as recognitions do to the Greek novels' heroes; but because his "novel" stems from the rejection of love, the recognition is reconfigured in the only terms that would make for a happy ending: as recognition by his children, the cause of his dismay and a major reason for his flight. The double recognition provides the double novel, so to speak, with its double happy ending: to each protagonist according to his or her wishes.

But again, we are not allowed to rest, for dark clouds gather foretelling more tragedy to come. Among the spectators at both recognition scenes is Arsace, the Persian queen who indirectly caused Thyamis to be exiled because he did not satisfy her lust. When he first appears on the scene to confront his brother, Arsace again feels the stirrings of desire. She also sees Theagenes, and instantly a new and stronger passion fires up in her (7.4.2). She keeps looking at him until he goes out of sight (7.6.3), and then she disappears from the narrative. Only when the second recognition is completed, when the drama turns "from tragedy to comedy," does she make her entrance again, ostensibly to participate in the celebrations—in other words, in the "comedy"—but in truth to feast her eyes on Theagenes alone: not an unsullied pleasure, though, for Chariclea's presence goads her with jealousy (7.8.6). Arsace's role announces itself to be other than that of a cheering participant in the party or a satisfied spectator. Her presence reopens, and taints with gloomier possibilities, a narrative that seemed to have reached the happy ending(s) subsequent to the two recognitions.⁷⁹

The turn for the worse is signposted by the recurrence of *thea*, spectacle, to describe both the joyful tableau of the reunited fiancés that spurs the celebration, the jewel of this drama,⁸⁰ and the sight of Theagenes in which Arsace luxuriates when he first appears on stage and again after the double recognition, under cover of participating in the festivities.⁸¹ That sight is the source of the mixed

⁷⁸ See Paulsen 1992, 152–53.

⁷⁹ See also Paulsen 1992, 70.

⁸⁰ See 7.8.2: τὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦς θέαν.

⁸¹ See 7.6.1: ἐντροφᾶν . . . τῇ θέᾳ; 7.8.6: τῆς ἐκείνου θέας.

pleasure on the note of which this scene ends, and which gives impulse to a new tragic movement as Arsace retires to her room, “afame from the irresistible sight”—*thea* again—“of Theagenes.”⁸²

The Recognition of Chariclea

Nature Is Never Wrong

Just as this false ending is prepared by two episodes of recognition, the true ending follows from the most elaborate recognition scene in the novel: that between Chariclea and her royal parents, which readers have been awaiting since they found out (at 4.8) the identity of the heroine. In Chariton, Xenophon, and Achilles Tatius, the recognition and reunion that end the core of the story, though expected, are not smoothly built into the narrative as they are in the *Aethiopica*: the journey in those novels is a forced necessity or a hurried flight, whereas Chariclea decides to leave in order to obtain her parents’ recognition and the right to marry Theagenes.⁸³ In all the other novels the recognition, from the point of view of the characters involved, is pure serendipity. It belongs to the Bakhtinian “adventure-time” like the other accidents of the journey, and like them is governed by a logic of fortuitous coincidence.⁸⁴ In contrast, Chariclea’s recognition by her family is the very aim of the journey. A structural indication of its function as *telos* is the displacement of the lovers’ recognition and reunion from the end to the middle of the narrative.⁸⁵ While in the other novels in which the lovers have been apart it is their recognition toward the end that marks the climax, in the *Aethiopica* that recognition happens midway through the journey, to leave the place of honor at the end to Chariclea’s, and is not final in spite of appearances. As the aim of the journey and the culmination of the narrative, Chariclea’s recognition by her family recalls Odysseus’s by the members of his household.

Just as Odysseus carefully times his self-disclosures, Chariclea offers these warnings against a rushed revelation: “It may be dangerous to reveal abruptly things that the passing years have made obscure, especially when the central figure in our entire story, the key to the whole tangled web of complexity and

⁸² See 7.9.2: ὑπὸ θεᾶς ἀμάχου τῆς Θεαγένους . . . ἀνακρίομενον.

⁸³ See Plazenet 2008, 73.

⁸⁴ See Bakhtin 1981, 92–94. Two characters, Daphnis’s father and Leucippe’s father, foster recognition acting on dreams. But the protagonists of the recognitions (Chloe and her father, Clitophon and Leucippe) are not prepared for them.

⁸⁵ The scenes in the middle of *Callirhoe* and *Leucippe and Clitophon* in which the lovers meet do not lead to their reunion as does the one in Heliodorus.

recognition, is missing. I refer, of course, to my mother, Persinna.”⁸⁶ She adds that in the absence of “those who could recognize and corroborate the truth of our story” (τῶν καὶ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ βεβαιοῦν δυναμένων), the king might become angry with her for trying to pass for his child. As Theagenes invokes the tokens she carries as evidence, she objects that even those “are tokens only to those who know them . . . or to those who laid them beside me. For those who do not know them or do not recognize every item, they are precious trinkets and necklaces with no other meaning, which might well bring their bearer under suspicion of being a thief or a robber. And even if Hydaspes should recognize one of them, who could persuade him that it was Persinna who gave them to me, that she gave them to me as mother to daughter? The one incontrovertible token of recognition, Theagenes, is maternal instinct, which, by the workings of an unspoken affinity, disposes the parent to feel affection for the child the instant she sets eyes on it. Let us not deprive ourselves of the one thing that would make all the other tokens convincing.”⁸⁷

We can appreciate the gulf separating the naïve Theagenes from the circumspect Chariclea. While he uncritically considers the objects she wears as evidence of identity, she is wary of not being believed. This difference is grounded in their opposite attitude toward truth and lies. Theagenes, the descendent of Achilles, cannot lie—or write fiction. When Chariclea asks him to pretend (πλάττου: make up) that he is sensitive to Arsace’s charms, he replies that he cannot (7.21.5: πλάττειν). Chariclea, in contrast, is a master of fiction. The first time she is asked to speak about herself, by Thyamis, she invents the story that she and her fiancé are siblings, that they are priestess of Artemis and priest of Apollo, and a storm has driven them off course while on their way to Delos. Her story is a miniature novel: the product of ἀναπλάττειν (1.25.6). Not surprisingly, then, only Chariclea is aware that words or even tokens as such do not prove one’s identity.

In particular Chariclea remarks on the purely subjective validity of tokens: bringing out the etymological kinship of *gnōrismata* (tokens) and *gignōskō* (to know), she argues that tokens are such only for those who know them, and that

⁸⁶ ἂ πολλὸς χρόνος συνέχεε, ταῦτα εἰς ὃξὺν καιρὸν ἀνακαλύπτειν οὐ λυσιτελές, τοῦ κεφαλαίου καὶ ταῦτα τῆς ὄλης καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὑποθέσεως καὶ ἐξ ἧς ἡ σύμπασα πλοκή τε καὶ ἀνέυρεσις ἡρτῆται, Περσίννης λέγω μητρὸς τῆς ἐμῆς, ἀπολειπομένης (9.24.4).

⁸⁷ τοῖς γνώσκουσιν . . . ἢ συνεκθεμένοις ἐστὶ γνωρίσματα, τοῖς δὲ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἢ μὴ πάντα γνωρίζειν ἔχουσι κειμήλια τηνάλλως καὶ ὅρμοι κλοπῆς, ἂν οὕτω τύχη, καὶ ληστείας τοῖς φέρουσιν ὑπόνοιαν προσάπτοντες. εἰ δὲ δὴ τι καὶ γνωρίσειεν Ὑδάσπης, τίς ὅτι καὶ Περσίννα ἢ δεδωκυῖα, τίς δ’ ὅτι καὶ ὡς θυγατρὶ μήτηρ ὁ πείσων ἔνεστιν; ἀναντίρρητον γνώρισμα, Θεάγενες, ἢ μητρῴα φύσις, ὑφ’ ἧς τὸ γεννῶν περὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἐκ πρώτης ἐντεύξεως φιλόστοργον ἀναδέχεται πάθος, ἀπορρήτῳ συμπαθείᾳ κινούμενον. τοῦτο οὖν μὴ προώμεθα δι’ ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γνωρίσματα ἂν πιστὰ φανείη (9.24.7–8).

for this reason she needs her mother, who exposed her, to be present. Toward the end of her speech, however, she bends her reasoning: she needs her mother's presence not so much because she knows the tokens as because the instinctive feeling a mother conceives for her offspring is the only indisputable token, the one that will give credibility to the others.

Chariclea's intuition seems to materialize right away: while she and Theagenes are conversing, they are brought before Hydaspes, and the king is startled by the resemblance of the girl to the daughter he has just dreamt was born to him. Already when he has first been presented with the two prisoners, "he rejoiced at the sight of the young pair; he felt instantly well-disposed to his own flesh and blood [literally: "to his own things"], as, did he but know it, the prophetic intuition of his heart exerted its power over him."⁸⁸

Persinna is drawn to the girl by an even stronger and inexplicable sympathy. As Chariclea, still unrecognized, is about to be sacrificed in thanksgiving for the Ethiopian victory, she fixes her eyes on her mother so intensely that the mother feels distressed and asks Hydaspes whether he can do something to save the girl: "O husband . . . what a girl you have selected for the sacrifice! Never to my knowledge have I seen anyone so beautiful. How noble her expression is! With what dignity she confronts her destiny. What pity I feel for her youth and beauty! If the only child I ever bore, the little daughter that was so cruelly taken from me, had been allowed to live, she would now be about the same age as this girl."⁸⁹

This description of an unconscious parental response to the sight of a yet unrecognized offspring might have been inspired by the account of Astyages's recognition of Cyrus in Herodotus:⁹⁰ "While the boy was speaking thus, Astyages came to recognize him: the features of his face seemed like his own, his thought, and his manner of answering was of a quite free man; and the date of the exposure seemed to match the boy's age. Struck by this, he was speechless for a long time."⁹¹ Astyages, however, is not feeling a mysterious emotion but comes to his discovery rationally: by observing the child's features and manners, he

⁸⁸ ὁ δὲ ἦδετο μὲν καὶ τῇ ὄψει τῶν νέων, εὐμενὴς αὐτόθεν πρὸς τὰ ἴδια καὶ οὐκ εἰδὼς ὑπὸ [τοῦ] μαντευτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς γινόμενος (9.1.3).

⁸⁹ ὦ ἄνερ . . . οἷαν κόρην εἰς τὴν θυσίαν ἐπιέλεξαι. οὐκ οἶδα ἰδοῦσα τοιοῦτο κάλλος· ὥς δὲ καὶ εὐγενὴς τὸ βλέμμα, ὥς δὲ καὶ μεγαλόφρων πρὸς τὴν τύχην, ὥς δὲ καὶ ἐλεεινὴ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀκμῆς. εἰ περιεῖναι συνέβαινεν ἡμῖν τὸ ἅπαξ μοι κυθεῖν καὶ κακῶς ἀπολωλὸς θυγάτριον, ἐν ἴσοις που ταύτῃ τοῖς ἔτεσι ἐζητάζετο (10.7.4).

⁹⁰ Billault (forthcoming) sees a general resemblance between Chariclea's story and Cyrus's. One more detail they share is the protagonist's namelessness at birth: see below.

⁹¹ ταῦτα λέγοντος τοῦ παιδὸς τὸν Ἀστιάγεα ἐσήμει ἀνάγνωσις αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἱ ὅτε χαρακτὴρ τοῦ προσώπου προσφέρεσθαι ἐδόκεε ἐς ἑωυτὸν καὶ ἡ ὑπόκρισις ἐλευθεριωτέρῃ εἶναι, ὃ τε χρόνος τῆς ἐκθέσεως τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τοῦ παιδὸς ἐδόκεε συμβαίνειν. ἐκπλαγεὶς δὲ τούτοις ἐπὶ χρόνον ἄφθογγος ἦν (1.116).

recognizes him *as his own*, whereas Hydaspes, and especially Persinna, feel a stirring *as if* the child were their own. Unlike Astyages, Persinna is hearing the call of parental instinct, or nature's voice.

The motif of nature's voice, or "the call of blood," was destined to have a fortunate history, especially in Christian hagiography and in early modern French literature, drama in particular.⁹² A reason for its success might be that it satisfies a psychological need to believe that one's kin is deeply connected to oneself. The call of blood is not a fact but a fallacy, a kind of wish fulfillment, that gives meaning to one's family ties.⁹³

The origins of the motif, however, are nebulous. It does not seem to appear in Greek myths of incest, as we might expect. The depth of Jocasta's ignorance of her relation to Oedipus is pointed up both in the Homeric narrative of her death (*Od.* 11. 271-80) and in Sophocles's *Oedipus Rex* (where, however, it could have been dictated by the plot's needs).⁹⁴ Another mythical story of incest, Myrrha and Cinyras, likewise assumes the silence of blood.⁹⁵ We can add the myths of Oedipus killing Laius and of Telegonus killing Odysseus without any inkling of their victim's identity or vice versa. When and how, then, did the motif develop?

In his book *The Call of Blood in French Classical Tragedy* (1958), Clifton Cherpac argues that the concept of nature's voice does not exist before the *Aethiopica*. Likewise, in a study of recognition scenes in Christian hagiography, Pascal Boulhol postulates a late date of birth for the concept, tentatively suggesting that it developed in the early imperial period and might have been fed by philosophical theory (if it was not a popular cliché).⁹⁶ I think that its origins can be traced further back, at least to classical Greek literature.

To be sure, the idea of an instinctual love for one's kin fully develops in the Peripatetic and Stoic theory of *oikeiōsis* which, Boulhol proposes, might be directly or indirectly linked to the motif of nature's voice in Heliodorus. *Oikeiōsis* is the sentiment and appreciation that something belongs to one, as shown first and foremost in parental love. Already Aristotle claims that "parents love their children as being a part of themselves" (*οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὥς αὐτῶν τι ὄντα*) and from the very instant of their births; mothers love more than fathers because they have produced the child; and kin feel the closer

⁹² See chapter 5 and the epilogue.

⁹³ See Cherpac 1958, 12–13. The eighteenth-century French critic Baculard d'Arnaud calls the voice of nature a "prejudice," which spectators to contemporary plays don when they enter the theater and abandon when they leave: see Marchand 2009, 193–94.

⁹⁴ See page 132.

⁹⁵ Ovid plays on blood's silence by having Cinyras call Myrrha "daughter," "perhaps with a name appropriate to her age," during intercourse (*Met.* 10. 0.467).

⁹⁶ See Boulhol 1996, 31 and n. 84; 33–34.

to each other the greater the nearness of the original ancestor (EN 61b 18–62a 4). The notion that one's children are one's own "parts" is central to the theory of *oikeiōsis*. Plutarch, for instance, reports the Stoic Chrysippus to have listed our children next to our limbs: "As soon as we are born, we feel ties of affinity also with our limbs and our offspring."⁹⁷ The statement seems illogical, for it claims that our offspring, along with our body parts, are our nearest and dearest from the very moment of our birth, before we conceive them, or even of them. Chrysippus might be adopting the adult's perspective.⁹⁸ But he could also be arguing that attraction to our flesh and blood is purely instinctual, prerational,⁹⁹ not unlike our sentiment that our body parts belong to us.

It is tempting to connect this passage in particular to the motif of nature's voice. Yet a fundamental aspect of the theory of *oikeiōsis* clashes with it: the claim that our feeling of affinity extends, or should extend, beyond our nearest and dearest and to humanity at large. The Stoic Hierocles (in the first half of the second century CE) conveys the message most vividly with a memorable image:¹⁰⁰ we draw concentric circles around ourselves, of which the closest comprises our minds, and then the larger and larger ones include our bodies, children, and parents, to encompass all humans. The image puts the nearest and dearest in a continuum with the most distant. Though Hierocles realistically acknowledges the fading of our sympathy as we move to the outer circles, he asks us to assimilate those circles, to bring them nearer, by practicing such exercises as calling a cousin "brother" and an uncle "father." Theophrastus likewise terms *oikeioi* not only those born of the same parents but also the descendants of the same ancestors; fellow citizens, who also descend from the same ancestors; and even animals, owing to the contiguity of the species.¹⁰¹ If, then, a link exists between philosophical *oikeiōsis* and the motif of nature's voice, the motif stopped at "*oikeiōsis* stage 1," for it puts a premium on primary and individual attachments, separating particular persons, one's kin, from the rest of humanity.

Another option for the development of the motif could be the increasing interest in and admiration for animals in the early imperial period. Beginning with the *Odyssey*, animals are credited with recognizing more spontaneously than humans, with needing no evidence other than presence. Aelian tells the story of a lion that immediately (*παραχρῆμα*) recognized a young man he had

⁹⁷ οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς γινόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα τὰ ἑαυτῶν (On Stoic Contradictions 1038B).

⁹⁸ See Reydam-Schils 2002, 224.

⁹⁹ See Magnaldi 1991, 41–42.

¹⁰⁰ In Stobaeus 4.27.23 Hense-Wachsmuth. The following observations are indebted to Blundell 1990, 223, and Ramelli 2009, 127–28.

¹⁰¹ Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 2.22 and 3.25, with Magnaldi 1991, 33–34.

befriended, while the man only belatedly (ὀψέ) recognized his companion, and from its welcoming behavior.¹⁰² In later literature, Argus's recognition of Odysseus becomes exemplary of this superior animal instinct and is even taken to illustrate the kinship between "the souls of men and animals."¹⁰³ This trend continues beyond classical antiquity. The Byzantine commentator Eustathius remarks that Argus and Euryclea alone saw through Odysseus's disguise.¹⁰⁴ Eustathius also wavers between attributing Argus's recognition of his master to sight and smell.¹⁰⁵ Later still, in seventeenth-century France, Argus's perceptiveness is understood as a sixth sense akin to the commotion caused by blood's call. The critic La Mesnadière contrasts the dog's intuition with human reason: whereas Euryclea and Telemachus "saw" Odysseus (*le virent*), Argus "felt" him (*le sentit*).¹⁰⁶ This reading testifies to the idealization of animal instinct in the same cultural climate in which the motif of blood's call was thriving. Animal instinct might also seem a more attractive source for this motif because it is observable and easier to grasp than a philosophical theory, though, admittedly, the evidence in Greco-Roman literature is scanty.¹⁰⁷

A literary genre of the imperial period in which I expected to find the motif are the rhetorical declamations, both the *Controversiae* by the Elder Seneca and the twin collections, the *Minor* and *Major Declamations*, attributed to Quintilian. Though fictional, the declamations are a site of debate about social norms and cultural values.¹⁰⁸ We might, therefore, assume that they would mirror or play with the existence of a concept like the call of blood when they deal with paternity issues or conflicts involving parents. Our expectations might be roused further by the symbolic importance of blood in Roman representations of identity: generation in particular was described in terms of transmission of blood from parents to children, and children or descendants could be called simply "my

¹⁰² *De natura animalium* 7.48.35–41.

¹⁰³ [Plutarch], *On the Life and Poetry of Homer* 125. See Varro *Men.* 471; Pliny *N.H.* 8.146, chapter 61. On the Homeric episode, see Goldhill 1991, 12–13.

¹⁰⁴ *Commentary on the Odyssey* 2.206.42–46. Eustathius mistakenly reads Euryclea's almost-recognition of Odysseus by his appearance and voice as a true recognition, which the discovery of the scar would only confirm. See also 2.207.1–6.

¹⁰⁵ *Commentary on the Odyssey* 2.145.45–146.28; at 2.206 Eustathius uses αἰσθέσθαι.

¹⁰⁶ I quote from Vuillermoz 2009, 26: "dans l'Odyssée, Ulysse après ses longs voyages fut reconnu dans sa maison par son Fils, par sa Nourrice, quand ils le virent en personne, & par un Chien qui le sentit. Voilà des reconnoissances faites par la raison dans les hommes, et par le sentiment dans les bestes."

¹⁰⁷ A hint is Plautus *Epidicus* 579 (discussed below): "aliter catuli longe olent, aliter sues," pronounced by a mother who can "smell" her kind. Another might be Lucretius 2.369–70: by recognizing their mothers, lambs choose the teats that are "theirs" (sua), "as nature demands" (quod natura reposit).

¹⁰⁸ See Mal-Maeder 2007.

blood.”¹⁰⁹ But blood in the declamations is mute. Here is, for instance, the subject of Seneca *Controversiae* 4.6: a man had a son whose mother died. He sent off the child to the country and remarried. Soon afterward, he had a son from his second wife, acknowledged him, and sent him off to the same place to be raised with his first son. After a long time the sons returned, looking alike. The father refused to tell his wife, who pressed him, which son was hers. She accused him of ill treatment.

This text implies that a mother whose child has been taken away from her at birth is unlikely to recognize him, and that this is quite acceptable. The projected readership of this *Controversia* apparently was not expected to factor in the call of blood as a natural way to recognition. Had it been otherwise, the advocate for the father could have said: “A mother should recognize her own without needing to ask; if this mother did not, why should she be told? It makes no difference to her ‘guts’ which child is hers. If she has the same feelings for both, let it stay that way.” The author makes no such argument. Instead, a point in the father’s defense is: Nature itself wanted the children not to be told apart, if my wife had not asked so insistently.

Instances of blood’s muteness in fictional declamations could be multiplied. A main argument of *Minor Declamations* 278, a paternity suit, is that begetting is a weaker ground for legal paternity than upbringing. Nature can be dismissed: “To appear [to be someone’s child] most of the time is enough for legal status” (sec. 5). The following point (sec. 7), that the natural father becomes father only when he pays back the putative one for the child’s upbringing, again undermines nature as the main grounds for paternity. To imagine his declamation succeeding, the declaimer must have thought that the imagined jury would take this point seriously.

The closest I could find to the motif of blood’s call in the genre is *Major Declamations* 8, a grim story of a mother accusing her husband of ill treatment for having allowed the vivisection of one of their twin sons, who were dying of the same illness, to help cure the other. An advocate for the woman, making the “Aristotelian” argument that a mother loves more than a father, gives this explanation: “Whereas the joy of the first sight of the child makes you fathers, mothers are mothers earlier, by their awareness.”¹¹⁰ Still, the sentiment is not intuition;¹¹¹ it is the certainty the mother has from feeling the child inside herself.

At the same time, however, we can find a hint of the concept of blood’s call as early as Plato, in the section of the *Republic* (460c-e) in which he prescribes how

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., Virg. *Aen.* 6.835 (*sanguis meus*). See Guastella 1985, 76–84 (the Virgilian reference is on p. 81, n. 87).

¹¹⁰ “Cum vos patres gaudium primum faciat oculorum, ante sunt conscientia matres” (8.7).

¹¹¹ As Mal-Maeder translates *conscientia* (2007, 105). My reading is closer to Sussman’s “inner awareness” (1987, 98).

to go about abolishing the family. The passage seems to assume an audience sensitive to the voice of nature but also amenable to believing that it could be suppressed. In order for his reform to be put to work, Plato needs to sever completely the guardians' biological parents from their offspring. To this purpose, all kinds of devices must be applied to prevent mothers from "having the perception of one's own" (*τὸ αὐτῆς αἰσθῆσεται*). This caveat intimates that Plato and his projected audience acknowledged something like the call of blood. The philosopher seems to be wary even of indirect contact between the children and their begetters, since he entrusts the children's upbringing to nurses who live apart from the rest of the city. But all the same, he thinks that these precautions will suffice to make the children unrecognizable to their parents (416d); and that the guardians, severed from their blood ties, will believe every passerby to be father, mother, son, or daughter, depending on their age (463c). In other words, he assumes that the voice of nature exists, but can be silenced.¹¹²

Is Plato's account confirmed by other sources? Drama might be a good witness for the existence of blood's call, since it often features family members who interact with each other without knowing their relationship. Do they feel it?

The normal tragic pattern of recognition does not seem to factor in the call of blood. Jocasta and Oedipus can live together without feeling any uprising in their innards; Orestes and Iphigenia can stand face-to-face and still experience no commotion in their veins. These and suchlike situations, however, cannot be taken to prove that the concept of blood's call objectively did not exist when those plays were produced. For considerations of plot are of course paramount in a dramatist's choice to emphasize the characters' ignorance of their relationship. Take for instance *Oedipus Rex*. The point is that Oedipus could not have married an older woman without fear of fulfilling the oracle, if he had even vaguely felt an obscure connection with her. Corneille's *Oedipe* demonstrates that for the sake of the plot, the call of blood could be ignored even when it became fashionable. In this play, the motif and ignorance of it peacefully coexist, for Jocaste says she would expect to feel *l'émotion du sang* for a brother (1103), yet she seems to feel none for her son.

Many comic plays likewise draw elements of their plots from the assumption that parents and children do not feel any instinctual connection. Consider, for instance, the dénouement of Terence's *Andria*: when Chremes discovers that Glycera, whom he thinks a courtesan, is his daughter, he is afraid that she will not know him (952); or Terence's *Heautontimoroumenos*, in which Sostrata,

¹¹² Likewise, when Plato prescribes that members of the same generation do not have intercourse with each other to prevent incest (461c-e), perhaps he implies that siblings attract each other, though he might simply think statistically (chances are that among so many people of that generation so many brothers and sisters will come together).

Chremes's wife, has given hospitality to her daughter without having the slightest hint of who she is, though the exposure was very painful to her. When her husband asks her if she has suspected anything about the girl (44: "Quid nunc suspicare aut invenis de illa?"), she says, "I don't know"; and it takes a canonical token, a ring, to reveal her daughter's identity to her mother. The silence of blood serves the needs of plot by helping to complicate situations. It also keeps the dialogues free from melodramatic sentimentality where it would not fit the mood of the play.

In at least one tragic play, however, blood speaks loudly: in Euripides's *Ion*. As soon as mother and son meet, they are instantly attracted to each other by an "inexplicable sympathy." Sympathy is already a prerequisite of recognition in the *Odyssey*, where only the characters who both show loyalty to the "absent" hero and sympathize with the "stranger" enjoy recognition of and by Odysseus.¹¹³ But in *Ion*, sympathy translates the strongest tie of kinship, instantly and incomprehensibly connecting mother and son. Creusa's feelings are strikingly similar to those of Persinna and Hydaspes: how noble you seem! If my son had lived, he would have your age!¹¹⁴ Mother identifies with her son's predicament, which intimately resonates with her own, and vice versa (359–60). Ion even wonders why he should care about that "stranger": "what is the daughter of Erechtheus to me"?¹¹⁵ He is surprised at his irrational interest in her. Ion's instinctual attraction to his mother poignantly contrasts with his instinctual repulsion for his nonfather, Xouthus, when he greets Ion as his newly found son and asks for a kiss and an embrace: "Are you out of your mind"? is Ion's first reaction (520, paraphrased). It takes forty lines before he believes he "is" Xouthus's son, and even then he does not embrace his alleged father but only greets him (561), with no display of happiness—a telltale indication that this is not a recognition scene as will be the one with Creusa, sealed by expressions of joy, kisses, and embraces (1437–41).

Even comic characters occasionally hear nature's voice. The common motif "Brother falls in love with sister without knowing their relationship," as in Plautus's *Epidicus*, is grounded on the acknowledgment of blood's obscure power. The same play also features a mother apparently gifted with animal instinct. One Periphanes is tricked into believing that a girl he guards in his house is his daughter, whereas she is his son's former sweetheart. For him, blood is mute in a

¹¹³ See Murnaghan 2011. On the role of sympathy in Odysseus's recognitions, see also Austin 1975, 204–206 and 218; Zeitlin 1996, 47. This comment by Eustathius on Euryclea is right on the mark: "The old woman thinks along with the stranger" (*Commentary on the Odyssey* 2.206.26).

¹¹⁴ *Ion* 237–38 and 354 (paraphrased). Creusa though pretends that the child is her friend's. An important trait shared by Ion and Chariclea is that both have been exposed because of the shame attached to their births.

¹¹⁵ ἀτὰρ θυγατὶρὸς τῆς Ἐρεχθέως τί μοι / μέλει; (433–34).

typically comic mood. But the woman he once raped and who is now searching for the daughter she lost to enemies knows better. When Periphanes shows her the girl he has taken in, telling her she is their daughter, she refuses to recognize her. As he insists that the girl's adornment might have made her unrecognizable, the woman bursts out: even from afar dogs and boars have a different smell! (579). She cannot be fooled because the girl does not "smell" like her daughter.

This episode, to be sure, might not be the best illustration for the presence of nature's voice in comedy, for the woman has known her daughter long enough, whereas Periphanes has not known her at all. If the woman has recourse to the animal imagery, it is not necessarily because she is following her intuition but could be because she wants to cut short the man's attempt at persuading her. But a second episode, from Plautus's *Rudens*, unmistakably plays on the ideal of nature's voice. *Rudens* is a peculiar comedy whose somewhat melodramatic style conjures up the novels. George Duckworth says of the play: "Its unusual setting . . . gives it an atmosphere of romance quite unlike the other Roman comedies," and talks of its "melodramatic pulsation of emotions."¹¹⁶ Another feature connecting this play to the novels is its markedly moralistic slant, spelled out in the prologue and pursued throughout. The deified Arcturus introduces the action by announcing that he is rewarding the good and punishing the wicked. Daughter and father are both immaculate: he in particular was such a generous benefactor of his countrymen that he used up all his substance in good deeds. The detail that he, unlike his comic colleagues, did not expose his daughter but was violently separated from her by pirates (another novelistic motif) clears him of even a well-tolerated fault.¹¹⁷ The play opens with the heroine cast on an unknown shore by a very novelistic storm and lamenting her fate in a very novelistic fashion (including: oh gods, I did nothing wrong! Why do you repay me thus?); and it features a father musing, at the sight of his (yet unrecognized) daughter: "Oh, my daughter, when I see her, you, though absent, stir me into remembering my miseries. That daughter of mine, who died at three, if she lives, would have her size, I know."¹¹⁸ Though this father has lived with his daughter for three years, which makes his feeling for her less startling than Persinna's for Chariclea, his commotion nonetheless resonates with Persinna's instinctual agitation.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Duckworth 1967, 148.

¹¹⁷ On attitudes toward child exposure in Rome, see especially Harris 1994.

¹¹⁸ "O filia / mea, quom hanc video, mearum me absens miseriarum communes; / trima quae periit mihi, iam tanta esset, si vivit, scio" (702–4).

¹¹⁹ Notice also the syntax: my daughter who *died*, if she *lives*, *would be* . . . The mixed conditional sentence conveys the man's unconscious hope, stirred by the girl in front of him, that his daughter lives.

If it is true that the concept of nature's voice surfaces already in Greek tragedy and philosophy, and in one of Plautus's comedies, Heliodorus was not as original as Clifton Cherpach has claimed in exploiting it for the recognition. But he seems to have been the first pagan author to assert the strength of that voice in an abstract, generalizing pronouncement, in addition to showing it at work.¹²⁰ More important, he entrusts blood's call with the main role, by attributing, in theory, absolute power to ἡ μητρῴα φύσις (the other tokens, claims Chariclea, mean nothing without the support of that instinct). This exaltation of maternal instinct fits the novel's idealization of parental love, just as in comedy the silence of nature, which is the rule, matches the recurring tensions between family members. The one comic play in which a father feels an instinctual attraction to his yet unrecognized daughter, Plautus's *Rudens*, is also one in which the father longs for his lost daughter and she for her parents. Persinna's gut feelings express an even deeper attachment to one's flesh and blood, a sentiment no weaker than erotic love.

In Heliodorus's novel, parental love shares traits with romantic love as described in the genre at large. The parallel is brought out by language and imagery: Hydaspes's fatherly feelings are a "paternal passion," just as the lovers experience "erotic passion";¹²¹ the metaphor of the wave to signify inner battle is applied both to Hydaspes when he strives to remain imperturbable before his newly discovered daughter and to the lover fighting not to drown in his passion.¹²² If lovers are "defeated" by love, so is Hydaspes "defeated" by the force of nature when he yields to his fatherly affection and runs to embrace his daughter.¹²³ Yet one more feature shared by parental and romantic love is that both parents and lovers should recognize their loved ones, "their own," immediately, and need no further proof of identity than presence.¹²⁴

The Impotence of Nature

The infallibility of maternal instinct is spelled out in a programmatic passage, as it were, which frames the recognition and creates expectations about its development: how will that instinct, "the only incontrovertible token," play in it?

¹²⁰ The motif is fully exploited in the Christian *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions*, which might date earlier than the *Aethiopica*: see chapter 5.

¹²¹ See *Aeth.* 10.16.2: πατρικὸν πάθος; *Callirhoe* 1.1.1 and 3.2.6: πάθος ἐρωτικόν.

¹²² See *Aeth.* 10.16.2: τῆς ψυχῆς . . . κυματομένης; *Callirhoe* 3.2.6: ἐκ τρικυμίας τοῦ πάθους.

¹²³ See *Ephesiaca* 1.3.1: ἡττᾶται; 1.4.1: νενίκημαι; *Aeth.* 10.16.2: ἡττήθη.

¹²⁴ Note that τὰ ἴδια, which describes Hydaspes's "flesh and blood" (9.1.3), echoes τὸ ἴδιον, describing the mutual recognition of Chariclea and Theagenes as they fall in love (3.5.4). Another indication that perfect parental love is no weaker than perfect erotic passion is, as Lalanne notes (2006, 248–49), that both Charicles and Calasiris wander in search for their adopted daughter (10.34.3; 1.22.3–4), as novelistic lovers do in search of their beloved.

The repeated stirring of maternal sympathy effectively enhances the pathos of the novel's culminating scene. Heliodorus's exploitation of nature's voice with its pathetic overtones can be contrasted with Longus's low-key reference to the same motif. When Daphnis is recognized, he clings to his parents "as if he had known them for a long time" (ὥς πάλαι εἰδώς). Longus comments: "So quickly is nature believed."¹²⁵ These words treat the motif of nature's voice as a commonplace; yet that voice has exerted a very weak power (if any at all) in the recognition, certainly not the power to stir a mother's guts. When Daphnis's soon-to-be-recognized mother first sees him and hears him play, she "marvels" at his skills more than any other person present (4.15.4). If this is a maternal instinctual response,¹²⁶ however, it is not a heartrending, tearful, and prolonged turmoil. Longus's underplaying of the motif of nature's voice with its melodramatic potential is consonant with his hasty handling of the recognition scenes, with his lack of interest in their choreography. In Longus, recognition serves to complete the protagonists' initiation into love, which has been the story. In Heliodorus, recognition is the goal of the story, the heart of the melodrama.

The effectiveness of maternal instinct, however, is only stylistic. In spite of Chariclea's confidence, maternal or paternal intuition plays no role whatsoever in advancing the recognition. Terence Cave writes about the scene: "And 'nature' . . . is clearly impotent when unaided by contrivance."¹²⁷ I would go further: it is contrivance alone that brings about the recognition. The joy Hydaspes feels at the first glimpse of the young prisoners is superseded by the even greater joy he derives from the omen of victory they afford to him. When later he is told that his dream might prefigure the future, he pushes it to the back of his mind and proceeds to ask Theagenes and Chariclea who they are.¹²⁸ While the experts' interpretation of his dream could have encouraged him to take his emotional stirrings seriously, the carelessness with which he treats it counters Chariclea's confidence in parental instinct. She is wrong indeed, for each time that instinct tries to direct events, it is either thwarted (as in these two instances) or treated as an impossible demand.

When Chariclea is about to be sacrificed, her mother is painfully shaken and asks Hydaspes whether he could do something to save her. Persinna's emotional turmoil, however, leads to nothing. There is no way Hydaspes can disregard the law, and this in spite of his own *aporrhētos sympatheia*: "I would wish to, for I, too,

¹²⁵ οὕτω φύσις ταχέως πιστεύεται (4.23.2).

¹²⁶ So for Morgan 2004, 233 (but see p. 239).

¹²⁷ Cave 1988, 18. Cherpak fails to see this: he argues that in Chariclea's recognition tokens are used "only as corroborating evidence" (1958, 7).

¹²⁸ On Hydaspes's failure to recognize the importance of his dream, see MacAlister 1996, 81.

am touched in some indefinable way and feel great pity for her.”¹²⁹ Soon afterward, when the virginity test proves Chariclea pure, hence fit for the sacrifice, Persinna is moved again, and again asks her husband what can be done: nothing, he answers, somewhat annoyed (10.9.5). Respect for the law blocks the way to recognition traced by parental instinct.

Chariclea herself, as she is about to take up her plea, seems no longer confident in nature’s power. She is delighted to hear that the president of the gymnosophists who will serve as judges is one Sisimithres, for that was the name of the man with whom she lived as a child, and hopes in “his collaboration and corroboration to assist her recognition.”¹³⁰ Chariclea is counting on Sisimithres as lawyer. And her plea proves her an expert lawyer herself, one knowledgeable of trial procedures: “In every case that comes to trial, sire, two types of evidence are recognized as most conclusive: documentary proof and corroboration by witness. Both types I shall adduce to demonstrate that I am your daughter.”¹³¹

The ineffectiveness of parental instinct is foreshadowed, long before the recognition scene, by the recurring mention, and sometimes detailed description, of the tokens left with Chariclea at her exposure. Heliodorus calls them “tokens,” *gnōrismata*, even when the term is not warranted by the context, for instance when Charicles gives them to Chariclea allegedly as a gift from his nephew Alcamenes. In that circumstance, Heliodorus could have said “he gave her the jewels exposed with her” instead of specifying “the necklaces from Ethiopia that Persinna had laid beside her to prove her identity.”¹³² The care with which the tokens are handled prepares for their crucial role in the recognition.¹³³ But even those tokens in the end would be ineffective without the witness, as the lawyerly Chariclea anticipates by promising to produce both (she was already thinking along those lines at Calasiris’s death, which she lamented also because he would have been the “token of recognition for her parents,” *ὁ τῶν φύντων ἀναγνωρισμός*, 7.14.7).

As soon as Persinna sees the band on which she engraved the vicissitudes of Chariclea’s birth and exposure, she is filled with “anguished astonishment” (*θάμβος καὶ . . . ἀγωνίαν*) and hands the inscribed cloth over to her husband: “I have nothing more to say. Take the band and read it. It will tell you all there is

¹²⁹ *καίτοι δέ ἐβουλόμην, πεπονθώς τι καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως καὶ κατελεῶν τὴν κόρην* (10.7.6).

¹³⁰ *συνήγορόν τε καὶ συνεργόν . . . πρὸς τὸν ἀναγνωρισμόν* (10.11.2).

¹³¹ *πάσα δίκη καὶ κρίσις, ὃ βασιλεῦ, δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀποδείξεις οἶδε, τὰς τε ἐγγράφους πίστει καὶ τὰς ἐκ μαρτύρων βεβαιώσεις· ἅμφω σοι τοῦ θυγάτηρ ὑμετέρα εἶναι παρέξομαι* (10.12.4).

¹³² *τοὺς ὄρμους τοὺς Αἰθιοπικοὺς τοὺς συνεκτεθέντας ὑπὸ τῆς Περσίννης εἰς γνωρίσματα* (4.15.4).

¹³³ See Morgan 1989a, 302; Kudlien 1989, 38.

to tell.”¹³⁴ Persinna is emotionally too shaken to act on the revelation; the most likely contributor to the recognition (in Chariclea’s evaluation of maternal instinct) falls into silence and becomes a mere figurant.¹³⁵ Though Hydaspes himself is “filled with wonderment” (*πολλὰ . . . θαυμάζων*), and though he can see that Sisimithres as well is “astounded” (*ἐκπεπληγμένον*), in the end he lets skepticism prevail: someone might have chanced on the tokens and used them.

The “witness,” Sisimithres, dispels some of Hydaspes’s worries by disclosing that he was the man who took Chariclea to Egypt and that he recognizes the band. There were other tokens exposed with the child, he says, and immediately Chariclea produces them. The disclosure again has such a strong emotional impact on Persinna that she is unable to say more than that “she recognizes them,” but “it would be best to examine them in the privacy of the palace.”¹³⁶ Her withdrawal from the inquiry leaves the floor to her husband; and he, even when Chariclea shows him his ring, the token he should know, refuses to recognize her as its legitimate bearer. What is most puzzling, her skin is white.

Sisimithres intervenes: the child I rescued was white, her age tallies with the number of years, the expression of her eyes, her beauty, are in accord with what I knew. Faced again with Hydaspes’s skepticism as to how could Ethiopian parents give birth to a white child, he asks for the painting of Andromeda, which Persinna, as she explained in the band, was watching when she conceived Chariclea.¹³⁷ The examination shows perfect likeness between the painting and the girl. At last, “Hydaspes could hold no longer in his disbelief but stood motionless awhile, possessed by a mixture of joy and amazement.”¹³⁸

We have come a long way from Chariclea’s initial confidence in maternal instinct as the only infallible token. Though Persinna’s intuition predisposes her to recognize the girl (contrary to Hydaspes, as soon as she sees the band she believes that its carrier is her daughter), her “inexplicable sympathy” does not lead to action before the revelation (she is unable to persuade her husband to save the girl), and her strong emotional response to it prevents her from participating actively in her daughter’s trial. The only parent who contributes to advancing the recognition is the skeptical Hydaspes, who, far from listening to the emotional turmoil he experienced as soon as he saw Chariclea, plays the role of opponent.

¹³⁴ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποιμι πλεόν, λαβὼν δὲ ἀναγίνωσκε· διδάσκαλός σοι πάντων ἢ ταινία γενήσεται (10.13.2).

¹³⁵ See Morgan 1989a, 313.

¹³⁶ γνωρίζει μὲν κατ’ οἶκον δὲ ταῦτα ἐξετάζειν καλόν (10.14.2), with Morgan 1989a, 313.

¹³⁷ On the origins and variations of the “Andromeda Effect,” see Reeve 1988.

¹³⁸ τὸν Ὑδάσπην οὐκέτι μὲν ἀπιστεῖν ἔχειν, ἐφεστάναι δὲ πολλὸν χρόνον ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἅμα καὶ θαύματος ἐχόμενον (10.15.1).

The ineffectiveness of nature serves narrative needs by protracting the recognition process, which the workings of a mother's instinct, if given free rein, would quickly bring to completion. In addition, since Chariclea speculates on the infallibility of *metrōia physis*, the recognition would unfold in a predictable way if that instinct played a decisive role. Failure of maternal instinct to advance the recognition allows for a suspenseful development. Likewise, though on a minor scale, Theagenes's failure to recognize Chariclea in spite of his proclaimed belief in *erōtika gnōrismata* allows that scene to have some latitude and to take an unpredictable, almost tragic turn (the cuff in Chariclea's face).

The impotence of blood, however, has a deeper rationale than just preventing foreclosure of the climactic recognition scene. It is thematically consistent with Chariclea's very identity, which has little to do with blood. The one piece of evidence that convinces Hydaspes is a painting, and after the girl has proven her resemblance to it rather than vice versa.¹³⁹ We can contrast her conception with Commodus's, also the result of a triangle, as it were. To be cured of her passion for a gladiator, the empress Faustina was instructed to have him killed, smear herself with his blood, and lie with her husband, Marcus Aurelius. The medicine worked, but the offshoot of that peculiar union was the emperor-gladiator.¹⁴⁰ Just as Chariclea bears no feature of her father, Commodus bears no character trait of his, the philosopher-emperor. But Commodus takes after the blood of his true father, while Chariclea takes after an artwork. Her expression of absolute confidence in the stirrings of a mother's innards is at odds with the artificiality of her very conception.

To be sure, the artificiality of Chariclea's identity appears to be qualified by Sisimithres's request that she produce, as one more proof, a dark spot on her arm. The spot seems to vindicate the role of nature in her birth, all the more so because it has no literary precedent in its function as sign of identity.¹⁴¹ The prototypical body mark in Greek literature is a scar, as, most famously, with Odysseus, but also with Orestes and, in this very novel, Theagenes. The original *gnōrisma* chosen by Heliodorus aims to reconnect Chariclea to her Ethiopian blood, for the mole is "like a ring of ebony staining the ivory of her arm."¹⁴² Chariclea has not mentioned it before or used it in any way, as she could have done, for instance, in the episode in which she and Theagenes agree on recognition

¹³⁹ See Whitmarsh 2011, 127.

¹⁴⁰ *Historia Augusta* 19.1–8, with Mencacci 1991.

¹⁴¹ I do not know of any other such spot used as *gnōrisma* in Greek and Roman literature. Hähnle (1929) does not mention any other. A close parallel in Italian literature is in Ariosto's play *I Suppositi* (The substitutes), where a young man is recognized as the son of one of the characters by a dark red mole on his shoulder (ll. 1940–42). In this recognition scene as well, the mole is the last token produced, and the decisive one.

¹⁴² ὥσπερ ἔβενος περιδρομος ἐλέφαντα τὸν βραχίονα μαίνων (10.15.2).

tokens should they lose each other. In that circumstance, Chariclea could have chosen her ebony spot just as Theagenes chooses his scar, also a physical mark; instead, she chooses Hydaspes's ring. Her choice is in character, for it can be attributed to her modesty (Sisimithres has to reassure her that it is not indecent to lay bare her arm). But Chariclea's modesty leaves the readers in ignorance of a detail of her body that turns out to be of great symbolic significance when her identity is disclosed to all. At the end of a scene largely built on the chasm of knowledge separating readers and characters, and even among the characters, those who know more (Chariclea, Theagenes, Sisimithres) from those who know almost nothing (the crowd), the revelation of the birthmark is a full discovery for everyone (readers included) except Sisimithres and Chariclea (and perhaps Persinna). This unforeseen revelation signs Chariclea's identity as the white child of black parents, and seems to ally nature with art.

The natural mole, however, in fact allies art with art, confirming, rather than correcting, Chariclea's artificial identity. It colors her arm as purple dye colors ivory in the Homeric simile to which Heliodorus is alluding ("as when a woman stains ivory with purple").¹⁴³ Homer compares Menelaus's limbs, tainted with blood from a wound, to ivory dyed with purple to make a cheek piece for horses, a pleasing object (*ἄγαλμα*) for a king. The simile beautifies the wounded Menelaus: like dye, the blood enhances the "shapeliness" (*εὐφυνέες*) of his limbs. The effect of the allusion is to aestheticize Chariclea's birthmark and to convert it into an ornament wrought by human hands. It is not a residue of her natural origin but is paint, turning her, too, into an *agalma*, a pleasing object or even a statue. The two gestures that complete Chariclea's recognition thus point up her quality as artwork: conceived in the image of a painting, she is now revealed to have the beauty of a painted statue. The statue also exalts the fusion of white and black, Greek and Ethiopian, for it is one in which the "stain" of Chariclea's biological origin, her blackness, further beautifies her. This beautification may symbolically point to the harmonious cultural and ethnic hybridization the novel propounds. Rather than a blemish that could not be bleached from Chariclea's conception, the black mole is added shine.¹⁴⁴

Theagenes's Recognition as Chariclea's Self

Just as he prolongs the recognition, Heliodorus defers the happy ending that normally follows from it, meanwhile suggesting possible tragic alternatives.¹⁴⁵ In this respect, the *Aethiopica* neatly meets the requirements for a literary, rather

¹⁴³ ὥς δ' ὅτε τίς τ' ἐλέφαντα γυνὴ φοίνικι μύνη . . . (Il. 4.141).

¹⁴⁴ Differently Létoublon 1993, 135.

¹⁴⁵ See Morgan 1989a, 314–318.

than a “mythic,” story, as set by Frank Kermode: “The story that proceeded very simply to its obvious predestined end would be nearer myth than novel or drama. Peripeteia, which has been called the equivalent, in narrative, of irony in rhetoric, is present in every story of the least structural sophistication. Now peripeteia depends on our confidence of the end; it is a disconfirmation followed by a consonance; the interest of having our expectations falsified is obviously related to our wish to reach the discovery or recognition by an unexpected and instructive route.”¹⁴⁶

In the *Aethiopica*, the predicted (by the oracle) and predictable (within generic rules) ending is that Chariclea will be reunited with her family and married to Theagenes. Her recognition follows along the expected route. Yet an unforeseen development immediately occurs: Chariclea will not ipso facto be saved; there is no instant reversal, as goes the expected route of recognition between kin. The reference that springs to mind, and with which no doubt Heliodorus is consciously playing to surprise the readers with his version, is *Iphigenia in Tauris*, in which recognition between kin immediately forestalls the death of one of them, and in which, as will only eventually be the case in Heliodorus, recognition “not only averts a human sacrifice (and parricide), but also calls in question the practice of sacrifice itself.”¹⁴⁷

We have already had a taste of Heliodorus’s deferring strategy in the recognition between Calasiris and his sons in book 7, which temporarily results in emotional turmoil, anguish, and uncertainty. When at last Chariclea is recognized, and the novel could quickly come to a close, the lack of a reversal following immediately from the discovery of her identity keeps the long-awaited recognition incomplete. Heliodorus suggests with a telling phrase that the recognition itself is incomplete as long as Chariclea’s fate remains undecided. As Hydaspes gestures to take his daughter to the sacrificial altar, the crowd rises up in protest: “We recognize you as king; and you, recognize yourself as father.”¹⁴⁸ This exhortation to the king who has proven himself king by agreeing to sacrifice his daughter spells out that Hydaspes has not fully recognized her if he does not recognize himself as father, that is, if he proceeds with the sacrifice. To recognize Chariclea as daughter, he must save her. The expected, yet delayed, reversal of fortune is perceived not simply as the necessary sequel of the recognition but as part of it.

The final recognition, however, is not completed even after Chariclea is saved, and this is because Theagenes has not yet been recognized for what he is to her:

¹⁴⁶ Kermode 2000, 18.

¹⁴⁷ Cave 1988, 19. Another significant parallel between the two recognitions is that both Orestes and Chariclea are suspected of inventing stories to avoid death. For a comprehensive treatment of the “Iphigenia pattern” in the *Aethiopica*, see Lefteratou 2010, 266–72.

¹⁴⁸ ἐγνωρίσαμέν <σε> ὡς βασιλέα· γινώριξε καὶ σὺ σαντὸν ὡς πατέρα (10.17.2).

her life.¹⁴⁹ Theagenes is the very cause of her quest. It is love for him that triggers her desire to reconnect with her origins. She becomes interested in knowing who she is and where she comes from only because she falls in love with Theagenes; and she leaves Delphi to find her family only because Theagenes kidnaps her. It is their recognition of each other (4.11.2: ἐγνώρισαν) that spurs Chariclea to look for her roots, to recognize (4.12.1: ἐγνώρισεν) her family identity and embark on her perilous journey.

Thematic parallels link Chariclea's recognition by her parents to the lovers' first recognition of each other and subsequent elopement. The elopement and Chariclea's disclosure of her identity are both delicate operations, requiring uttermost care and caution. As soon as Theagenes learns that Chariclea returns his love, he sets off to see her. Calasiris grabs him and says: "Our undertaking is not plunder taking! These are not goods openly on sale at a cheap price to anyone who cares to buy them. This is something that requires a great deal of forethought to achieve a proper result and a great deal of preparation to carry it off successfully."¹⁵⁰ Chariclea warns Theagenes in a similar vein when he presses her to tell Hydaspes who she is: "My darling . . . great ends can only be achieved by means of equal greatness. A story whose beginnings heaven has made convoluted cannot be quickly resolved."¹⁵¹ In addition, both the flight and the final recognition are initiated by the reading of a band, the only *gnōrisma* Chariclea needs in order to believe in her royal birth and elope, and the first of a series for her to be recognized by her parents. Through these correspondences it is suggested that the final recognition follows from, and completes, the first.

The dependence of Chariclea's recognition by her family on the lovers' recognition of each other at their first encounter quite likely caught the eye of the commentator Philip the Philosopher,¹⁵² who read the novel as a Neoplatonic

¹⁴⁹ Taken alone, Theagenes's recognition as Chariclea's fiancé rather than her brother is not an *anagnōrismos* in the sense of a rediscovery or *Wiedererkennung*. *Anagnōrīsis*, however, as "the passage from ignorance to knowledge" (Arist. *Poet.* 52a 30–31), authorizes a broader sense than just knowing again. And even if we take *anagnōrīsis* more literally, the text, as I hope to show, makes the revelation of Theagenes's identity part and parcel of Chariclea's *Wiedererkennung* by her parents in meaningful ways.

¹⁵⁰ οὐ γὰρ ἄρπαγμα τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ εὗωνον καὶ τῶν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ βουλομένῳ προκειμένων ἀλλὰ πολλῆς μὲν βουλῆς ὥστε προπόντως ἀνυσθῆναι πολλῆς δὲ διασκευῆς ὥστε ἀσφαλῶς πραχθῆναι δεόμενον (4.6.5).

¹⁵¹ ὦ γλυκύτατε . . . τὰ μεγάλα τῶν πραγμάτων μεγάλων δέϊται κατασκευῶν. ὧν γὰρ πολυπλόκου τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δαίμων καταβέβληται, τούτων ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ τέλη διὰ μακροτέρων συμπεραίνεσθαι (9.24.3–4).

¹⁵² Date unknown: possibly the twelfth century, but as early as the fifth has been proposed. See the discussion in Lamberton 1989, 148–56; Hunter 2005a.

allegory. Chariclea, Soul, leaves the practical life behind when she meets Theagenes, Mind. After many ordeals she will return home (like Odysseus, who is mentioned as the model reader, the philosopher who will not be metamorphosed into a beast by the novel's magic); and there she will "be put to trial by fire—for 'the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is' (1 Cor. 3.13)—and, radiant . . ." ¹⁵³ The text breaks off. But we can imagine its reading of Chariclea's recognition: the Soul appears pure, freed from the flesh, and returns to her source, Mind, to live forever beyond the material world from which she longed to escape when she first met "Theagenes."

Though few readers would endorse this allegory in every detail, ¹⁵⁴ the novel apparently warrants a Platonizing interpretation connecting Chariclea's recognition to the onset of love. Richard Hunter shows how Philip's reading is spurred by several interpretive habits in the text: one of these being allegorizing. He argues that Calasiris's reading practices resonate with Philip's; in particular his description of the protagonists' falling in love, with its Platonizing overtones, "itself gives impetus to Philip's Platonizing reading of the soul's pursuit." ¹⁵⁵ If Philip interpreted the final recognition as the Soul's homecoming, the end of her struggles, he found a strong clue in the narrative.

At the same time, however, Chariclea's vital identity is not in a metaphysical home or even an earthly one, but stays with her love: the force that Platonically spurs her quest is also the aim of it. The recovery of her parents is not a goal in itself, but only insofar as they will give her love their imprimatur. ¹⁵⁶ Theagenes is the home she is traveling to. Her search, therefore, ends not with family reunion but with the public revelation and approval of Theagenes's relationship to her.

Because of her particular predicament, as a child exposed at birth and brought to live at the opposite ends of the world, Chariclea has a more fluid cultural identity than the other novelistic heroines. She has multiple "fathers," each from a different country, and does not seem to settle for any of them. ¹⁵⁷ Her fathers are

¹⁵³ δοκιμασθήσεται μὲν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ. ἐκάστου γὰρ τὸ ἔργον ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ πῦρ δοκιμάσει. φανεῖσα δὲ . . . (Test. 13.130–31 Colonna, in Lamberton's translation [1989, 311]).

¹⁵⁴ Not even Philip, for the allegory has playful traits: see Hunter 2005a, 130. Lamberton (1989, 152) even speaks of parody.

¹⁵⁵ Hunter 2005a, 135. See also Lamberton 1989, 154; Dowden 1996, 285.

¹⁵⁶ Plazenet (2008, 73) notes that "la recherche identitaire est amorcée par la poursuite amoureuse" but views the latter as subordinate to the former. I think that the opposite is true: as we shall see, Chariclea can conceive living with Theagenes a wandering life, but not being reunited with her family without him.

¹⁵⁷ See especially 7.13.1 (Calasiris is τὸν δοκοῦντα καὶ ὄντα πατέρα). When Chariclea laments the loss of her three fathers, however, she recognizes that one is father "by nature" (7.14.5–6). On her multiple fathers, see Whitmarsh 1998, 107–9; 2011, 119 and 126–27.

instrumental in the fulfillment of her love: as soon as Charicles becomes the obstacle, she abandons him; Calasiris takes over because he promises his help in her love; and she would prefer death over recovering her natural father, if he should sacrifice Theagenes.

Chariclea's very name does not connect her to her origins. Her mother did not name her (4.8.1). We may speculate that Sisimithres, who rescued her, gave her a name; but if he did, that name disappeared with her second "father" and was never retrieved. Be that as it may, Chariclea was originally nameless. Her namelessness recalls Cyrus's, another royal foundling, in Herodotus's account, a story Heliodorus is likely to have known and used. Cyrus also has no name, at any rate not a name important enough to be recorded, when he lives with his foster family: he was not yet called Cyrus, but was given "some other name" (1.113.15: οὐνομα ἄλλο κού τι), that is, whatever he was called, it does not matter. But in Cyrus's case, we guess (Herodotus is silent on the issue) his name-giver to be his royal grandfather, who recognizes him and restores him to his origins, whereas Chariclea receives her name from a foster father, when she is far from returning home.

Just as Chariclea has been nameless in life, she has no name in the narrative until the wounded Theagenes calls her "My darling, my soul, Chariclea."¹⁵⁸ Whereas the other novelists name the heroine along with her parents and country, Heliodorus makes us hear the name of his heroine from the mouth of her beloved, when we do not yet know her parents and country. To be sure, this is owing to the author's choice to start the narrative in medias res and his narratological stance of incomplete cognition: he introduces his protagonists' name when context naturally allows without forcing him to speak as an omniscient narrator. The seventeenth-century critic Charles Sorel already noticed this concerning Theagenes: "Since it begins at the middle, it [Heliodorus's novel] does not name its hero. It speaks of him as of an unknown person. If it had named him at the start, it would have been forced to say at once who he was, and to tell part of his story. This happens later, when it becomes appropriate."¹⁵⁹ But Heliodorus could have chosen other equally natural ways to disclose Chariclea's name, for instance by having Cnemon, who seems to be present at the scene in which we learn the heroine's name (1.8.5), ask her and Theagenes, whose name instead we have just learnt from Chariclea (1.8.3), how they are called, just as they ask him

¹⁵⁸ ὦ φιλάττη καὶ ψυχὴ ἐμὴ Χαρίκλεια (1.8.4).

¹⁵⁹ "En commençant par le milieu, elle [Heliodorus's novel] ne nomme point son Heros; Elle en parle comme d'un inconnu; si elle l'avoit nommé d'abord, il y eust eu obligation de dire en mesme temps qui il estoit; et de conter une partie de son Histoire; Cela se fait après lorsque cela vient à propos" (*De la Connoissance*, p. 354, in Huet, ed. Kok 1942, 60). The same holds true for Cnemon's name (revealed at 1.8.6): see Paulsen 1992, 82–83; Fusillo 1989, 128.

his name (1.8.6). By making us hear Chariclea's name from Theagenes, the novelist connects her identity and her love.¹⁶⁰

Chariclea's lack of geographic and cultural definition can be detected in her behavior during the journey home: more as an uprooted cosmopolitan than as the princess of Ethiopia she has found out she is, or the Delphic priestess she was. Chariclea does not identify with any place. Delphi is what she knows best, but if she and Theagenes choose "Pythian" as password, and if they sigh when they hear mention of Delphi, it is because Delphi is where they met. Whereas the other heroines, severed from home, invoke it in moments of distress, Chariclea, though directed there, does not show a burning desire to be reunited with her (royal) family. She does not long for her native country.¹⁶¹

The legend of homeless Homer, told by Calasiris right after the gods enjoin on him to take Chariclea and Theagenes to Africa, runs parallel to Chariclea's story and suggests the possibility of a homeless, cosmopolitan life for her, as for the poet.¹⁶² Exiled from Egypt, his native land, because of a birthmark that betrayed his divine origin (his real father was Hermes), Homer came to Greece and hid both his name—as Chariclea might have been nameless when she left Egypt—and his birthplace, perhaps because he was ashamed of his exile, or possibly because "by concealing his true place of origin he was claiming the whole world as his own."¹⁶³

Chariclea's journey could have ended in homelessness like Homer's and, as perhaps for him, without sorrow. Recall her lamentation in Nausicles's house: "I thought that I had escaped from the clutches of robbers and eluded certain death by the sword, that I could live out the rest of my days in my beloved's company: it would have been a homeless life in foreign land, but his presence would have made it the sweetest of all lives."¹⁶⁴ Chariclea seems to have forgotten that she

¹⁶⁰ A first-time reader would not have known Chariclea's name until this scene if it did not appear in the title. Some testimonies have Ἡλιοδώρου Αἰθιοπικῶν βιβλίον . . . (first, second, and so on), including our earliest reference to the work (in Morgan 1989b, 99, n. 4), though others do have Chariclea's name in it. While Morgan inclines for the nameless title, Whitmarsh (2005) prefers to include Chariclea, though he is also intrigued by a Byzantine scholar's claim (test. 17 Colonna) that *Aethiopica* was the title. Paulsen (1992, 231, n. 2) argues that *Aethiopica* alone would not ring a bell with the readers until 2.35.5, when the "dark land of the sun" is mentioned. Heliodorus, however, might equally well have looked for a title whose relevance would become clear only in the course of the narrative, since he has a penchant for disclosing the truth gradually.

¹⁶¹ Whitmarsh (2011, 150–51) has a similar view.

¹⁶² Scholars have long noted the relevance of the tale of Homer's wandering life to characters and concerns of the novel: see, e.g., Whitmarsh 1998, 106, with further bibliography; Perkins 1999.

¹⁶³ καὶ τοῦ τὴν οὖσαν ἀποκρύπτειν πᾶσαν ἑαυτῷ πόλιν [πατρῖδα] μνῶμενος (3.14.4).

¹⁶⁴ χεῖρα ληστρικὴν ἐκπεφηνέαι καὶ μαιφόνον ὥμην θάνατον ἐλπισθέντα διαδεδρακέαι βιώσεσθαι τε τὸ λειπόμενον ἅμα τῷ φιλάτῳ, ξένον μὲν καὶ ἀλήτην βίον ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου γινόμενον ἥδιστον (5.2.7).

and her beloved were traveling to reach Ethiopia; the goal of her journey has receded to the back of her mind and, we surmise, she would settle on a wandering life with Theagenes—the sweetest of all lives—rather than on reunion with her family without him. Recall also the alternatives she envisages when she binds Theagenes to chastity: “He will have no carnal knowledge of me before I regain my home and people; or else, if heaven prevents this, before I fully consent to be made his wife, or not at all.”¹⁶⁵ While consecration of their love by home and people is preferable to her, she conceives also the possibility of a life of love without her family, of sex without a proper marriage.¹⁶⁶

In spite of sketching an alternative route, however, the *Aethiopica* takes the preferable, and standard, direction by ending with both family reunion and marriage, thus emphasizing that even in this novel, for all the cultural fluidity in the heroine’s identity and the paramount role of love in defining it, the triumph of that passion is not a victory of the individual over society but requires the latter’s endorsement of the individual’s desires.¹⁶⁷ Chariclea’s recognition by her parents is completed with the recognition, as sanctioning, of her love for Theagenes and his for her, which recognition also brings to fulfillment the original recognition between the lovers’ souls.

For Theagenes’s recognition to happen, however, he must prove himself. The final revelation, that he is Chariclea’s fiancé, follows his athletic achievements (the grabbing of the bull; the wrestling with the Ethiopian giant). The deferral in his recognition once again contributes to creating momentum even as the novel is drawing to its predictable close. But there might be an additional, ideological reason for the delay: in this novel, as in Chariton’s, the male protagonist must earn his wife (again) by accomplishing admirable feats. In Chariton, the lovers’ recognition occurs only after Chaereas has shown himself an outstanding admiral; it is in this capacity that he is introduced to the captive Callirhoe. Heliodorus substitutes military feats with athletic ones for Theagenes.¹⁶⁸ But again, it is those

¹⁶⁵ οὐτε ὁμιλήσει τὰ Ἀφροδίτης πρότερον ἢ γένος τε καὶ οἶκον τὸν ἡμέτερον ἀπολαβεῖν ἢ, εἴπερ τοῦτο κωλύει δαίμων, ἀλλ’ οὖν γε πάντως βουλομένην γυναῖκα ποιεῖσθαι ἢ μηδαμῶς (4.18.5).

¹⁶⁶ There is no doubt that Chariclea is obsessed with virginity (see Ormand 2010), but this phrase, pronounced at the solemn moment of the oath, betrays her passionate nature and the sensual turmoil she is experiencing, which has surfaced already in the violence of the symptoms she displayed when she tried to repress her love.

¹⁶⁷ See Perkins 1995, chapter 2.

¹⁶⁸ Though Theagenes’s exploits have invited comparison with a Homeric *aristeia* (Paulsen 1992, 49–50), Amyot criticizes Heliodorus for replacing war with athletics: the novel lacks *grandeur* because Theagenes does not accomplish “nulz memorables exploitz d’armes” (1575, proem, 5). Earlier on, to be sure, he fights victoriously against Chariclea’s suitors Trachinius and Pelorus; the exploit is, however, a brief one, and the real victor is Chariclea with her arrows.

feats that authorize, as it were, the revelation of the young man's identity. Theagenes has acquired heroic status and the right to compete with Meroebus (the kinsman chosen by Hydaspes to marry his daughter), who has valiantly fought in the war against the Persians. Theagenes's recognition, like Chaereas's, is twofold: he is recognized for his achievements and soon thereafter as Chariclea's lover, that is, as the hero who deserves to be Chariclea's lover. Heliodorus spells out the dependency of Theagenes's recognition on his show of courage by highlighting the growing collective sympathy and enthusiastic admiration for the captor of the bull, and then the victorious wrestler who yet is doomed to die (10.30.5; 10.32.3). Even the king, so far not particularly sensitive to Theagenes's charms (he is sympathetic to the youth only when he first appears before him, and perhaps owing to Chariclea's presence), now cannot restrain himself from crying: "O Destiny . . . what a man the law obliges us to sacrifice!"¹⁶⁹

More events intervene, however, as if to underscore the climactic importance of the upcoming recognition by jeopardizing its happening. Hydaspes's sympathy for Theagenes is chilled by the tense exchange that follows concerning Chariclea's betrothal, in which the king sides with Meroebus, and after which, with a backpedaling in the narrative, Theagenes is escorted back to his place as sacrificial victim. Chariclea's despair at this regression (she "found her hopes dashed") is communicated to the reader. Though the reader's own hopes are again revived when Chariclea's mother presses her to spell out what she has to do with Theagenes, yet another development prevents the public disclosure: the king has one more embassy to receive. And it is from this apparently anticlimactic distraction, when we least expect it, that Theagenes is recognized as the girl's lover. Among the visitors is Charicles, who obtains permission to look for his daughter. He does not see her but discovers Theagenes and runs to drag him from the altar, insulting him all the while, for "this is the man who kidnapped my daughter."¹⁷⁰ Asked to account for the charge, Theagenes explains that the daughter Charicles claims is Chariclea, and Sisimithres confirms it. As Chariclea races out of the tent to embrace Charicles, Persinna shares with Hydaspes their daughter's confession: Theagenes is her fiancé.

There are meaningful correspondences between this sequence and Chariclea's recognition by her parents. Charicles's role is parallel to Sisimithres's in that recognition: he is the witness, or the missing link drawing out every fold of the mystery. Sisimithres himself appears here in a similar light as in the previous recognition: as the best informed of the characters, the one able to explain who is who to all. Because of his superior knowledge and perhaps higher intelligence,¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ ὦ τῆς ἀνάγκης . . . οἷον ἄνδρα καταθύειν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πρόκειται (10.32.3).

¹⁷⁰ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὴν ἐμὴν θυγατέρα συλαγωγήσας (10.35.2).

¹⁷¹ See Charicles's observation at 2.30.1.

he has recognized (*γνωρίζων*) the truth from the start but has refrained from intervening, “waiting for the gods to bring their revelation to the fullness of its clarity.”¹⁷² By harking back to Chariclea’s recognition, Heliodorus links the disclosure of Theagenes’s relation to her with that recognition, as its necessary sequel for her to exist in the only way she can, as Theagenes’s other half.

One more detail sends the reader back to the couple’s initial recognition of each other as kindred souls: the reappearance of the torch. As noted, the torch is a symbol of recognition. A torch illumined the instant when the pair fell in love; another was dropped when Chariclea was mistaken for Thisbe; shortly thereafter, when Chariclea’s voice revealed her to be alive, the same torch appeared again, lighted—a purely symbolic illumination, since no torch is needed to recognize a voice. The lovers themselves endorsed the torch’s symbolic meaning by choosing it as one of their *symbola* for recognizing each other. And finally, as Sisimithres explains to Hydaspes how he reads the will of the gods in the events that have just come to pass, he comments thus on the discovery of Theagenes’s relation to Chariclea: “To put a finishing touch to our good fortune, as the torch of the drama they [the gods] have revealed that this young stranger is betrothed to the maiden.”¹⁷³ Yet another torch sheds light over the last puzzle of identity. And only with this last revelation is Chariclea’s own identity fully brought to light and acknowledged.

Recognition and Happy Ending: Not a Comedy

“Instead of a tragic, a comic ending,” the formula that seals Calasiris’s recognition by his sons, could be applied to the final recognition as well. Here as there, however, the referent is Euripides’s happy-ending tragedies, in which a calamity is averted by recognition.¹⁷⁴ Like the false ending in book 7, the true ending is not comic, this time not because of a threat looming over the collective happiness, but because of the atmosphere and mood: the solemnity of the scenes following the recognition (the abolition of human sacrifice, the wedding combined with religious investiture, and finally the procession that escorts Chariclea and Theagenes to their “mystic initiation” [10.41.3]) is a far cry from comic lightness. The prevailing note, as sounded by Heliodorus himself, is not even simply cheerful but is a mixture of happiness and sorrow, with the same actors weeping and rejoicing (10.38.4). The drama ends happily, but the pathos remains strong.

¹⁷² εἰς τὸ ἀκριβὲς δὲ περιελθεῖν τὰ φανερούμενα πρὸς τοῦ κρείττονος ἀναμένων (10.37.3).

¹⁷³ τὴν κορωνίδα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὥσπερ λαμπάδιον δράματος τὸν νυμφίον τῆς κόρης τουτοῦ τὸν ξένον νεανίαν ἀναφάναντες (10.39.2).

¹⁷⁴ See Paulsen 1992, 170–71. Fusillo (1989, 43–55) allows for both tragedy and comedy as models for the novels’ recognition scenes, but calls Heliodorus “the most tragic.”

The reappearance of the torch, and with identical phrasing, in the two processions that celebrate the recognitions (7.8.5 and 10.41.3: ὑπὸ λαμπάσιν ἡμμέναις) ties the two scenes and sets them further apart from comic models, suggesting that the “light of love,” which revealed the hero and the heroine to each other (3.6.1: λαμπάδιον), is also a mystic light. In fact, the presence of the torch in the second procession harks back to the “torch of truth” that illumines the mysteries of the Nile for the initiates. While all and sundry believe the Nile to be a god because it embodies the vital moist element, “those who have reached the higher grades of the mysteries” (τοὺς δὲ ἐποπτικωτέρους) learn that the river is Osiris, “in the light cast by the torch of truth” (9.9.5: τῶν ὄντων λαμπάδι).¹⁷⁵ The torch connects the lovers’ recognitions of each other—their first “rediscovery” in Delphi, their reunion in Memphis, and the public revelation of their love in Meroe¹⁷⁶—to their mystic wedding. The torch may also evoke tragic scenes, most famously the procession, also lighted by torches (λαμπάδες), that escorts the Eumenides to their dwelling (Aesch. *Eum.* 1022 and 1042).

By fashioning the recognitions in books 7 and 10 in a tragic mold, Heliodorus brings out the distance separating their “tragic” protagonists from the “comic” antihero, Cnemon, who, contrary to the couple, enjoys a happy ending in the light manner of New Comedy. As Thomas Paulsen has shown in detail, Cnemon styles himself as a tragic character: highly born, pure and chaste, yet doomed, like Hippolytus, by the illicit love of a stepmother and by the naïveté of a The-seus-like father. Heliodorus, however, does not endorse Cnemon’s self-image but degrades him to a comic figure with “comic flaws,” such as cowardliness.¹⁷⁷ He puts him in bed with a slave (Thisbe) and involves him in the comedy of errors engineered by Demainete and Thisbe.

Another character carved in a comic mold is Nausicles, who plays the greedy merchant of New Comedy.¹⁷⁸ And both Nausicles and Cnemon exit—hand in hand—midway through the narrative (in book 6), as if to suggest there is no more room for lowly comedy; the journey now will continue to loftier heights, to tragic and epic peaks, with only heroic characters, Chariclea and Calasiris, as travelers.

Nausicles announces to his guests his intention to sail to Greece, and invites Cnemon to go along. Cnemon decides to do so, but seeks Chariclea’s forgiveness for not accompanying her and Calasiris in their search for Theagenes. She grants it wholeheartedly, for it is their lot to part ways: she and Calasiris are bound to journey on, while Cnemon should seize the opportunity to go back home

¹⁷⁵ The parallel with the procession is in Whitmarsh 2011, 134.

¹⁷⁶ See 3.5.4: δᾶδα; 5.5.2: λαμπάδα; 7.7.7: λαμπάδιον; 10.39.2: λαμπάδιον.

¹⁷⁷ See Paulsen 1992, 82–110. On Cnemon’s comic traits, see also Brethes 2007, 115–24.

¹⁷⁸ See Paulsen 1992, 119–24.

(6.7.9). Chariclea neatly separates the heroic world in which she and Calasiris live from the “bourgeois” to which Cnemon and Nausicles belong.¹⁷⁹

Cnemon’s bourgeois choice culminates with a marriage in the bourgeois style of New Comedy: it happens suddenly and involves a wealthy father, a modest daughter, and a well-born young man who meets with greater fortune than he had hoped. And, in the manner of comedy, a wedding party is quickly put together.¹⁸⁰ Dancing, singing, and a nightlong vigil (*παννυχίς*) evoke a comic *komos*.¹⁸¹ Chariclea does not join in the festivities but withdraws to her room to lament the tragic life allotted to her, while Cnemon and Nausicleia are celebrating a comedy’s happy ending.¹⁸² From the point of view of the despairing heroine, comedy is a better lot. But from the point of view of the author, comedy belongs to the flawed Cnemon, whereas the flawless heroine has played, and will continue to play, her tragic role. At the end of the novel we recall Cnemon’s jolly wedding-feast and realize that there is no revelry to celebrate the protagonists’ mystic union.

This exile of comedy from the epic-tragic journey that restarts, as it were, the novel in book 6 culminates in the two recognitions in book 7, with which that journey reaches its end. Calasiris’s behavior in particular sheds all the nontragic and nonepic colors that added to the complexity of this figure in previous scenes. As again Thomas Paulsen has shown, Calasiris combines epic and tragic traits with comic ones: for instance, he schemes to help the girl in her love against the wishes of her father, in the manner of the slave of New Comedy.¹⁸³ Paulsen notes that Calasiris, with his “tragicomic” ambivalence, embodies Heliodorus’s novel itself, a “tragicomedy.”¹⁸⁴ Calasiris, however, does not retain any comic feature in the final recognition scene, but plays only tragic and epic roles: Jocasta and Odysseus. Calasiris’s “novel” ends with a tragic recognition (in Euripides’s style), which brings him nearer to the protagonists and sets him further apart from Cnemon, whose self-styled tragic misadventures meet with a comic ending.

¹⁷⁹ See Paulsen 1992, 137. The journey on which Chariclea and Calasiris embark has a tragic coloring also because it is wandering (6.7.9), as is typical of tragedy (think of Io, Orestes, the Suppliant Women, or Oedipus).

¹⁸⁰ See Paulsen 1992, 138–39.

¹⁸¹ See Brethes 2007, 123. We may note that the mystic torch does not appear: though the vigil is of course by torchlight (*παννυχίς* . . . *κατέλαμπεν*), vocabulary distinguishes it from the processions in books 7 and 10, which are both *ὑπὸ λαμπάσι ἡμμέναις*. The term *λαμπάς* is absent from Cnemon’s “comic” wedding.

¹⁸² See Paulsen 1992, 140.

¹⁸³ See Paulsen 1992, chapter 5. On Calasiris as a comic character, see also Brethes 2007, 167–70.

¹⁸⁴ The term, which appears for the first time in Plautus’s *Amphitruo* 59 (*tragicomoedia*), was indeed used for the *Aethiopica* by the sixteenth-century German philologist M. Curtius: see Plazenet 2008, 810.

The contrast between Calasiris and Cnemon, with the first playing a tragic and the second a comic role, is already apparent in the recognition scene at Nausicles's house. Cnemon searches the whole house in a frenzy, and when he becomes convinced that the woman Nausicles captured is Thisbe, he panics and recoils in his bed, spending the rest of the night all atremble and in fits of fainting. When finally Chariclea shows herself and the truth comes to light, "in the same instant they all burst into tears and cried aloud, as though a single sign had been given them all, or one blow had been dealt them all. For some time all there was to be heard were cries of 'Father!' 'Daughter!' and 'Truly it is Chariclea and not Thisbe!'"¹⁸⁵ These outbursts, starting with the cry "Ololygē," are reminiscent of tragedy.¹⁸⁶ While Cnemon displays a comic paroxysm of fear, Calasiris is the protagonist of a formal tragic recognition. It is true that Cnemon as well participates in it, but only as an accompanying figure, and one whose presence is soon obliterated: "Nausicles was dumbfounded as he watched how Calasiris wept as he embraced Chariclea, and tried in bewilderment to make sense of the theatrical recognition scene played before him."¹⁸⁷ Only Calasiris holds the girl and weeps; only he, not Cnemon, is in the binocular of the spectator Nausicles as he watches this *anagnōrismos* in the tragic style.

In another recognition scene Cnemon's comic persona is again on stage, this time set against Theagenes's tragic one. When, in the cave, Theagenes embraces the body of the dead woman he thinks is Chariclea, he performs a markedly tragic lamentation. In contrast, when Cnemon recognizes the same woman as Thisbe, he shrinks back, has a fit of trembling, and stands speechless: "You took to your heels as if from the evil spirit of a play" is Theagenes unflattering comment.¹⁸⁸ Cnemon's cowardly behavior, or rather Theagenes's mockery of it, indeed provides a little comic relief to the couple and their friend in their critical situation (2.8.1)

To sum up: the recognitions involving the protagonists and their main helper, Calasiris, are not comic because those involved dwell in loftier regions than comic characters (in Calasiris's case this is fully true for the last stretch of his journey, to Memphis). By their tragic quality those scenes markedly differ from

¹⁸⁵ ὁδυρμὸς ἅπασιν ἀθρόον ἀνεκινήθη καὶ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐνὸς συνθήματος ἢ πληγῆς τῆς αὐτῆς ἀνωλόλυξαν. ἦν τε ἀκούειν ἐπὶ πλείστον "ὦ πάτερ" καὶ "ὦ θύγατερ" καὶ ἀληθῶς Χαρίκλεια καὶ οὐχὶ Θίσβη" (5.11.1–2).

¹⁸⁶ Paulsen (1992, 259, n. 57) gives as parallels the recognitions of Orestes and Iphigenia in *Iphigenia in Tauris*, of Helen and Menelaus in *Helen*, of Creusa and Ion in *Ion*, and of Orestes and Electra in Euripides's *Electra* (though in the last one there is no *ololygē* but an explosion of joy: see 585–95).

¹⁸⁷ ὁ δὲ Ναυσικλῆς ἐνέος ἐγεγόνει τὸν τε Καλάσιριν ἐφ' ὅσον περιβαλὼν τὴν Χαρίκλειαν ἐδάκρυν ἀφορῶν καὶ τίς ὁ καθάπερ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ἀναγνωρισμὸς διαπορῶν (5.11.2).

¹⁸⁸ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς δαίμονας ἀπεδίδρασκες (2.7.3).

the recognitions of Daphnis and Chloe with their comic imprint, which in turn fits the characterization of the protagonists. Daphnis and Chloe have human proportions: she is not as ineffably beautiful as Chariclea; and they are not as uncompromisingly honest with each other as Chariclea and Theaganes. Chloe hides from Daphnis the kiss she gave Dorcon; Daphnis hides from her his sexual initiation. They belong in a world inhabited by a variety of human types, neither divinely virtuous nor abject, but more real. The foster parents are pragmatically minded; and so are the true parents when they expose their children for purely material reasons. Lycaenium seduces Daphnis both to satisfy her own lust and to help him find his way with Chloe. Dorcon tries to rape Chloe but then helps her recover Daphnis. Almost everyone lies.¹⁸⁹ The comic mode of the recognitions suits the mood of a novel in which most of the characters, like their comic counterparts, conceal their thoughts and actions, and that does not aspire to mystical sublimity as the *Aethiopica* does.

Heliodorus's distancing of his protagonists from comic types and his purifying the last part of the novel of comic elements might provide an additional explanation for the emphasis he places on the call of blood as a way to recognition in book 10. For in comedy, as we have seen, blood is normally mute, in keeping with the lack of idealization of family relationships typical of the genre. Longus's novel is closer to comedy also in this respect: it underplays the motif of nature's voice in the recognition by reducing it to a movement of admiration (of Daphnis's mother for her son) and a gnomic pronouncement ("nature is immediately believed"), with no tears or gut-stirring in Persinna's style.

Reading Recognitions

Anagnōsis (Reading) and *Anagnōrisis* (Recognition)

Recognitions are answers to problems of reading.¹⁹⁰ They are prompted by interpretations of signs (Desdemona's handkerchief, misread).¹⁹¹ Euripides's Electra calls into question the facility and confidence with which her counterpart in *Choephoroë* believes the flock of hair to be Orestes's by rejecting the inference "same hair, same blood," on which Aeschylus's heroine based her reasoning (*El.* 530–31). But already the chorus in *Choephoroë* opposed Electra's belief in the

¹⁸⁹ On lying in Longus see J. Winkler 1990, 108–12; Bowie 2009, 16.

¹⁹⁰ Greek *σημα* (sign) is etymologically related to Indic *dhyāma* (thought), and its working relationship with *νόος* / *γινώσκω* in archaic poetry points up the interpretive process involved in recognition. See Nagy 1983.

¹⁹¹ Cave (1988, 262) gives this example, which fits the proclivity of modern critics to privilege recognitions of a fact or of a person's guilt or innocence, rather than of family identity.

lock as “an easy sign” (170: *εύξυμβολον*). In Greek the rapport between reading and recognizing is spelled out in the language: *ἀναγιγνώσκω*, to read, and *γνωρίζω*, to recognize, are cognate terms.¹⁹² Novelists exploit this lexical kinship when recognition happens (or is hoped to happen) literally by reading: Habrocomes reads and recognizes (*ἀναγνοὺς καὶ γνωρίσας*) the dedication by his servants (*Ephesiaca* 5.10.7); Clitophon recognizes (*ἐγνώρισα*) Leucippe’s handwriting before reading (*ἀναγνῶναι*) her letter (*Leucippe and Clitophon* 5.18.2); reading the same letter, Melite is struck at heart because she recognizes (*ἀνέγνω*, *γνωρίσασα*, 5.24.2) Leucippe’s name;¹⁹³ Calasiris’s discovery of Chariclea’s story is both reading and recognition: “As I read [*ἀνέγνων*], I recognized [*ἐγνώριζον*] the good management of the gods” (*Aeth.* 4.9.14); just as Chariclea, at the end of Calasiris’s reading, “recognized [*ἐγνώρισεν*] who she was” (4.12.1).¹⁹⁴

Alone of the novelists, however, Heliodorus brings to the fore the problems involved in reading signs of identity. In the passages listed above, reading and recognizing are one and the same: the recognition happens along with the act of reading the evidence. Not so at the beginning of the great recognition scene in the *Aethiopica*, when Persinna tells Hydaspes: “Read” (*ἀναγίνωσκε*) the band—implying: and recognize what happened. Though Hydaspes believes her writing, his acceptance of the content of the band does not ipso facto mean that he recognizes the girl standing in front of him as his daughter. Hydaspes disjoins author (Persinna) and text (the band), suspecting the text of having been unduly appropriated in a fashion reminiscent of Plato’s unprotected written text.¹⁹⁵ By disjoining author and text, Hydaspes also disjoins reading and recognizing, in that he doubts, if not the authenticity of the document, the entitlement of its carrier to it.

The attention paid to the interpretation of recognition tokens fits with Heliodorus’s keenness on problems of hermeneutics. If other narrative patterns as well exhibit the hermeneutic process (for instance, the recurrent and revised interpretations of dreams), recognitions are privileged sites for it, both because they always are answers to problems of reading and, specifically for this novel, because its core subject is the revelation of Chariclea’s identity, around which questions such as “What is known?” and “How?” cluster and multiply.

Heliodorus points up hermeneutic problems in connection with the three major recognition scenes: in all of them the recognizers go through initial

¹⁹² *ἀναγιγνώσκω* itself means both recognizing and reading (“knowing the letters again”): see Goldhill 1991, 5.

¹⁹³ Lefteratou (2010, 332) calls Leucippe’s recognition “a result of *ἀνάγνωσις*.”

¹⁹⁴ See also 8.12.5: “read [*ἀναγίνωσκε*] me the letter and recognize [*ἀναγνώριζε*] the seal”—though in this case reading and recognizing do not concern the same object. The two verbs appear also in the scene in which Dionysius reads Callirhoe’s letter (*Callirhoe* 8.5.13).

¹⁹⁵ See Whitmarsh 1998, 120–22.

disbelief or misread the evidence. From a hermeneutic perspective, we can take the mistakes initially made by Theagenes with Chariclea and by Calasiris's sons with their father to show that recognitions are answers to *problems* of reading (remember: Calasiris's sons "examined the recognition with accuracy"). In the final recognition scene, the intelligent Sisimithres, who has more background knowledge than Hydaspes and plays the role of interpreter, is careful not to rush to conclusions: when he reads the band, his mind shifts this way and that as he steadily, *συνεχῆς*, watches the band and Chariclea; and even when Hydaspes is at last persuaded that the girl is his daughter, Sisimithres wants her to show one more proof, the birthmark he remembers on her skin.¹⁹⁶ This cautious weighing of the evidence sharply contrasts with its uncritical acceptance in the recognitions of Daphnis and Chloe, in which the entitlement of the child to the tokens is taken for granted, and this in spite of the fact that in this novel (and not in Heliodorus's) a foster father did think of taking the tokens without the child.

Heliodorus highlights the interpretive problems involved in recognitions also by introducing readers who do not fully understand the scene that unfolds before their eyes. One such reader is Nausicles, as he witnesses, puzzled, Calasiris embracing Chariclea, and does not know what to make of that "theatrical *anagnōrismos*." The following episodes of recognition likewise feature internal spectators who stand there astounded, unable to grasp the particulars. A crowd witnesses both recognition sequences, in book 7 and in book 10, eliciting Heliodorus's comments on its responses: at seeing Calasiris, still unrecognized, on the stage of his children's fight, some of the citizens of Memphis marvel at his courage, while others laugh, finding him ridiculous (7.7.1). When the recognition occurs, all are struck dumb at the spectacle (7.7.4); later, watching the scene of the lovers' reunion, they are "enraptured by the miraculous deeds of theatrical art" (7.7.7); and all give first prize to the lovers' recognition when both are completed (7.8.2). At the sight of Chariclea's perfect likeness to Andromeda's painting, a crowd again is struck with joyful amazement (10.15.1).¹⁹⁷

The crowd's emotional participation in the recognitions naturally invites comparison with the behavior of tragic choruses.¹⁹⁸ The chorus sympathizes

¹⁹⁶ The role of Sisimithres might recall that of Leucon and Rhode (in Xenophon), who by their reasoning put the recognition literally together from scattered pieces (see chapter 1). That recognition, however, does not deal with the problems of interpreting signs, with their meaning. The servants do not ask questions: they are slow to make sense of the data but not skeptical; they believe what they see and hear, and so do the protagonists.

¹⁹⁷ Another instance of mystified crowd is at 2.36.1–2 (when the Delphians hear the oracle encoding the protagonists' destiny). See Dowden 1996, 283.

¹⁹⁸ The comparison was already suggested to Haight (1943, 79), though not in connection with recognitions.

with the protagonists of recognition scenes (as in Soph. *El.* 1230–31, where it weeps from joy), celebrates with them (as in Eur. *El.* 585–95), or marvels like Heliodorus's crowds (as in Eur. *IT* 900–901; *Ion* 1510–11).¹⁹⁹ Those expressions of happiness and astonishment, by both tragic choruses and the Heliodorean crowds, are implicitly aimed at the external audience to encourage the same emotional reactions to the staged recognition: the spectator or reader is invited to share the chorus's or crowd's empathy and amazement; to rejoice with the protagonists; and to marvel at the wondrous "stagecraft" capable of producing such prodigious scenes.²⁰⁰ The crowd's or the chorus's response to the recognition provides directions for enjoying its artfulness.²⁰¹

The response of Heliodorus's crowds is, however, also one of plain ignorance. This is not the case for tragic choruses that witness recognition scenes. In *Choe-phoroe*, to be sure, the chorus functions as an obstacle to the happening of the recognition because of its lack of interpretive skills. When Electra suggests that the newly found lock of hair is Orestes's, the chorus resists the idea to the point that Electra herself grows more and more doubtful and is finally anguished.²⁰² But this chorus actively participates in the recognition and claims to know. Conversely, Heliodorus emphasizes the crowd's passivity and ignorance, or partial understanding. Crowds are agape, disoriented, and do not perceive clearly the events on stage.²⁰³ Calasiris's reunion with his sons leaves those who watch it "struck dumb by their ignorance" (*ὑπ' ἀγνοίας*). When Chariclea is compared with the painting, "those members of the crowd with the slightest understanding of what was being said and done explained it to their neighbors."²⁰⁴ And again after the final revelation, that Theagenes is Chariclea's fiancé, the crowd "understood very little of what was said":²⁰⁵ if it gained a clue, it was not from the words it heard but from what it already knew, or from an impulse of divine origin (10.38.3). The crowd's lack of understanding in the two crucial sets of recognition scenes is one more manifestation of this novel's interest in questions of hermeneutics. If recognition scenes, as Terence Cave has suggested, exhibit the power of literature to astound us, or even shock us, the crowd that witnesses

¹⁹⁹ In *Ion*, though, the chorus's expression of wonderment concerns the whole story of Creusa, Apollo, and Ion, not just the recognition.

²⁰⁰ On the importance of stupefaction in the novels' poetics, see Graverini 2010. In Heliodorus recognitions are among the main causes for stupefaction.

²⁰¹ The crowd's metaliterary function and its role as chorus are even more prominent in Chariton: see Kaimio 1996; Tilg 2010, 138–40.

²⁰² Aesch. *Cho.* 211. See Solmsen 1967, 6.

²⁰³ See Marino 1991.

²⁰⁴ ἄλλων πρὸς ἄλλους, ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν συνίεσαν τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, διαδηλούντων . . . (10.15.1).

²⁰⁵ τὰ μὲν πλείστα τῶν λεγομένων οὐ συνιέντες (10.38.3).

them and is only partially able to grasp their development figures the efforts, shortcomings, and failure of interpretation.

The crowd cannot fully appreciate the development of Chariclea's recognition because it occurs in Greek. Sisimithres speaks Greek to Hydaspes until the end, when he switches to Ethiopian for everyone to understand (10.39.1). We imagine the recognition scene to take place entirely in Greek in "reality," as in the reporting, also because Chariclea does not speak any other language. Heliodorus is delving again into the problems of linguistic barriers, which, as we have seen, repeatedly impair identification. Though the recurrence of the language motif matches the novelist's striving for realism rather than his keenness on examining the processes of cognition,²⁰⁶ the motif is also exploited, at least in books 1 and 10, so as to explore those processes, since the question "Who is Chariclea?" is posed jointly with "What is known"? and cannot be fully answered by those who do not speak her language. The motif of linguistic barriers at both junctures enriches that exploration, insofar as it is associated with the emphasized inability to read events.²⁰⁷

There might be more at stake: perhaps the stress on linguistic differences also suggests how well versed in Greek the reader of this novel must be. If we take reading not only in a broad sense, as interpreting, but also in a narrower one, as reading Greek, the reappearance of the language motif as Chariclea's identity is being read seems to hint at the linguistic ability required of this novel's readers to savor the richness of its texture, exemplified in the culminating scene of the heroine's recognition.

Increasing Guidance

We, external readers, at the start are in no better position than the crowds to pin down the characters' identities. Our ignorant gaze merges with the robbers' in the opening scene. Though we assume the girl to be the heroine and the boy the hero based on generic patterns, we have no certainty. Soon thereafter we discover that the heroine lies about herself (1.22) but do not gain positive knowledge. We partially do when Charicles adopts the girl without knowing where she comes from, partially because Calasiris, who is reporting the story to Cnemon, does not tell right away all that he knows, but only promises to do so (2.32.3). Our ignorance of Chariclea's identity is the apex of the generalized ignorance that keeps us from fully understanding the actions played before us (why is Theagenes wounded in the opening scene? What is Thisbe doing in the cave?).

²⁰⁶ See Morgan 1982, 258–60. Otherwise J. Winkler 1982.

²⁰⁷ See also 10.35.2, where not everyone can understand Charicles's words.

The treatment of recognitions early in the narrative matches this state of affairs: we are as unequipped to recognize who is who as are the characters involved.

Thisbe is mistaken for Chariclea and killed; Chariclea is mistaken for the dead Thisbe and mourned. It is the characters that make the mistakes; but the readers share their ignorance. Again, we surmise part of the truth only because we assume that the heroine cannot die, but the detail given in the first episode (that the woman Thyamis kills spoke Greek) keeps us suspended concerning her identity (the only Greek-speaking woman we know to be around is Chariclea); and darkness, real and metaphorical, shrouds the second scene. The belated discoveries that Chariclea is alive and that the dead woman is Thisbe are discoveries for us as for Cnemon and Theagenes. Heliodorus does not tell us, when Chariclea's voice is heard, that it is hers: he lets Cnemon listen to that voice and identify it. We make the discovery with him, following his thoughts and movements.²⁰⁸

In the course of the narrative, however, we are given more and more clues to understand the recognition scenes that are played before us. This authorial guidance comes gradually, along with the novelist's choice to adopt a more knowledgeable perspective as the folds of the story progressively come to light.²⁰⁹ The next recognition (in book 5) finds us more enlightened than the characters. Cnemon makes the mistake, thinking Chariclea to be Thisbe; but we know better, and not only because we go by generic patterns as soon as we hear from the girl that she is passionately in love but also because this time the author discloses her identity ("the woman who was lamenting was not Thisbe, but Chariclea": 5.4.2) before the characters discover who she is, and provides a long retrospective narrative of all that happened to her until her willing capture by Nausicles.

The end of book 5 marks a turning point in our degree of knowledge, for we find out what events caused the slaughter we watched, mystified, in the opening scene. This increase of knowledge is mirrored in a change of pattern in the staging of recognitions scenes: no longer a puzzle for characters and readers alike, the recognitions from here on fully exploit the gap between the characters' ignorance and the reader's understanding. When we read the recognition of Calasiris by his sons, of Chariclea by Theagenes, and finally of Chariclea by her parents, we no longer recognize who is who along with the characters, but enjoy the

²⁰⁸ We are, however, in a better position than the characters to understand what happened as soon as Thermouthis appears in the cave and finds Thisbe dead, because in addition to knowing that Thyamis went to the cave to kill Chariclea, we are now told that Thermouthis took Thisbe there. The characters do not know any of this: they only identify the weapon as Thyamis's (2.11.4; 2.14.5) and are mystified by the recognition (2.11.4–5).

²⁰⁹ On the increasing presence of an omniscient narrator as the story progresses, see Fusillo 1989, 127–32.

workings of their discoveries from a higher vantage point. Having been totally ignorant (in the opening scene), we have become omniscient. This progression in the guidance the author offers his readers as they are faced with recognition scenes corresponds to the progression in the revelation of a story whose roots lie in a prenarrative past, which has been gradually disclosed and is fully uncovered and recovered with Chariclea's recognition. When we reach that recognition, we do not need to read to recognize.²¹⁰

²¹⁰ With the exception of the dark spot on Chariclea's arm, a detail, as we have seen, unknown to every outsider except Sisimithres.

A Gift of Providence?

Recognitions in Two Roman Novels

The *Satyrica*: Recognition and Capture

Petronius is not fond of recognition scenes. Or rather, the world in which his characters move is at odds with the poetics and aesthetics of traditional recognitions: it is a world neither heroic nor novel-like, and one in which justice, human or poetic, does not reign. Not surprisingly, then, the few episodes of recognition are a far cry from those in the Greek novels: they do not bring happiness but cause trouble or pain. The kind of recognition the *Satyrica* favors is not of a person who would wish to be recognized by kin or lover and eventually is, but of one who would wish to remain undetected and cannot. Giton is discovered in his lair by Eumolpus; and both Encolpius and Giton are recognized by Lichas as they try to hide from him.

Distancing by Petronius of his recognition scenes from tradition is apparent in the sequence and manner of Encolpius's detection. This is how it runs: when Encolpius discovers that Giton and he are on Lichas's boat, they supplicate Eumolpus to help them escape. After discarding several plans, they decide to disguise themselves as branded slaves and shave their heads and eyebrows. As the operation is taking place, however, a passenger inadvertently witnesses it. At this point (104) Lichas and Tryphaena relate strangely similar dreams they simultaneously had: just when Priapus revealed to Lichas that he would find Encolpius, an image of Neptune announced Giton's presence on the boat to Tryphaena. Lichas pushes for a search, in order to show that they appreciate the workings of Providence (*divinae mentis*). Soon thereafter he finds out that someone has shaved on his boat and becomes alarmed by the bad omen. Eumolpus admits that he is responsible for the deed but still tries to hide the identity of his protégés by making Lichas believe that they are branded slaves indeed, whom he gave orders to shave so that the marks on their forehead should show fully. As a result, Lichas resolves to have them whipped. Giton's screaming betrays his identity,

while Encolpius keeps a heroic silence, or Spartan pride, under “torture” (only three lashes . . .). But his stoic countenance does not protect him, for Lichas rushes to grab his genitals and greets him by name.

Petronius makes sport of traditional recognition scenes in a variety of ways. To begin with, Encolpius and Giton are recognized because of their disguise rather than in spite of it. It is their attempt to pass for branded slaves that causes their exposure and subsequent punishment.¹ In addition, the choice of evidence for Encolpius’s identity is obviously iconoclastic. His protagonist tries to dress up his humiliating experience by referring to a foundational recognition scene, that of Odysseus by Euryclea, and by improving on it. The scene is adumbrated already in the narrator’s emphasis on Encolpius’s voice and appearance: if Euryclea almost recognized Odysseus by his “form, voice, and feet” (*Od.* 19.381), “Lichas, who knew me intimately, ran up as though he had heard my voice too, and did not glance at my hands or face, but at once looking down applied a busy hand to my groin, and said, ‘How are you, Encolpius?’”² In particular, the mention of the voice—when Encolpius has not spoken—is a clear allusion to the Homeric scene.³ The allusion becomes explicit after the fondling: “No one need be surprised that Ulysses’s nurse discovered the scar that revealed his identity after twenty years, when a clever man hit upon the one test of a runaway slave so brilliantly, though every feature of his face and body was blurred.”⁴ Lichas turns out to be a better detective than Euryclea, for he wastes no time on deceptive appearances and instead goes straight to the unmistakable mark of identity.⁵ His assurance replaces Euryclea’s vague intuition.

Lichas’s improvement on the Homeric scene, however, actually consists in his dismissal of its choreography. By ignoring Encolpius’s hands, voice, and appearance, Lichas demonstrates that he has not followed that model, countering Encolpius’s Homericizing self-styling. As Gian Biagio Conte has shown,⁶ the scene plays on the distance between the protagonist’s reading of his experience and the ironic author: Encolpius elevates his embarrassing adventure by referring to the Homeric episode, following his habit of aggrandizing himself by appealing

¹ See Kragelund 1989, 437.

² “Lichas, qui me optime noverat, tanquam et ipse vocem audisset, accurrit et nec manus nec faciem meam consideravit, sed continuo ad inguina mea luminibus deflexis movit officiosam manum et ‘salve’ inquit ‘Encolpi.’” (105).

³ See Vannini 2010, 171. The mention of the hands also alludes to *Od.* 19.359: see Schmeling 2011, 415.

⁴ “Miretur nunc aliquis Ulixis nutricem post vicesimum annum cicatricem invenisse originis indicem, cum homo prudentissimus confusis omnibus corporis orisque lineamentis ad unicum fugitivi argumentum tam docte pervenerit” (105).

⁵ See Vannini 2010, 171.

⁶ Conte 1996, 53–55.

to literature. The *scholasticus* must have learnt the topos of recognition scenes, among which Euryclea's of Odysseus was a canonical one. More: he remembers even learned criticisms of that scene!⁷ Petronius's narrative, however, cannot stage a recognition in the heroic mold, but only, with Conte, "farcical recognitions." Encolpius the well-read *litterator* is disappointed not to be treated as the protagonist of a recognition scene in due form, and mentions the neglected "signs," voice, hands, and appearance, because they should have been considered according to the protocol of high-literature recognitions. But Lichas does not know that protocol. Part of the scene's irony derives from Encolpius calling Lichas *prudētissimus* or complimenting his hand for aiming *tam docte* when Lichas's *prudētia* or *doctrina* consists in his ignorance of the etiquette of heroic recognition scenes.

The farcicality of the episode resides not only in the gap between Encolpius's scholastic self-styling and Lichas's actual procedure: Petronius does not even stage a recognition scene proper but its (for Encolpius humiliating) aftermath. Lichas has already recognized Encolpius when he moves his hands to the *unicum argumentum* of his victim's identity. The specification "qui me optime noverat" (he knew me very well) forecloses the recognition scene, for it makes clear that Lichas from his knowledge of Encolpius has already inferred that he must be where Giton is.⁸ Lichas's recognition of Encolpius follows from Tryphaena's recognition of Giton by his voice and merges with it, for Lichas as well (*et ipse*) acts as though driven by a voice (which he has not heard). His hand does not reveal, whereas Euryclea's does, just as his eyes and ears, contrary to Euryclea's, play no role in foreshadowing or preparing the recognition. Lichas's eyes intervene to photograph the organ he knows so well (the other, erotic meaning of *qui optime noverat*), while his hand seems to move with no determined aim:⁹ though of course "movit officiosam manum" (he moved a busy hand) goes with "ad inguina mea" (to my groin), the word order, with *manum* at the end, and the insertion of "luminibus deflexis" (with eyes cast down) between *inguina* and *movit* keep the hand from landing where we know it does. Lichas's final greeting fashions his fondling of Encolpius's member as a gesture of "acknowledgment" that replaces a formal handshake, which Lichas has deliberately avoided by disregarding Encolpius's hands. Instead of a handshake, Lichas's former lover gets, pardon my French, a prickshake from the busy or serviceable (*officiosam*) hand of the man who knew him so well.¹⁰

⁷ Encolpius seems to allude to criticisms of Odysseus's scar as a sign of identity. See Conte 1996, 53–55; Vannini 2010, 172. The reference is to Eustathius *Commentary on the Odyssey* 2.213.29–32. Another novelist to have known and exploited Homeric criticism is Heliodorus: see Telò 1999.

⁸ See Vannini 2010, 170.

⁹ Vannini (2010, 171) speaks of "una meta volutamente indeterminata."

¹⁰ Vannini (2010, 171) points out that the expression *officiosam manum* refers to the canonical gesture of shaking hands but also has erotic overtones.

Petronius's farcical recognitions also dismiss a topical feature of epic, dramatic, and especially novelistic recognitions: the hand of the gods. Petronius mocks the optimistic teleology that typically underlies recognitions by creating a dissonance between his characters' habit of appealing to Providence in the context of recognitions and the clearly nonprovidential results of the recognitions themselves. Eumolpus is ready to pontificate on the providential design behind recognitions when he detects Giton under the mattress he is hugging as Odysseus did the belly of the ram. Here is the sequence (97–98): Ascyllus has launched a search for Giton, his "runaway slave," with a crier publicizing the Identikit of the pretty boy. Encolpius succeeds in hiding Giton under the bed, but Eumolpus knows that the boy is with Encolpius and threatens his rival with giving him away. No need, for Giton betrays his presence by sneezing, and is then uncovered by Eumolpus himself, who comments, "The god who judges human affairs wrung a sign from this hanging boy" (slightly modified). Eumolpus is upholding divine justice and seeing its workings in Giton's detection. But of course the reader does not agree with Eumolpus, the lecherous old man who has been making passes at the pretty boy and has tried to steal him from Encolpius. Eumolpus's sermonizing serves only his own interests, not those of justice.

The providential nature of recognition comes under ironic scrutiny again in the context of Encolpius's and Giton's detection by Lichas and Tryphaena. The scene deflates the moral purport of the gods' participation in recognitions. As in Achilles Tatius or Longus, god-sent dreams inspire the search. Petronius underscores his characters' belief in the providential origin of the dreams and in the obligation to act on them. But he straightaway presents an opposite view through Eumolpus, who breaks in to make naught of dreams following Epicurus ("Epicurus was a superhuman creature; he condemns jokes of this kind in a very witty fashion").¹¹ Eumolpus's skepticism is of course catered to his interests: it aims to protect his charge, Encolpius and Giton, by dissuading Lichas and Tryphaena from giving credence to their dreams. The reader, however, is invited to gloss the exposition of the dreams with this skeptical view and to question from the start the role of Providence in the upcoming recognitions. To be sure, Lichas turns out to be right, which prompts him to call again on the providential design underlying the finding: the gods brought these sinners into my boat and revealed this to us in dreams to hand them over for punishment (106). Though this conceit would fit well in a Greek ideal novel (recall Theron's predicament: he is kept alive by Providence only for harsher punishment), the distribution of roles, however, would not: Lichas and Tryphaena are not paragons of virtue who

¹¹ "Epicurum esse hominem divinum, qui eiusmodi ludibria facetissima ratione condemnat" (104).

deserve to recover loved ones they unfairly lost, but are incited by lust and call Providence their own desire.¹² While in the ideal novels the gods' aim in promoting recognition is to reward the unsullied lovers, in this scene the "aim" turns out to be to deliver the protagonist and his love-boy into undesirable and "dirty" hands.

The culminating episode, Encolpius's recognition, by its very literary ancestry disproves any participation of Providence in the sequence, for it is modeled after the only unplanned recognition of Odysseus (by a human) in *Odyssey* 16–24: the only disclosure of his identity that neither he nor Athena control (Athena's role is rather to contain the damage by distracting Penelope), and that for a moment makes Odysseus lose his self-possession.

The *Golden Ass*: Recognition and Return

Lucius's "Return"

Apuleius is not much fonder of recognitions than Petronius.¹³ He seems to have appreciated the recognition scenes of a Greek comic poet, which he praises for "unfolding clearly" (*Florida* 16.7: "agnitus lucide explicatos"), but he himself does not stage any such scene. Recognitions in the *Golden Ass* hardly "unfold": there is no dramatic suspense, no elaborate reasoning or emotional tension involved. Though several structural and thematic features seem to connect the *Golden Ass* to the ideal Greek novels, the Latin narrative does not make much of a favorite device of the genre.¹⁴

What is most noticeably missing is the climactic recognition scene(s) that in the Greek novels decide(s) the plot's end. When Isis restores Lucius to his human form, Rumor on its swift wings takes care to announce everywhere "the provident goddess's praiseworthy blessing and my own noteworthy fortune."¹⁵ At which news Lucius's relatives, dropping their mourning for him, rush to see their "reborn" kinsman ("reducem . . . ab inferis") and bring him gifts. Lucius, cheered by their unexpected arrival, gladly accepts their gifts but then rushes off: "I dutifully spoke

¹² See Kragelund 1989, 438.

¹³ I reconsider in this section some of the material in Montiglio 2007 but from a new angle and sometimes with different results.

¹⁴ The comparison of the *Golden Ass* with the Greek novels is standard. It appears already in Haight 1943, chapter 8. See also, e.g., Hägg 1983, 182–86; Reardon 1991, 44; Harrison 2003, 503. Sandy (1994), however, argues that there is no connection between the two because the parallels normally adduced are too general. For criticism of this view see now Graverini 2009: with caution, this scholar advances the hypothesis that Apuleius used *Leucippe* and *Clitophon*, and is certain that he knew Greek novels (p. 79).

¹⁵ "Deae providentis adorabile beneficium meamque ipsius fortunam memorabilem" (11.18.1).

to each of them and rapidly described both my former sufferings and my present joys; and then I returned again to the contemplation of the goddess. I rented a house within the temple precinct and set up a temporary home there.”¹⁶

Like Leucippe by Clitophon, Chariclea by her mother, or Callirhoe by Chaereas, Lucius is thought dead by his family when the reunion unexpectedly occurs; as Rumor advertises Clitophon's presence to Leucippe, so it broadcasts the news of Lucius's recovery. But Apuleius disposes of the climactic moment of recognition that in the Greek novels underpins the reunion.¹⁷ Lucius does not even go back to his family; his family goes to him. His hasty account (*propere*), in compliance with mere duty (*ex officio*), contrasts sharply with the eager exchange of stories that marks the protagonists' reunion in *Callirhoe*; with the long recapitulation of their adventures Chaereas offers to the whole city; or with the detailed narratives Clitophon and Leucippe deliver, with pleasure, to Leucippe's father. Lucius, the lover of tales, is in a hurry to tell his own and move on, again away from family.¹⁸ While in the Greek novels the review of the adventures is entrusted to the protagonists themselves, it is here devolved to the priest who adduces Lucius as evidence for Isis's power and tells his story to a crowd of strangers, rather than to his family or fellow citizens (11.15). These substitutions further disjoin Lucius from his nearest and dearest or his community. After the first of his initiations, at last he goes home (11.26.1 and 11.24.6: “tardam domuitionem”), but only briefly, for the goddess summons him to leave again, for Rome. The novel opens up again as its protagonist embarks on another journey.

Apuleius's disregard for the motif of recognition comes to light in his granting a diminutive version of it to his protagonist: recognition and reunion with his horse. As soon as Lucius was turned into an ass, he withdrew to the stable, hoping that his white horse, whom he had generously fed, would recognize him and treat him well; but of course this does not happen (there might be here an ironic wink at the recognition of Odysseus by Argus: animal instinct is numb in a world in which there is no loyalty).¹⁹ Failure to be recognized underscores Lucius's

¹⁶ “Adfatis itaque ex officio singulis narratisque meis propere et pristinis aerumnis et praesentibus gaudiis me rursum ad deae gratissimum mihi refero conspectum, aedibusque conductis intra conspectum templi larem temporarium mihi constituo” (11.19.1).

¹⁷ Xenophon's novel in particular provides a parallel to Apuleius's because of the presence of Isis: see Harrison 2003, 503.

¹⁸ If Apuleius wished to avoid a detailed account in the style of Odysseus or Chaereas, he still could have conveyed Lucius's eagerness to tell his story to his family by phrases such as “he narrated his adventures at length,” “with gusto,” rather than “in haste.”

¹⁹ See 3.26.5: “If any unspoken natural bond of allegiance existed among dumb animals [si quod inesset mutis animalibus tacitum ac naturale sacramentum].” See also 4.21.6. On the crumbling of *fides* in Lucius's world, see Shumate 1996, 87–90.

separation from his familiar world after the metamorphosis.²⁰ As soon as he recovers his human shape, he also recovers his horse, which his servants have recognized by a mark on its back and now bring to him (11.20.6). This underdeveloped sketch of a recognition scene, and with an animal as its main character, is a pale substitution for the traditional full-blown recognition of lover or family.²¹

The absence of a final recognition scene from the *Golden Ass* matches the centrifugal thrust of all the major journeys in it. Except for Charite, who goes back home only to be killed there, travelers in Apuleius's novel remain abroad.²² Three of them—Socrates, Aristomenes, Thelyphron—can neither go back home nor be recognized because they suffer a shocking physical or psychic transformation that alienates them from their former selves and belongings.

Socrates has been irrevocably transformed by his passion for Meroe. He is disfigured (*deformatus*) to the point that even Aristomenes, his close friend, hardly recognizes him (1.6.1). Like Odysseus, Socrates wears tatters, but not as a weapon. His changed appearance is not an empowering disguise that helps his homecoming but the sign that he will never go home again, a disempowering reality which makes him unrecognizable in spite of his will, to the point, literally and metaphorically, of nonreturn. When he met Meroe, he narrated to her, in an Odysseus-like fashion, "the reasons for my long travels and my anxiety to return home";²³ but only to end up as a "larvale simulacrum" (1.6.3) for having preferred her to hearth and children (1.8.1). Meroe is even more successful than her model, Circe: she both metamorphoses her lover and makes him forever oblivious of home.²⁴

Aristomenes as well, after witnessing Socrates's death, decides not to go home ever again. He is so terrified by the manner of his friend's death that he behaves like one guilty of murder: he flies "through remote and pathless wildernesses [*per diversas et varias solitudines*]"—imitating Bellerophon's dismal wandering

²⁰ Fry (1984, 151) reads Lucius's treatment by both his horse and his servant in that episode as a rejection of him by his household.

²¹ Lucius's reunion with his white horse has been read in light of Plato's myth of the soul's team of horses: after Lucius has converted, he would recover the white horse of his immortal soul (Drake 1968, 108). It is, however, hard to imagine the horse, which we first meet as it empties its belly and grazes with good appetite, in the role of the Platonic *thymos*.

²² It is true that two more travelers return: the soothsayer Diophanes and the merchant Thiasus. Diophanes's return, though, is not narrated but only assumed (Lucius has consulted him in Corinth apparently after his prophetic debacle in Thessaly). As for Thiasus, his journey is purely instrumental to Lucius's: see below. The story of Plotina and her husband (7.6.2–7.7.3) is one of exile and return. It is, however, also a lie. The self-styled robber makes it up along with his persona.

²³ "Causas et peregrinationis diuturnae et domuitionis anxiae" (1.7.7).

²⁴ On Meroe as a Circe-figure, see Harrison 1990, 194. 4.

away from the path of men (*Il.* 6.202); abandons his *lar*; and embraces a voluntary exile (1.19.12). Likewise Thelyphron does not go home after his mutilation. His journey has an outward thrust from the start: he leaves Miletus to go watch the Olympic games and travels on, crossing the whole of Thessaly in his eagerness (“cum . . . cuperem”) to visit that famous region (2.21). His ignorance of magic, Thessaly’s claim to fame, earns him the same taunt the Cyclops hurls at Odysseus: “You are terribly young and very much a stranger.”²⁵ Like Odysseus on the Cyclops’s island, Thelyphron is exposed to unknown and dangerous customs. But while Odysseus defeats the cannibal through his never-sleeping intelligence, Thelyphron is lulled to sleep by the Thessalian “cannibals,” the witches who then slice off his ears and nose. As a consequence of the disfiguration he stays in Thessaly, for “I could never afterward return to my ancestral home so maimed and so ludicrous.”²⁶

The Odysseus behind these figures of travelers is only the wanderer, never the homeward-bound traveler. Socrates is an Odysseus who has no magic herb to protect him from his Circe; and when he tries to escape from the clutches of magic, like Odysseus from Calypso (1.12.6), he is tracked down and prevented forever from going home. He leaves there a Penelope who is forced to remarry (1.6.3), for this Odysseus will never rescue her. Thelyphron is an Odysseus-like investigator of exotic lands and ways (he goes off to Thessaly with no practical reason, just as Odysseus sails on to the Cyclops’s island spurred by sheer curiosity) who is mutilated as a consequence of his inquisitiveness.²⁷

Lucius imitates these travelers. Like all of them, he goes to Thessaly. Like Socrates, he forgets his *nostos* (“nec domuitionem paro”)²⁸ under the spell of a woman who ends up metamorphosing him through magic.²⁹ His mind, like Thelyphron’s, is inquisitive from the inception of his journey: a business trip (1.2.1), to be sure, but one that is forthwith transformed into an opportunity to satisfy his desire to learn *rara miraque*. Family and fatherland are not in his thoughts. Even during his trying asinine wanderings he never invokes his forlorn home or parents in the fashion of a Callirhoe or an Anthia, but only curses wicked fortune. His disposition does not rouse expectations for a return journey

²⁵ “Nam oppido puer et satis peregrinus es” (2.21.7); see *Od.* 9.273: νήπιός εἰς, ὃ ξέν’ ἢ τηλόθεν ἐλήλουθας.

²⁶ “Nec postea debilis ac sic ridiculus Lari me patrio reddere potui” (2.30.9).

²⁷ Diophanes, the soothsayer who purportedly guides travelers, is also fashioned after Odysseus the wanderer (2.13.1–2.14.3).

²⁸ See 3.19.6. Graverini (2007, 170) remarks that *domuitio* is a rare, archaic word, characteristically used in Latin literature in association with the return of the Greek heroes from Troy. He also notes that the phrase *domuitionem parare* reproduces ἀρνύμενος . . . νόστον at *Od.* 1.5.

²⁹ Significantly Lucius tells Photis that he no longer cares about home right after he asks her to satisfy his craving for magic by showing him Pamphile at work. Magic and *nostos* don’t mix.

in the Greek novels' style. Nor does the prophecy he receives, which promises him reputation and literary fame as the subject of an incredible tale (2.12.5) but no homecoming.³⁰ The lack of a final recognition between family members is thematically consistent with the centrifugal impulse of Lucius's journey and mind and the weakness of his family attachments.

Lucius, however, does return in the sense that from an ass he becomes a man again. Reconversion is a return, as in this sample of phrases: "forms restored to themselves" (1.1.2: "figuras . . . in se rursum . . . refectas"), "give me back to my Lucius" (11.2.4: *redde me meo Lucio*), "you will return among human beings" (11.6.5: "*redieris ad homines*"). Lucius is luckier than the "metamorphosed" travelers whose stories he hears, for he meets with Isis's favor and thanks to it recovers his former shape.

Isis's favor takes us back to the poetics of recognition that operates in the Greek novels, where a benevolent deity saves the innocent and candid pair by granting them the recognition that ends their wretched wanderings. Recognition is a gift of grace. The lovers deserve it in the sense that they are virtuous and have proven themselves through countless ordeals, but on their strength alone, without divine intervention, they would not find each other.

In its core, this view underlies the *Golden Ass* as well. The hero is graced with the protection of a goddess who saves him by changing him into a man again and putting an end to his wanderings.³¹ The happy ending is a gift of grace for him even more than for the protagonists of Greek novels, for Lucius does not earn it by his moral qualities.³² Before the metamorphosis he is no more virtuous than his fellow travelers who do not return. He shares Thelyphron's youthful eagerness to plunge into exotic and forbidden lore and (to a lesser degree) Socrates's weakness for sex. After he is changed into an ass, he does not prove himself in the course of his wanderings as the protagonists of Greek novels do.³³ Nor does he learn to correct his weaknesses.³⁴ In Lucius's own self-evaluation, the ass has

³⁰ Readers, though, might be wary of the pronouncements issued by the storm-tossed traveler Diophanes: see 2.14.4.

³¹ See 11.15, with Montiglio 2007, 106. After his encounter with Isis, Lucius's travels are quick and safe (11.26.2, with Zimmerman 2002, 80–81). Compare the similarly uneventful journeys that follow the lovers' recognition and reunion in Chariton, Xenophon, and Achilles Tatius.

³² Lucius is not a "bad guy," but I cannot agree with Graverini (2012, 101) that his bouts with fortune compare him with Seneca's good man, also battered by fortune (see especially the *De providentia*). Lucius is no Heracles or Cato.

³³ The ass is mainly interested in saving his skin. Though two of his escapes have an ethical motive, to help Charite and to avoid pollution from copulating with a criminal, they also respond to survival-instinct: see 6.26.1 and 10.35.1. His service to the cuckolded baker (9.26–27) is motivated by moral disgust but also by a desire for revenge (see also 9.15.3).

³⁴ The *Golden Ass* is not a *Bildungsroman*. Critics have sometimes argued otherwise (for instance, Brzenk 1978), but see Sandy 1994, 1529 and 1562; Shumate 1996, 121.

accumulated plenty of scattered knowledge (*multiscium*) but gained no wisdom, even the practical wisdom called *prudentia* (9.13.4–5). Isis comes to his rescue perhaps because of the “innocence and faithfulness” of his life (the crowd’s reading at 11.16.4)³⁵ but not because of deserving behavior. The priest makes it clear that Lucius has not redeemed himself, and that he has met with Isis’s favor for no apparent reason. The phrase “the blindness of Fortune, by torturing you with the worst of perils, has brought you in its random wickedness to this holy state of happiness”³⁶ has been variously interpreted: either to suggest, or to disprove, Isis’s governance of Lucius’s course in its entirety.³⁷ Its immediate effect, however, is to point up the gratuitous and incomprehensible fortune with which Lucius met.

Though the *Golden Ass* enhances the novelistic vision of the savior deity who brings about the happy ending, it does not share with the Greek novels the content of that ending. Isis’s favor saves Lucius from wandering and grants him a return, to his human shape. But that return requires the sacrifice of another return. When Lucius prays to the Moon at the beginning of book 11, his ardent desire is to be restored both to his human self and—for the first time in the novel—to the sight of his family (11.2.4: “redde me conspectui meorum, redde me meo Lucio”). But he soon learns that for him, the two do not go together. Though Lucius recovers his family thanks to divine favor, he will have to give it up and devote himself entirely to the goddess who has saved him (11.6.5), which also means to go wherever she sends him.

Isis’s uncompromising demand is adumbrated in the last stretch of Lucius’s journey before his encounter with her. That journey’s trajectory picks up and modifies the Greek novels’ typical ending because the ass does go back to his hometown, Corinth, but only to find more trouble in store

³⁵ James (1987, 245) argues that “the crowd’s speculations upon Lucius’s former innocence and faith are not to be taken at face value.” J. Winkler (1985, 212–13) sees incompatibility between the crowd’s reading and the priest’s (11.15), which blames Lucius’s morals, and concludes from Lucius’s silence as he listens to both that the author does not authorize one interpretation over the other. Schlam (1992, 121) considers the crowd’s claim ironic. (It could also be argued that the two readings are not incompatible because innocence is not at odds with curiosity and a weakness for sex, or with other faults. For instance, Chaereas “kills” his wife out of excessive jealousy because, in his gullible innocence, he believes the slander. In the *Golden Ass* Psyche is both innocent and faulty.) For discussion of the problems raised by the two passages, see Graverini 2007, 66–70. W. Smith’s suggestion (2008, 67–70) that the crowd’s interpretation is that of *profani* who have not heard the priest fails to convince me, for the priest’s exhortation, “videant irreligiosi,” would make little sense if the crowd had not heard his address to Lucius.

³⁶ “Fortunae caecitas, dum te pessimis periculis discruciat, ad religiosam istam beatitudinem improvida produxit malitia” (11.15.2).

³⁷ A recent advocate of the first reading is Graverini 2012; of the second, Drews (2012), especially p. 19.

there and to flee again. The rich merchant Thiasus rides the ass, which has amazed its owner by its human tastes and manners, to Corinth, where he intends to showcase it. Since the ass has been feeling for awhile that its fortunes have been better than ever (10.13.5), as indeed is the case (no more beatings, no more deadly threats, but delicious foods galore), and since it has tasted human pleasures again (wine and sex in addition to food), a first-time reader is likely to expect its recovery of human shape to happen in Corinth, so as to complete the humanization it is enjoying there after the happy turn of its fortunes. But the sojourn in Corinth, instead of liberating Lucius from both his asinine shape and his troubles, brings him yet another deadly threat: of sex in public with a woman condemned to the beasts. To avoid the deed he flees at full speed. The site of his salvation thus will not be Corinth but Cenchrae, where Isis is about to have her yearly celebration at the reopening of the sailing season.

Lucius's arrival in Cenchrae, not in his homeland, has the quality of a *nostos*, as suggested by a possible reference to Odysseus's arrival on Phaeacia as its subtext.³⁸ Isis takes her protégé away from his hometown to become his home herself.³⁹ Compare this sequence with the end of the *Ass* attributed to Lucian: homecoming-flight-recovery of human shape in Apuleius; recovery of human shape—homecoming in the *Ass* (the Greek Lucius becomes a human again in Thessalonica, then sails to his hometown, Patras, where the novel ends). The Greek text stays closer to the pattern recognition-reunion-return of the Greek novel: the ass is changed back to the human Lucius abroad, as novelistic lovers recognize each other and are reunited abroad; then, like them, Lucius returns home. Compare also the family reunion in the two texts: while in Apuleius it is a brief parenthesis in Lucius's process of "settling down" with Isis, in the *Ass* Lucius's brother meets him in Thessalonica and then travels with him back home. In the Greek narrative, Lucius's reconversion is completed with his return, while in Apuleius it requires a new departure in order to happen and more departures as a result or a "payment."

In sum, Apuleius's disposal with the family recognition not only is related to Lucius's centrifugal mental habits but seems to be owing also to the demands placed on him by his acquired allegiance to Isis. (A pressing question will be whether this allegiance results from yet another movement of his centrifugal mind or marks the end of such movements.) Lucius's enlisting under her rank enters in conflict with family reunion in a way that might seem to foreshadow Christian texts in which family ties and, on the level of literary

³⁸ See Beer 2011. Another possible subtext, and one that also casts Lucius's arrival in Cenchrae as a return, is Odysseus's landing on Ithaca. See below.

³⁹ See 11.19.1: "larem temporarium"; 11.26.3: "fani quidem advena, religionis autem indigena."

motifs, recognition by family members clash with a competing claim, that of a life devoted to God.⁴⁰

Recognitions in the World of Wandering

It seems, then, that the *Golden Ass* dismisses the final recognition typical of the Greek novels because it substitutes a “vertical” for a “circular” recognition, the discovery of a new and truer order for the recovery of a previously known one. Lucius’s journey may be read as reproducing Psyche’s, another journey that ends in transformation and nonreturn, like Socrates’s or Thelyphron’s, but one that replaces return not with self-exile or death, like theirs, but with immortality and the admission to a higher level of reality. Psyche, too, has to renounce her family⁴¹ and is even thought dead. But she travels upward. Like the journey of the Platonic Lover, the Lover of Wisdom, hers is a journey of knowledge with a definitive and “metaphysical” ending.⁴² She meets with recognition so as to be elevated to divine status, not to recover what was hers: Jupiter takes her up to Olympus and acknowledges her as the equal, no longer mortal, wife of a god.⁴³ We could take Lucius to follow this model. On this reading, if he is not the protagonist of a family recognition, it is because he does not go back to what he was but is taken upward by Isis’s enlightenment.

The pivotal role of Isis seems to be demonstrated in the very workings of recognition, which change suddenly and drastically from the first ten books to the last one. Before Lucius meets Isis, recognitions are not happy events. They would fit in the universe of the *Satyrিকা* much better than in a Greek novel, for Providence plays no role in them. The sorry outcome of recognitions in books 1–10 confronts an ideological mainstay of both novelistic and comic treatments of the motif: poetic justice, or “goodness wins.”

In the world crossed by the ass, the good people are not always rewarded (though the bad ones are eventually punished).⁴⁴ Two loud challenges to the

⁴⁰ See Boulhol 1996, especially chapters 6, 7, and pp. 98–100; and here below, chapter 5. Boulhol also sees in Lucius’s trajectory a “mystic quest,” which as such cuts short the reunion with family (93–94). Though I have reservations on this reading, we shall note that Lucius calls Mithras, the priest instrumental in his recovery of human shape, “my father” (11.25.7: “meum . . . parentem”), as the Christian convert should call God. W. Smith (2008) makes a parallel between Lucius and Paul. A shared feature is that both have to forsake their kin.

⁴¹ See James 1987, 126: “The demands of supernatural lovers invariably entail the renouncement of family ties.”

⁴² The Platonic coloring of the fairy tale needs no commenting: many scholars have expounded it. See, most recently, Graverini 2010, 78–79.

⁴³ May (2006, 227–28) calls Psyche’s admission to Olympus a recognition.

⁴⁴ Contra: Sandy (1994, 1537) thinks that the good get rewarded.

ideal of poetic justice are the tragedy of Charite, who enjoys a moral victory but at the cost of losing love and life, and the lurid tale of the rich man's three sons who defend a poor man from his wicked neighbor, and for their gesture are savagely killed by the neighbor (9.35–39). The treatment of recognition in books 1–10 is consonant with the grim worldview that can be drawn from such stories.

In one instance, to be sure, recognition does satisfy the needs of poetic justice. At the beginning of book 10, the ass hears this tale: a woman fell in love with her stepson, and when her passion was no longer bearable, she confessed it to him. He promised to satisfy it, but piled excuse on top of excuse until she understood that he had no intention of pleasing her. Her love then turned to hatred. She asked a slave to buy poison to kill her stepson, but her own son drank the potion instead. When she charged her stepson with both trying to seduce her and killing the boy, her husband believed her and asked for a public trial. At the last moment, however, just when everyone, convinced by the slave's false testimony, was about to condemn the young man, a doctor revealed that the slave, who had come to him to buy the poison, had seemed suspicious, and that therefore he had asked him to seal the money for the poison with his ring (*anulo*). The doctor immediately produces the seal and summons him to recognize it (“videat et suum sigillum recognoscat”: 10.9.5). Though the slave gives himself away by trembling with fear and muttering nonsense, so that “absolutely no one could reasonably believe that he was free of guilt [ut eum nemo prorsus a culpa vacuum merito crederet],” he persists in his lie even under torture, until the doctor reveals that the “poison” he gave him was a sleeping potion, and that the boy who had drunk it must be just waking up. As this turns out to be true, the slave is crucified, the stepmother exiled, and her husband blessed with an ending to his fortunes “worthy of divine providence [*providentiae divinae condignum*]”: while he is thinking he has lost both of his children, he suddenly recovers both (10.12.5).

In the treatment of recognition, this narrative recalls the episode in Chariton in which Theron is recognized as a local of Syracuse when he is trying to pass for a Cretan. The parallels are numerous. First, though the slave is recognized only for what he has done and not, like Theron, for who he is, in both cases the target of the recognition is a villain about to escape rightful judgment. Second, both Theron and the slave hold on to their lies even under torture (the slave more enduringly than Theron). Third, both recognized criminals are punished in the same way, by crucifixion. Fourth, when Theron finally confesses, his disclosure is labeled the victory of truth, choreographed by Providence,⁴⁵ the same force

⁴⁵ “This [keeping Theron alive] was the work of Providence, preserving him for the torture and the cross” (τὸ δὲ ἅπα τῆς Προνοίας ἔργον ἦν βασάνους καὶ σταυρῶ τὸν ἄνδρα τηρούσης: *Callirhoe* 3.3.12).

invoked in Apuleius's tale. The gloss to its ending, as "worthy of divine providence," no matter how funny we might find an ass's theological sermonizing, could suggest that justice has a place somewhere in the world as he sees it.

This "providential" recognition,⁴⁶ however, is in an inset tale that plays with literary genres, countering with a happy ending the tragedy it announces itself to be: "So now, excellent reader, know that you are reading a tragedy, and no light tale."⁴⁷ As Maaïke Zimmerman has shown, the reader's expectation that the plot will keep to its announced tragic pattern is instantly challenged by the cast of characters, which rather conjures up mime or declamation: a *noverca* buying poison, a bourgeois paterfamilias, and, instead of an adamantly pure lad in the style of Hippolytus, a weak youth who verbally yields to his stepmother's advances.⁴⁸ And again, after the tale has veered from "tragedy" to a more lurid story pattern, the physician who exposes the seal resists the generic type of the avaricious doctor, which readers are likely to expect at this point.⁴⁹ The unexpected happy ending triggered by the "providential" recognition is the final generic twist given to a "tragedy" set in the sordid world of mime or declamation: it is not a comment on the workings of justice but a display of literary bravura, with no moral message attached.

This interpretation is further supported by the next inset tale, which must be read in conjunction with the "tragedy," and the first part of which likewise confounds generic expectations but in the opposite direction: this time a potential comedy ends with murder, and it does so for lack of the expected comic recognition (10.23.3–24). The opening of this story, as a comic prologue, could build the background action to a play of mistaken identity:⁵⁰ "Husband orders pregnant Wife to kill their baby if it's a girl. Wife gives birth to baby girl but, seized by maternal feelings, she leaves her with neighbors." The action proper now would begin. The first scene would introduce the disquieted mother delivering a monologue: "My girl is now ripe for marriage! How can I provide a dowry for her without my husband's knowledge?" At a loss, the mother confides her secret to her son, who agrees to help. The next scene would feature the young man with his wife. At some point, he goes off and reappears with his sister, who moves into his house. Because he wants to protect his family's respectability, he tells no one who the woman is and meanwhile puts together a rich dowry for her and arranges her marriage with a dear friend of his.

⁴⁶ Graverini (2012, 90–91) notes that in books 1–10, *Providentia* "has little to reveal itself as truly divine, and the reference to its power is undermined by parody or irony."

⁴⁷ "Iam ergo, lector optime, scito te tragoediam, non fabulam, legere" (10.2.4).

⁴⁸ See Zimmerman 2000, 442. Whether the label "tragedy" fits the tale is also questioned, from a different angle, by Frangoulidis (2001, 119–27), who proposes that the "tragedy" is in fact a variant of Thelyphron's tale.

⁴⁹ See Zimmerman 2000, 442–43.

⁵⁰ See Zimmerman 2000, 443; May 2006, 293.

The story, however, does not end in a wedding, comedy-style. For the young man's wife, jealous of the girl, traps her and kills her. Even the sketched comedy was not one because the girl had not been accepted back into her family. The father remains ignorant of her identity throughout. A comedy working with a similar plotline would have run differently: recognition tokens would have disclosed the girl's identity to her father, who, happily reunited with his entire family, would have arranged her marriage, no doubt to the man his son had in mind, and with whom the girl in the meantime would perhaps have fallen in love (and certainly vice versa). The lack of the canonical comic recognition is a warning sign that this story will take a turn for the worse. Or, more concretely: the lack of recognition causes the actual disaster by perpetuating a misunderstanding.

The turn for the worse begins with a fraudulent use of recognition tokens. The wife sends a servant to tell the girl that the young man went to his country house and wanted to see her. To persuade the girl, she authenticates the message with a seal, entrusting the servant with her husband's ring (*anulum*), which she has stolen, as *signum*. After examining the token (*respecto signo*), the girl rushes off in obedience to her brother and is instantly killed (10.24.3–5). Note that the token is the typical ring of comedy, misused to kill the recognizer: "A signet ring, the recognition token par excellence which 'puts the seal' on the happy ending in so many comedies, becomes a lethal weapon in the hands of this murderess."⁵¹ Note also the identity of the token with the one in the previous story: both *anuli*. This correspondence, which ties the two stories further together, points up their reversed exploitations of the recognition motif: unexpectedly "comic" in the first, unexpectedly "tragic" in the second.

When the wife strips the girl naked and whips her, she screams, repeatedly, "I am his sister!" "Don't be jealous of me!" But the wife does not believe her and kills her in the most gruesome fashion. This finale turns upside down yet another comic motif connected to identity and recognition: the discovery of a tie of blood between two young persons who were on the way to becoming lovers.⁵² This motif is already hinted at in the prelude to the "comic" act, when the girl's mother mentions as an additional reason to reveal her secret to her son the fear "that, under the impulse of hot-blooded youth, he might slip and attack his own sister without either of them being aware of their relationship."⁵³ However,

⁵¹ Zimmerman 2000, 443.

⁵² Examples are Menander's *Perikeiromene* and Plautus's *Epidicus*. Mason (1999, 109) sees a possible echo of Menander's play in Apuleius's tale. See especially 985–86: "It was a brother she kissed, not a lover." May, however (2006, 290–94), does not settle for one comic source.

⁵³ "Ne . . . caloris iuvenalis impetu lapsus, nescius nesciam sororem incurreret" (10.23.5). See Zimmerman 2000, 443.

whereas in comedy the revelation of a tie of blood between would-be lovers brings about the happy ending, in this story it is not believed: the wicked wife thinks that her rival is making up a lie in a novelistic mold, pretending that she and her lover are sister and brother.⁵⁴ In the ideal novel the innocent lovers get away with this lie;⁵⁵ in this grim story, not even the truth saves the innocent.

It might be tempting to read this morally appalling reversal of a recognition motif, together with the lack of a family recognition and a perverted use of recognition tokens, as reflecting Lucius's pessimistic outlook on the world he wanders in. The turn of the story for the worse is indeed introduced by his comment on the inexorable wickedness of fortune: "But these excellent arrangements, made in a thoroughly responsible way, could not escape the fatal nod of Fortune, at whose instigation cruel Jealousy steered her course straight for the young man's house."⁵⁶ Lucius's observation could be taken to bring out the philosophy he sees at work in the world: that virtue is not rewarded with happy endings.

Invectives against Fortune, to be sure, are one of Lucius's signatures. Yet to push the moral meaning of this particular invective would be to disregard Lucius's own admission, shortly before hearing the story of the evil wife, that his own fortune has never been better (10.13.5). Wicked Fortuna in the inset story is a literary construct, the remake of the generally benevolent Tychē of comedy.⁵⁷ The grim tale is, again, a pastiche operating a shift in literary genres.⁵⁸ Because of its playful literary quality, it resists interpretations that would take it as a genuine expression of Lucius's feelings or views.

That said, however, it cannot be denied that the recognitions involving Lucius-the-ass are grim episodes: in stark contrast with the canonical novelistic recognition, they bring no happy ending but harm the "innocent" protagonist. To some extent this is true already before his metamorphosis, for Lucius, when he is recognized, feels trapped. His first recognition, by his friend Pythias, has an awkward ring from the outset: "Just as I was leaving, Pythias came upon me, who had been a fellow-student of mine at Athens in Attica. With a loving gleam of recognition after such a long time, he rushed to me and hugged me and kissed me affectionately. 'My friend Lucius,' he said, 'by heaven, it has been a long time since I last saw you. Yes, by Hercules, it was when we took leave of our teacher

⁵⁴ Létoublon (1993, 151–53) numbers this deception among the novel's *topoi*. Heliodorus is the best witness. In Petronius's *Satyricon* "brother" is a common term for sexual partner, and so is "sister" (see, e.g., 127).

⁵⁵ Arsace in Heliodorus uncovers the lie, but because Theagenes himself tells her the truth.

⁵⁶ "Sed haec bene atque optime pleneque cum sanctimonia disposita feralem Fortunae nutum latere non potuerunt, cuius instinctu domum iuvenis protinus se direxit saeva Rivalitas" (10.24.1).

⁵⁷ See Zimmerman 2000, 443.

⁵⁸ See also May 2006, 275–95, elaborating on Zimmerman's reading. The phrase "shift of genres" is in May 2006, 273.

Clytius. What brings you here in your travels?’ ‘You will find out tomorrow,’ I replied.”⁵⁹ Instead of answering, Lucius asks his friend what his dress and important apparel mean, which gives Pythias the opportunity to boast of his office as food inspector and offer his services.

This recognition is presented as one-sided, and is not greeted by mutual kisses and embraces. Pythias alone rushes to hug his friend, while Lucius does not even respond to his effusions. Lucius’s passivity suggests indifference to the encounter or even resignation. And his choice of “*invadit*” next to “*amanter agnitum*” to describe Pythias’s advances subsequent to the recognition points up his ambivalence toward it: in his perception his friend welcomes him warmly (*amanter*) but also aggressively (*invadit*).⁶⁰ Lucius’s uneasiness becomes apparent in the haste with which he dismisses his friend’s question and changes the topic. Lucius does not want to talk about himself, to be fully recognized. (The aftermath of the recognition justifies his malaise, for Pythias, to show off his power rather than help his friend, attacks the fishmonger from whom Lucius has bought his dinner at too high a price and then tramples on the fish and tells him to be off (“*ut abirem*”). Lucius is left without dinner and without the friend who seemed so loving when he recognized him.)

A second person to recognize Lucius is his aunt Byrrhena. While he is walking around Hypata, he chances on a richly dressed woman and follows her. An old servant of hers spots in Lucius her nephew and invites him to go greet his aunt. As he blushes, does not move, and refrains from addressing the unknown woman, she stares at him and comments: “He has . . . that well-bred behavior of his pure and virtuous mother, Salvia. And his physical appearance is a damnably precise fit too: he is tall but not abnormal, slim but with sap in him, and of a rosy complexion; he has blond hair worn without affectation, wide-awake light-blue eyes with flashing glance just like an eagle’s, a face with a bloom in every part, and an attractive unaffected walk.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ “Inde me commodum egredientem continatur Pythias condiscipulus apud Athenas Atticas meus, qui me post aliquantum multum temporis amanter agnitum invadit, amplexusque ac comiter deosculatus: ‘mi Luci,’ ait ‘sat pol diu est quod intervisimus te, at hercules exinde cum a Clytio magistro digressi sumus. Quae autem tibi causa peregrinationis huius?’ ‘crastino die scies,’ inquam” (1.24.5–7).

⁶⁰ Lev Kenaan (2004, 271) notes the aggressive connotations of *invadit*. She reads Lucius’s ambiguous attitude to the encounter as one aspect of the general nonsensicality of the episode, which she takes to be a dreamlike narrative.

⁶¹ “En . . . sanctissimae Salviae matris generosa probitas, sed et cetera corporis exsecrabiliter ad [regulam qua diligenter aliquid adfingunt] amussim congruentia: inenormis proceritas, succulenta gracilitas, rubor temperatus, flavum et in affectatum capillitium, oculi caesii quidem, sed vigiles et in aspectu micantes, prorsus aquilini, os quoquoversum floridum, speciosus et immeditatus incessus” (2.2.8–9).

Apuleius plays with the motif of the *eikonismos*, or “iconistic portrait,”⁶² by entrusting Byrrhena with a detailed description of Lucius’s features *after* she recognizes him (whereas the typical *eikonismos* aims to identify a person). This is a clever way of telling the reader what the protagonist looks like within a first person narrative, and one that does not recount the life of the protagonist *ab ovo*: it would be incongruous for Lucius to describe himself, and even more so in the complimentary manner Byrrhena does. At the same time, however, by producing an *eikonismos* and by “staring” at her nephew (“optutum in me conversa”), Byrrhena exposes him. Lucius is photographed and helplessly caught by sudden light.

Or so Lucius feels, as is conveyed by his recounting of the episode. Again, he presents the recognition as one-sided, with no exchange of kisses or embraces. His unease blocks, as it were, the recognition and prevents it from following its happy course, which would be to make him Byrrhena’s protected guest. The scene echoes Telemachus’s recognition by Helen and Menelaus (*Od.* 4.141–50), who guess their guest’s identity from his resemblance to his father.⁶³ The possible reference to Telemachus in his role as guest points up Lucius’s inadequacy in playing the same role. Telemachus’s respectful timidity, which keeps him from addressing his hosts directly (*Od.* 4.158–60),⁶⁴ in Lucius’s performance escalates to a clumsy embarrassment: when the servant calls him, he does not move but lowers his head (2.2.7: “deiecto capite restiti”).⁶⁵ Lucius’s embarrassment culminates in his rejection of Byrrhena’s offer of hospitality (2.3.5). Instead of impersonating Telemachus, the model guest, he tries to avoid his aunt as he tried to avoid Pythias. Accepting her invitation would be remembering home and family while being abroad, for Byrrhena, before making her offer, expounds in great detail the strong tie she had with Lucius’s mother. In spite of their connection, Lucius breaks away from his aunt’s protection already at their first encounter; he disjoins recognition of a family member from acceptance of her.⁶⁶ The encounter ends abruptly when Lucius frees himself from Byrrhena “as from a chain” (2.6.3) in response to her warning against the witch with whom he lives.

⁶² See Misener 1924, 123.

⁶³ See Harrison 1990, 195–97. More precisely, though, Helen guesses Telemachus’s identity from his resemblance to Odysseus’s son when he was very little.

⁶⁴ There might also be an allusion to Telemachus’s bashful hesitation to address Nestor (*Od.* 3.14 and 24).

⁶⁵ See Harrison 1990, 195–97.

⁶⁶ Lucius is justified not to accept Byrrhena’s offer because he already has a host, Milo. But Milo is not a family member. If Lucius calls him *parentem* once (3.7.3), he does not mean it literally but exaggerates their relation to point up his host’s indifference to his apparent plight during the trial in the Risus festival. Milo never alludes to a family tie between them, not even in the contexts in which this would be expected (as when Lucius is first introduced to him).

Thereafter Byrrhena acts accordingly, for on their second encounter she becomes an unwitting helper in his passion for magic by providing him with the entertainment of a story concerned with witches (Thelyphron's).⁶⁷ Once Lucius is changed into an ass, she ceases to be a family member: she does not even try to defend him when he is accused of robbery in absentia (7.1.5–2.1).⁶⁸

After his metamorphosis Lucius is recognized three more times, two of them to his direst doom.⁶⁹ Recognitions are among the ways cruel Fortune forestalls his plans of escape. The first time he is flying from the wicked boy who has been torturing him and who is now about to be attacked by a huge bear. A passerby makes the ass his mount, to the ass's relief; but not for long, because the ass's owners, who are by chance wandering in the area searching for a heifer, instantly recognize and capture him (7.25.4: "statimque me cognitum capistro prehensum"). To preface the unfortunate recognition, Lucius sings the familiar refrain "Stubborn, wicked Fortune!" (7.25.3, paraphrased). Recognition brings him back to his sorry road.

This merciless function of recognitions is brought to full light in a previous episode, when Lucius, threatened with death, screws up his courage to flee, taking advantage of a momentary absence of the robbers who own him: "Why don't you take up a manly spirit and think about your safety while you can? You now have the best opportunity to flee."⁷⁰ After violently disposing of the old woman who is guarding him and Charite, the girl the robbers just captured, he takes off on his "voluntary flight" (*voluntariae fugae*) with Charite on his back, but alas, when they reach a three-road fork (*trivium*) and he resists going where the girl is pushing him because he knows that the robbers have gone that way, the moonlight gives ass and girl away: the robbers recognize them ("ad lunae splendorem . . . cognitos") and greet them with a wicked laugh (6.29.8).

Lucius invites us to compare his misadventure with Psyche's, when she gives up her flight from Venus, for his words are identical with Psyche's in that episode:

⁶⁷ See 2.20.7. James (1987, 73–76) points out that "at no time is it suggested that Thelyphron's story is a lesson for Lucius or a warning which will deter him from unwise interests." This is true from Byrrhena's point of view, for she intends the story only to delight Lucius ("lepidi sermonis . . . comitate")—though Lucius could have drawn a lesson from it, which, as is his habit, he does not.

⁶⁸ See James 1987, 110. Byrrhena might not even be present at the deliberations concerning Lucius. The only truthful witness is Lucius's slave, who, even under torture, does not denounce him.

⁶⁹ At 9.42.2 recognition does not get the ass into special trouble but simply causes him to change masters. His owner, a gardener, had beaten a soldier who claimed the ass as his own. The soldier and his fellows, provided with the gardener's and the ass's "distinguishing marks" (*signis*), go search for them, but succeed only because the ass cannot contain his curiosity and wriggles his head out through his hiding place, thus giving his and the gardener's presence away. The gardener is ruined by the recognition.

⁷⁰ "Quin igitur masculum tandem sumis animum tuaeque saluti, dum licet, consulis? habes summam opportunitatem fugae" (6.26.7–8).

“quin igitur masculum sumis animum”?⁷¹ Since Venus has apparently been unable to track Psyche down, she has ordered Mercury to proclaim an official search for her fugitive slave, providing her Identikit, or *eikonismos* (“indicia qui possit agnosci”; 6.7.4).⁷² The reward for the person who will stop her flight (*fuga*) is so enticing (eight delicious kisses from Venus, including a deep thrust of her honey-eyed tongue) that “every mortal man” rushes to the task. This puts an end to Psyche’s lingering hesitation (*cunctationem*) and makes her determined to hand herself over to her mistress. She has been, however, already inclined to do so even before Venus launched her search. Despairing of finding any support, she has taken counsel with herself: “What . . . roof or darkness can I hide beneath to evade the inescapable eyes of Venus? Why don’t you take up a manly spirit and bravely give up your broken hopes, and willingly hand yourself over to your mistress”?⁷³

The phrase “quin masculum sumis animum,” to be sure, may appear not to tie Lucius specifically to Psyche because it chimes with similar expressions in other episodes: when Thelyphron “screws up his courage” to take up the job as the watchman of a corpse (2.23.1: “animum meum commasculo”) and when Charite “with manly spirit” (*masculis animis*) sets out to blind the assassin of her husband (8.11.4). The phrase is in the mouths of less-than-manly characters: two women, a “female-minded” man (Thely-phron), and a man-donkey.⁷⁴ I think, though, that Lucius casts his brave decision specifically like Psyche’s not only because he uses her exact words, whereas the other parallels are variations, but also because he reproduces the structure of the extended phrase (in both cases accusative + verb followed by dative + verb). In addition, these two episodes (contrary to the other two) are close enough to resonate with each other in the reader’s mind. If Lucius is harking back to Psyche, however, the effect of the allusion is not to equate his actions with hers but rather to highlight his exploitation of her words to mean exactly the opposite: though Lucius’s flight is as willing (*voluntariae*) as Psyche’s resolve to hand herself over to Venus (*ultroneam*), for him bravery consists not, as for her, in ceasing from flight but in fleeing. Thus, whereas Mercury’s proclamation simply rushes Psyche’s own decision to surrender, Lucius’s recognition counters his plans and forces him back on his rugged road.

⁷¹ Though we should be wary to attribute profound meaning to each verbal echo (see Mal-Maeder 2001, 411), we should not underplay verbal correspondences either by considering them mere coincidences (see Schlam 1992, 6–7).

⁷² Misener (1924) does not include this episode among the literary *eikonismoi*, but it clearly is one.

⁷³ “Quibus . . . tectis vel etiam tenebris abscondita magnae Veneris inevitabiles oculos effugiam? quin igitur masculum tandem sumis animum et cassae speculae renuntias fortiter et ultroneam te dominae tuae reddis?” (6.5.3)

⁷⁴ The parallel with 2.23.1 is in Nicolini (2011, 103–4), who points out that in Thelyphron’s case the words have a literal meaning.

The difference could be rephrased in philosophical, namely Stoic, terms: Fate or Fortune are forces one cannot escape.⁷⁵ Psyche and Lucius cannot choose their way. The necessity for Psyche to submit to Venus is underscored by the subtext to the scene of Mercury's proclamation: Moschus's poem in which Aphrodite tries to track down Eros, her runaway "slave," by providing his Identikit, as Venus provides that of her "slave," and by promising a kiss.⁷⁶ Both Psyche and Eros are wanderers. Eros's wandering, though, connotes his freedom of movement. The lawless bird of Bizet's *Carmen* can evade capture. Psyche cannot. Thus, her choice of stopping her flight is the decision of a good Stoic, as it were, who harmonizes her will with destiny.

On the other hand, Lucius opposes destiny, both literally and metaphorically, by his flight, thinking that his free will can take a different route. His final attempt, at the fork, to resist the girl's pressure that he ought to go where she wants to take him (and where the robbers went), epitomizes his stubbornness in fighting destiny, which is also suggested by an eloquent parallel, perhaps a subtext, to this scene: Oedipus's and Laius's fatal encounter, which also happens at a three-road crossing (πρὸς τριπλαῖς ἀμαξιτοῖς, *Oedipus Rex* 730).⁷⁷ Oedipus is trying to escape from destiny by exiling himself from Corinth when, at a crossroads, he meets and kills his father because of failure to recognize him, and is thus pushed back onto his destined path. Lucius likewise has to stop his own flight from destiny at a crossroads, but because he *is* recognized. This use of recognition to implement the cruel law of Fortune, which the ass tries in vain to escape, brings out the lack of guidance that characterizes his wanderings.

Recognition and Isis's Guidance

The one episode of recognition of persons after Lucius meets Isis is utterly different from those I have discussed so far. Lucius the ass never dreams until the beginning of book 11, when he has two visions, one immediately after the

⁷⁵ Though Apuleius is a Platonist, his Platonism is eclectic. Critics have argued that the *Golden Ass* loosely shares the Stoicizing determinism of the *De mundo* and the *De Platone*; see, e.g., Fry 1984, 140–41; 145, 169 and Schlam 1992, 61–62. See 1.20.3: "However the fates decide, that is the way everything turns out for mortal men" (utcumque fata decreverint ita cuncta mortalibus provenire). Perhaps the description of Fortune's tyranny that best applies to the two episodes I am discussing is at 9.1.5. Updated (and diverging) treatments of philosophical aspects of the *Golden Ass* are Graverini 2012 and Drews 2012.

⁷⁶ Moschus 1.1–5. See Kenney 1990, at 6.8.1.

⁷⁷ Though we cannot prove that Apuleius is alluding to *Oedipus Rex*. On allusions in Apuleius see Finkelppearl 1998, specifically her methodological introduction. Perhaps for this episode it is safer to speak of intertextuality in the sense adopted by Morgan in Morgan and Harrison 2008: as the range of texts activated in the reader.

other, the first of the Moon and the second of Isis, who gives him instructions for recovering his human shape and orders him into her ranks. After he pledges his life to her, Lucius becomes a compulsive dreamer. Isis sends him dreams as soon as he shuts his eyes, even for a short nap (11.19.2). One of those dreams fosters recognition. When his second initiation is drawing near, he has the vision of a devotee exhibiting his limp to him, apparently to help him identify the priest in charge of the initiation (11.27.5). Lucius, at seeing this mark, is suddenly enlightened. In the morning, he eagerly sets out to look for a man fitting his vision, and instantly recognizes him by his limp as well as by his overall appearance.

For the first time, Lucius is the recognizer, not the recognized; for the first time, the recognition improves his fortunes; for the first time, it is prompted by a dream, as in the ideal novels (*Leucippe and Clitophon* and *Daphnis and Chloe*). It seems that thanks to his newly found divine patroness, Lucius sees what he has never seen before, the road of upcoming events, and recognizes the way to go. He is no longer attempting to flee from his grim fortune only to be brought back to it brutally by those who spot him, but is happily following Isis's guidance. The transition is foreshadowed by a telling detail in the ass's movements: the flight that takes him to Cenchrae at the end of book 10 is successful. The absence of an episode of recognition such as those that previously stop him and drive him back to his destined road may suggest that Lucius is no longer acting blindly.

This abrupt change in the function of recognition could be invoked to support interpretations of the novel as a celebration of Isis's powers. Isis would ask Lucius to forsake his home but would also guide him along his path to her by helping him recognize it, by opening his eyes. The beginning of book 11 seems to encourage this interpretation further. For as he wakes up in front of the bright moon, Lucius muses on the cosmic order, "certain . . . that the supreme goddess now exercised the fullness of her power; that human affairs were fully governed by her providence; that not only flocks and wild beasts but even lifeless things were quickened by the divine favor of her light and might."⁷⁸

It is easy and even tempting to read Lucius's awakening in the moonlight as an image of spiritual rebirth and enlightenment: the moonlight has quickened Lucius's own insight, and substituted the experience of chaos with the certainty of order. Lucius has ceased from wandering, both in the world and in his mind. We could shore up this interpretation by contrasting his brightness of vision and Odysseus's blindness when he wakes up on Ithaca and fails to recognize his

⁷⁸ "Certus . . . summam deam praecipua maiestate pollere resque prorsus humanas ipsius regi providentia, nec tantum pecuina et ferina, verum inanima etiam divino eius luminis numinisque nutu vegetari" (11.1.2).

homeland because Athena has cast a mist around it. Both scenes mark an abrupt transition, underscored by sleep; and in both a goddess assists the protagonist. But while Athena blinds Odysseus even to familiar surroundings and imposes a disguise on him, Isis opens Lucius's eyes for him to see the order of things and soon thereafter takes off his "disguise." The reader who approaches book 11 from this comparative angle might expect a radical change in the content of the narrative: no longer wanderings and adventures but a homecoming. Lucius's home, however, announces itself to be not his physical *patria* but the spiritual harbor⁷⁹ where he lands because the goddess has made him see: through conversion.

Nancy Shumate has interpreted the *Golden Ass* precisely as a narrative of conversion,⁸⁰ a genre that could be termed the opposite of a narrative of return. She reads the *Golden Ass* together with conversion narratives such as those of Augustine, Tolstoy, and Dante, drawing especially on the analysis of the experience of conversion by William James (in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*) and later scholars of religious psychology.

As other critics have noted, however, Lucius fails to engage in an exercise characteristic of conversion narratives, moral recognition in a radical sense: retrospective self-analysis and rejection of one's past self.⁸¹ Typically converts realize that all they have been striving for, the values they have held, what they have thought mattered in the world was wrong and disavow their former actions and the false self they perceive themselves to have been (sometimes even by changing their names, as Saul to Paul or as in early baptismal practice). This is true not only of the Christian narratives Shumate brings into play, most notably Augustine's *Confessions*, but also of a Jewish story of conversion, *Joseph and Aseneth*, a text closer to the Greek novels in narrative structure and motifs, in which Aseneth's discovery of Joseph's divine beauty results in self-chastisement, almost self-hatred, and in the devastating recognition of her ignorance.⁸² Recognition of

⁷⁹ Cenchræ's harbor is a *tutissimum receptaculum* (10.0.35.5.3), which looks beyond to the *portus Quietis* of Isis (11.1.15.5.1).

⁸⁰ Shumate 1996.

⁸¹ See, e.g., Lev Kenaan 2004, 281: "In order to create a conversion tale, Apuleius would have had to employ a confessional paradigm whose critical view of the past was the dominant element in the narrative." See also the review of Shumate's book by Harrison 1997, 12: "Lucius's complete lack of retrospective self-analysis seems to differentiate the *Met.* from other examples of the 'crisis' and 'conversion' autobiographical narrative such as Augustine's *Confessions*." Readings of the *Golden Ass* as a narrative of conversion are challenged also by Bradley (1998), on different grounds. He argues that Lucius's experience cannot be called a conversion in the Christian, Jewish, or Muslim sense because it does not involve a total transference of commitment from one set of beliefs to another. Isis does not ask for exclusive rights. Bradley also points out that the goddess strikes a "contract" with Lucius, which is in the spirit of the conventional Roman *do ut des*.

⁸² See chapter 5.

one's ignorance marks also the conversion to Socrates's "examined life" as interpreted by Plato in the *Symposium*. Alcibiades, though unable to make the leap and follow Socrates's teaching, to "grow old by him" (παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω), feels its sting as a challenge to his way of life and recognizes that that life is wrong: each time he is with Socrates, his soul is in turmoil (ἐτεθορύβητο), vexed (ἡγανάκτει) at the slavish life he leads. He thinks that life not worth living (μὴ βιωτόν), for Socrates forces him to admit that he does not take care of himself but minds the business of the Athenians (*Symp.* 216a-b).⁸³

Unlike these specimens of (would-be) converts, Lucius does not condemn his past self. True, that he does not tell his whole story with hindsight, as converts tend to do, in itself is no compelling argument against reading the novel as a narrative of conversion. Lucius recounts his adventures in the present tense, as if he were writing a diary in ignorance of the future.⁸⁴ He presents his encounter with Isis as a sudden happening, rather than as the hoped-for answer to long and excruciating soul-searching. (Had he done the latter, the *Golden Ass* would not be a comic, or even seriocomic, novel.) The lack of a *post eventum* perspective conveys the immediacy and unexpectedness of the revelation, for Lucius as for the reader, favoring the reader's identification with the novel's hero.⁸⁵

Note, however, that the follower of Isis does not trash the pleasurable sides of his life as an ass. On the contrary, he is appreciative of that life. When he compares the knowledge he acquired as an ass with Odysseus's, his words, "I remember with thankful gratitude the ass that I was because while I was concealed under his cover and schooled in a variety of fortunes, he made me better-informed, if less intelligent,"⁸⁶ come from the initiate, from Lucius the *auctor*.⁸⁷ In a very rare "authorial" comment, one spoken not in the present tense of the adventures, Lucius looks back on his asinine self not judgmentally but thankfully. A reading of the novel as a conversion narrative seems to me at odds with Lucius's

⁸³ Conversion-analysis risks being simplistic when applied to the espousal of a philosophy, for the commitment to philosophy did not necessarily rule out involvement in other endeavors (especially oratory): see Moles 1978, 79–81. However, in the *representation* of conversion to the Socratic life offered in the *Symposium*, that life clashes with engagement in "other business," and, more important for the discussion at hand, the trigger of conversion is the recognition of one's bad state.

⁸⁴ Shumate (1996, 160) puts it thus: "the *Metamorphoses* can be read as a running account of the fragmentation of a conversion-ripe subject's view of the world." Schlam (1992, 38) also notes that Lucius's experiences in book 11 "are narrated from the same immediate perspective and in a similar naïve tone as those of the preceding books."

⁸⁵ See Graverini 2007, 134.

⁸⁶ "Gratas gratias asino meo memini, quod me suo celatum tegmine variisque fortunis exercitatum, etsi minus prudentem, multiscium reddidit" (9.13.5).

⁸⁷ See Hijmans et al. 1995, 132, pointing out that *asino meo* reminds the reader of the distance between the narrating I and the experiencing I.

appreciative outlook, as expressed in this passage, on his past life with its “enriching” opportunities.⁸⁸

If not an unrecoverable hiatus between past and present, what does Lucius recognize? Mithras, the priest who interprets his metamorphosis and wanderings as the sinful fall of an inquisitive and sensual youth, adduces him as an exemplar to the unbelievers, a “token” of recognition of their own mistakes: “videant irreligiosi, videant et errorem suum recognoscant” (11.15.4). The priest points at Lucius to urge recognition of one’s faults. But does Lucius engage in it? This question is at the center of a lively debate, which is unlikely to be settled because it impinges on the larger and vexed question of the religiosity of the Isis Book. A reader who takes Lucius to admit his responsibility in his metamorphosis will be inclined also to take book 11 to celebrate the regenerative power of Isis. The opposite scenario, of an unreflective Lucius, might invite a more skeptical attitude toward the overall religious meaning of the book.

Vocally at least, Lucius does not blame his “fall” on himself but only on Photis, both before and after his encounter with Isis (“though . . . angry at Photis’s mistake [quamquam . . . suscensens errori Photidis],” 9.15.6, resonates with “when Photis had entangled me in my sorry wanderings [cum me Photis malis incapistrasset erroribus],” 11.20.6). We do not want to make much of this correspondence because the second passage presents a textual problem: the genitive Photidis, not the nominative Photis, is in the oldest copy of manuscript F. Photis, however, is an old correction, which appears in the majority of the copies and is adopted by most editors. If the text is correct, as leading critics of Apuleius believe,⁸⁹ the phrasing again suggests continuity between past and present in Lucius’s self-perception. This would fit with his general lack of introspection. Though the description of Isis’s devotee recalling his vicissitudes as he contemplates the image of the goddess (11.17.5: “intentus in deae specimen pristinos casus meos recordabar”) may conjure up an inward-looking gaze and could even be read as an implicit admission of responsibility (“I was remembering how it all happened, what my role in it was”), Lucius never deploys his regrets, as he often deploys his thoughts even when he is an ass (see, e.g., 7.2.4–5), let alone after he has met Isis and ponders the demanding requirements of her cult (11.19.3) or the meaning of a second and then a third initiation prescribed to him (11.26.4–27.1 and 29.1–3).

⁸⁸ Lucius’s comment at 9.13 has raised questions, but mainly on whether *multiscium* applies to the initiate as well as to the ass or only to the ass. Winkler opts for the former (1985, 166–68); Shumate (1996, 246–47) opts for the latter, based on the reading of *reddidit* as an aorist (“at that time the ass rendered me *multiscium*,” implying: *but now I am more than that*). “Memini gratas gratias,” however, is a praise of the ass’s “multiscientia” from the mouth of the initiate, even if the initiate has acquired more than just “multiscientia.”

⁸⁹ So, for instance, Stephen Harrison and Maaïke Zimmerman (in correspondence).

Critics have argued that Lucius's silence is unimportant, for his behavior does show that he has recognized his errors: he abstains from sex and condemns curiosity, whereby he corrects his two major weaknesses, and the ones the priest holds responsible for his fall into asshood (11.15.1).⁹⁰ Luca Graverini has offered a lucid formulation of this argument: "It is not important, in my opinion, that Lucius never says explicitly . . . [that] he accepts Mithras's religious and teleological reading of his adventures at 11.15. . . . Lucius makes it very clear, both with his actions and his words, that he totally adheres to the Isiac religion; in this context, what would need to be explicitly stated in the text is a possible doubt by Lucius of Mithras's interpretation, and not the contrary."⁹¹

A detail in Apuleius's possible "editing" of the original Greek *Metamorphoses*, however, seems to suggest that he chose to emphasize continuity rather than change in Lucius's behavior before and after his encounter with Isis. In the *Onos*, as soon as Lucius is transformed into an ass, he blames his "untimely curiosity" (15: ὁ τῆς ἀκαίρου ταύτης περιεργία) in addition to the maid Palaestra. He seems to be admitting some responsibility (though shortly thereafter he protests that he has done nothing wrong). Apuleius has disposed of this detail, which was probably in the Greek *Metamorphoses* as well, since it is in the epitome.⁹² Apuleius's cut is intriguing if we consider that the Latin novel, according to most critics, expands on the original.⁹³

The cut highlights Lucius's lack of insight. Lucius keeps to his unreflective ways all along his wanderings, where he fails to mention his "untimely curiosity" as a culprit. He never says, even after he has suffered many a bad treatment, "curiosity cost me dearly." But—and this is my point—neither does he do so after meeting Isis. If Apuleius indeed erased Lucius's self-reproach from the Greek *Metamorphoses* to bring out his hero's superficiality, an effective way to convey the radical change caused in him by his "rebirth," to create a rupture in his psyche between "before" and "after," would have been to show not only the

⁹⁰ It is unclear whether Lucius has to renounce sex altogether or only temporarily: see, recently, the discussion in Penwill 2009, 94, who argues for the former. On Lucius's condemnation of curiosity, see especially Tatum 1969, 491–92; Penwill 1975; Schlam 1992, chapter 5. The passage usually quoted is 11.23.5, where Lucius shrinks from indulging the readers' "harsh curiosity" as regards his initiation. Lucius, however, ultimately satisfies that curiosity on the account that it *might* ("forsitan") be owing to religious longing ("desiderio . . . religioso"). Lucius is as keen on telling stories as before his initiation, though he keeps within the bounds of what it is permitted to tell. For discussion, see Keulen 2007, 167–68.

⁹¹ Graverini 2007, 90, n. 87 (translation by Benjamin T. Lee (slightly modified), forthcoming). For a similar line of argument see also Shumate 1996, 221; Schlam 1992, 9; contra: Mal-Maeder 2001, 410, and the authors referenced in note 81.

⁹² James (1987, 95) notes this difference but in a different context: the Roman Lucius, unlike his Greek counterpart, would not condemn curiosity as such.

⁹³ For a review of the scholarship, see Mason 1999, 106.

once curious young man containing his curiosity but also the callously unreflective one becoming suddenly self-critical after the conversion, and blaming his past misguided actions.⁹⁴

Grant that Lucius's behavior is enough evidence to demonstrate that he recognizes his errors. Even so, he does not change his hermeneutic habits, his way of reading what happens to him, but keeps interpreting what he sees and hears according to his desires, just as he did throughout his adventures. As many a critic has noted,⁹⁵ before the metamorphosis Lucius meets with several warning texts: from the story of Socrates, who died for getting erotically enmeshed with a witch, to the art display in Byrrhena's palace, with the centerpiece of Actaeon changing into a stag for watching Artemis, to Byrrhena's explicit warning against Pamphile's magical practices. Lucius, however, does not interpret any of these texts as cautionary messages. He enjoys the stories and the artwork but does not understand that "all that you see . . . belongs to you" (2.5.1: "tua sunt . . . cuncta quae vides"). Lucius underrecognizes, as it were. As James Tatum puts it, "he has a talent for hearing only what he wants to hear."⁹⁶ He does not see in those texts himself, his character, and the risks he is running. On the contrary, a story about the dangers of magic incites him further to become acquainted with magic (2.1.1–2).

The same deafness to the personal references encoded in the stories he hears characterizes him during his asinine wanderings. Again in Tatum's words, "through much of the work he is oblivious of the message."⁹⁷ This is clearly spelled out in his comment on the tale of Cupid and Psyche: what a pretty story! Too bad I cannot write it down! (6.25.1). Apuleius's first "reader," Lucius the ass, is the only one not to see that the tale in many ways runs parallel to his own, and that in this capacity it should teach him a lesson, or at least provide him with an explanation for his sorry condition, as well as with better hopes for the future.⁹⁸ His deafness to any message conveyed in the story is brought out, for instance, by his using Psyche's words *Quin masculum sumis animum* to encourage himself to do the opposite of what Psyche did, to flee rather than surrender. The repetition of those words confirms his purely aesthetic appreciation of the story, of which he retains even the style but from which he learns no lesson.

⁹⁴ To this argument it could be objected that the kind of recognition I am advocating is not a feature of the ancient novel. And in fact, only Dionysius in Chariton seriously engages in self-accusation (see chapter 1). The heroes of the Greek novels, however, do not meet with a transformative religious power.

⁹⁵ See especially Tatum 1969; James 1987, 45; Schlam 1992, 33, 46; Graverini 2007, 127–28.

⁹⁶ Tatum 1969, 499.

⁹⁷ Tatum 1969, 526.

⁹⁸ See Graverini 2007, 127–28.

If before the metamorphosis Lucius reads too little because he is eager to be exposed to magic, after his encounter with Isis he seems to read too much because he is eager to be initiated. His recognition of the priest charged with his initiation can indeed be taken as an unfounded interpretation on his part to make his wishes come true, rather than an objective favor coming from Isis. Perhaps the dream is not predictive: Lucius sees guidance where in effect there is none and “recognizes” as happening what *he* wants to happen.

Wishful readings of dream are not unknown to the ancient novels. We can think, for instance, of Thyamis when he imposes on a dream the interpretation matching his desire (*Aethiopica* 1.18.5).⁹⁹ In Lucius’s report of his dream, the claim that the limp is the priest’s identifying mark is not the priest’s but is Lucius’s own: if the priest’s foot is twisted, “*evidently*” it was “to assist me in the recognition by some definite sign [ut agnitionem mihi *scilicet* certo signo sui sumministraret].” As Stephen Harrison suggests, Lucius is making a hopeful identification.¹⁰⁰ That the priest would have a limp is awkward, because, as Harrison points out, lame persons normally were not admitted to the priesthood of Egyptian cults.¹⁰¹ The educated reader must have known this as much as Apuleius and smiled at Lucius’s rushed and naïve identification of the priest, and at his taking the limp in the dream as the enlightening detail rather than a problematic one.¹⁰² A more thoughtful person should have considered it rather worrisome or at least should have interrogated its meaning instead of making it a “definite sign,” in need of no further interpretation.

Lucius’s overall response to the dream indeed shows too much naïve self-assurance not to betray a bias: “My dark cloud of doubt was *completely* lifted, therefore, after this *clear manifestation* of the gods’ will, and *immediately* . . . I began enquiring of everybody *with the outmost eagerness* whether there was anyone with the same gait as my dream. Nor did confirmation fail to appear, for I *instantly* caught sight of one of the *pastophori*, who, besides the evidence of his foot, *precisely* fitted my dream apparition in physical appearance and dress.”¹⁰³

⁹⁹ See also, in the same novel, 5.36.1.

¹⁰⁰ See Harrison 2000, 247–48, and 2012.

¹⁰¹ Harrison 2000, 248, adducing Griffith 1975, *ad loc.* The “wholeness” of priests was a requirement also in Greece and in Rome. See Seneca the Elder *Controversiae* 4.2, with further parallels as noted by Winterbottom (in the Loeb edition).

¹⁰² Graverini (2007, 75–76), drawing on Coarelli 1989 (*non vidi*), thinks that the priest whom Lucius identifies by his limp might have been a real person, a friend of Apuleius. In this case the limp could just be a realistic trait and a “mark of recognition” for the reader. If this is true, however, the episode is even more comical, with a friend of the author stepping into the *Golden Ass* to initiate its protagonist.

¹⁰³ “Sublata est ergo post *tam manifestam* deum voluntatem ambiguitatis *tota* caligo et *ilico* . . . *summo studio* percontabar singulos, ecqui vestigium similis ut somnium. Nec fides auit. Nam de pastophoris unum consexi *statim* praeter indicium pedis cetero etiam statu atque habitu *examussim* nocturnae imagini congruentem” (11.27.6–7).

Lucius “sees” too clearly and too quickly what the dream “portends” and too quickly makes it “come true.”

The priest, to be sure, seems to bear out Lucius’s interpretation because he does not push him away. He does not say, as the aspiring initiate excitedly approaches him, “What do you want from me”? but eventually initiates him. Possibly he also tells Lucius that he himself has had a dream¹⁰⁴ in which Osiris has announced to him “that a man from Madaurus was being sent to him; the man was quite poor, but it behoved the priest to administer the god’s initiation rites to him at once, since by the god’s providence the man would acquire fame for his studies and the priest himself ample recompense.”¹⁰⁵

This passage has long puzzled readers because the man of Madaurus obviously is Apuleius, not Lucius. Interpretation of this authorial intrusion falls beyond the scope of this discussion: I shall explore only whether the priest’s dream really validates Lucius’s interpretation of his own dream and the recognition he claims it portends. Grant that the priest’s dream is at some level truthful, it tells him, and us, that he is being sent a man from Madaurus, not that Lucius is that man. The priest, in other words, has had a dream identifying a man to be initiated by him but does not necessarily recognize in Lucius that man. This seems suggested by the summary fashion in which Lucius himself narrates the facts. The priest does not even greet him, as is customary in recognition scenes: that is, he does not vocally confirm Lucius’s own identification of him as the priest in charge of the initiation.

I may be pushing the argument too far here. One critic, commenting on “the man from Madaurus,” can say with confidence: “since it is not very probable that Asinius [the priest] is speaking of an anonymous third party, Lucius has to be the one who is labelled as such.”¹⁰⁶ Yet there is no evidence that this is the case. At least, Lucius does not recognize himself as that man, in spite of appearances. Eager as he is to be initiated and make his dream come true, he runs to the priest; but he does not tell him: “I am the man of your dream.” Vincent Hunink points out that “unlike what is often thought, Lucius does not actually identify himself as a man from Madaurus.”¹⁰⁷ Lucius does not acknowledge the priest’s words (if he heard them on the spot). The two might as well have met on the basis of a misunderstanding, but one convenient for both: for Lucius to satisfy his religious craving; and for the priest to satisfy his greed (a *grande compendium* was promised to him in the dream). The fact that the initiation is kept on hold by

¹⁰⁴ Possibly, because Lucius is not specific, just as he is not specific about when he found out.

¹⁰⁵ “Mitti sibi Madaurenssem, sed admodum pauperem, cui statim sua sacra deberet ministrare; nam et illi studiorum gloriam et ipsi grande compendium sua comparari providentia” (11.27.9).

¹⁰⁶ Van der Paardt 1981, 97. See also W. Smith 2008, 60.

¹⁰⁷ Hunink 2006, 29.

Lucius's poverty (11.28.1) reinforces the impression that the priest's greed is a decisive motor in his desire to perform the ritual.

If this reading is correct, Lucius's reading of his dream is not: he himself thinks he is receiving guidance and recognizes the priest accordingly, but for the reader, the alleged god-induced recognition is not one but is a fabrication of Lucius's juvenile overenthusiasm and impressionable nature. Isis does not make him see more clearly.¹⁰⁸ The accumulation of dreams in book 11, as Hunink phrases it, "reveals perhaps more about Lucius and his ardent desire to devote himself to Isis than about her divine power."¹⁰⁹ The encounter with the goddess has changed Lucius from an "underinterpreter" to an "overinterpreter"; but this change still aims to make his wish come true. Whereas before the metamorphosis Lucius's burning passion, to learn magic lore, blinded him to the warnings sewn on his way, after meeting Isis his equally burning passion, to become her acolyte, pushes him to interpret what he sees as prefiguring the initiations. The two excesses are driven by the same mental attitude.

This reader is then inclined to interpret Lucius's journey to Isis as a lateral move rather than a vertical one, at least in the sense that it does not seem to activate a recognition of a "before" and an "after" in Lucius's self-evaluation, or even a shift from the uncritical rush with which he satisfied his desire for magic to a more guarded attitude vis-à-vis his new desire for initiation into Isis's cult.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ James (1987, 216–21) contrasts Lucius's blindness prior to his encounter with Isis and his foresight thereafter. I think that this is his perspective, but not necessarily an objective truth; that Apuleius does not want us to agree with his hero. Lucius's gullible behavior and lack of insight about himself can be read as an implicit message that his "illumination" is not to be shared by the readers as, say, the vision of the sun in Plato's allegory of the cave. Whereas Plato presents the ascent and that final sight as desirable for anyone who wants to know, Apuleius presents Lucius's "gift of sight" in ambivalent terms: Lucius is happy with it and with what happens to him subsequently, but the reader is not pushed to go along with Lucius's view (as Plato's reader should with the allegory of the cave).

¹⁰⁹ 2006, 28. Hunink essentially agrees with Harrison: see also p. 27 and 30. Contra: Carlisle (2009, 225, nn. 26 and 232) believes that Lucius's dream is predictive.

¹¹⁰ Shumate's (1996) reading of the novel as a narrative of conversion accommodates its opposite in a "Winklerian" fashion. By representing Lucius's religious experience in ironic tones, Apuleius suggests that his character is "naïve in thinking that he has found true reality. Instead of mounting to a 'higher' order of reality, he has simply made a lateral move" (182). The novel's author looks with skepticism, though also with indulgence, at his character's prompt acceptance of a rigid system for the sake of security (see also p. 205; 310; 325–27). Lucius does not seem to change at the level of moral awareness: Newbold (2003) argues that in book 11 he "is still captive to conventional normative values" (p. 100). He is still motivated by a need for security and does not look beyond himself, to a greater good. As to his religious cravings, it is true that at first he is held back by the strict requirements of Isis' cult (11.19.3) and that he wonders why he has to be initiated again and again (11.26.4–27.1 and 11.29.1–3). But divine voices swiftly persuade him: the "amazing discovery" that Osiris, too, demands his services (11.27.1, where "novum mirumque" resonates with Lucius's passion for "rara miraque") is confirmed by the dream of the lame priest, and another dream comes handy to dispel his renewed doubts.

Tentative Conclusive Remarks

To sum up: Apuleius's treatment of recognitions at a first reading suggests a neat transition from the grim world crossed by blind Lucius, in which recognitions mark a reversal of fortune for the worse in the manner of Petronius's *Satyrica*, to the orderly cosmos he recognizes thanks to Isis's guidance. While the ass is recognized only to be brought back to destiny's path against his will, the initiate thinks he recognizes the priest who is going to forward the journey of initiation he is eagerly undertaking. But it is precisely Lucius's eagerness, and consequently the haste with which he interprets the dream and makes it "come true," that suffuses the scene with an ironic smile, and invites the reader to suspect that Lucius is a dupe, or at least that he is as naïve and overenthusiastic as he was before the metamorphosis.

Perhaps, then, if the *Golden Ass* does not end with a climactic recognition in the style of the Greek novels, it is not because it ends with conversion rather than return but because it lacks definitive closure. Lucius does not recover a lost order, as the protagonists of a typical novelistic recognition do. He does not go back home to his former existence but follows Isis. Yet has his journey come to its final destination, like Psyche's? The very last word of the novel, *obibam*, suggests not only movement but also incomplete movement ("I was in the process of . . .").¹¹¹ Lucius's journey, which did not end with recognition of family and a homecoming, is restarted time and again by the demands of new initiations, including relocation in a foreign country, and perhaps is not over when we leave him.

¹¹¹ See Winkler 1985, 224, with the eloquent translation of "obibam" by two verbs: "I was performing" and "I was going about"; Slater 2002, 175; Finkelpearl 2004, 330 (I discuss the ending(s) of the *Golden Ass* in more detail in 2007, especially 108–11). Luca Graverini, however, points out to me that the imperfect "obibam" could also suggest continuity and constancy (*I kept performing*).

From the Pagan Novels to Early Jewish and Christian Narratives: Refashioning Recognition

“Telling My Whole Life with His Words”: Recognitions in *Apollonius of Tyre*

Autobiographical Narratives, Sincerity, and Recognition

With *Apollonius of Tyre*, the idealistic vision of the Greek novels reappears. In the end the wicked are punished and the virtuous recover each other, thanks to the gods, who reward their virtue with two un-hoped-for recognitions, bringing together family members who were long dispersed and thought dead. Both recognitions happen because one of the parties involved tells his or her story.¹

One day Athenagoras, the king of Mytilene, sees a richly appointed ship moored in the city’s harbor. Discovering that the ship’s owner is hiding inside, in deep mourning, he goes down to try to heal his sorrow and, when he fails, sends Tarsia, a beautiful and talented virgin, versed in the liberal arts. Her task is to persuade the stranger to live and to come up “to the light” (32.11: *ad lucem*).² But in spite of her efforts, as she physically tries to take him to the light (37.14: “*ad lucem conabatur trahere*”), he pushes her back, and she falls, her nose

¹ The phrase in the section title comes from the lyrics of “Killing Me Softly with His Song,” made famous by Roberta Flack in 1973. Though in *Apollonius of Tyre* the protagonists speak of their own lives, not the life of the listener (as does the singer in “Killing Me Softly”), their stories cause a strong emotional identification in the listeners, who are deeply connected to the speakers.

² The text is Schmeling 2010 (1988), cited by page and line. The manuscripts of the novel, whose original is widely held to date to the early third century CE, have been grouped into several families, or Recensions. The oldest or A (c. 600) is also believed to be the best (I refer to it as the base text), but B includes clarifying information. C borrows from both: see Schmeling 1999, 145; 2003 a, 526–28. Garbugino (2010) considers B as important as A.

bleeding. Tears fill her eyes while she laments the dire misfortunes that have beset her all her life: "O hard-hearted powers of heaven, how can you allow an innocent girl like me to be harassed by such great calamities right since the cradle? As soon as I was born, at sea in the midst of storm-driven waves, my mother died in labor because the placenta reverted to her womb and clotted, and she was denied a grave on land,"³ and so on. The stranger, who is king Apollonius, recognizes the girl for his daughter and rushes to embrace her, weeping from joy.

After recovering his daughter, Apollonius is reunited also with his wife. As he is sailing with Tarsia and Athenagoras (who in the meantime has become Tarsia's husband) in the direction of Tarsus, Apollonius is advised in a dream to sail to Ephesus instead, go to the temple of Diana, "and present in good order all the vicissitudes you have suffered since youth."⁴ The priestess appears with a retinue to hear his "recitation" (40.16–17). She is so beautifully attired that Apollonius, Tarsia, and Athenagoras think she is Diana herself. The traditional novelistic motif of a mortal mistaken for a goddess because of her extraordinary beauty is here exploited to prevent immediate recognition in order to ensure that the decisive role will fall on Apollonius's account. (How she does not recognize him is, however, left unexplained: we may find it plausible because the many years, fourteen at least, and the blows of fortune could have significantly altered Apollonius's appearance.) In detailing his story Apollonius omits his name. This reads like a cheap narrative ploy, since he gives the names of other people (such as "Archistrates, the king of Cyrene") with no other reason than that the author needs the recognition to happen. But the omission, easy as we may judge it, has the result of putting the entire burden of recognition on Apollonius's recitation of his life.

Apollonius of Tyre stands out in Greek and Roman literature for building recognition scenes entirely around autobiographical narratives. This manner

³ "O ardua potestas caelorum, quae me pateris innocentem tantis calamitatibus ab ipsis cunabulis fatigari! nam statim ut nata sum in mari inter fluctus et procellas, parturiens me mater mea secundis ad stomachum redeuntibus coagulato sanguine mortua est, et sepultura ei denegata est terrae" (37.17–21).

⁴ "Et omnes casus tuos quos a iuvenili aetate es passus expone per ordinem" (40.5–6). The mysterious advisor is someone *angelico habitu*: The translation in Reardon 2008 [1989] runs "of angelic appearance," but the phrase could simply mean "in the appearance of a messenger," i.e., the messenger of a god. Holzberg (1990, 99), who believes that the text we have derives from a Greek one, proposes that in the original Apollonius's advisor was Artemis. This would fit with the dedication of Apollonius's wife to Diana and with Apollonius's own declaration to her that it was Diana who commanded him to come. If the original author was Greek (which, however, is disputed) or knew Greek novels, he might also have had in mind the ending of Achilles Tatius, which is similarly spurred by Artemis in a dream and similarly leads to the recognition of a woman temporarily under the protection of Artemis. See also Kortekaas 2007, 809.

of recognition, common enough in folklore,⁵ is startlingly underexploited in Greek epic and drama. True, autobiography leads to recognition in the very first such scene in Greek literature: Diomedes's and Glaucus's discovery of their ties as guest-friends owing to Glaucus's detailed account of his ancestry (in *Iliad* 6).⁶ In spite of this prestigious urtext, however, Aristotle does not even acknowledge the category (at *Poetics* 16, where he classifies recognitions according to their means), reflecting its underrepresentation. Odysseus's story is tied up with recognition, but as its consequence, not its cause: it is the vocal unfolding of an involuntary self-disclosure, prompted by songs that painfully stir his memory; the extension, as it were, of the tears that expose him and that he tries, but in vain, to hide. In extant tragedy, there are only two recognitions by means of personal narratives. In Sophocles's *Electra*, Orestes recognizes his sister by her lamentation over his "death,"⁷ and in *Iphigenia in Tauris* Iphigenia is recognized as she spells out to Orestes and Pylades the content of the letter she wants to be delivered to Orestes, in which she tells her "postmortem" history and conjures her brother to rescue her.⁸ Two comic instances are Plautus's *Menaechmi* and *Captivi*, where the discovery of the protagonists' identity is brought about by the memories they have of their lives.

Of the novelists, only Xenophon exploits autobiographical narratives as means to recognition, but he does not rely on them nearly as extensively as the author of *Apollonius of Tyre*. Anthia is recognized by Hippothous because, forced by the erotic demands he presses on her, she tells him of her love and sufferings (5.9.12–13); and the lovers are recognized also by their laments, in which they pour out their love for each other.⁹ More ingredients, however, make the final recognition happen, including material objects and traditional tokens (hair, dedications, signatures). In *Apollonius of Tyre* there are no such tokens. In fact, the

⁵ "Recognition by telling life history" is an entry in Thompson 1955, H 11.1.

⁶ Critics tend to overlook that this episode is the first recognition scene in Greek literature (if by recognition we mean, with Aristotle, a passing from ignorance to knowledge, especially concerning someone's identity). Two exceptions are Hoffmann 1910, 61 and Boulhol 1996, 187, n. 504. This recognition has the result, which foreshadows Euripides's *Ion* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*, of forestalling deadly violence.

⁷ I agree with the line of criticism according to which Orestes recognizes Electra only after her dirge over "Orestes's" urn. See, e.g., Solmsen 1967, 26–27.

⁸ In *Oedipus Rex* the recognition results from putting together pieces of Oedipus's life history, but the story is told by many. Oedipus knows only parts of it and misreads them.

⁹ See Lefferatou 2010, 310: "Leucon and Rhode recognize Habrocomes because he laments over Anthia and Anthia because she laments over Habrocomes." The parallel between Anthia telling her story and Tarsia doing so is one of several connecting *Apollonius of Tyre* to Xenophon's novel: Rohde notes it (1960, 440). More parallels are in Archibald 1991, 32; Schmeling 2003 a, 541–42.

elements of Tarsia's story are themselves "tokens," *signa*: "Apollonius, at hearing these tokens, cried out, weeping and in a loud voice."¹⁰

The limited exploitation of personal narratives as triggers of recognition in Greek and Roman literature seems to be connected to a simple fact: the suspicion that they are lies. This might explain why, for them to foster recognition, they must be either crosstested or meant for other purposes than recognition. In *Menaechmi*, the biographical information, which is sought out, goes through cross-examination rather than being immediately believed; one of the twins asks the other "What is our mother's name"? The same happens in *Andria*: when the revelation is first given, the reaction of Pamphilus's father is "this is a story" (925, paraphrased). Little by little, he and his friend realize the truth of the story, but to believe it for sure they need to hear the girl's name of birth, which she is no longer using (942–45). Likewise in *Choephoro*, Orestes is not believed when he tells Electra "I am Orestes"; she thinks it's a trick (220) and is persuaded only by a token. Glaucus's readily believed exposition of his genealogy does answer the question "who are you"? The etiquette of the *Iliad*, though, requires that heroes tell the truth about themselves before meeting in combat. Conversely, in the *Odyssey*, self-naming is not the way to recognition: Odysseus must produce tokens to his servants, to Penelope, and to Laertes. If Telemachus does not ask for tokens, it is because he was too young to know anything about his father when they were parted. But even Telemachus does not believe Odysseus's disclosure "I am your father." He accepts it as true only after Odysseus has dwelt on the power of the gods and his wretched wanderings.

On the other hand, Electra's and Iphigenia's self-disclosures are not aimed at recognition: one is a lament over a "dead" brother and the other an appeal to an "absent" one. Both *Apollonius of Tyre* and the *Ephesiaca* show this pattern: Tarsia speaks of herself to Apollonius not to reveal who she is, but to unburden her soul; Apollonius does tell his story to the priestess of Diana to reveal who he is but in obedience to a dream, with no other goal than to execute its orders; and Anthia discloses her love for Habrocomes to try to curb Hippothous's desire for her. If speakers are not asked who they are, if they volunteer details of their lives pressured by other forces, they are likely to tell the truth regardless of any additional moral compulsion. A neat illustration of this is the recognition of Orestes and Iphigenia in *Iphigenia in Tauris*: Iphigenia is immediately believed because she tells her story with a goal other than to be recognized, whereas Orestes, who names himself to her in order to be recognized, is asked to prove his identity by other means.

¹⁰ "Apollonius haec signa audiens exclamavit cum lacrimis voce magna" (77.11 and 127.6). *Menaechmi* provides a parallel: when one of the brothers is persuaded of the identity of the other by his words, he says "signa adnovi" (1124). This use of *signa* in *Apollonius of Tyre* is in Recensions B and C.

The suspicions attached to personal narratives intended for recognition emerge clearly in Shakespeare's *Pericles, Prince of Tyre*, which is based on *Apollonius of Tyre*.¹¹ After Marina (= Tarsia) sings of her misfortunes, Pericles muses (act 5, scene 1): "My dearest wife was like this maid, and such a one / My daughter might have been: my queen's square brows; / Her stature to an inch; as wand-like straight; / As silver voic'd; her eyes as jewel-like." Pericles is moved by the girl's song and by her resemblance to his wife and his imagined daughter, and asks her who she is. But Marina hesitates to speak: "If I should tell my history, it would seem / Like lies disdain'd in the reporting." Pericles reassures her: "Falseness cannot come from thee," for "thou seem'st a palace / For the crown'd truth to dwell in." He promises to believe her. But does he in fact? After hearing her story, he still would like to receive confirmation of her identity from a third party and, unable to do so, asks her "What was thy mother's name? Tell me that, / For truth can never be confirm'd enough, / Though doubts did ever sleep."¹² Pericles is not convinced by Marina's answer to the question "who are you"? but needs several kinds of evidence to believe her. Conversely, Apollonius is content with the—unsolicited—story Tarsia tells about herself.

In *Apollonius of Tyre*, however, no suspicions of untruthfulness mar personal identifications, whatever their goals. We can contrast Pericles's recognition of his wife with Apollonius's of his: though both women believe the stranger to be their husband on the basis of his story, Pericles is reluctant to accept the woman as his wife and asks for tokens (the jewels that were put in his wife's coffin, the name of the nobleman of Tyre who took his place as king when he left the city), whereas Apollonius believes her on her words alone.¹³ In the thought-world of the Latin novel, Tarsia's story can only be truthful, for as the blameless heroine, she cannot lie. The exceptional role of autobiographies as the only means to recognition in *Apollonius of Tyre* is in keeping with the ideal of *simplicitas*, highly valued in it (21.11; 25.9): both Tarsia and Apollonius are candid at heart; and both are rewarded for their sincerity with the power granted their personal stories to promote their interests.

In the Greek novels even good characters lie. Lying to stay loyal to the beloved is a virtuous trick, as it were: witness Chariclea, who dresses herself up as Theagenes's sister, and especially Anthia. When the pimp who has bought her puts her on display, she displays creative intelligence by coming up with a cunning *technē* (5.7.4): suddenly she collapses on the ground in convulsive movements as

¹¹ For the *Nachleben* of *Apollonius of Tyre*, see Archibald 1991 and 1999.

¹² Pericles's question recalls Apollonius's in C, on which *Pericles* is based: "what is your nurse's name"? (77.17–18; 127.13–14) In A, however, there is no such testing.

¹³ In Recensions B and C he initially rejects her embrace, but when she repeats "I am your wife," he needs no further proof.

if prey to the “divine illness.” Once she has “recovered” from her contrived fit of epilepsy, she tells the disappointed pimp how she fell victim to the disease: the ghost of a dead man in a cemetery struck her when she was little. Anthia piles lie on top of lie. By shoring up her feigned illness with a made-up story, she persuades the pimp, stays out of business, and is eventually sold out of the brothel.

There is no such virtuous lying in *Apollonius of Tyre*. The two chief liars, Antiochus and Dionysiades, are the novel’s chief villains, while the noble protagonists, Apollonius and his daughter, put their exceptional intelligence to the service not of deceiving but of deciphering. They are experts in riddles, that is, in filling blanks, turning silence into words: the very opposite of deceiving.

This rejection of virtuous lying is best illustrated by Tarsia’s behavior when she faces the same predicament as Anthia. Sold to a pimp, Tarsia finds as creative a way out as Anthia, but one in a quite different mold: she keeps her purity not by faking a story but by detailing her story to her customers. The moving account of her misfortunes assumes “the power of a talisman,”¹⁴ which deflates the men’s arousal (27.18: “avertit a libidine”) and rouses their tears instead. Tarsia no doubt narrates her vicissitudes *con sentimento*. After her recognition the king Athenagoras, watching father and daughter reunited, weeps and remembers “how once the girl in the brothel had narrated everything to him in that order.”¹⁵ Telling her story rewards Tarsia emotionally (after her dear nurse dies, every day she goes to her grave and tells her “all her vicissitudes [casus suos omnes]”);¹⁶ but is also an exercise in which she displays her eloquence as a public spectacle to preserve her virginity.¹⁷ She offers to exhibit her *facundia* equally by solving riddles and by telling *omnes casus meos* (69.13–14)—by unearthing hidden truths and by telling the whole truth about herself. While Anthia and Tarsia both rouse pity in their clients-to-be by inventive means,¹⁸ Anthia does it by the persuasive enactment of a lie, Tarsia by the persuasive recital of her true story.

Apollonius is as sincere as his daughter. A king fallen from splendor to nothingness, like Odysseus, he nonetheless does not believe in *mētis* as a means to improve his fortunes. As noted, the string of episodes in Cyrene at the beginning of the novel seems to reproduce Odysseus’s stay at the court of Alcinoüs: both

¹⁴ Schmeling 2003 a, 550.

¹⁵ “Quomodo sibi olim hoc ordine puella in lupanari posita universa narrasset” (77.23–24; 127.18–19).

¹⁶ See 64.25; 107.3. The phrase *universos casus suos exposuit* (or variants of it) recurs with formulaic frequency already in A: see 26.30–31; 27.17; 28.6 and 9.

¹⁷ See 28.38–39: “facundia sermonis mei spectaculum praebeo.” On the motif “eloquence preserves virginity” from Seneca the Elder to Shakespeare, see Helms 1990, and, specifically on *Apollonius of Tyre*, Panayotakis 2002. Interesting parallels with hagiographies are in Cataudella 1981, 944.

¹⁸ For Anthia see *Ephesiaca* 5.7.4, with Panayotakis 2002, 107.

heroes are shipwrecked; both please their royal host with their talents; and both are helped (and loved) by the king's daughter.¹⁹ Apollonius, however, does not contrive to keep his identity hidden. As soon as he is cast ashore, naked and desperate, he meets an old fisherman and, to urge him to help, introduces himself: "So that you'll know the kind of man I am asking you to pity, I am Apollonius of Tyre, a king in my native land."²⁰ Apollonius counts on his name and rank, whereas Odysseus in an identical situation, when he supplicates Nausicaa, remains anonymous and counts on the seductive power of his shimmering and deceptive eloquence. Odysseus turns his anonymity to his advantage by adopting it as a cover; Apollonius thinks that his advantage consists in spelling out that he is king Apollonius, not the destitute shipwreck victim he appears to be.

Openness characterizes Apollonius also in his dealings with Archistrates and his daughter (the nameless "Nausicaa"). If at first he hesitates to speak of himself, it is not to dissimulate his identity but because he is overwhelmed by sorrow (tears dress his silence: 11.5, 18); and, urged to "speak more plainly," he instantly obliges: "universos casus suos exposuit" (11.28). He is sincere again when the envoy from Tyre asks him whether he knows Apollonius: "I know him as I do myself" (17.10: "ut me ipsum, sic illum novi"). The envoy misses the pun, but Apollonius is not trying to hide. As soon as he hears that Antiochus was killed by lightning and that he is to become king of Antioch, he rejoices openly with his wife, quite likely in the presence of the envoy.²¹

Apollonius's openness about himself is, like Tarsia's, rewarded. Father and daughter both gain from telling their stories. If Tarsia preserves her virginity, Apollonius recovers wealth and status. The gentle request by Archistrates's daughter to the shipwrecked guest that he tell the vicissitudes of his life sets in motion the events leading to their marriage. Because Apollonius, after telling his story, shows himself distressed by the memory of old sorrows, like Aeneas before telling his (11.31: "veteres ei renovasti dolores"), the girl gives him riches galore, plays the lyre for him, hears him play, and falls in love with him. It is Apollonius's undisguised response to his undisguised recitation of his life that improves his fortunes.

The recognition is to be read as the greatest reward granted father and daughter for their sincerity about themselves. Tarsia tells Apollonius about herself as soon as she descends into the boat to entertain him. She sings of her purity, her

¹⁹ See Holzberg 1990, who thinks that the author of *Apollonius of Tyre* modeled this sequence on the corresponding episodes from the *Odyssey*. See also Kuhlmann 2002, 115–16. On the other hand, Konstan (1994, 105) does not believe in a direct imitation.

²⁰ "Ut scias cuius miserearis, ego sum Tyrius Apollonius, patriae meae princeps" (9.11–12).

²¹ The text does not say that the envoy has left, though this might be because it focuses on Apollonius.

misadventures, her nobility (no one would be more nobly born, if only she knew where her father was), before begging him to be in better spirits. At hearing her song, Apollonius looks at her and weeps (33.6). He weeps because her song has rekindled his fresh sorrow (33.13: “recentem enim mihi renovasti dolorem”), because her story has stirred him as his own. Tarsia’s autobiographical performance causes another Aeneas-like response in him. His emotional stirring is also reminiscent of Odysseus’s when Demodocus sings of his deeds: it initiates the kind of recognition Aristotle calls “by memory” (at *Poetics* 16). Just as Odysseus cannot stay hidden for long after hearing the songs, Apollonius is roused to “come to the light.” He uncurls his body, lifting his head and sitting up in a gesture of awakening (“levavit caput; erigens se . . . adsedit”), and then lets his heart speak: “Wretched me! How long can I fight against *pietatem*”? For him, *pietas* is the girl’s affection, even compassion (Sandy’s translation) for a stranger. But for the reader, who knows in what relationship the two are, *pietas* has an additional ring: it is the love, devotion, obligation, that ties children to parents and vice versa. At reading Apollonius’s words the reader thinks: how long will he resist the *pietas* that binds him, as father, to the girl before him? That is, how long will he stay “in the dark” about his relationship to Tarsia?²²

It is true that Apollonius, though instantly moved by the story of Tarsia’s life, tries not to act on his emotion. His resistance allows the recognition scene some latitude. The Aeneas-like feeling caused in him by the song, as much as it betrays his emotional identification with the girl’s vicissitudes,²³ risks forestalling recognition: he tells Tarsia to go away and offers her 200 aurei, “as if you had taken me to the light” (33.12–13: “ac si in lucem produxeris me”). When she returns, his eagerness to be further entertained by this intelligent girl (33.26–34.1: “cupiens a prudenti puella audire sermonem”) is countered by his insistence on his incurable state (34.1–2), by his repeated claim that he cannot put an end to mourning (35.1–2; 11). He tells her to stop, lest he appear to insult the dead (37.7–8) whose memory he wants to mourn (37.11–12). His final flare of violence against her, as she attempts to take him *in lucem*, is a fight against the call of joy (“Please stop urging me to be happy”!),²⁴ against his growing desire to see the light.²⁵ That

²² Apollonius’s responsiveness to *pietas* casts him as the opposite of Antiochus, the negative exemplar of a father, who no longer has *pietas* when he forces himself on his daughter (1.10; see also 2.6: “impietas fecit scelus”) but still pretends to be *pious* in public (2.14; Apollonius greets him as a “pater pius” at 3.2).

²³ In Virgil it is the speaker, Aeneas, not the listener, Dido, whose sorrow is awakened even by the prospect of telling his story. The reversal in the novel’s episode points up the identification of the listener with the speaker.

²⁴ “Te obstetor ne ulterius me ad laetandum provoces”: 37.7–8.

²⁵ I cannot agree with Konstan (1994, 110) that Apollonius remains “unmoved.” His violent response to Tarsia’s efforts follows from his stirring.

desire has been aroused by Tarsia's autobiographical song. Her sorrowful outpouring, which soon thereafter fosters recognition, is in a continuum with that song, and Apollonius's recognition of her is prepared for by his empathetic response to it.

Recognitions: Father and Daughter

Apollonius's unnamed wife is as sincere as her husband and daughter. Yet her story plays no role in her recognition or its aftermath. In the Greek novels, the heroine recounts her trials at least to her beloved, if not also, as it happens in Achilles Tatius, to a larger public: Clitophon credits Leucippe's story with being more exciting than his and invites her to fill in the missing part of the "drama," which Leucippe, once her virginity has been proven, does "with pleasure" (8.15.3–4). That both lovers narrate their adventures marks the reciprocity and mutual intensity of their feelings, and is one manifestation of the relative "sexual symmetry"²⁶ that characterizes their relationship. In contrast, the story of Apollonius's wife remains untold even after she recovers her husband.

The wife's silence highlights a well-known feature of this novel: the privilege accorded to the relationship between father and daughter.²⁷ This is reflected also in the greater length and narrative sophistication of the recognition scene featuring Apollonius and Tarsia.²⁸ Tarsia plays the role that the Greek novels entrust to the heroine, and her father that of the hero.²⁹ These impersonations are not just mechanical substitutions but cut disturbingly into a thematic core of the

²⁶ Konstan 1994.

²⁷ Szepessy (1985–88) calls *Apollonius of Tyre* a "family novel," pointing out that it does not have one couple but two, and that both weddings occupy unmarked positions, in the course of the narrative, rather than at the beginning or at the end. The priority of the relationship father-daughter over husband-wife is indicated already by the absence or death of Antiochus's wife: see Konstan 1994, 100–113; Schmeling 1999, 148–49; Panayotakis 2002, 99–100. It comes to the fore also in Apollonius's lack of passion for his wife-to-be and in Athenagoras's unclear feelings for his. Perry (1967, 307 and 315) sees in Apollonius's apparent indifference to the girl who loves him and resignation to marry her a comic imprint, and attributes Athenagoras's strange behavior toward Tarsia (first he seems to be enamored of her, but then he is willing to deflower her and does not buy her freedom) to the author's goal of introducing a "Plautine" episode (the farcical brothel visitations). Whatever the case, the author's carelessness in handling both men's feelings brings out the relative insignificance of romantic love in his narrative. Konstan (1994, 100–113) observes the absence of the threats to the couple's fidelity typical of the love-and-adventure novels, and the depiction of marital love as a paternal, not erotic, affection. See also Kuhlmann 2002, 113.

²⁸ See Kuhlmann 2002, 114, referenced by Garbugino 2010, 7. Kortekaas (2007, 754), on the other hand, views the first recognition as "very short" whereas it "should in fact have formed the climax."

²⁹ See Kuhlmann 2002, 114.

novel, incest. The reappearance of a riddle contest and Apollonius's excited participation in it build further anxiety by harking back to the story of incest at the beginning of the novel: just as Apollonius then solved a riddle encoding the incestuous relationship between a father and a daughter, now he is enthralled by his own daughter's ability to propose riddles, and solves them with growing gusto. His attraction to Tarsia recalls the comic pattern of misreading the call of blood as erotic desire. Readers enjoy the *suspens scabreux* of a scene that flirts with the risk of incest alongside the more canonical tragic motif of violence between family members unknown to each other.³⁰ This "overload" of emotional tension relaxes into exuberant effusions when at last the recognition occurs: Apollonius runs to embrace his daughter and weeps from joy (38.4–5: "in amplexu illius ruens . . . coepit flere prae gaudio"). By comparison, the recovery of his wife leaves him cold: she is the one who runs to him (41.12), and in a later variant he does not even recognize her instantly but pushes her away (80.20–21; 132.6–7). After he recognizes her, he still does not say a word of greeting to her but responds only to her request to see her daughter: "Here she is" (41.16: "ecce, haec est").³¹ We are presented with the tableau of a family reunion featuring the daughter at the center.

The recognition between father and daughter announces itself as the novel's climactic episode by means of a telling detail: right before it occurs, Apollonius makes Tarsia bleed. Spilled blood sends the reader back to the very first page of the novel, where Antiochus takes his daughter's virginity and leaves her bleeding. This correspondence suggests that the novel is coming full circle. The blood is the graphic detail around which crystallizes the opposition bad father/good father, and as such it has diametrically opposite functions in the two scenes: it makes Antiochus's daughter fatherless ("where is my father? . . . The name Father has ceased to exist for me"),³² while it reunites Tarsia with her father.³³

The aftermath of the recognition between father and daughter has even the qualities of a true ending: once the pimp who owned Tarsia has been burnt alive, the citizens of Mytilene dedicate a statue to Apollonius and Tarsia, and Tarsia marries Athenagoras. The novel seems to be coming to a close both because of the dedication, a gesture that carries a sense of finality, and because of the marriage, which typically ends the novels and typically follows from recognition. The brief mention of the marriage, while betraying its relative lack of

³⁰ Critics have even suggested that in an earlier version Apollonius only narrowly avoided committing incest: for references, see Archibald 1991, 16–17.

³¹ In B, Apollonius and his wife both weep (80.27) but only after she has recovered her daughter in addition to her husband.

³² "Et ubi est pater? . . . periit in me nomen patris" (2.7–8).

³³ See also Schmeling 2003 a, 525.

importance—again, the father matters more than the husband—also conveys the sentiment that the story is over: “Why say much? A few days later he [Apollonius] gave his daughter to the prince Athenagoras, receiving much honor from the citizens and causing them much joy.”³⁴ What word would be more fitting to end an ancient novel than *laetitia*? If the story resumes, it is thanks to a *deus ex machina*, the vision urging Apollonius to go to Ephesus. The artificiality of this intervention again strongly suggests that what follows it is appended to the story merely as a necessary coda to bring the expected reversals to full completion (for the ending to be truly happy, the whole family must be reunited, all the good people rewarded, and the bad ones punished).

The guidance offered Apollonius by the vision is yet another telltale sign that the novel has reached its climax with the recognition between father and daughter. For Apollonius, who was accustomed to storms and shipwrecks (as one critic put it, in this novel “travel by ship is better termed travel by shipwreck”),³⁵ after recovering his daughter enjoys an unusually serene journey: he safely deviates from his chosen path in accordance with divine instruction and arrives in Ephesus *felici cursu* (40.9). Likewise, the heroes and heroines of the Greek novels are blessed with safe traveling after their recognitions: it takes Anthia and Habrocomes only a few days to reach home (*Ephesiaca* 5. 15. 1); Chaereas and Callirhoe sail “with good fortune” to Syracuse, helped by a steady tailwind (*Callirhoe* 8. 6. 1); Leucippe and Clitophon enjoy “a fair wind” as they sail to Byzantium (*Leucippe and Clitophon* 8. 19. 2). The identical pattern puts the recognition of Tarsia and Apollonius on the same plane as those of romantic lovers, which constitute the culminating episode after which the sea becomes quiet.³⁶

The priority accorded to the relationship between father and daughter over husband and wife emerges also from a comparison of the novel’s recognitions with corresponding ones in the *Odyssey*. There are several parallels between *Apollonius of Tyre* and the *Odyssey* also in the treatment of recognition. Let me start with a specific episode. At the end of the journey, as he returns to Cyrene with his recovered family, Apollonius catches sight of the fisherman who, when he was stranded naked and destitute near the city some fourteen years earlier, clothed him, fed him, and gave him lodging. He orders his servants to take the

³⁴ “Quid multa? Inter paucos dies tradidit filiam suam Athenagorae principi cum ingenti honore ac civitatis laetitia” (39.27–28). The phrase *Quid multa?* is almost formulaic: it appears whenever the author wants to cut the narrative short.

³⁵ Schmeling 1999, 142. (Frye 1978, 4, makes a similar observation for the Greek novels: “The normal means of transportation is by shipwreck.”) In medieval French versions of *Apollonius of Tyre*, Apollonius was referred to as “le perilliers de mer” (the one in danger at sea): see Archibald 1999, 233–34.

³⁶ Literary or metaphorically: in Chariton there are no shipwrecks, though the sea does major damage to the couple (as Callirhoe says at the end of book 3).

old man to his palace. The fisherman, who apparently has not recognized or even seen Apollonius, fears for his life, but Apollonius discloses his identity, rewards him for his past cares, and makes him his friend for life (43.11–22).

This episode of recognition between the novel's protagonist and a lowly but loyal character has no equivalent in the Greek novels. Perhaps the figure of the fisherman was inspired by the *Ephesiaca*, where another fisherman, Aigialeus, gives hospitality to the protagonist. But when Habrocomes goes back to see the fisherman again, he finds him dead. The different turn of events in *Apollonius of Tyre* could suggest that the author is rather modeling his fisherman on Eumaeus, who not only feeds the stranger, gives him shelter, and clothes him but eventually enjoys recognition of and by him because of his loyalty.³⁷ The fisherman in *Apollonius of Tyre* must benefit from recognition for his Homeric impersonation to be complete.

More general recognition patterns in this novel also follow the *Odyssey*'s. In both texts, the child recognizes the father before the wife recognizes the husband; and in both, subsequent to recognitions the hero punishes the family's enemies.³⁸ In *Apollonius of Tyre* the recognition between father and daughter conveys a sense of closure, but only once it is completed with Tarsia's marriage. For as soon as Apollonius recognizes her, he also realizes that she was sold to a pimp and cries out "let this city die!" (38.8–9: "pereat haec civitas!") Desire for revenge swells in him as much as joy at the recovery of his daughter, and is a prelude to violent action.

The plot of *Apollonius of Tyre* thus comes closest to the *Odyssey*'s with its double ending, happiness for the good and ruin for the wicked. Though in the Greek novels as well good is rewarded and evil punished, the ending is not double: it is the victory of goodness that is emphasized rather than the punishment of badness.³⁹ The ending is celebratory and, in *Daphnis and Chloe*, even conciliatory (the couple's rivals participate in the marriage festivities). There is no recognition at the end of a Greek novel that recalls Odysseus's godlike self-disclosure in *Odyssey* 22, with its deadly consequences for the suitors, whereas in *Apollonius of Tyre* we have one such episode. Apollonius introduces the last act of his revenge, against Tharsia's foster parents, by exhibiting the girl herself to the

³⁷ Holzberg 1990.

³⁸ Holzberg 1990. Holzberg takes the influence of the *Odyssey* on *Apollonius of Tyre* as evidence that the latter comes from a Greek text. However, the lack of references to Greek authors (including Homer) and the numerous citations of Roman ones might indicate that the text is originally Latin. (This thesis is defended especially by Schmeling, e.g., 2003 a; see also Kuhlmann 2002, with the additional argument that fundamental motifs of the novel, such as *pietas*, have Latin roots.) We can safely assume that the *Odyssey* was well known to a Latin-speaking author in late antiquity.

³⁹ One exception is Thersander in Achilles Tatius, who is punished toward the end.

entire population of Tarsus and specifically to the wicked couple who, even on his return, had the audacity to declare her dead from natural causes. In one of the later variants, the girl is summoned as if from the Underworld,⁴⁰ and she enters with her head veiled and then reveals her face (81.21: “revelata facie”), as Odysseus takes off his disguise. The foster mother’s panicky response to Tarsia’s “epiphany” recalls that of the suitors to Odysseus’s: “The evil woman, when she saw her, trembled convulsively.”⁴¹

These extensive parallels with the *Odyssey*, however, highlight the reversal operated by the author of *Apollonius of Tyre* in the order of importance of the recognition scenes. In both narratives the protagonist’s recognition by his child precedes the one by his wife. But in the epic, the recognition between husband and wife is the most elaborate and the most eagerly looked forward to. Odysseus’s reunion with Penelope ends in a long night of stories and lovemaking, which marks a temporary respite from the dangers that still await the couple. Apollonius and his wife, on the other hand, limit their effusions to an embrace, for which she takes the initiative.⁴² The community’s celebrations of their reunion end with a farewell to the former priestess of Diana, as she departs “with her husband, daughter, and son-in-law” (41.22–23). Even when the “camera” briefly stops on Apollonius’s nameless wife, it is to shoot the picture of a happy family.⁴³

“Who Are You”? *Joseph and Aseneth*, or It Is Impossible to Recognize a Convert

In banning conventional tokens from the recognition of Tarsia and her father, *Apollonius of Tyre* breaks away from a fixed pattern adopted also by the Greek novels, which in other respects experiment with alternative modes of recognition. If, in *Callirhoe*, intuition leads the way to the excited Chaereas and his voice proves his identity to Callirhoe, the recognition is not one of family identity. Heliodorus makes much of nature’s voice, but in the end traditional tokens (and untraditional ones: the painting, the mole) bring about the revelation of

⁴⁰ We are reminded of Chaereas’s apparition at the trial (*Callirhoe* 5.7.7).

⁴¹ “Mulier mala, ut vidit eam, imo corpore contremuit” (42.11–12).

⁴² Ancient critics considered Odysseus’s and Penelope’s reunion the telos of the poem, whereas in *Apollonius of Tyre*, as I have suggested, it is Apollonius’s recovery of Tarsia that reads like an ending or the main “goal.” We can contrast *Apollonius of Tyre* also with *Callirhoe*, in which *Od.* 23.296 signs the couple’s recovery of each other. Odysseus and Chaereas have their long night of love, Apollonius does not.

⁴³ We shall also note that only Tarsia and her father take part in her “epiphany” at Tarsus. Apollonius’s wife, though present (41.51), remains in the backstage.

Chariclea's origins. In rejecting tokens throughout, *Apollonius of Tyre* rubs elbows with early Christian narratives that likewise exile artificial paraphernalia from recognitions of family identity.⁴⁴

This marked correspondence seems to me to provide an appropriate entry-way to turn the investigation from pagan to Jewish and Christian texts, some of which also rework the recognition motif. My discussion will necessarily be brief:⁴⁵ its goal will be only to map the main aspects in the reconfiguration of the motif operated by early Jewish and Christian writings that have invited comparison with the Greek novels, and for which, in at least some cases, we can postulate direct contact. Since in those narratives recognition becomes intertwined with conversion, I shall ask: how? Whether recognition of a family member or a loved one can coexist with recognition of god depends on how demanding either party is; on whether either one asks for exclusive rights. The very experience of conversion, however, as such is incompatible with recognition in the novelistic sense: as the discovery of a higher order, it cannot coexist with the recovery of a status quo. How, then, do Jewish and Christian narratives negotiate the tensions between discovery and recovery, between vertical and circular recognition? My main focus will be the Jewish *Joseph and Aseneth* and the Christian *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions*, whose manifold and detailed similarities with the Greek novels have been noted.

Joseph and Aseneth belongs to a group of narratives that has earned the label "Jewish novels," as in the title of Laurence Will's book on the subject.⁴⁶ Those include also *Greek Esther*, *Susanna*, *Tobit*, *Judith*, the *Tobiad Romance*, novelistic *Testaments*, and others.⁴⁷ Jewish novels share with their Greek sisters the extraordinary beauty of the heroine; of the hero (Joseph); the purity of both; the attention paid to dreams (*Esther*); divine protection and support of the protagonists; and more. Misrepresentations of identity also occur. In the *Tobiad Romance*, for instance, Joseph's brother sends his daughter to sleep with Joseph in lieu of a dancer who has caught his fancy. Joseph, being drunk, does not recognize the girl and, after more nights together, falls in love with her. This intrigue smacks of New Comedy and of the novel: think of the "Thisbe saga" in Heliodorus (though in the Jewish text the trick serves a morally good purpose, for Joseph's brother is ready to disgrace his own daughter in order to save Joseph from the shame of sleeping with a dancer).

⁴⁴ One exception is the *Life of John Calybite* with a family gospel as *gnōrisma*: see Boulhol 1996, 22.

⁴⁵ For comprehensive treatment of the *anagnōrismos* motif in Christian hagiography, I refer again to Boulhol 1996.

⁴⁶ Wills 1995. See also Wills 2002.

⁴⁷ Wills (2002) differentiates between "Jewish novels," "Jewish historical novels," and "Jewish novelistic testaments."

Another motif connected with recognition and reminiscent of New Comedy and the novel is in the *Testament of Joseph*, where Joseph the slave refrains from revealing who he truly is in order not to defame his brothers, who have sold him, yet the leader of the Ishmaelites to whom he has been sold says, "You are no slave, for I can tell that from your appearance."⁴⁸ These words could come straight from New Comedy, from *Callirhoe*, and especially from *Daphnis and Chloe*.⁴⁹

What the Jewish novels do not exploit, however, are scenes of recognition between the hero and the heroine of the kind that populate the Greek novels. We might expect one such scene at least in *Joseph and Aseneth*, which is (also) a love story involving separation and reunion of the couple, like the Greek novels.⁵⁰ Joseph, in his capacity as the governor of Egypt, is sent to inspect the plantation of Aseneth's father. He wants to betroth Aseneth to Joseph, but she, a beautiful maiden so fond of virginity that no man yet has even caught a glimpse of her, violently rejects the alliance with a foreigner who bears the additional stigma of having been a slave, and retreats to the tower where she lives in seclusion. When Joseph arrives, however, she peeps from the window. Struck by his beauty, she chastises herself for her blasphemous words. Joseph also sees her but asks his host to send her away because he is wary of all women. Only when he learns that Aseneth has never seen a man does he agree to meet her; but still he does not allow her to kiss him because she worships idols. As she bursts into tears, he feels pity for her and prays to his god that he make her new (8.9: ἀνακαίνισον). Joseph leaves for a week, during which Aseneth goes through agonizing soul-searching and converts. When he returns, they marry.

This constitutes the first and longest part of the novel. (The second narrates the couple's victory against the Pharaoh's elder son, who attempts to kill Joseph and kidnap Aseneth, and Joseph's ascent to the throne of Egypt.) As critics have long observed, *Joseph and Aseneth* shares a number of motifs with the Greek novels, such as adventures, the protagonists' exceptional beauty, and their chastity.⁵¹ The parallels reach down to details: Aseneth's famed beauty, like Callirhoe's, rouses suitors from all over Egypt, who fight each other for her; Joseph's beauty, like Habrocomes's, causes every woman to fall for him;⁵² Aseneth does

⁴⁸ *Testament of Joseph* 11, in Wills 2002, 237.

⁴⁹ Wills (1995, 168, n. 27) notes that the motif is reminiscent of Greek novels.

⁵⁰ *Joseph and Aseneth* was written between 100 BCE and the early second century CE. I consider it Jewish following mainstream opinion, though scholars have also proposed that it is Christian. For full citations I adapt the translation by Wills 2002; the text is Fink 2008, which revises Burchard 2003.

⁵¹ Kraemer (1998, 10–11), drawing on Philonenko 1968, lists these motifs. See also Wills 1995, 175–76.

⁵² See Philonenko 1968, 151.

not look Egyptian but Jewish, as Chariclea does not look Ethiopian but Greek;⁵³ she worships virginity like Chariclea and Habrocomes. The numerous and manifold correspondences have pushed Stephanie West to call *Joseph and Aseneth* “a Greek romance.”⁵⁴

This romance, however, lacks the canonical recognition of the protagonists that in the Greek specimens ends their separation. The effusions that typically mark the lovers’ recovery of each other in the Greek novels also celebrate the reunion of Joseph and Aseneth: “They clung to each other for a long time and kissed, and their spirits came to life.”⁵⁵ But no recognition precedes the reunion. On the contrary, the text emphasizes that Joseph *does not* recognize Aseneth: “Aseneth went out of the entryway to meet Joseph, and when he saw her, he was amazed at her beauty and said to her, ‘Who are you?’”⁵⁶ The absence of a mutual *anagnōrismos* from a narrative that could be labeled a Greek romance calls for interpretation.⁵⁷

Joseph and Aseneth modifies the outward novelistic sequence—encounter, separation, and reunion—to accommodate Aseneth’s conversion. As soon as she sees Joseph, she recognizes his true nature: “the sun has come down to us

⁵³ The detail that Aseneth looks Jewish is likely to be an echo of the rabbinic tradition grappling with the problem: how could the pious Joseph marry an Egyptian? The solution was that in truth Aseneth was the daughter of Joseph’s sister Dina. See Philonenko 1968, 32–33. Another possible solution is that Aseneth is Jewish *in nuce*: see below.

⁵⁴ West 1974. West sees in *Joseph and Aseneth* a direct forerunner of the Greek novels, whereas Pervo (2003, 688) postulates influence from them, and Wills (1995, 161–62) sees only a “strained connection” between the Jewish narrative and Greek ones. In an earlier article Pervo (1976) argues that *Joseph and Aseneth* imitates Greek novels in structure and motifs, but considers the Jewish tradition of the “sapiential novel” as its main matrix.

⁵⁵ καὶ περιεπλάκησαν ἀλλήλοις ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ ἡσπάσαντο καὶ ἀνέζησαν τῷ πνεύματι αὐτῶν (19.10). West notes (1974, 75) that the description of the reunion follows a “romantic cliché.”

⁵⁶ καὶ Ἀσενεθ ἐξῆλθεν ἐκ τοῦ προδρόμου εἰς συνάντησιν τῷ Ἰωσήφ· καὶ εἶδεν αὐτὴν Ἰωσήφ καὶ ἔθαμβήθη ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει αὐτῆς καὶ εἶπε πρὸς αὐτήν· τίς εἶ σύ; (19.4). Of the two versions in which *Joseph and Aseneth* has been transmitted, only the longer one contains this episode. Scholars are undecided as to which version is the original: see Wills 2002, 123. Philonenko (1968) edits the shorter one, whereas Burchard (2003) and Fink (2008) the longer one. Kraemer (1998) believes the shorter to be original. Inowlocki (2002) translates the shorter one, but also states that both choices are valid (153). Wills includes the longer one in brackets. McEwan Humphrey (1995, 34) bases her interpretation on the longer. The most recent trend among scholars seems to be in favor of the longer: see Fink 2008, 5–7. Even if the failed recognition was not in the original, however, apparently it could be felt to develop naturally from the scene of Aseneth’s and Joseph’s reunion. In the shorter version, the reunion is not marked by recognition either: Joseph greets Aseneth as a “saint virgin” and explains that the angel had told him about her.

⁵⁷ Philonenko (1968, 45) notes the absence of the motif of recognition as well as those of oracles and dreams, and attributes it to the author’s choice to dispose of such easy devices: “l’auteur a fait peu de cas de tous ces procédés faciles et traditionnels de la littérature romanesque de son temps.” In the case of recognition I think that there is a more profound reason for its absence.

from heaven";⁵⁸ and she is forced to realize that "I said vicious things about him, and did not know."⁵⁹ Aseneth suddenly sees;⁶⁰ and (contrary to Lucius in the *Golden Ass*) she vocally recognizes her faults: "Pardon me, for I have sinned against you in ignorance . . . and spoken blasphemies against Joseph, my Lord, because I did not know that he was your son . . . and I have spoken blasphemies about him, and did not know that he was your son."⁶¹ The incompatibility of the two models of recognition, circular and vertical, is effectively highlighted by the novel's chiasmic patterning:⁶² to the sequence "Aseneth sees Joseph and recognizes who he really is" when first he appears to her (6.1–2) corresponds, with a reversal, "Joseph sees Aseneth again and does not recognize who she is" when he comes back to her.

The occurrence of a radical transformation in the religious beliefs of the heroine is *Joseph and Aseneth's* main departure from the Greek novels, whose protagonists do not undergo any such fundamental change after love enters their lives. Falling in love is the change that reorients their lives. In *Joseph and Aseneth*, on the other hand, the discovery of love, while punishing Aseneth for her virginal arrogance—we are reminded of Habrocomes and Chariclea—and initial rejection of Joseph, also ignites a spiritual crisis that goes beyond lovesickness.⁶³ Aseneth's reaction—her failing knees, her trembling body—recalls that of a mortal to a god's epiphany rather than of a virgin to the onset of love.⁶⁴ She experiences an unbridgeable distance between her worthless self and the "Sun of Heaven."

⁵⁸ ὁ ἥλιος ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἦκε πρὸς ἡμᾶς (6.2).

⁵⁹ ἐλάλησα ῥήματα πονηρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ᾔδην (6.3).

⁶⁰ Inowlocki (2002, 38–39) makes a parallel between Aseneth and Helen in the *Odyssey*, in that Helen also recognizes the true person beyond superficial appearances (Odysseus disguised as a beggar).

⁶¹ σύγγνωθί μοι, διότι ἡμαρτόν σοι ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ . . . καὶ λελάληκα βλάσφημα εἰς τὸν κύριόν μου Ἰωσήφ, διότι οὐκ ᾔδην ὅτι υἱὸς σου ἐστίν . . . καὶ λελάληκα περὶ αὐτοῦ πονηρὰ καὶ οὐκ ᾔδην ὅτι υἱὸς σου ἐστίν (13.13).

⁶² On the chiasmic structure of *Joseph and Aseneth*, see McEwan Humphrey 1995, especially 46–48.

⁶³ On character-change in the Jewish novels see Wills 2002, 14–15; 1995, 13, 184, and 172 (specifically on Aseneth). A stereotype of the genre is the "identity crisis" suffered by the heroine, causing her to mourn, fast, repent, and therein experience a growing intensity in her feelings and belief. Wills notes (1995, 172) that Aseneth's heartrending conversion scene outwardly resembles the lamentations of Greek romantic heroines, but that in her case, "at issue is the inward transformation of the protagonist," whereas in the Greek novels, "the suffering is always over something external, usually the loss of the loved one."

⁶⁴ Aseneth responds in a similar way to the appearance of the angel: she falls at his feet "with great fear and trembling in her whole body" (14.10: ἐφοβήθη . . . φόβον μέγαν καὶ ἐτρόμαξε πάντα τὰ μέλη αὐτῆς). Aseneth's reaction to Joseph's epiphany also evokes the experience of the initiate into the Eleusinian mysteries: see Inowlocki 2002, 112.

A parallel can be made with Psyche's predicament after she sees Cupid. The description of Aseneth's *coup de foudre* indeed calls forth Psyche's reaction to her discovery: when Aseneth saw Joseph on the chariot, "she was cut to the heart. Her soul was broken, her knees grew weak beneath her, her entire body trembled."⁶⁵ "But Psyche was terrified at this marvelous sight and put out of her mind; overcome with the pallor of exhaustion she sank faint and trembling to her knees."⁶⁶ Both Aseneth and Psyche discover the divine identity of the person they see, which discovery makes them realize their previous blasphemous disposition. (Psyche "tried to hide the weapon—in her own heart.") For both, the recognition brings about a painful and laborious journey of expiation and knowledge, with no return.

Aseneth's vertical recognition prevents the typical novelistic recognition from happening because, when Joseph comes back to her, they are not reunited but rather united for the first time. The conversion transforms the reunion and return of the Greek novels into a first encounter. Joseph and Aseneth have not truly met before, for their first interaction was marred by misrepresentation of identity and rejection on both sides: to her initial refusal to marry him corresponds his refusal to kiss her; to her misjudged perception of him responds his assumption that she is yet one more lustful woman. True, toward the end of their first meeting they come emotionally closer, in that they are both cut to the heart (κατενύγη), she at his rejection, he at her tears (8.8). But Joseph's sympathy comes across not in a word or gesture of welcome but in the prayer that she be "made new," which underscores the gulf separating them and the imperative that she become like him for them to meet.

Joseph and Aseneth are kindred souls from the start: they both worship virginity and are god-fearing.⁶⁷ As one scholar has put it, they are "almost mirror images of each other."⁶⁸ Their affinity calls to mind the profound kinship that connects the lovers in the Greek novels and that is at the very basis of their falling in love, their first "recognition." But in *Joseph and Aseneth*, that profound kinship remains buried, unrecognized, as long as the heroine is a heathen. The conversion brings her likeness to Joseph to fulfillment by transforming her into a thing of light, the same as he. For Joseph had appeared to her as "the sun from heaven," a "glittering light" (λάμπει . . . ὥς φῶς), and again a light (φῶς) such as no

⁶⁵ κατενύγη ἰσχυρῶς· καὶ παρεκλάσθη ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτῆς καὶ παρελύθησαν τὰ γόνατα αὐτῆς καὶ ἐτρόμαξεν ὅλον τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς (6.1).

⁶⁶ "At vero Psyche tanto aspectu deterrita et impos animi, marcido pallore defecta tremensque desedit in imos poplites" (*Golden Ass* 5.22.3). The parallel is in Philonenko 1968, 148, and Inowlocki 2002, 103.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., 3.6; 4.7; 7.7; 8.1.

⁶⁸ See Douglas 1988, 35.

woman could have borne (6.2 and 4). After her conversion, Aseneth likewise becomes “a vision of light” (20.6: *εἶδος φωτός*). Her brilliance descends from the angelic light that has touched her and of which she has partaken. (The angel appears to her from a “great and indescribable light”;⁶⁹ his face is “like lightning, his eyes like the light of the sun; his hair . . . like the flame of a burning torch, and his hands and feet like glowing hot iron.”)⁷⁰

That light has made Aseneth unrecognizable. Whereas the heroine of a Greek novel is as beautiful at the beginning as at the end, Aseneth undergoes an “angelic transfiguration” at which she is the first to marvel.⁷¹ When she is adorning herself to meet Joseph again, she asks for clean water to wash her face. But she stays her hand as she leans over the basin, for she sees her face “like the sun” (18.8: *ὡς ὁ ἥλιος*)—like Joseph—and does not recognize herself: “She was awed . . . and rejoiced greatly and did not wash her face, saying: ‘Let me never wash away this great beauty.’”⁷² The radiance of her beauty now beams far and wide and amazes those who see her. In addition to Joseph and Aseneth herself, her servant (18.11), the Pharaoh (21.4), his son (23.1), and Aseneth’s own parents (20.6) are struck by it. We are reminded of the effects of Callirhoe’s beauty—except that Aseneth’s is the result of change. The Jewish narrative rewrites the novelistic topos of the family reunion by stressing the astonishment that seizes Aseneth’s parents at the sight of their daughter’s dazzling beauty. When they come back from a week’s absence, during which she has discovered God, they find her with Joseph, dressed as a bride. Instead of embracing her, or even greeting her, they stop to marvel: “[She was] a vision of light, and her beauty was like a heavenly beauty. . . . Awed by her appearance, they praised the God who brings life back to the dead.”⁷³ The reunion with family is marked not by recognition but by wonder and by the celebration of God’s regenerative powers. Likewise, Joseph reacts to that beauty as to a divine

⁶⁹ *φῶς μέγα καὶ ἀνεκκάλητον* (14.2).

⁷⁰ *ὡς ἀστραπή καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς φέγγος ἡλίου καὶ αἱ τρίχες . . . ὡς φλόξ πυρὸς ὑπὸ λαμπάδος καιομένης· καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ οἱ πόδες αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ σίδηρος ἐκ πυρὸς ἀπολάμπων* (14.9).

⁷¹ The formula “angelic transfiguration” is in Kraemer 1998, 39–40. Chloe is the only heroine of a Greek novel to become even more beautiful as she is about to marry. In her case, however, the beautification is owing to artificial accoutrements and does not externalize a change in her inner being but foreshadows her upcoming recognition as an upper-class urban girl, while at the same time illustrating the transformative power of marriage: see chapter 2.

⁷² *ἐθαμβήθη . . . καὶ ἐχάρη χαρὰν μεγάλην καὶ οὐκ ἔνυψε τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτῆς, εἶπε γάρ· μήποτε ἀποπλύνω τὸ κάλλος τοῦ μέγα τοῦτο* (18.10).

⁷³ *εἶδος φωτὸς καὶ ἦν τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς <ὡς> κάλλος οὐράνιον· . . . καὶ ἐθαμβήθησαν ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει αὐτῆς καὶ ἔδωκαν δόξαν τῷ θεῷ τῷ ζωοποιοῦντι τοὺς νεκρούς* (20.6–7).

epiphany: with *thambos* (19.4).⁷⁴ By underscoring Aseneth's transfiguration, Joseph's failure to recognize her paradoxically intimates that she has become like him: his marveling at her beauty echoes her physical and psychic turmoil at the discovery of his.

Or should we rather say that Aseneth has become herself? A telling detail in her description might suggest that she has always been a Jew but unbeknownst to herself, that to the question, "Who am I"? she has been giving the wrong answer all along until she converts. When she is first introduced, we learn that she is "as tall as Sarah, as comely as Rebecca, as beautiful as Rachel."⁷⁵ We have here a variation on the novelistic motif of the godlike heroine, but with a significant twist: the Egyptian Aseneth is not compared to pagan goddesses but to venerable Jewish matriarchs. Though the comparison descends from the Jewish provenance of the narrative, it also complicates Aseneth's identity. Like Chariclea, Aseneth in appearance does not belong to her race. Chariclea, though, is not entirely severed from hers; on the contrary, the Greek-like princess of Ethiopia bears a black mole on her arm, which she is asked to expose as the final, decisive proof of identity. Aseneth bears no such mark: Egyptian features have left no imprint, no "coloring," on her conception, as if to prepare her for her conversion and marriage to the Sun of Heaven. Her conversion is inscribed in her appearance: it is the fulfillment of her visible identity.⁷⁶

When she meets Joseph again, she can answer the question he asks her, and the central question of the novel: "Who are you"?⁷⁷ "I am your servant, Aseneth. I have cast out all my idols and destroyed them. Today a man came to me from heaven and gave me bread of life . . . and said to me, 'Today I have given you to Joseph to be his bride.'"⁷⁸ It is because she can say who she is, because her identity is finally defined, that Joseph asks her directly. As soon as he saw her in her

⁷⁴ And so does the Pharaoh (21.4). Aseneth as well experiences *thambos* before her own beauty (18.10). In contrast, the Pharaoh's son experiences purely erotic stirrings: "Struck to the quick at the sight of Aseneth, he became heartsick and despondent because of her beauty" (23.1: *καὶ ἐ<ῖ>δε τὴν Ἀσενὲθ καὶ κατεγύνη καὶ ἐδυσφόρει βαρέως καὶ κακῶς εἶχε διὰ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς*). The lecherous "villain" cannot see God.

⁷⁵ *μεγάλῃ ὡς Σάρρα καὶ ὠραία ὡς Ῥεβέκκα καὶ καλὴ ὡς Ῥαχήλ* (1.5).

⁷⁶ For Wills (1995, 178, n. 45) Aseneth's appearance is a "foreshadowing" of her conversion. See also McEwan Humphrey 1995, 48, n. 46: "Joseph's preliminary prayer . . . and the angel's revelation that her name 'has been written' in a heavenly book, makes the metamorphosis appear more as an epiphany of what actually is, in spite of her initial pagan 'appearance.'"

⁷⁷ On Aseneth's identity as an "obsession" of the novel, see Wills 1995, 181; McEwan Humphrey 1995, 48, n. 46.

⁷⁸ *εἴμι ἡ παιδίσκη σου Ἀσενὲθ καὶ τὰ εἰδῶλα πάντα ἀπέρριψα ἀπ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ἀπώλονται. καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἦλθε πρὸς με ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σήμερον καὶ ἔδωκε μοι ἄρτον ζωῆς . . . καὶ εἶπέ μοι. δέδωκα σε νύμφην τῷ Ἰωσήφ* (19.4).

tower, he already inquired about her; but it was of her father he asked, “who is that woman”? (7.2: τίς ἐστὶν ἡ γυνὴ ἐκεῖνη;). Aseneth is not called on to answer the crucial question of her identity until she converts because she has no true identity until then: because only in the Light of Joseph does she find herself.

Recognition of Family and Recognition of God in the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions*

Almost Like a Pagan Novel

If *Joseph and Aseneth* dramatizes the tension opposing circular and vertical recognition, return and conversion, the *Recognitions* accommodates the two. This narrative, which has been variously dated,⁷⁹ recounts the adventures of Clement’s dispersed family and its final reunion. Clement’s mother, Mattidia, pressed by the advances of her brother-in-law, leaves Rome without telling her husband the true reason but alleging a dream. She takes her twin sons with her and is separated from them after a shipwreck. Soon thereafter her husband, Faustinianus, also disappears, in search of his wife and twin sons. Clement, the third and youngest, stays in Rome. A tormented youth, obsessed with death and eager to discover the truth about the order of things, he turns to the philosophical schools but to no avail. Learning that Jesus has appeared in Judea, he sails there, meets Peter, and becomes his devoted companion on his travels, the main goal of which is to refute Simon Magus. Clement’s brothers, whom he did not know (7.8.2), are captured by pirates and sold, under different names, to an honorable Jewess who gives them a good education; eventually, after joining the ranks of Simon Magus, they also decide to follow Peter. One day, on the island of Aradus, Peter comes across an old woman begging for food. Realizing that she is Clement’s mother from her story, he reunites her with her children, first Clement and then the twins. Mattidia immediately converts to Christianity, is baptized, and joins her children and Peter on their travels. Shortly afterward an old man approaches Peter. He is Clement’s father. Peter again realizes this from the old man’s story and reunites him with his family. The novel ends with a joyful celebration of Faustinianus’s conversion and baptism.⁸⁰

Scholars have often noticed the kinship between the *Recognitions* and the Greek novels,⁸¹ and even suggested that a lost pagan novel might have been a

⁷⁹ See Pervo 2003, 706–7. He suggests the third century, other scholars the second. The text we have, Rufinus’s translation (of a Greek original), dates to 400. There is also a kindred narrative, the Greek *Homilies*.

⁸⁰ I have skipped the long theological debates that make up the largest part of the narrative.

⁸¹ See, recently, Boulhol 1996, 65–68; Hansen 1997; Vielberg 2000, especially 111–14.

direct source for its composition.⁸² Among the features this narrative shares with the novels are recognition scenes. In fact, the author has selected the *anagnōrismos* motif and given it more prominence than it has in the pagan novels: it figures in the title and unfolds as a succession of episodes reuniting the family members step by step, whereas other novelistic stock scenes do not appear.⁸³ In addition to the sheer motif, the *Recognitions* shares with the Greek novels a major ideological assumption underlying it: that recognition is a reward for goodness. Whether already converted or still pagan, Clement's relatives stand out for their noble characters. In particular, his mother displays modesty, generosity, and altruism (she begs in order to feed both herself and the bedridden, paralytic woman with whom she lives). In her case, the recognition is explicitly attributed to one of her major virtues, chastity (7.38.5). We are reminded specifically of Chariclea's recognition, which likewise remunerates her chastity.

Another feature in the treatment of recognition connects the Christian narrative to Heliodorus's novel: the emphasis on nature's voice. Face-to-face with his father, yet unrecognized, Clement says: "I . . . was deeply shaken, I don't know how, in my heart, recollecting many things in him that seemed almost familiar to me; for someone says well that what is born of something, though it may be separated from it for long, yet a spark of relatedness is never extinguished in it."⁸⁴ Clement's feelings and observations chime with Persinna's stirrings in the presence of her daughter and with Chariclea's confidence in maternal instinct as the only "undisputable token."

It may come naturally to ask: did one novel derive the motif of blood's call from the other? It has been argued that episodes in the Christian narrative echo the *Aethiopica*: the dream that Mattidia alleged for her departure, for instance, seems to be inspired by the one in which Artemis and Apollo appear to Calasiris, urging him to take Chariclea and Theagenes away from Delphi.⁸⁵ There is, however, the problem of relative dating, for the majority of scholars put Heliodorus in the fourth century. We can then advance the reverse possibility: that Heliodorus might be echoing the *Recognitions*. But we still cannot rule out the alternative that the two works developed the motif of blood's call independently.

⁸² See Perry 1967, 285–86; Boulhol 1996, 65; Pervo 2003, 707. Contra: Edwards (1992) doubts whether a Christian author of the second century (when he dates the *Recognitions*) would have been acquainted with pagan novels (though he also admits that the choice of Aradus as setting for one of the recognitions may echo Chariton's).

⁸³ Boulhol (1996, 67–68) notes that the author has suppressed novelistic episodes useless for the recognitions.

⁸⁴ "Et ego . . . nescio quid corde pulsabar, multa quasi nota mihi recolens in eo; bene enim ait quidam, quia quod ex aliquo natum est, etiamsi multo tempore afuerit, numquam tamen scintilla propinquitatis exstinguitur" (8.2.4).

⁸⁵ *Aethiopica* 2.25. See Hansen 1997, 123. Hansen, though, is referring specifically to the *Homilies*.

Be that as it may, nature's voice is by far more effective in the Christian novel. In the *Aethiopica*, as we have seen, parental intuition is thwarted by inattention or denial, and Chariclea's own behavior as "lawyer" casts doubts on the power of a mother's instinct to foster recognition, in spite of the heroine's own stated conviction. In the *Recognitions*, by contrast, nature's voice would lead instantly to the revelation were it not that Clement's father does not answer straightaway the question about his family that Clement asks him subsequent to his stirrings.⁸⁶ The father postpones the answer because he wants to engage in a theological debate, after which he offers to disclose his identity. In the rest of the discussion preceding the recognition, Faustinianus and his children keep calling each other "father" and "son." We enjoy the dramatic irony but also appreciate the surfacing of unconscious feelings (as is made explicit in the case of one of the twins at 8.8.5: "I do not know that I called him father"); and so does Peter, who becomes suspicious.⁸⁷

To the prominence of nature's voice in this episode responds the absence of tokens. Tokens play no role either in another recognition scene that otherwise has a close equivalent in Heliodorus, Clement's recognition of his mother. Peter, discovering the identity of the beggar-woman he has met near a temple on Aradus, brings her face-to-face with Clement: "As soon as I touched her hand, she uttered a loud shrieking sound and rushed into my arms, and began to press me eagerly with maternal kisses. But I, being ignorant of the whole affair, was pushing her away as a mad woman. . . . But he [Peter] said: 'Stop! What are you doing, Clement, my son? Do not push away your mother.' And I, when I heard this, immediately was filled with tears, fell upon my mother, who lay on the ground, and began to kiss her. For as soon as I heard, little by little I recalled her face to my memory; and it grew more and more familiar the longer I looked."⁸⁸

This scene compounds several elements paralleled in novelistic recognitions. It takes place on the island of Aradus, as the recognition of Chaereas and

⁸⁶ Nature's voice, however, is not always heard in this novel: Clement and his twin brothers have no gut-intuition of their kinship. Considerations of plot are again paramount in the author's choice to emphasize or disregard blood's call. The *Homilies* makes no use of the motif (see 14.3).

⁸⁷ Instances of the address "father" or "son" are countless. See, e.g., 8.2.1; 8.5.1; 8.6.4; 8.7.1; 8.8.1; and so on. The recognition of Faustinianus and his children is skillfully drawn. The twins, who, unlike Clement, have changed their names, are called by name in front of Faustinianus, whereas Clement is called by name only when Faustinianus is not present (8.38.2), and more insistently at the approaching of the recognition (8.57.5; 9.1.2; 9.2.1 and 4; 9.16.1: "my son Clement").

⁸⁸ "Simul autem ut manum eius contigi, ululatu ingenti reddito in amplexus meos inruit et matris me consecrari osculis coepit. at ego ignorans omne negotium quasi insanientem mulierem repellerebam . . . at ille: 'desine,' inquit; 'quid agis o fili Clemens? Noli repellere tuam matrem.' Ego vero ubi haec audivi, continuo lacrimis suffusus concidi supra iacentem matrem et osculari eam coepi: simul enim ut audivi, paulatim vultum eius revocabam ad memoriam et notior mihi intuenti quanto magis fiebat" (7.22.2–23.3).

Callirhoe;⁸⁹ Clement slowly realizes the identity of his mother by looking at her intently, as the servants in Xenophon's novel slowly identify their masters by their appearance, voice, and words, and as Calasiris's children in Heliodorus recognize their father after a careful examination of him. The best matching parallel, however, is the recognition of Chariclea by Theagenes:⁹⁰ in both cases, the party who knows the other looks like a beggar (Mattidia is a true beggar); in both she clings to the man she recognizes, kissing and embracing him; and in both she is taken for a deranged person.⁹¹ Clement's error, though, is far more justified than Theagenes's because he has not seen his mother for many years, and as he himself says, he remembers her face only vaguely, as if in a dream (7.8.2). More important, Clement is ready to recognize the woman on the basis of a disclosure alone. He does not need the evidence of tokens, like Theagenes, but is content with Peter's revelatory statement: "Do not push away your mother." Clement believes Peter's words immediately. His assurance marks a contrast with the behavior of two more characters in Heliodorus, Calasiris's sons, who do not believe their father's self-disclosure until he assumes a dignified appearance. Contrary to his Heliodorean counterparts, Clement does not need the proof of either conventional tokens or the "token" of social respectability.

Instead of tokens, the key to recognition in the Christian novel is the family history, told in various ways by all those involved (by Clement to Peter, by Mattidia to Peter, by Peter to the twins, and finally by Peter to Faustinianus). This preference for verbal disclosures over tokens seems to be owing to the fact that tokens were typical of heathen literature. As Pascal Boulhol puts it, they smacked of pagan fables,⁹² whereas autobiographical narratives, as we have seen, were not in favor as means to recognition in Greek and Roman literature.

Autobiographical narratives, however, are *the* key to recognition in *Apollonius of Tyre*. Along with the rejection of tokens, the privileged role of life histories is one of the features connecting the *Recognitions* to that novel. As noted,⁹³ both

⁸⁹ I agree with Calvet-Sébasti (2005) and Tilg (2010, 64–65) that this very specific parallel strongly suggests Chariton's influence on the *Recognitions*. Calvet-Sébasti takes the correspondences in the use and meaning of Aradus in the two narratives to bear witness to the popularity of Chariton's novel.

⁹⁰ See Kerényi 1973, 73–74, followed by Boulhol 1996, 26, n. 66; Hansen 1997, 124. The scene in the Christian text has even been regarded as a parody of Chariclea's recognition: see the critical discussion in Vielberg 2000, 122. Once again, chronology poses problems.

⁹¹ This type of recognition scene, in which the recognized person pushes away the other, appears also in *Apollonius of Tyre* (80.20–21: see above). A remote ancestor is Ion's rejection of Xouthus when he announces that he is Ion's father.

⁹² Boulhol 1996, 23.

⁹³ See Vielberg 2000, 139–144.

narratives are family novels; and in both all the family members put a premium on chastity. (Apollonius's wife chooses to become a priestess in order to avoid remarrying, just as Mattidia flees to stay chaste; Tarsia preserves her virginity even in a brothel.) Concerning recognitions, just as Apollonius recovers his wife in a temple, so does Peter discover Clement's mother on the occasion of a visit to a temple. What has not been sufficiently stressed, however, is that in both narratives the recognition comes about through personal stories alone; and that both emphasize the replacement of tokens by such stories.⁹⁴ Just as in the pagan novel Tarsia's outpouring functions as *signum*, in its Christian counterpart Peter's knowledge of Clement's family history is the guarantee for the upcoming recognition. Peter tells Faustinianus that he will restore him to his family and that his wife is chaste. "And now be assured of these things from the fact that I know the whole situation much more precisely than you."⁹⁵ The exceptional role of life histories as proofs of identity in the *Recognitions* and *Apollonius of Tyre* is a strong indication that the Christian narrative, as Perry argued, "was derived from a pre-Christian romance built on a structural pattern similar to that of *Apollonius Prince of Tyre*," if not from the novel itself.⁹⁶

Another feature related to recognition draws the Christian narrative nearer to *Apollonius of Tyre* than to any other pagan novel: the protagonists are family members who already know of one another's existence as members of the same family. In Longus or Heliodorus, the recognition reveals hidden identities while bringing parents and children back together. The parents discover what happened to children they exposed; the children discover that they have been exposed and who they truly are. In *Daphnis and Chloe* both parties are in the dark prior to the recognition.⁹⁷ In the *Aethiopica*, Chariclea has discovered who she is before she comes face-to-face with her parents, but they do not even know that they have a daughter: Persinna's only certainty is that she exposed her child, whom she did not name, and Hydaspes thinks that the child died at birth.

⁹⁴ Vielberg, though, notes the importance for the recognitions of the life histories of those involved, told several times from a variety of perspectives (2000, 141).

⁹⁵ "Et iam nunc accipe fidem rerum ex eo, quod omnem causam multo diligentius scio quam tu" (9.34.6).

⁹⁶ See Perry 1967, 285–86. See also Pervo 2003, 707; Vielberg 2000, 143–44 (the *Grundschrift* of the *Recognitions* might have been influenced by *Apollonius of Tyre*); Kuhlmann 2002, 120, n. 84. The importance of an intermediary in the recognitions, however, is rather reminiscent of Xenophon's novel (see below). Consider especially the recognition of Faustinianus and Mattidia (9.37): it is choreographed by a third party; one spouse is not present when the other is found; one spouse rushes to meet the other, looking insane. Vielberg indeed cautions us against taking *Apollonius of Tyre* as the only source, or even a direct source, for the *Recognitions*. We have seen the importance of Chariton.

⁹⁷ *Daphnis and Chloe* have only a vague sense of their origin, and their parents know nothing of what happened to them after birth.

Apollonius, on the other hand, has named his daughter, and she knows her father's name; Apollonius's nameless wife knows her husband's name. Likewise, in the Christian narrative the members of Clement's family know at least the names of their lost relatives (and in some cases also a part of their life histories) when the recognitions occur. As in *Apollonius of Tyre*, the family has been dispersed by storms and the belief in false deaths, not by exposures shrouded in silence or lies.⁹⁸

Not Like a Pagan Novel

In a major aspect, however, the treatment of recognition in the pseudo-Clementine narrative sets it apart from both *Apollonius of Tyre* and its Greek sisters. Whereas in the pagan novels the recognitions take the protagonists back to their birth land and birthrights in a circular movement, in the Christian text they initiate a vertical movement, far from their earthly home. The pivotal role of Peter in the recognitions is meant both to bring the family members together and to change their religious beliefs and reorient their lives.

Peter functions as stage director:⁹⁹ he choreographs the recognitions and times each scene as he thinks fit. We are again reminded of Greek novels, namely Xenophon's, in which the protagonists' recognition happens thanks to their servants and to Hippothous. Peter's directing function is, however, more pronounced. He links the brothers even unwittingly, when he does not yet suspect their kinship. For instance, he gives theological explanations on the same subject to two of them individually, isolating them by the equal treatment they receive: "Although, Clement, I have expounded those things more fully to you in that treatise in which I dissertated about predetermination and the end, yet it is appropriate that now I demonstrate to Niceta also, on his request, what is the reason that Simon . . . could perform so great marvels."¹⁰⁰ Shortly thereafter, Peter separates the three brothers from the group of his other followers by keeping them with him (3.69.1). His function as stage manager of the recognitions comes to light especially in the final act, when Faustinianus is reunited with the

⁹⁸ On the last point, see Edwards 1992, 472. Edwards comments: a Christian would reply to Longus that abandoning a child is wrong. Perhaps this needs qualification: the author of the *Recognitions* would, but as a whole the early-Christian attitude toward the exposure of children was much more complex and tolerant. Those who condemned it were moralists from the upper class: see Boswell 1988, 157–60. Boulhol (1996, 19, n. 47), however, notes the absence of exposed children from ancient hagiography as a whole.

⁹⁹ See Boulhol 1996, 17.

¹⁰⁰ "Et quamvis haec tibi, o Clemens, in eo tractatu, quem de praefinitione et fine disserueram, plenius exposuerim, tamen et nunc requirenti Nicetae manifestare me convenit quae sit ratio, quod Simon . . . tanta facere mirabilia potuit" (3.52.5).

entire family. At hearing the story of the old man, Clement and his brothers understand the truth and start off to embrace him. But Peter stops them and asks the old man: if I give you your family back, will you abjure your beliefs? Peter then tells him the story of his lost family, which he knows better than Faustinianus himself, and thus produces the recognition like a *deus ex machina* (9.34).

Peter's role as *artifex* of recognition is owing to his central position in the life of Clement and his family, as the fulcrum around which the three brothers, and eventually their parents, converge. Peter, however, is not simply a helper of the family in reuniting it, in Hippothous's fashion. He is at the center of Clement's family because its members, as many other people, flock to him as to a spokesman for God. Peter is an agent of conversion. The recognitions he promotes, therefore, do not end with the physical reunion and the recovery of a status quo.

True, the pseudo-Clementine narrative is a family novel, and one in which the recognition-reunions represent the narrative high points. In this respect, we can contrast the *Recognitions* with the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* (second century) and *Xanthippe and Polyxena* (third century), which are likewise filled with novelistic motifs and follow novelistic patterns in their structure.¹⁰¹ The story of Thecla is well known: a wealthy and beautiful girl in Iconium on the eve of her wedding hears from her window Paul preaching chastity (as Aseneth sees Joseph on his horse) in a neighbor's house, "falls in love" with his message, rejects her fiancé and family to follow the apostle on his travels, and is a martyr twice, miraculously surviving both ordeals. After the second one, Paul deems her worthy of becoming an evangelist herself, and in this capacity she returns to Iconium. Finally, she moves on to Seleucia and peacefully dies there.

In the essentials, this narrative reproduces travel patterns typical of the Greek novels. But I shall highlight meaningful departures from them. Thecla's return to Iconium is a religious mission. She does not go back home as a fiancée or even a daughter but as Paul's transformed follower and a teacher of the true God (41). If she emotionally relates to her homeland, it is only as the place where she first heard Paul, "where the light shone for me" (42: *ὅπου μοι τὸ φῶς ἔλαμψεν*).¹⁰² What makes her cry is the vision of that house and of the chair where Paul sat (42), not recovery of family. Her betrothed has died. This detail, while a convenient ploy to dispose of an opponent of the heroine when the narrative is heading to its happy ending, is thematically relevant because it celebrates objectively, as it were, Thecla's conversion and choice by destroying the alternative. The possibility that her fiancé might convert and marry her is alien to the ethics of this antimarriage text. As to her mother, another opponent (she is the first to denounce Thecla for her beliefs), she is disposed of differently: though alive, she does not enjoy

¹⁰¹ This is widely acknowledged: see recently Pervo 2003.

¹⁰² The text is Lipsius and Bonnet 1891.

recognition by and reunion with her daughter. Thecla neither kisses nor embraces her but only says, “Do you believe that the Lord lives in heaven”? and offers her own presence as evidence of this. (“If you long for riches, the Lord will give them through me; if for your child, look, I am here.”)¹⁰³ She is not so much her mother’s daughter as a witness to God’s power. Last but not least, she leaves again on her evangelist mission. The ideology of this act, with its adamant condemnation of sex, even within lawful marriage, deeply modifies the novelistic pattern of separation from loved one, recognition, and reunion/return. The conversion to the strand of Christianity preached by Paul drives out recognition of family because family cannot exist without sex, and sex is banned from the convert’s life.

Another example of Christian narrative in which the circular pattern of the Greek novels is strained, though not so radically, by the thematic core of conversion to a chaste life is *Xanthippe and Polyxena*, which Richard Pervo has termed a Christian equivalent to the *Ephesiaca* and, wittily, a “low-calorie novel.”¹⁰⁴ Though this work, as Pervo remarks, follows the convention of “there and back,” the homecoming is complicated by the protagonists’ religious transformation. The main characters are two sisters: Xanthippe, the older and a married woman, and the beautiful Polyxena. While Xanthippe (and eventually her husband) converts when she hears Paul preach in Spain, Polyxena does so in Greece, where she is cast ashore by a storm after a kidnapping. A run of novel-like adventures enlivens the story until she returns to Spain with a following of converts and a spiritual husband. At seeing her, Xanthippe faints and dies from joy. The whole city also rejoices, but the joy is religious bliss: converts multiply, and all glorify the Lord. Polyxena’s return builds a spiritual community but does not build or rebuild a family.¹⁰⁵

In contrast to these two narratives, the *Recognitions* does not propound asceticism: family reunion is one side of the happy ending. But the other side is the espousal of the Christian faith. The tension between these goals affects the meaning of recognition. On the one hand, Clement misses his family and laments his condition as orphan: he has not chosen to be severed from his kin.¹⁰⁶ But at the same time he has embarked on a journey that takes him to Truth—it is Truth that receives him, a wanderer and a stranger (“peregrinantem et hospitem”), in her city (1.13.3). The end of wandering is not in reunion with family but in the harbor of Christian belief. God is everyone’s true father: “It is foolish indeed to love anything more than God. For if they be parents, they die,

¹⁰³ δύνασαι πιστεῦσαι ὅτι ὁ κύριος ἐν οὐρανοῖς; εἴτε γὰρ χρήματα ποθεῖς, δώσει σοι κύριος δι’ ἐμοῦ· εἴτε τὸ τέκνον, ἰδοὺ, παρέσθηκά σοι (43).

¹⁰⁴ Pervo 2003, 707–8.

¹⁰⁵ I could read the text only in translation, in Cox Miller 2005, 166–80.

¹⁰⁶ See Boulhol 1996, 68.

if relatives, they do not last.”¹⁰⁷ And again (6.6.2–4, summarized): “Love God more than parents!” Clement, for all that he misses his biological father, tells Peter: “you are the object of all my affections, instead of father, mother, and brothers; but above all this . . . the cause of my salvation and knowledge of the truth.”¹⁰⁸ This hyperbolic expression of attachment to Peter in lieu of family might mean that Clement’s family should not and could not turn up until he is baptized.¹⁰⁹ His status as a youth bereft of family is the ideal condition for conversion.¹¹⁰ Clement indeed holds Peter as more than just an ersatz father: he is a spiritual guide, whom Clement has merited having instead of parents (7.7.6). A remote parallel is Calasiris, for Chariclea a father because of his role as guide. Calasiris’s guidance, though, aims to help the couple find Chariclea’s family and finalize their marriage, whereas Peter’s takes Clement to a truth that can, and to some degree should, dispose of family.

Shortly before Clement’s recognition of his mother, we are reminded that the youth was in a perfect position to follow Peter because he did not have to leave family members to do so (7.5). Yet his longing for his family becomes apparent as never before. He tells Peter that he has no family; but he also tells him, for the first time and at some length, the story of his family (7.8–10), which betrays his affection for them. We are thus alerted to the tension between family attachments and an active commitment to the Christian message at exactly the point when Clement is about to be reunited with a family member.

The conflict between the legitimacy of family attachments and the higher demands God places on a Christian emerges again, and most pointedly, shortly before Faustinianus’s recognition. Clement, still unaware of the old man’s identity, calls him “father,” whereupon one of the twins retorts: “What is the need . . . of calling him father, when we are prescribed to call no one father on earth?”¹¹¹ Even as he is taunting Clement, however, his brother himself calls the old man “father,” with a Freudian slip, as it were: “Do not take it . . . badly, *father*, that I have faulted my brother for calling you father, for we have a precept not to call anyone by that name.”¹¹² The emotional and spiritual tension between the desire

¹⁰⁷ “Et vere stultum est, aliquid plus amare quam deum. Sive enim parentes sunt, moriuntur; sive propinqui, non permanent” (3.54.4).

¹⁰⁸ “Te enim solum pro omnibus meis affectibus habeo, pro patre, pro matre, pro fratribus; super haec autem omnia . . . mihi salutis causa et agnoscendae veritatis (7.5.2).

¹⁰⁹ See Vielberg 2000, 123.

¹¹⁰ Vielberg (2000, 123) refers to the Gospel according to Matthew, 19:29: “And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name’s sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall inherit everlasting life.”

¹¹¹ “Quid necesse est . . . ut eum patrem vocemus, cum in mandatis habeamus neminem super terram patrem vocare?” (8.8.2)

¹¹² “Non iniuriose . . . accipias, *pater*, quod fratrem meum culpavi, quia te patrem vocaret; habemus enim tale mandatum, ne aliquem nomine isto vocitemus” (8.8.3).

for recovering the biological father and the belief in God as the only true father surfaces at the approaching of the final recognition, which will reunite the entire family. The finality of the family recognition is thus undermined.

Because God is the object of the highest love, the motif of recognition and reunion between family members is reconfigured as both an end, as in the Greek novel, and a beginning: recognition takes to conversion, and is only completed with conversion. The recognitions require that those involved become Christian. The kinship of the two processes, to recognize a family member and to become Christian, comes to light in the recognition of Mattidia and Clement. To encourage Mattidia to explain the reason for her despair, Peter promises her “some remedy, for you to be able to end your life without torment.”¹¹³ The remedy is the Christian truth about the afterlife. Once Peter learns more about the woman’s history, however, the remedy becomes reunion with family: “But he . . . being struck with a suspicion, asked the woman her family, her country, and the names of her sons; ‘if you tell me,’ he said, ‘I shall instantly give you the remedy.’”¹¹⁴ The use of the same term, *medicamentum*, for both Christian belief and reunion with family collapses the two into one.¹¹⁵ Whereas Chariclea earns only an earthly reward, recognition and marriage, from her chastity,¹¹⁶ Mattidia earns also initiation into the mysteries of eternity: “And because of it [chastity] she has been preserved to you, and you to her; furthermore, she has been granted the knowledge of eternal life.”¹¹⁷

Because recognition involves conversion, Mattidia cannot share food with her recovered son as long as she is not baptized (7.29.3–4), that is, she cannot fully enjoy the aftermath of her recognition because she and her son are not “the same.” This emphasis on separateness points up the essential role played by conversion in the recognition. Mother-son is a weaker and less legitimate tie than the one of religion, and as long as religion does not bind them, the couple cannot celebrate the recognition as they immediately do in the Greek novels. Because Clement has changed in a fundamental way, the reunion with his mother will truly happen only after she has completed another journey, to Christian belief.

Mattidia’s twin sons think along the same lines: they hope for her conversion, “so that we may be able to eat and share a table with you.”¹¹⁸ The almost obscene

¹¹³ “Medicamentum aliquod, ut sine cruciatu valeas vitam finire” (7.14.4).

¹¹⁴ “Ipse vero . . . suspicione quadam pulsatus requirebat a muliere genus et patriam simul et nomina filiorum; quae si mihi, inquit, dixeris, dabo continuo medicamentum” (7.19.3).

¹¹⁵ In the *Homilies* the term is *φάρμακον*, and Peter’s words are held ambiguous (12.14–15).

¹¹⁶ Odysseus promises Chariclea a generic *τέλος δεξιόν* (5.22.3). Her investiture as priestess comes with her royal status.

¹¹⁷ “Propter quod et conservata vobis est ac vos illi, insuper autem et aeternae vitae agnitione donata” (7.38.8).

¹¹⁸ “Ut possimus etiam cibum et mensam habere communem” (7.33.4).

haste with which both Mattidia herself and her sons want her to be baptized betrays their eagerness to be truly reunited. They want to interpret her spontaneous fasting as commanded by God to accelerate their reunion: "Perhaps . . . God, wishing that our mother, now that we have been recognized, should not be separated, even for one day, from our common table, preordained her fasting."¹¹⁹

The responses to recognition are as melodramatic in the Christian narrative as in the Greek novel: in both they are marked by fainting, mad running, outbursts of tears, falling to the ground. But fasting is unique to the *Recognitions*, where it foreshadows Mattidia's conversion. Though Peter does not agree that she should be baptized immediately, because her fasting has been caused not by a religious calling but by her emotional upheaval at finding her children, the very fact that fasting is both the spontaneous response to recognition and the prerequisite for baptism ties together recognition and conversion.

Peter further intertwines recognition and conversion right before stage-managing the last reunion, of Faustinianus with his family. "If I give you your family back," he tells Faustinianus, "will you believe that what we have said is true, and *genesis* nothing"? (9.34.3, paraphrased). Recognition of family will put an end to misrepresentations and false beliefs and lead to the recognition of the truth of Christianity.¹²⁰ Faustinianus wants to illustrate the alleged truth of astrological determinism, *genesis*, by the example of his wife, whose horoscope apparently made it inevitable that she took a lover, as indeed, he claims, she did (9.32.3–33.2). The reader, who knows that she did not, connects Faustinianus's mistake and his astrological persuasion. His recovery of his wife entails his own recognition of his error, and that recognition, in turn, invalidates his own belief in *genesis*. The reunion with family proves the truth of the Christian belief in divine providence, which Peter and his followers have been defending against astrological determinism in the debate preceding the recognition.

The providential quality of recognition is yet another trait that the Christian narrative shares with the pagan novels, where the gods engineer the reunion of the lovers and of the lovers with family. In the Greek novels, however, the providential hand in the recognition does not prove to the lovers that their beliefs were wrong. If the recognition has any religious meaning for them, it is rather to confirm them in their beliefs: Anthia and Habrocomes honor Artemis by praying, sacrificing, and dedicating a stele to her; Callirhoe prays to Aphrodite; Leucippe and Clitophon celebrate their reunion in the temple of Artemis, the same goddess who appeared to Leucippe and her father separately in a dream to promise the happy ending; Chariclea and Theagenes become priestess of the Moon and

¹¹⁹ "Sed forte . . . volens deus matrem nostram nec una die agnitis nobis separari a consortio mensae nostrae, praedordinavit hoc ut ante ieunaret" (7.36.3).

¹²⁰ See Boulhol 1996, 44; Vielberg 2000, 115–16.

priest of the Sun, a new cultic role for them but not one causing a rupture in their beliefs. In the *Recognitions*, on the other hand, the truth of Christian Providence asserts itself through the recognitions to dispel unbelief. As Pascal Boulhol puts it, “la reconnaissance s’élève du statut de péripétie à celui de preuve théologique.”¹²¹ Recognitions multiply not only to entertain the readers amid the lengthy theological debates but also to broadcast the workings of Providence.¹²²

Even after Faustinianus has recovered his family, however, he is prevented from enjoying its company because he suffers a strange metamorphosis. He suddenly looks like Simon, Peter’s enemy. His appearance shocks his family and causes him to wail: “What has happened to wretched me, that on one and the same day I was recognized by my wife and my sons and yet could not rejoice with them, but was rolled back to the previous miseries that I endured in my wandering!”¹²³ Faustinianus is summoned to go to Antioch and, pretending to be Simon, to repent in front of the crowd and celebrate Peter and his faith. Only thereafter will he be restored to his true semblance.¹²⁴

What is the meaning of this transformation following right after the recognition? I think it iterates that Faustinianus’s reunion with his family is incomplete as long as he remains a heathen. He appears like Simon only to his family, not to Peter (10.53.4–6). This discrepancy, in addition to highlighting Peter’s sharper vision, suggests that it is from family that Faustinianus is severed. And this is because he has not yet converted.¹²⁵ He must amend for his disbelief in grand style, singing Peter’s praise under the semblance of his wickedest enemy. By so doing, he will recover his own self. His family will recognize him again only after he becomes like them: a Christian. When at last this happens, Peter comments: “As God has given your sons back to you, their father, so your sons give you, their father, back to God.”¹²⁶ This observation sums up the subordination of horizontal to vertical recognition: God has allowed Faustinianus to be reunited with his sons, but only in order that, like his sons, he may “travel upward,” to God.

¹²¹ Boulhol 1996, 70. Miraculous salvation is another novelistic motif that can function as *preuve théologique* in Christian narratives: whereas in Xenophon, Longus, and Heliodorus, the savior gods are the ones the protagonists already believe in; in *Xanthippe and Polyxena*, for instance, Polyxena becomes a Christian when her life is threatened and “the God of Paul” saves her.

¹²² Notice that the last member of the family to be recognized, Faustinianus, is also the most stubborn in his pagan beliefs.

¹²³ “Quid mihi misero accidit, ut una die recognitus ab uxore et filiis laetari non potuerim cum eis, sed ad priores miseras quas in errore pertuli, revolutus sum?” (10.57.2–3)

¹²⁴ Faustinianus’s voice, though, is unchanged, and should persuade his wife of his true identity (10.62.6). The motif of the voice as *gnōrisma* is one more feature connecting the *Recognitions* to the Greek novels.

¹²⁵ As he admits, he has yielded to Simon’s seduction (10.58.1–2). His faith is still shaky.

¹²⁶ “Sicut tibi patri filios restituit deus, ita et te patrem filii restituunt deo” (10.72.4).

Accordingly, the ending of the *Recognitions* modifies its novelistic counterparts. Like some of them, it culminates in a celebration involving the community (10.71–72). But, unlike them, it focuses on one character only, Faustinianus, the last member of the family to convert, and it devolves the role of narrator to the apostle who has engineered the happy ending. In addition, the event prompting the narrative is not reunion with family, as in Chariton or Achilles Tatius, but conversion and baptism: “And in the midst of the people, he [Peter] related all his [Faustinianus’] vicissitudes *starting from his conversion*, so that the whole community looked upon him as upon an angel.”¹²⁷ The final image is not one of a happy family reunited but of an individual transfigured by the new faith he has acquired along with recovering—because he has recovered—his family.

The two kinds of recognition, of God and of family, are articulated in a rich variety of ways in later hagiography, where recognition and reunion of family members no longer provide the happy ending and the recovery of lost world relations, as in the Greek novels and, with the appropriate adjustments, the *Recognitions*, but initiate another departure: to the ascetic life or the afterlife.¹²⁸

Dress and Recognition: A Novelistic Motif Becomes Christian

Leucippe, her head shaven, her dress a slave’s, and her back scarred: enough for her “ideal” novelistic lover to miss her identity. Chariclea, filthy, her clothes in tatters: enough for her “Platonic” lover to take her for a vagabond. The motif of failed recognition caused by physical changes reappears with added significance in early Christian hagiographies, in a number of which the saint’s disfigured features and especially her disguise as a man prevent recognition. Variations on this motif are rich and numerous. It is not my ambition here to cover them extensively or unearth their full significance, tasks that have been expertly undertaken by specialists in the area of early Christian literature.¹²⁹ My more modest goal is to discuss a few aspects of the Christian topos of crossdressing against the background of its novelistic antecedents, which are considered among the possible direct sources for the Christian versions of the motif.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ “Atque in medio populi ex conversione eius materiam sumens, omnes casus eius exposuit, ita ut omnis civitas quasi angelum eum aspiceret” (10.72.5).

¹²⁸ This literature is the subject of Boulhol’s book (1996).

¹²⁹ See, e.g., Anson 1974; Boulhol 1996, especially 20 and 73–75.

¹³⁰ See Söder 1932, 127–28, who also refers to Apuleius, *Golden Ass* 7.6. See also Anson 1974, 4: “That the Greek romances may have influenced the legends of transvestite saints seems a highly plausible position.”

The heroines (and occasionally the heroes) of Greek novels disguise themselves to pass unnoticed. Their choice is not aimed at defining their identity but, at the most, only highlights aspects of their characters. Clitophon's "disguise of a disguise," as Achilles disguised as a woman, points up his cowardliness; Chariclea's and Calasiris's Odysseus-like rags point up their cunning and determination to achieve their goals. We can add Thelxinoe in the *Ephesiaca*, who elopes from Sparta with her lover at night, her hair cut off and dressed like a boy: her courageous choice "proves" the appropriateness of her disguise. Or we can add Parthenope, who shaves her head perhaps as a sign of loyalty to her husband or even to disfigure herself and thus ward off potential suitors:¹³¹ the disguise in this case may serve ethical principles but remains, as in all the other cases, essentially a practical trick to deceive or divert attention. It does not become self.

As is to be expected, things sit differently for hagiography. An early Christian specimen of transvestite is Thecla, when, after surviving her second martyrdom, she travels to look for Paul, dressed like a man and followed by many (*Acts of Paul and Thecla* 40). The disguise does not seem to serve a practical purpose, since Thecla is safe and not alone. Rather, her garments are "a sign of her newborn spirit,"¹³² a symbol of sacred initiation. In other narratives, to be sure, a manly appearance helps the woman escape from the world and join a monastery of monks; but the apparel is not just a deceptive disguise. Better: it is not a disguise, because the woman who dons it is renouncing her earthly identity as a woman. She dresses like a man to destroy her womanhood. Like heroines of pagan novels, Christian heroines wear men's clothes to spoil their beauty; but their goal is not temporary and worldly (to escape detection in order to keep themselves for an earthly husband) but definitive and unworldly (to deny the flesh). This seems to have been fact as much as fiction: in the mid-fourth century the Council of Gangra declared anathema women who dressed like men "under pretext of piety" or "because of presumed asceticism."¹³³

Recognition, therefore, for Christian transvestites is not desirable, not even if the recognizer is the nearest and dearest. In this respect, the Christian scenario is radically different from that of the Greek novels, where "recognition of the loved one" is the expected response, no matter what she wears. We have seen that novelists do not sympathize with their heroes' failure to recognize their beloveds in disguise. Achilles Tatius mocks Clitophon's apologetic self-styling and smiles at his blindness and deafness; Heliodorus demotes Theagenes to an inadequate player of his Platonizing fiction. And in both cases the heroine is eventually recognized, for otherwise the ideal novel would not be one. In contrast, the typical Christian transvestite succeeds in her "deception." It is she who

¹³¹ See chapter 2.

¹³² Anson 1974, 7.

¹³³ See the articles of the Council in Cox Miller 2005, 151.

may decide to disclose her identity, either to exculpate herself of a blasphemous slander (as Apollinaria and Eugenia) or to comfort her parent (as Euphrosyne).¹³⁴ The proposition, “her appearance has changed to the point of being unrecognizable,” that in *Leucippe and Clitophon* is challenged by the “hidden author” is taken seriously in Christian stories. To be sure, it happens (as to Eugenia) that the saint’s beauty breaks through her disguise in spite of her, perhaps an echo of another novelistic motif. But the radiance of beauty does not lead to recognition of identity, as it does or should in a Greek novel, and is far from desirable: it causes temptation in others and even sexual advances.¹³⁵ What the woman wishes instead is to have lost every trace of attractiveness, for her inner transformation to show on her face. This happens with poignancy when the rigors of an ascetic life are added to her manly accoutrement to make her irrecoverably unrecognizable.

An illustration of this is the famous transvestite Pelagia.¹³⁶ She once was a glamorous actress, a dazzling beauty decked in jewelry, so much so that she earned the nickname Margaret (Pearl). But one day she sees God in the eyes of a holy bishop, is baptized, gives all her jewelry to the church, and withdraws to the Mount of Olives to live the life of a monk. Her disguise represents the “ultimate reversal of her shame as a woman.”¹³⁷ The narrator, a deacon obsessed with his sins, is told that a certain monk, Pelagius, could help him and finds him in his small and dark cell. The monk, who is Pelagia, recognizes him, but he does not recognize her: “How could I have known her again, with a face so emaciated by fasting? It seemed to me that her eyes had sunk inwards like a great pit” (14). It is unclear whether she reveals her identity then or whether he finds it out at her death, which occurs shortly afterward. But the important point is that Pelagia’s sainthood resides in her transfiguration. When the narrator leaves her, he feels “much helped by the sight of her angelic face.” Whereas the unmistakable and unchangeable beauty of a Chariclea asks for recognition, the recognition of Pelagia’s sainthood is in her visitor’s inability to recognize her. In the pagan novels, the hero’s failure to identify the heroine through her disguise does not attest to any profound transformation in her but only to his myopic vision, unable to penetrate the disguise. Conversely, these Christian stories exalt the unrecognizable change that comes not from a superficial disguise, but from a new and permanent dress, worn deep inside.

¹³⁴ See Boulhol 1996, 73–74.

¹³⁵ A case close to a novelistic heroine is Polyxena, whom Andrew urges to change her appearance to a man’s “so that no one will snatch you away from me because of your beauty” (in Cox Miller 2005, 178–79). Though the trick does not work and Polyxena is almost raped, she is not, however, trying to pass for a man to become a monk but only to escape from novelistic misadventures.

¹³⁶ I could read the story of Pelagia only in translation, from the Latin, in Cox Miller 2005, 238–47.

¹³⁷ Anson 1974, 13.

Epilogue

The Ancient Novel in the History of the Recognition Motif

Tragedy and Comedy

The main function of recognition in the Greek novel is to confirm the lovers' unchanged and reciprocal love. This may seem a blunt statement, one that does not account for variations embedded in both ideological and narrative stances. It fits best Chariton's and Xenophon's novels, where the protagonists' marriage occurs at the beginning and their family identity is known. But even in these novels, as we have seen, the workings of recognition slightly differ: while in Xenophon it primarily celebrates sameness ("I find you as you were when we parted"), in Chariton it also acknowledges change. In Achilles Tatius, the meaning of the final recognition is slippery. Outwardly it presents features of the early novels: it happens at the end yet before the return, and does not reveal family identity. The father's presence, though, deromanticizes the recognition by preventing the customary effusions, contributing to this novel's sense of inconclusiveness. In *Daphnis and Chloe*, the recognition is the end-point of an erotic transformation, to which it gives the imprimatur of family and community. Finally, in the *Aethiopica* the heroine's recognition is intertwined with issues of legitimacy and succession, which in turn play into the lovers' marriage.

Yet in Chariton, Xenophon, and Heliodorus, the recognition emphatically harks back to the first encounter, the first exchange of gazes. In the two earlier novels it repeats that encounter, as is pointed up by the mode of the recognition itself: immediate and perfectly mutual as was the ignition of love. Chariton highlights the unchangeable reciprocity of passion by connecting the infallible quickness of the lovers' eyes (or even intuition) in the final recognition to the onset of love. To fall in love is to recognize another self in the other. In Heliodorus it is the onset of love that spurs the journey ending with the final recognition, which, in turn, is as much an acknowledgment of the lovers' identical passion for each

other as of the heroine's family identity. Phraseology and thematic correspondences send the reader back to the first recognition, of love, Platonically refashioned as a blurred recollection of having met the other before.

The novels' fragments, to be sure, suggest a more varied landscape. In particular it seems that the author of *Sesonchoris*, possibly dated to the first century CE, exploited the motif of recognition to point up not the lovers' enduring and identical passion but asymmetry in love's beginnings and even a lack of reciprocity. I have kept *Sesonchoris* out of the discussion because its very fragmentary state does not allow any firm interpretation of any detail; but a brief treatment of its hypothetical use of recognition might be of interest in appendix to this study to remind us that the novels we have are only a handful, and that there seem to have been more patterns in the use of recognition than those we can draw from the extant evidence.

At some point the prince *Sesonchoris*, the hero, suffers a military debacle. This puts in jeopardy his engagement with the maiden promised to him, *Meameris*. According to the plot sequence established by Alain Billault, *Sesonchoris* is consulting with a friend about what to do next when he catches sight of his fiancée and shows her to his friend.¹ The girl does not recognize him. Billault comments: quite likely she had not even seen *Sesonchoris* when her father promised her to him. The prince knows about the engagement; she does not. The sequel might have developed the motif of recognition of which this scene would constitute a prelude. Billault speculates that the recognition played a similar role to that of the family recognitions in *Daphnis and Chloe* or the *Aethiopica* because the girl does not seem to know either *Sesonchoris* or that he is her fiancé, just as, say, *Hydaspes* does not know either *Chariclea* or that she is his daughter. If this reconstruction is correct, the recognition motif underscored an unequal and gendered treatment of the protagonists with respect to love and marriage. The girl did not know her betrothed yet apparently fell in love with him at first sight; he had seen her, but was not in love.²

In the state of our knowledge, however, this exploitation of recognition to highlight an asymmetrical relationship would be exceptional. The challenge (by *Achilles Tatius* and *Heliodorus*) to the cliché "lovers recognize *each other* instantly and unfailingly" points to its typicality. The lovers' recognition in the surviving novels is always mutual, though sometimes with a time gap. Mutuality is part and parcel of the recognition's happy outcome. In this respect, the Greek novels differ markedly from their Latin counterparts, the *Satyricon* and the *Golden Ass*, where recognitions tend to be one-sided and unfortunate.

¹ Billault 2010, 200.

² Billault 2010, 201. Stephens and Winkler (1995, 247), though, suggest the possibility that *Sesonchoris* had never met *Meameris*.

The happy outcome of recognition is tied to its mutual happening in Greek literature at large, beginning with the *Odyssey*: though Odysseus originally knows the members of his household while they know him not, each episode of recognition, which helps their fortunes and his, is mutual because each party acknowledges the other's merits (including loyalty to Odysseus) and both shed the "disguise" they have been forced to wear.³ In tragedy mutual recognitions always bring joy to the characters involved. There is one exception: Oedipus and Jocasta. But the exception is only apparent because the recognition is not truly mutual: Jocasta does not want to know, and when she realizes, Oedipus does not yet.⁴ Her flight leaves him alone on stage to solve the final puzzle of his identity. Oedipus and Jocasta never look each other in the eye when both are in possession of the dreadful knowledge.

The happy outcome of mutual recognitions is stated as a fact of drama in Menander's *Epitrepontes*: "Now they have recognized each other, and all is well!"⁵ Richard Hunter takes this passage as a self-conscious reference to the dramatic tradition of recognition scenes and the literary criticism about them.⁶ On this reading, Menander would be saying that the happy ending is inseparable from "they have recognized *each other*" and that it was understood to be such by critics.

Recognitions in the extant Greek novels follow this protocol. Again, a lost novel suggests alternative patterns, in that it contemplates a recognition with a catastrophic outcome, though the narrative, Iamblichus's *Babyloniaca*, is normally considered a far cry from the ideal novels because of the heroine's aggressive jealousy and of a liking for gruesome scenes. One of such scenes was an episode of recognition, as we gather from a detailed section of a Byzantine summary of the novel.⁷ If the summary is accurate, the *Babyloniaca* featured one of the grimmest recognitions in Greek literature, with a father, the heroine's, thinking that his daughter was eaten alive by a dog because he recognized the dog as her husband's; killing the dog as a result; burying the remnants of the girl (who of course was not his daughter) after inscribing, with the dog's blood, "Here lies Sinon the fair"; and finally hanging himself. The father's mistake may conjure up Callisthenes's in *Leucippe and Clitophon*: both combine recognition

³ See Murnaghan 2011, chapter 1. On recognition as a mutual process in the *Odyssey* see also Goldhill 1991, chapter 1.

⁴ As Vuillemin (1984, 261) notes, Jocasta "ne prononce pas une formule de reconnaissance" but pushes Oedipus away from his own recognition. It is her efforts to prevent it that convince us that she knows. Perhaps a simultaneous occurrence of the recognition would have been psychically intolerable even for a Greek audience.

⁵ νυνὶ δ' ἀναγνωρισμὸς αὐτοῖς γέγονε καὶ / ἅπαντ' ἀγαθὰ (1121–22).

⁶ Hunter 1985, 136.

⁷ The text (Photius *Bibliotheca* 94, 77a29–b8) is in Stephens and Winkler 1995, 197.

and misrecognition, since they arise from the wrong inference that identification of one object (the dog, Leucippe's mother) entails that another object can only be one (Sinonis, Leucippe). The episode in *Leucippe and Clitophon*, though, does not have tragic results (it is fortunate for the protagonists and only temporarily unfortunate for Calligone). In a few other cases, as we have seen, novelistic recognitions do bring misfortune; but those cannot be labeled tragic either because they satisfy the requirements of poetic justice (as Theron's recognition in Chariton) or because they have comic effects (as Clitophon's detection when he tries to flee in a woman's clothes). By contrast, in Iamblichus (mis)recognition kills the father of the heroine.

This tragic episode, however, is immediately offset by an enforcement of the Greek novelistic protocol. Sinonis's husband soon afterward arrives and, thinking his wife dead, strikes a blow against himself and inscribes with his own blood, next to the girl's epitaph, "And [here lies] Rhodanes the fair." But serendipity saves the hero: a friend appears with Bakhtinian punctuality, as it were, just in time to tell him who the dead girl was. We find again the familiar exploitation of recognition to skirt deadly violence in the nick of time.⁸

In staging happy-ending recognitions, the novels match the tendency in late antique literary criticism to consider recognition a comic, rather than tragic, motif. Already Aristotle includes in his treatment of recognition episodes producing a last-minute reversal "from bad to good fortune." His preference indeed goes to this kind: the best recognition is the one in which violence is avoided by a timely revelation of identity (*Poet.* 54a 4–9). However, he considers those happy ending recognitions "tragic" in generic terms, while later authors view recognition preferably as a feature of comedy. The comic refashioning of the motif apparently had a significant impact on theoretical discussions of it, perhaps because in New Comedy recognition becomes a standard feature of the plot, or because the happy-ending type of recognition, harking back to Euripides and ultimately to the *Odyssey*, was felt to be the dominant type.

It is true that the recognition motif could also be perceived as tragic. In the third book of his *Ars grammatica*, the fourth-century Latin grammarian Diomedes writes that in tragedy "from joyful beginnings proceed sad endings and the recognition to their sorrow [in peius adgnitio] of children and of their former fortunes."⁹ This description fits the Oedipus type of recognition, or, to echo Aristotle, the category "recognition of personal identity bringing about a reversal for the worse." But this witness is overshadowed by others. In a gloss to another grammarian, for instance, we read a clear-cut statement identifying recognition

⁸ This novel also featured a recognition similar to Chariclea's in Heliodorus: of a character about to be killed by his father (Photius *Bibliotheca* 94.77b38–40).

⁹ Cited from Cave 1988, 51.

only with comedy: “Tragedy ends with slaughters and murders, comedy with recognition.”¹⁰ Such assessment would rob several Euripidean plays of the label “tragedies,” in keeping with a restrictive definition of the genre that could be justified by invoking already Aristotle.¹¹

The tie between recognition and comedy seems to be assumed by another fourth-century author, the Greek writer of declamations Himerius. His *Fourth Oration* features a poor man accusing a rich one of a gruesome deed: he raised the poor man’s child, who was exposed, but did not tell him, though he knew it, who his natural father was; he then corrupted the child into committing adultery with his own mother without revealing her identity to him. The natural father knew nothing of what happened to his child after the exposure. When he caught the young man and his own wife in flagrante, he killed both (as was legal). The foster father then brought out the tokens that disclosed the horrible truth, allegedly to allow the dead to be buried with his ancestors.

The poor man accuses the other of having produced “tragic tokens” (*τραγικοῖς*. . . *γνωρίσμασι*) and “brought them at the right moment in your magnificent drama. You introduced into tragic misfortunes the kind of ending that one finds in comedy! Through these tokens, which would put an end to calamity in a comedy, you worsened my misfortune!”¹² And again: “How truly tragic . . . the revealing of those tokens has been!”¹³ The pleader’s claim is that tragic endings and recognition tokens do not mix. By using tokens to create a tragedy rather than a comedy, the rich man has inappropriately scrambled generic rules.¹⁴

Are, then, the recognitions in the Greek novels comic? I have suggested that though they exhibit comic features, the model the novelists primarily follow is Euripides’s in his happy-ending tragedies: so do Heliodorus (especially, but not only, in the final recognition) and Chariton (in the recognitions of the protagonists and of the king and queen of Persia), whereas Xenophon seems to play with stereotypes of

¹⁰ Scholion in Dionysii Thracis *artem grammaticam*, in *Grammatici graeci*, Leipzig 1883, 306, 20–24: ἡ μὲν τραγωδία τὰ τέλη περὶ σφαγῶν καὶ φόνων ἔχει, ἡ δὲ κωμωδία περὶ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ.

¹¹ See *Poet.* 53a12–15 (the exemplary tragic plot leads from good to bad fortune). This view underlies Aristophanes’s of Byzantium judgment on *Alcestis* (in his summary of the play): “The drama is rather satyr drama, because at its dénouement it turns to joy and pleasure contrary to the essence of tragedy” (τὸ δὲ δράμα ἐστὶ σατυρικώτερον, ὅτι εἰς χαρὰν καὶ ἡδονὴν καταστρέφει παρὰ τὸ τραγικόν). See Telò 1999, 87. Likewise a number of modern critics are reluctant to consider Euripides’s happy-ending tragedies real tragedies. See the discussion in Wright 2005, chapter 1.

¹² τῆς λαμπρᾶς σου σκηνῆς τὰ κατὰ καιρὸν ἀναφανέντα γνωρίσματα. ὦ κωμικὸν πέρασ τραγκαῖς τύχαις ἐπαγαγόν, καὶ τούτοις αὐξήσας τὴν συμφορὰν, οἷς ἐν κωμωδίας πάθη λύεται (45–48). Translations of Himerius are by Penella 2007.

¹³ ὦ τῆς τραγικῆς ὄντως . . . τῶν γνωρισμάτων καταμηνύσεως (117–19).

¹⁴ This is not strictly the case in myth and literature. Witness also Euripides’s lost *Alope*, in which recognition tokens produced a tragic ending. Nonetheless, Himerius’s treatment of recognition suggests that perceptions of it as a comic device were commonplace.

tragic recognitions for his. The emotional buildup, the pathetic notes, and the highly melodramatic response to recognition conjure up tragedy rather than the typical comedy. The recognitions closest to comedy's are in Longus, though, as we have seen, even in this novel recognition has the "tragicomic" result of avoiding disaster just in time. (Daphnis was going to be given away as a sex toy when he is recognized.) Comic features are detectable also in the climactic recognition of *Apollonius of Tyre*, the plot of which has striking similarities with Plautus's *Rudens*, including the strong attraction between a father and his (not yet recognized) daughter.¹⁵ Ultimately, however, the distinction between comic and tragic is irrelevant from a literary-historical perspective, because Euripides's happy-ending recognitions already in antiquity were considered the direct ancestors of comic ones: "Violated maidens, suppositious children, recognitions by rings and necklaces: doubtlessly these are the components of New Comedy, and Euripides pushed them the farthest."¹⁶

Future Influences: Highlights

Epic is as important as drama for the fashioning of novelistic recognitions, and not only, as we have seen, as a mine of episodes, but also for a detail in the protagonists' emotional response to recognition: the frequency of tears.¹⁷ Tears send the reader back to the *Odyssey*¹⁸ rather than drama, where embracing is the main bodily response while tears are generally absent,¹⁹ quite likely because they could not be seen on the stage.²⁰ The narrative form allows novelists, as it does the epic poet, greater freedom in putting before the readers' eyes emotional expressions that in the theater could not be shown.

Though they draw on their literary tradition, however, novelists, at least in some cases, seem to have felt that the recognition motif in its traditional forms had exhausted its possibilities. In spite of the importance Longus attaches to the recognitions by carefully intertwining them with the protagonists' growing knowledge of Eros, he is more dedicated to what happens in between the two

¹⁵ See Archibald 1991, 29–30, with further references.

¹⁶ β[ι]α[ι]σμοὺς παρθ[ε]νων, ὑποβολὰς παιδίων, ἀναγνωρισμοὺς διὰ τε δακτυλίων καὶ διὰ δεραίων, ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ δῆπου τὰ συνέχοντα τὴν νεωτέραν κωμωδίαν, ἃ πρὸς ἄκρον ἤγα[γ]εν Εὐριπίδης (Satyrus *Life of Euripides* 39.7.8–22).

¹⁷ See, e. g., *Callirhoe* 8.5.5; 8.6.8; *Daphnis and Chloe* 4.22.1; 4.23.1; *Aeth.* 5.11.2; 10.16.1–2.

¹⁸ See *Od.* 16.214–19; 21.223; 23.207; 23.232. Gainsford, in his formal analysis of recognition scenes in the *Odyssey*, identifies "Joy and weeping at recognition" as a motif (2003, 43).

¹⁹ They are added in Eur. *Hel.* 633.

²⁰ Lochert (2009, 64) shows that in stage directions of seventeenth-century French drama, embraces are the leitmotif of happy recognitions, whereas tears are generally mentioned in implicit stage directions, by a character, because they are hardly visible. On the Greek stage they are totally invisible unless painted on the mask.

scenes than to their actual choreography. The tokens are listed one by one at the beginning; further mentions of them are static, with no other relevance for the plot than to remind the reader that the protagonists are from the upper crust of society and to prepare for the recognition that will reveal it; and when this happens, the tokens are immediately accepted and so are their carriers, with no cross-testing. The haste with which the recognitions are handled brings out the felt unproductivity of the device, which is there as a “must” in a novel that draws much from comedy but is no more alive than a fossil.

Heliodorus, for his part, revitalizes the motif by giving it thematic prominence, and produces what may well be the most elaborate recognition in extant Greek and Roman literature. Because of its complex staging, with emotional swings, sustained reasoning, and multiple tokens, the scene reads like a compendium of traditional recognitions and the definitive achievement in that tradition. Heliodorus, however, is not content with an “encyclopedia” and the ultimate synthesis: he also innovates, injecting fresh blood into the old motif. The band that reveals Chariclea’s birth may evoke the traditional piece of cloth woven by a mother or a sister, and used in dramatic recognitions:²¹ but this cloth tells the story of the exposure, mirroring the novel itself. The black mole on Chariclea’s shoulder may recall the traditional bodily mark: yet this is not the familiar scar but a mark never used before, which sets off the heroine’s complex and hybrid identity, as Greek and Ethiopian, and a product of art, against the conventional, Greek and Homericizing, origins of her lover (who exhibits the stereotypical scar). Finally, and most important, the stress on blood’s call as the main criterion for recognition (though one that turns out to be ineffective in the actual process) is unparalleled in ancient literature.

Heliodorus’s emphasis on blood’s call as *gnōrisma* is in keeping with an overall aspect of novelistic recognitions: their relative naturalness. Greek novelists revise a tradition that privileged artificial means in the mechanics of recognition. A liking for such means and for drawn-out scenes caused the recognizable quality of the voice to be unrealistically discounted in epic, and drama for the same reasons generally avoided recognition scenes with characters who should know each other’s voice.²² Like the voice, appearance is not a typical *gnōrisma*, at least compared to material objects and outstanding bodily marks.²³ Euryclea perceives merely a resemblance between the “stranger” and Odysseus in bodily

²¹ On cloth garments as tokens in tragedy see McClure, unpublished paper.

²² See chapter 1.

²³ Recognitions by appearance occur in *Odyssey* 4. 141–43 (of Telemachus by Helen) and 24. 391 (of Odysseus by Dolius), in *Alcestis* (of Alcestis by Admetus), and *Helen* (of Menelaus by Helen). But Telemachus’s recognition is also by reasoning (“he looks like Odysseus’s son when he was little, therefore must be he”), Alcestis’s occurs at the end of a long-lasting episode, and Menelaus’s is in a scene questioning the reliability of appearances. Two comic examples of recognition by appearance are the end of Menander’s *Aspis* and *Epitrepontes* 857–60.

features as in voice. Odysseus's appearance is not immediately believed. When Athena rejuvenates and beautifies him, the transformation does not ipso facto produce recognition: Penelope (if she has not recognized Odysseus already) wavers between belief and unbelief even after her husband has recovered his youthful features, until he passes the test of the bed. The novels modify this state of affairs. Except for the *Aethiopica*, and, to a minor extent, the *Ephesiaca*, traditional tokens lose currency: if Longus deals with them flatly, Chariton, Achilles Tatius, and the author of *Apollonius of Tyre* do not use them at all. This might indicate that those novels' projected readership, in addition to the writers, perceived tokens as unsatisfactorily contrived.²⁴ More natural ways to recognition gain prominence in their stead: appearance becomes a sufficient mark of identity if properly displayed, that is, if freed from demeaning accoutrements;²⁵ voices are identifiable;²⁶ even breathing reveals identity; as do personal stories.

Of the more natural vectors of recognition that the novels bring to the fore, at least three have a fortunate history in later literature: autobiographical narratives, the voice, and blood's call. The goal of these conclusive remarks is briefly to highlight occurrences of those features in literary treatments of recognition from medieval to early modern Europe, and possible connections between those treatments and the ancient novel.²⁷

²⁴ Cave (1988, 247–48) dates a dislike for tokens back to late-classical Greece. He takes Euripides's parody of Aeschylus in *Electra*, along with Aristotle's criticism of *anagnōris* by tokens, to suggest that contemporary audiences were dissatisfied with them. I rather think that Aristotle's criticism is idiosyncratic (he rarely goes along with the audience's taste). As for Euripides, though he mocks Aeschylus's scene with its absolute reliance on tokens, in his own version he has recourse to a scar (*El.* 572–75), in Aristotle's evaluation a proof of identity as "inartistic" as artificial tokens (*Poet.* 54b 19–26). Later literature, especially comedy, does not suggest that tokens displeased the audience, for recognitions normally depend on them. Plautus's *Cistellaria* plays on the audience's liking for tokens by giving extended attention to the casket that contains them.

²⁵ The one exception is Hippothous's failure to recognize Anthia and vice versa in the *Ephesiaca*.

²⁶ Exceptions are Anthia's voice for Hippothous and Leucippe's for Clitophon.

²⁷ I limit my survey to the West for reasons of space. Among the Byzantine novels, *Hysminias and Hysmine* offers an interesting refashioning of a Greek novel's recognition. Inspired mainly by *Leucippe and Clitophon*, *Hysminias and Hysmine* nonetheless corrects Achilles's iconoclastic treatment of the recognition motif in the episode in which Clitophon fails to recognize Leucippe. The situation is comparable: another woman loves Hysminias, and Hysmine is her slave. The hero, however, has never yielded to the woman's advances, not even formally, and instead keeps remembering his love. When he sees her in her slave's outfit, he does not say "she seemed to have something of Hysmine" but "I seemed to see Hysmine" (9.7: *πάλιν τὴν Ὑσμίνην βλέπων δοκῶ*: note *δοκῶ* echoing *ἐδόκει* in *Leucippe and Clitophon* 5.17.7) and does not forget her for a moment. Though he repeatedly asks himself whether the vision is true, he is not just under a vague impression but is certain that the girl is identical with Hysmine, and this even though she has not spoken. The unsullied intensity of love in this novel is rather reminiscent of Heliodorus's, which seems to have inspired the exploitation of another motif connected to recognition: the lovers reunited pretend to be brother and sister in order not to antagonize the woman who loves Hysminias (9.14). We think of Chariclea and Theagenes lying in the same way to Thyamis and especially to Arsace.

Autobiographical narratives become common means of recognition in medieval epic, in the configuration of two warriors discovering their relationship right before combat because one of them tells his story. Tokens, normally rings, are sometimes employed as well, but more for confirmation than recognition proper.²⁸ Medieval romances likewise put a premium on life histories in recognition scenes.²⁹ These developments are to be traced back mainly to Christian texts, especially the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions* and the later *Life of Eustathius*, which uses life histories in the same manner.³⁰ But could we also postulate influence of *Apollonius of Tyre*? The temptation is difficult to resist, at least for romances, given the extraordinary popularity of that novel in the Middle Ages and its countless rewritings, in most of which the climactic recognition between father and daughter was reproduced with its song, riddles, and confession in various combinations.³¹ Be that as it may, the preference for life histories as vectors of recognition in medieval epic and romance marks a reversal from classical patterns, and one for which *Apollonius of Tyre* is responsible.

The voice acquires the full dignity of an identity mark in chivalric romances. We can contrast Athena's disregard for Odysseus's voice with Tristan's care to disguise his ("Tristan knew well how to change his voice")³² and then to change it back to his own when he wants to be recognized: "His voice changed. He spoke straight. Isolde realized it all the way. She threw her arms around his neck, and kissed his face and eyes."³³ Instances of the voice as *gnōrisma* multiply in this period, but, as I hope I have shown, that *gnōrisma* was not "invented" then.³⁴ Chariton elevates the voice to the decisive proof of identity in the climactic recognition; Xenophon mentions it as one of the items that help the servants recognize the protagonists; and Heliodorus (contrary to Homer) camouflages the heroine's voice when recognition is not supposed to happen, making her sob from overwhelming emotion. The concern for realism with which this novelist in particular removes the obstacle of a recognizable voice is not a far cry from Boccaccio's attentiveness to the same detail in a hilarious episode from his *Decameron* (day 7, novella 8), in which a maid replaces an unfaithful wife in her bed to save her from the beatings of her husband, and is

²⁸ See Boulhol 1996, 141–42.

²⁹ See Boulhol 1996, 145–47.

³⁰ See Boulhol 1996, 147. To my knowledge, the only precedent of recognition by life history before single combat in Greek and Roman epic is that of Glaucus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 6.

³¹ See Archibald 1991. More recently the story circulated orally in Greece: see Dawkins 1942.

³² "Tristant sout ben müer sa voiz" (v. 212), cited from Mölk 1964, 14.

³³ "Sa voiz muat, parlat a dreit. / Isolt s'empres s'en aparceit. / Ses bras entour sun col jetat, / le vis e les oilz li baisat" (975–78).

³⁴ This is Mölk's claim (1964).

indeed taken for her. Boccaccio makes the husband's mistake plausible by altering the maid's voice in the same way Heliodorus alters Chariclea's: "Era sí la voce dal pianto rotta e Arriguccio impedito dal suo furore, che discernere non poteva più quella esser d'un'altra femina che della moglie."³⁵ We are sent back to yet another scene in the *Aethiopica*: when Thisbe, allegedly maneuvering to help Demainete have sex with Cnemon without his knowledge, asks her to take her fill of love in silence.

If we cannot prove that the ancient novel influenced later uses of the voice as *gnōrisma*, with the call of blood we are better served. To be sure, there is no doubt that hagiography, which privileges blood's call in the process of recognition, was greatly responsible for transmitting the conceit, common in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century romances, of a natural sympathy drawing to each other blood relatives unaware of their tie.³⁶ The conceit becomes important also in medieval German epic, where fathers and sons or uncles and nephews who do not know their connection feel it in their veins. Possibly hagiography has fed into this development as well, though it has been argued that the success of blood's call in German epic is essentially owing to a socio-cultural structure that identifies the individual with his larger kin-group, the *Sippe*.³⁷

Blood's call, under the evocative name *occulta virtù* (hidden force or impulse), is heard in at least three of Boccaccio's novellas. *Occulta virtù* stirs a mother when her unrecognized son appears in front of her with his new wife (*Decameron* 2.6); a daughter is pushed by the same impulse to believe her father's self-disclosure (5.5); and even grandchildren feel that inner commotion and flock festively around their unknown relative, "quasi da occulta virtù mossi avesser sentito costui avolo essere" (2.8).³⁸

The three novellas are remarkably novelistic. To dwell only on one, novella 6 of day 2 features a mother landing on a desert island against her will with her two children, who soon are kidnapped by corsairs. The mother feeds on grass and lives in a cave, where, kindhearted, she suckles a kid. A pious couple find and rescue her, along with . . . the kid. Meanwhile, the two children have been given away as servants. One of them escapes and ends up in the same family as his mother, but age has changed them so much that they do not recognize each other. The master's daughter falls in love with the lad, and vice versa. Caught in

³⁵ Translated: "Her voice was so broken by weeping and Arriguccio so much hampered by his fury that he was not able to detect that the voice was of a woman other than his wife."

³⁶ See Boulhol 1996, 152. On the call of blood in these texts see also Sinclair 1979.

³⁷ See Bell 1922. This explanation, however, seems disputable to me, for the motif is hardly present in archaic Greece, which has a similar sociocultural structure.

³⁸ Translated: "As if, moved by a hidden force, they had felt that man to be their ancestor."

flagrante by her father, they are put in prison until it turns out that the boy is of good stock (*gentil*), and therefore worthy of marrying his master's daughter. At this point, the couple appears in front of the boy's mother, and she experiences the stirring of an *occulta virtù*. Soon thereafter she recovers her other son and her husband, and all ends well.

There is no need to point out the manifold similarities in plot and themes between this story and the Greek novels. The funniest of them is the kid, whose role, with an inversion, reproduces that of the goat that suckles Chloe and is taken by her foster father to his house along with her.³⁹ That Boccaccio was familiar with Greek fiction is not likely, but not impossible either.⁴⁰ We know that he could read some Greek and that in his youth he was close to Paolo da Perugia, a librarian at the d'Angiò court in Naples and an avid collector of myths and tales. Boccaccio was doubtlessly interested in exploiting ancient fictional narratives (he used the *Golden Ass* profusely). At the same time, the lack of evidence for manuscripts of Greek novels in Florence (or Italy) as early as Boccaccio recommends caution.

The influence of the novel on literary exploitations of blood's call becomes a certainty when we reach French classical tragedy, where the motif amounts to a commonplace.⁴¹ Blood's call also seasons plots that have classical subjects. Corneille plays with it in his *Oedipe*, and one Guimond de la Touche in his *Iphigénie en Tauride*. In Euripides's equivalent, Iphigenia has no intuition but feels the same sympathy for both Orestes and Pylades: "And your sister, if you happen to have one . . . of what pair of young men will she be deprived!"⁴² "Are you brothers from a single mother?"⁴³ Her privileged interlocutor is Orestes, for obvious dramatic reasons; but even after their excited exchange, she does not show stronger feelings for him than for Pylades. By contrast, in the French play she has a *sentiment secret* for Orestes.⁴⁴

Heliodorus's novel in particular contributed to the success of the motif in this period. As is well known, starting in the Renaissance, ancient novels became popular and fashionable in Western Europe, where they inspired numerous

³⁹ See Wolff 1961, 372.

⁴⁰ Wolff (1961, 170–75), following Rohde (1960, 572–74), gives a positive answer.

⁴¹ See Cherpac 1958; Forestier 1988, 533–38; Vuillermoz 2009, 29; Marchand 2009, 187 and 193–94 (on eighteenth-century drama). It seems that *le sang* was taken seriously also outside literature: the judge in the Martin Guerre case considered the witness of his closest relatives of the highest value "because of the closeness of blood." See Zemon Davis 1983, 78.

⁴² ἀδελφή τ', εἰ γεγώσα τυγχάνει . . . οἷον στερεῖσα διπτύχων νεανιῶν ἀνάδελφος ἔσται (IA 473–75).

⁴³ πότερον ἀδελφῶ μητρὸς ἔστον ἐκ μῆς; (497).

⁴⁴ The lines (in Cherpac 1958, 122–23) run: "Un sentiment secret me rend plus cher l'un d'eux; / Mais l'autre également est homme et malheureux" (2.5).

adaptations and imitations.⁴⁵ Disguises, misidentifications, and recognitions are among the features that appealed most to modern emulators. As one critic puts it, in their novels “many characters disguise themselves, and even disguise their true sex, girls often masquerading as boys; and the true birth and parentage of hero and heroine are nearly always unknown until the end.”⁴⁶ As Voltaire’s mockery in *Candide* also testifies,⁴⁷ early modern writers of prose fiction seem to have been keen on rivaling their models in exploiting the recognition motif.

Among the ancient novels, the *Aethiopica* was the most popular and most imitated. Stories inspired by it retain the complications and *coups de théâtre* of the original, including recognitions. One example is Philip Sidney’s work *The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia*. In both Sidney and Heliodorus, a father condemns to death his own child, who has come back after many years of wandering; and in both the father does not know the child’s identity, and the child does not reveal it immediately.⁴⁸ The father in *Arcadia* imitates his Heliodorean counterpart in inhuman rigor, for he remains firm in his decision to kill his newly discovered son (and his son’s cousin) to implement his ideal of justice, which he spells out to his child: “I prefer you much before my life, but I prefer justice as far before you.”⁴⁹ It takes a *deus ex machina*, the awakening of the allegedly dead king of Arcadia, to bring about the happy ending.

The call of blood is not heard in the English novel. But it is in Alexandre Hardy’s theatrical adaptation of Heliodorus, *Les chastes et loyales amours de Théagène et Cariclée*,⁵⁰ as well as in a number of Hardy’s plays inspired by the same novel.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Except for Chariton and Xenophon, whose debut on the European scene is in the eighteenth century. The humanist Politian read Longus and Heliodorus (he also excerpted Xenophon but in an insignificant portion): see Wouters 1994, 134 n. 16; Reeve 2008, 282; Wolff 1961, 8–9. Wouters refers to “Daphnis and Chloe: The Markets and Metamorphoses of an Unknown Bestseller,” a London exhibit of editions of Longus since the Renaissance (British Library, 1988). An Italian translation of Heliodorus existed from 1556. Amyot’s French translation dates to 1547 and the revised version to 1559. The bibliography on the reception of the ancient novels is vast: see already Calderini 1913, chapters 1 and 6. Informative surveys are also those by Sandy (2003) and Futre Pinheiro (2003) on France, England, and Iberia; Bertoni and Fusillo (1998) on the *Aethiopica* in baroque Naples. A detailed account of the novel’s influence on Elizabethan prose fiction is Wolff 1961, and on English and French novels, Plazenet 1997. For a narratological comparison of the Greek novels with French and Spanish ones of the baroque period, see Molinié 1995. See also the brief remarks by Cherpac 1958, 21–22.

⁴⁶ Highet 1949, 164.

⁴⁷ See the introduction.

⁴⁸ See Wolff 1961, 309. Interestingly, this scholar adds to the similarities that the recognition in both novels is brought about by the sudden arrival of a traveler from far away. In Heliodorus this is the case only if we include the revelation of Theagenes’s relationship to Chariclea in her recognition, as I think we should.

⁴⁹ Sidney 1977, chapter 8, p. 842.

⁵⁰ See the passages, from act 4, in Forestier 1988, 535–36.

⁵¹ See Cherpac 1958, 22–24; Forestier 1988, 535–36. One of Hardy’s plays is entitled *La force du sang* (1625).

In the tragicomedy *Cornélie*, for instance, a mother feels a powerful commotion at hearing her child cry offstage, though she does not know the baby's identity.⁵² In another theatrical version of Heliodorus, *L'Éthiopique* by Génétay, Persine feels a strong inclination toward both prisoners but especially the girl, and connects her sentiment to a dream in which, in a way again reminiscent of Heliodorus, it was revealed to her that one of the prisoners was her child.⁵³

Blood speaks loudly also in the rewriting of the Heliodorean scene in an Italian tragicomedy, *Il pastor fido*, by Battista Guarini (1590). Because of the tricks contrived by a jealous woman, the nymph Amaryllis risks being sacrificed to obey the injunction of an old Arcadian oracle of Diana, but her lover, Mirtillo, offers his life to save her. When the chief priest of Diana is about to strike the blow, he recognizes the victim as his son. As in Heliodorus, the destiny of the heroine is governed by an oracle of difficult interpretation; if in the Greek novel the sacrificial victims can only be foreigners, in the Italian pastoral drama, with a reversal, they can only be natives of Arcadia. As in the *Aethiopica* the crowd reads in the heroine's recognition a divine decree enjoining on her father to save her, in *Il pastor fido* a seer explains to Mirtillo's father that the will of the gods opposes the sacrifice; and, just as in the Greek novel the heroine's father and mother are deeply moved at the sight of their yet unrecognized daughter, Mirtillo's father has a surge of pity when he prepares to sacrifice his yet unrecognized son: "Deh, come di pietà pur ora il petto / intenerir mi sento! / Che 'nsolito stupor mi lega I sensi! / Par che non osi il cor né la man possa / levar questa bipenne" (act 5, scene 4, 507–11).⁵⁴

Even a cursory study of blood's call in early modern European literature provides further insights into possible reasons why the motif could appeal so strongly to a Greek novelist. A parallel motif in the French plays that exploit blood's call is that of amorous sympathy, which in turn can be traced back to the theory of cosmic sympathies and antipathies that was first advanced by the alchemist Bolus or Pseudo-Democritus (c. 200 BCE) and became popular in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.⁵⁵ The novel's exaltation of amorous sympathy in the strongest

⁵² The text is in Chérpack 1958, 23.

⁵³ See the selection of passages, from act 4, in Forestier 1988, 535.

⁵⁴ Translated: "Oh, how I feel my breast just now becoming tender with pity! What strange wonder binds my senses! My heart, it seems, dares not, my hand cannot, raise this two-edged axe!" Other aspects of the recognition in *Il pastor fido* are inspired by *Oedipus Rex*: the witness leading to the recognition is a shepherd, who gave Mirtillo to his putative father; the shepherd is afraid that he might be punished because he hid from Montano that he saved the child. We shall note, however, that in a significant detail *Il pastor fido* differs from both *Oedipus Rex* and the *Aethiopica*: the child was not exposed but ravished by a storm. Perhaps this detail is meant to keep the father unsullied: though in sixteenth-century Italy children's exposure was still tolerated, more and more abandoned children met with tragic ends in hospitals, which after the fourteenth century became the most common "home" for them. See Boswell 1988, 397–434.

⁵⁵ See Chérpack 1958, chapter 1.

sense, as a predestined connection between two individuals, could build the appropriate background for the idealization of the mysterious “sympathy” connecting parents and children. (Recall that the term Chariclea uses for the expected gut response of her mother to her presence is precisely *sympatheia*.) Both forms of sympathy could equally demonstrate the power of nature in human relations.

Indeed, the French Renaissance potter and polymath Bernard Palissy invokes the call of blood and the call of love jointly. He recounts the story of a woman who felt the presence of her lover over two miles away alongside that of a mother whose breasts flowed with milk when her child cried, even if she did not hear him.⁵⁶ Love is as good a diviner as blood. Though more visceral and concretely physical,⁵⁷ the call of blood could sound notes similar to those of love’s call. And love’s call is a leitmotif in the Greek novels, one that even the iconoclastic Achilles Tatius brings to bear on the comical scene in which Clitophon fails to recognize Leucippe yet, if we believe him, feels a stirring, caused by “something” (τι) in her appearance, a *je ne sais quoi*.

No presentiment, no call of love, and no *je ne sais quoi* stir Tancredi, the protagonist of Tasso’s *Gerusalemme liberata*, into recognizing his beloved Clorinda as they fight at close quarters in one of the epic’s culminating episodes. Tasso used Chariclea for his Clorinda: a maiden-warrior of Muslim faith, she was born white of Ethiopian royals. Her mother secretly confided her to a servant, with whom the girl led a wandering life until he longed in old age to go back to his native Egypt and took her along, as if following in Calasiris’s footsteps. Like Chariclea, Clorinda learns of her origins, from the servant, only when she is about to make the most momentous decision of her life: to raid the enemy camp at night, the equivalent to Chariclea’s elopement (*Gerusalemme liberata* 12.21–38). The last parallel suggests that Clorinda’s exploit, like Chariclea’s, will end in some form of return and recognition.⁵⁸

It does and does not. Clorinda learns that her parents were Christian but her mother could not baptize her. The servant, in turn, did not have her baptized, though urged to do so by a dream vision. The same vision appears to him again the very night before his revelation to Clorinda, and this time it shakes his Muslim faith (12.40.5); but not Clorinda’s, who remains firm both in her religious belief and in her intent to raid the Christian camp. To pass unnoticed, she wears weapons “ruginose e nere” (rusty and black) instead of her shiny armor (12.18.4), reversing the gesture of Patroclus when he dons the conspicuous armor of Achilles so as to be mistaken for him.

Clorinda’s trick would work were it not for Tancredi, the Christian warrior who loves her. He spots her as an enemy but thinks her a man and challenges her

⁵⁶ The text is in Palissy’s *Discours admirables* (1580), paraphrased in Cherpac 1958, 9.

⁵⁷ See Cherpac 1958, 132.

⁵⁸ Other implications of the Heliodorean subtext are analyzed by W. Stephens 1994.

to fight. Neither one recognizes the other. A feature that may surprise modern readers even more than Tancredi's failure to see that his opponent is a woman is the failure on both sides to recognize each other's voice, in spite of the boastful challenges they exchange. Tasso is giving his narrative an archaizing touch by connecting it to medieval French and Italian heroic poetry, where the voice is not used as *gnōrisma*.⁵⁹ Clorinda's voice, however, suddenly has a strong emotional effect on Tancredi when, on the point of death, she asks her killer to baptize her (12.66). The sweetness of that voice saddens the victorious hero even before he finds out the identity of his victim. As he prepares to uncover her forehead, yet unknown, his hand trembles. The anxiety is caused by that voice, not by a presentiment of the warrior's identity. The text is categorical: she is "non conosciuta ancor," not yet known.

The recognition occurs only when he uncovers her and, ostensibly, only for him. We are not told that he uncovers his face; or at any rate, emphasis falls only on his discovery ("La vide, la conobbe"). One possible reason for this focalization is that Tancredi, not Clorinda, is the tragic protagonist. The poet records his hero's discovery because it destroys him. Another is that Clorinda is otherwise preoccupied: she has embarked on another journey, and her eyes look not at Tancredi but to heaven. Tasso might have had in mind the story of Penthesilea, killed by Achilles and posthumously loved by him (Quintus of Smyrne *Posthomerica* 1.18–674). A main difference, though, is that both Achilles and Penthesilea know who the other is when they fight. They introduce themselves in Homeric style, boasting of their prowess and genealogy: Achilles is the slayer of Hector (581), Penthesilea is an Amazon and the daughter of a god (553–62). Achilles's tragic recognition consists in discovering not the woman's identity but her beauty. His is a vertical recognition: of love. Conversely, Tancredi's recognition is horizontal, in the sense that he "recovers" Clorinda, that he sees in his victim the woman he loved and loves. That woman, though, has experienced a vertical recognition herself, a sudden transfiguration by the Christian faith. Recognition of God replaces Chariclea's recognition by her family. Both recognitions are a return, a homecoming, to the heroine's origins; but Clorinda's return marks also a departure to the new life of the soul, to a death that brings life ("morir . . . vivace," 12.68.7).⁶⁰ Her conversion is foreshadowed by the servant's doubts about the true faith subsequent to his dream and by the dream's own words, which announce that Clorinda will soon be changed: "l'ora s'appressa / che dée cangiar Clorinda e vita e sorte" (12.39.5–6).⁶¹ The theological virtues, faith,

⁵⁹ See Mölk 1964, 108. But see Harms 1966, 301, n. 2, on German epic.

⁶⁰ See Caretti's note on *vivace* (Tasso 1979, 709).

⁶¹ Translated: "The hour is drawing near / which must change Clorinda, both her life and her destiny."

charity, and hope, are infused into her as her blood flows out, and speak through her dying voice (12.65). Whose voice is it, then, that moves Tancredi? A transfigured voice, one in which rings “un non so che di flebile e soave,” a faint, soft melody, like the call of an angel. When he baptizes Clorinda, he sees a face transmuted by joy, as she departs in peace and leaves him alone, to wrestle with his tragedy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alaux, J., and F. Létoublon. "Les vicissitudes des choses humaines dans le roman grec: L'exemple des *Éthiopiennes*." *Cahiers du Gita* 11 (1998): 145–70.
- Alt, K. "Zur Anagnorisis in der *Helena*." *Hermes* 90 (1962): 6–24.
- Alvares, J. "Chariton's Erotic History." *American Journal of Philology* 118 (1997): 613–29.
- Alvares, J. "Some Political and Ideological Dimensions of Chariton's 'Chaireas and Callirhoe.'" *Classical Journal* 97 (2001–2): 113–44.
- Amyot, J., transl. *Histoire Aethiopique de Heliodorus, Contenant Dix livres, Traitant des loyales & pudiques amours de Theagenes Thessalien, & Chariclea Aethiopienne*. Lyon: Loys Cloquemin & Estienne Michel, 1575.
- Anson, J. "The Female Transvestite in Early Monasticism: The Origin and Development of a Motif." *Viator* 5 (1974): 1–32.
- Archibald, E. *Apollonius of Tyre: Medieval and Renaissance Themes and Variations*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1991.
- Archibald, E. "Apollonius of Tyre in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance." In Hofmann 1999: 229–37.
- Austin, N. *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Baker, A. "Novelistic Elements in the *Life of Marius*." Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 2005.
- Bakhtin, M. M. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Ed. M. Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.
- Baslez, M-F. "L'idée de noblesse dans les romans grecs." *Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne* 16 (1990): 115–28.
- Beer, B. "Lucius bei den Phäaken: Zum νόστος-Motiv in Apuleius, *Met.* 11." *Ancient Narrative* 9 (2011): 77–98.
- Bell, C. H. "The Call of the Blood in the Mediaeval German Epic." *Modern Language Notes* 37 (1922): 17–26.
- Bertoni, C., and M. Fusillo. "Heliodorus Parthenopaeus: The *Aithiopika* in Baroque Naples." In Hunter 1998a: 157–81.
- Billault, A. *La création romanesque*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991.
- Billault, A. "Les romanciers grecs et la tragédie." In *Le théâtre grec antique: La tragédie. Colloque de la villa Kérylos*, 1997, Ed. J. Leclant and J. Jouanna, 179–94. Paris: Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1998.
- Billault, A. "Le *Roman de Sésonchoris*: Fragments, Thèmes et Fiction." In *I papiri del romanzo antico: Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Firenze, 11–12 giugno 2009*, Ed. G. Bastianini and A. Casanova, 193–208. Florence: Istituto Papirologico "G. Vitelli," 2010.
- Billault, A. "Recognitions in the Greek Novel." In *Ancient Narrative (Acts of the Fourth International Conference on the Ancient Novel)*. Forthcoming.

- Biraud, M. "L'hypotexte homérique et les rôles amoureux de Callirhoé dans le roman de Chariton." *Publications de la Faculté de Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Nice* 29 (1985): 21–27.
- Block, E. "Clothing Makes the Man: A Pattern in the *Odyssey*." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 115 (1985): 1–11.
- Blundell, M. W. "Parental Nature and Stoic Oikeiosis." *Ancient Philosophy* 10 (1990): 221–42.
- Boswell, J. *The Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
- Boulhol, P. ἈΝΑΓΝΩΡΙΣΜΟΣ. *La scène de reconnaissance dans l'hagiographie*. Aix en Provence: Publications de l'Université de Provence, 1996.
- Bowie, E. "The Readership of Greek Novels in the Ancient World." In Tatum 1994: 435–60.
- Bowie, E. "The Function of Mythology in Longus' *Daphnis and Chloë*." In *Mitos en la literatura griega helenística e imperial*. Ed. J. A. López-Férez, 361–76. Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 2004.
- Bowie, E. "Literary milieux." In Whitmarsh 2008: 17–38.
- Bowie, E. "Vertus de la campagne, vices de la cité dans *Daphnis et Chloé* de Longus." In Pouderon and Bost-Pouderon 2009: 13–22.
- Bradley, K. "Contending with Conversion: Reflections on the Reformation of Lucius the Ass." *Phoenix* 52 (1998): 315–34.
- Brethes, R. *De l'idéalisme au réalisme: Une étude du comique dans le roman grec*. Salerno: helios editrice, 2007.
- Brethes, R. "Rien de trop: La recherche d'un juste milieu chez Aristote, Ménandre et Chariton." In Pouderon and Bost-Pouderon 2009: 71–83.
- Browne, R. A. "Types of Self-Recognition and Self-Reform in Ancient Drama." *American Journal of Philology* 64 (1943): 163–71.
- Brzenk, E. J. "Apuleius, Pater and the Bildungsroman." In *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass*. Ed. B. L. Hijmans Jr. and R. Th. van der Paardt, Groningen: Bouma's Boekhuis, 1978: 231–37.
- Burchard, C., ed. *Joseph und Aseneth*. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
- Calderini, A. *Caritone di Afrodizia: Le avventure di Cherea e Calliroe*. Turin: Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1913.
- Calvet-Sébasti, M.-A. "Une île romanesque: Arados." In *Lieux, décors et paysages de l'ancien roman des origines à Byzance*. Ed. B. Pouderon, 87–100. Lyon: Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée, 2005.
- Capra, A. "The (Un)happy Romance of Curleo and Liliat: Xenophon of Ephesus, the *Cyropaedia*, and the Birth of the 'Anti-tragic' Novel." *Ancient Narrative* 7 (2009): 29–50.
- Carlisle, D. P. C. "Vigilans somniabar: Some Narrative Uses of Dreams in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*." In *Paideia at Play: Learning and Wit in Apuleius*. Ed. W. Riess, 215–34. *Ancient Narrative*, supp. 11, 2009.
- Carson, A. *Eros the bittersweet*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1986. Reprinted, Normal, Ill.: Dalkey Archive Press, 2000.
- Cataudella, Q. "Vite di santi e romanzo." In *Literature comparate: Problemi e metodo. Studi in onore di Ettore Paratore*. Ed. M. and G. Simonetti, 2:931–52. Bologna: Pàtron, 1981.
- Cave, T. *Recognitions: A Study in Poetics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Chaniotis, A. "Epigraphic Evidence for the Philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias." *Bulletin for the Institute of Classical Studies* 47 (2004): 79–81.
- Cherpack, C. *The Call of Blood in French Classical Tragedy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958.
- Cicu, L. "La poetica di Aristotele e le strutture dell'antico romanzo d'amore e d'avventura." *Sandalion* 46 (1991): 107–41.
- Clay, J. S. *Homer's Trojan Theater: Space, Vision, and Memory in the "Iliad"*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Connors, C. "Chariton's Syracuse and Its Histories of Empire." In Paschalis and Frangoulidis 2002: 12–26.
- Conte, G. B. *The Hidden Author: An Interpretation of Petronius's "Satyricon"*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

- Cox Miller, P., ed. *Women in Early Christianity: Translations from Greek Texts*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005.
- Cueva, E. P. *The Myths of Fiction: Studies in the Canonical Greek Novels*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.
- Culbertson, D. *The Poetics of Revelation: Recognition and the Narrative Tradition*. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1989.
- Dalmeyda, G., ed. and transl. *Longus. Pastorales (Daphnis et Chloé)*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1934.
- Dawkins, M. "Modern Greek Oral Versions of Apollonius of Tyre." *Modern Language Review* 37 (1942): 169–84.
- De La Fresnaye, V. *L'art poétique* (1st ed. 1605). Ed. G. Pellissier. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1885.
- de Temmerman, K. "How Ideal Is the Oldest Ideal Greek Novel?" *Mnemosyne* 63 (2010): 465–78.
- Dolar, M. "At First Sight." In *Gaze and Voice as Love Objects*. Ed. R. Salecl and S. Žizek, 129–53. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996.
- Douglas, R. C. "Liminality and Conversion in Joseph and Aseneth." *Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha* 3 (1988): 1–42.
- Dowden, K. "Heliodoros: Serious Intentions." *Classical Quarterly* 46 (1996): 267–85.
- Drake, G. C. "Candidus—a unifying theme in Apuleius' *Golden Ass*." *Classical Journal* 64 (1968): 102–109.
- Drews, F. "Asinus Philosophans: Allegory's Fate and Isis' Providence in the *Metamorphoses*." In Keulen and Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012, 107–31.
- Duckworth, G. E. *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment*. 1952. Reprinted, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Durham, D. B. "Parody in Achilles Tatius." *Classical Philology* 33 (1938): 1–19.
- Edwards, M. J. "The *Clementina*: A Christian Response to the Pagan Novel." *Classical Quarterly* 42 (1992): 459–74.
- Felson-Rubin, N. *Regarding Penelope. From Character to Poetics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Feuillâtre, E. *Études sur les Éthiopiennes d'Héliodore*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.
- Fink, U. B. *Joseph und Aseneth: Revision des griechischen Textes und Edition der zweiten lateinischen Übersetzung*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008.
- Finkelpearl, E. D. *Metamorphoses of Language in Apuleius: A Study of Allusion in the Novel*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.
- Finkelpearl, E. D. "The Ends of the *Metamorphoses*: Apuleius' *Met.* 11.26.4–11.30." In *Metamorphic Reflections: Essays Presented to Ben Hijmans at His 75th Birthday*. Ed. M. Zimmerman and R. van der Paardt, 319–42. Leuven: Peeters, 2004.
- Foley, H. P. "Anodos Dramas: Euripides' *Alcestis* and *Helen*." In *Innovations of Antiquity*. Ed. R. Hexter and D. Selden, 133–60. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Forestier, G. *Éthétique de l'identité dans le théâtre français (1550–1680)*. Geneva: Droz, 1988.
- Frangoulidis, S. *Roles and Performances in Apuleius' "Metamorphoses"*. Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2001.
- Fry, G. "Philosophie et mystique de la destinée: Étude du thème de la Fortune dans les 'Métamorphoses' d'Apulée." *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 18 (1984): 137–70.
- Frye, N. *The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance*. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1976. Reprinted 1978.
- Fusillo, M. *Il romanzo greco: Polifonia ed eros*. Venice: Marsilio, 1989.
- Fusillo, M. "How Novels End: Some Patterns of Closure in Ancient Narrative." In *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature*. Ed. D. H. Roberts et al., 209–27. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Futre Pinheiro, M. "The Nachleben of the Ancient Novel in Iberian Literature in the Sixteenth Century." In Schmeling 2003b: 775–800.
- Gainsford, P. "Formal Analysis of Recognition Scenes in the 'Odyssey.'" *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 123 (2003): 41–59.
- Garbugino, G., ed. *La storia di Apollonio re di Tiro*. Alessandria, Italy: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2010.

- Genette, G. *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*. Trans. J. E. Lewin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.
- Giraldi Cintio, G. *De' Romanzi, delle Comedie e delle Tragedie* (1st ed. 1554). Milan: G. Daelli e Comp, 1864.
- Goff, B. E. "The Sign of the Fall: The Scars of Orestes and Odysseus." *Classical Antiquity* 10 (1991): 259–67.
- Goldhill, S. *The Poet's Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Goldhill, S. *Foucault's Virginity. Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of Sexuality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Goldhill, S. "Genre." In Whitmarsh 2008: 185–200.
- Goold, G. P., ed. and trans. *Chariton: "Callirhoe"*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Graverini, L. *Le metamorfosi di Apuleio: Letteratura e identità*. Ospedaletto, Italy: Pacini Editore, 2007 (English transl. by B. T. Lee, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2012).
- Graverini, L. "Apuleio e Achille Tazio. Una scena di caccia e una 'regola aurea'." In *Il romanzo latino: Modelli e tradizione letteraria*. Ed. F. Gasti, 61–96. Pavia: Ibis, 2009.
- Graverini, L. "Amore, 'dolcezza', stupore: Romanzo antico e filosofia." In *Lector, intende, laetaberis: Il romanzo dei Greci e dei Romani*, Atti del Convegno Nazionale, Turin, April 27–28, Ed. R. Uglione, 57–88. Alessandria, Italy: dell' Orso, 2010.
- Graverini, L. "Prudentia e Providentia: Book XI in Context." In Keulen and Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012, 86–106.
- Griffin, J. *Homer on Life and Death*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Griffith, J. G., ed. *Apuleius of Madauros: The Isis Book (Metamorphoses, Book XI)*. Leiden: Brill, 1975.
- Guarini, B. *Il pastor fido*. Ed. E. Selmi, Venice: Marsilio, 1999.
- Guastella, G. "La rete del sangue: Simbologia delle relazioni e modelli dell'identità nella cultura romana." *Materiali e discussioni* 15 (1985): 49–123.
- Guez, J.-P. "Homme tyrannique, homme royal dans le roman de Chariton." In Pouderon and Bost-Pouderon 2009: 23–38.
- Hägg, T. *Narrative Techniques in Ancient Greek Romances: Studies of Chariton, Xenophon Ephesius, and Achilles Tatius*. Stockholm: Svenska institutet, 1971.
- Hägg, T. *The Novel in Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- Hägg, T. (2004a) "The Ephesiaca of Xenophon Ephesius—Original or Epitome?" In Hägg 2004d: 159–98. Originally published as "Die Ephesiaka des Xenophon Ephesius—Original oder Epitome?" *Classica et Mediaevalia* 27 (1966): 118–61.
- Hägg, T. (2004b) "Epiphany in the Greek Novels: The Emplotment of a Metaphor." In Hägg 2004d: 141–55. Originally published in *Eranos* 100 (2002): 51–61.
- Hägg, T. (2004c) "The Parthenope Romance Decapitated?" In Hägg 2004d: 233–61. Originally published in *Symbolae Osloenses* 59 (1984): 61–92.
- Hägg, T. (2004d) *Parthenope: Studies in Ancient Greek Fiction (1969–2004)*. Ed. L. B. Mortensen and T. Eide. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2004.
- Hähnle, A. ΓΝΩΡΙΣΜΑΤΑ. Tübingen: Druck von H. Laupp Jr., 1929.
- Haight, E. H. *Essays on the Greek Romances*. New York: Longmans, 1943.
- Hansen, D. U. "Die Metamorphose des Heiligen: Clemens und die Clementina." *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 8 (1997): 119–30.
- Hanson, J. A., transl. *Apuleius "Metamorphoses"*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989, 2 vols.
- Harms, W. "Anagnorisis-Szenen des mittelalterlichen Romans und Ulrich Fütters 'Buch der Abenteuer.'" *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 96 (1966): 301–18.
- Harris, W. V. "The Theoretical Possibility of Extensive Infanticide in the Graeco-Roman World." *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 114–16.
- Harris, W. V. "Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire." *Journal of Roman Studies* 84 (1994): 1–22.
- Harrison, S. "Some Odyssean Scenes in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*." *Materiali e discussioni* 25 (1990): 193–201.

- Harrison, S. Review of Shumate 1996. *Petronian Society Newsletter* 27 (1997): 11–13.
- Harrison, S. *Apuleius: A Latin Sophist*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Harrison, S. "Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*." In Schmeling 2003b: 491–516.
- Harrison, S. "Narrative Subversion and Religious Satire in *Metamorphoses* 11." In Keulen and Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012, 73–85.
- Harsh, P. W. *Studies in Dramatic "Preparation" in Roman Comedy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936.
- Helms, L. "The Saint in the Brothel: Or Eloquence Rewarded." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 41 (1990): 319–32.
- Heseltine, M., transl. *Petronius "Satyricon"*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Heulot-Petit, F., and L. Michel, eds. *La reconnaissance sur la scène française: XVIIe–XXIe siècle*. Arras: Artois Presses Université, 2009.
- Highet, G. *The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949.
- Hijmans, B. L., et al., eds. *Apuleius Madaurensis, Metamorphoses, Book IX*. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1995.
- Hilton, J. "An Ethiopian Paradox: Heliodorus, *Aithiopika* 4.8." In Hunter 1998a: 79–82.
- Hirschberger, M. "Epos und Tragödie in Charitons *Callirhoe*: Ein Beitrag zu Intertextualität des griechischen Romans." *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 25 (2001): 157–86.
- Hoffmann, P. "De anagnorismo." Wrocław: Faviorke, 1910.
- Hofmann, H., ed. *Latin Fiction: The Latin Novel in Context*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Holzberg, N. "The *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri* and the *Odyssey*." *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 3 (1990): 91–101.
- Holzberg, N. "The Genre: Novel Proper and the Fringes." In Schmeling 2003b: 11–28.
- Höschele, R. "Meleager and Heliodora: A Love Story in Bits and Pieces?" In *Plotting with Eros: Essays on the Poetics of Love and the Erotics of Reading*. Ed. I. Nilsson, 99–134. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009.
- Huch, H. "Funktionswandlungen des antiken Romans." In *Der Antike Roman*. Ed. H. Huch, 52–81. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1989.
- Huet, P.-D. *Traité de l'origine des romans*. Ed. A. Kok, Amsterdam: N. V. Swets & Zeitlinger, 1942.
- Hunink, V. "Dreams in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*." in *Land of Dreams: Greek and Latin Studies in Honour of A. H. M. Kessel*. Ed. A. Lardinois et al., 18–31. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- Hunter, R. *A Study of Daphnis and Chloe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Hunter, R. *The New Comedy of Greece and Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Hunter, R. "History and Historicity in Chariton." In *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.34.2 (1994): 1055–86.
- Hunter, R., ed. (1998a) *Studies in Heliodorus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hunter, R. (1998b) "The *Aithiopika* of Heliodorus: Beyond Interpretation?" In Hunter 1998a: 40–59.
- Hunter, R. "Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*." In Schmeling 2003b: 361–86.
- Hunter, R. (2005a) "'Philip the Philosopher' on the *Aithiopika* of Heliodorus." In *Metaphor and the Ancient Novel*. Ed. S. Harrison et al., 123–38. *Ancient Narrative*, supp. 4, 2005.
- Hunter, R. (2005b) "Generic Consciousness in the *Orphic Argonautica*?" In *Roman and Greek Imperial Epic*. Ed. M. Paschalis, 149–68. Herakleion: Crete University Press, 2005.
- Inowlocki, S. *Des idoles mortes et muettes au Dieu vivant: Joseph, Aséneth et le fils de Pharaon dans un roman du Judaïsme hellénisé*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2002.
- James, P. *Unity in Diversity: A Study of Apuleius' Metamorphoses with Particular Reference to the Narrator's Art of Transformation and the Metamorphosis Motif in the Tale of Cupid and Psyche*. Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 1987.
- Kaimio, M. "How to Enjoy a Greek Novel: Chariton Guiding His Audience." *Arctos* 30 (1996): 49–73.
- Kenney, E. J., ed. *Apuleius, "Cupid and Psyche"*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Kerényi, K. *Die griechisch-orientalische Romanliteratur in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung: Ein Versuch mit Nachbetrachtungen*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1973 (1927).

- Kermode, F. *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a New Epilogue*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Keulen, W. "Il romanzo latino." In *Il romanzo antico: Forme, testi, problemi*. Ed. L. Graverini et al., 131–73. Rome: Carocci, 2006. Reprinted 2007.
- Keulen, W., and U. Egelhaaf-Gaiser, eds. *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass III: The Isis-Book*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- König, J. "Body and Text." In Whitmarsh 2008: 127–44.
- Konstan, D. *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Kortekaas, G. A. A., ed. *Commentary on the "Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri"*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Kraemer, R. S. *When Aseneth Met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical Patriarch and His Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Kragelund, P. "Epicurus, Priapus and the Dreams in Petronius." *Classical Quarterly* 39 (1989): 436–50.
- Kudlien, F. "Kinderaussetzung im antiken Roman: Ein Thema zwischen Fiktionalität und Lebenswirklichkeit." *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 2 (1989): 25–44.
- Kuhlmann, P. "Die *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri* und ihre Vorlagen." *Hermes* 130 (2002): 109–20.
- Lalanne, S. *Une éducation grecque: Rites de passage et construction des genres dans le roman grec ancien*. Paris: La découverte, 2006.
- Lamberton, R. *Homer the Theologian*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Reprinted 1989.
- Laplace, M. "Les légendes troyennes dans le 'roman' de Chariton, *Chairéas et Callirhoé*." *Revue des Études Grecques* 93 (1980): 83–125.
- Lefteratou, A. "The Myth of the Novel." D.Phil. diss., Oxford University, 2010.
- Létoublon, F. *Les lieux communs du roman*. Leiden: Brill, 1993.
- Létoublon, F. "Le prince idéal de la *Cyropédie* ou l'histoire est un roman." In Pouderon and Bost-Pouderon 2009: 39–49.
- Lev Kenaan, V. "Delusion and Dream in Apuleius' 'Metamorphoses'." *Classical Antiquity* 23 (2004): 247–84.
- Lipsius, R. A., and M. Bonnet, eds. *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*. Leipzig: Hermann Mendelssohn, 1891.
- Liviabella Furiani, P. "La voce degli dei nelle *Pastorali* di Longo." In *La ricerca di Dio*. Ed. E. Mirri and F. Valori, 69–102. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1999.
- Liviabella Furiani, P. "Il corpo nel romanzo di Achille Tazio." *Ancient Narrative* 1 (2000): 134–51.
- Liviabella Furiani, P. "L'occhio e l'orecchio nel romanzo Greco d'amore: Note sull'esperienza del bello nelle *Etiopiche* di Eliodoro." In *Studi di filologia e tradizione greca in memoria di Aristide Colonna*. Ed. F. Benedetti and S. Grandolini, 417–42. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2003.
- Liviabella Furiani, P. "Il V secolo, tra *fiction* e realtà, nel romanzo di Caritone." In *Il quinto secolo: Studi di filosofia antica in onore di Livio Rossetti*. Ed. S. Giombini and F. Marcacci, 617–44. Perugia: Officina del libro, 2010.
- Lochert, V. "Les didascalies de la reconnaissance: Les avatars de l'agnition de la représentation à la lecture." In Heulot-Petit and Michel 2009: 59–74.
- Lush, B. "Irony and the Rejection of Imagined Alternatives in Euripides' *Alcestis*." *Classical Journal* 107 (2012): 385–407.
- MacAlister, S. *Dreams and Suicides: The Greek Novel from Antiquity to the Byzantine Empire*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- MacQueen, B. D. *Myth, Rhetoric, and Fiction: A Reading of Longus's "Daphnis and Chloe"*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.
- Magnaldi, G. *L'οἰκείωσις peripatetica in Ario Didimo e nel "De finibus" di Cicerone*. Florence: Le Lettere, 1991.
- Malerba, L. *Itaca per sempre*. Milan: Mondadori, 1997.
- Mal-Maeder, D., van. *Apuleius Madaurensis Metamorphoses: Livre II*. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2001.

- Mal-Maeder, D., van. *La fiction des déclamations*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Marchand, S. "D'une autre reconnaissance: L'efficacité du cliché des scènes de reconnaissances familiales dans le drame de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle." In Heulot-Petit and Michel 2009: 185–99.
- Marino, E. "Il teatro nel romanzo." *Materiali e discussioni* 25 (1991): 203–18.
- Mason, H. J. "The *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius and Its Greek sources." In H. Hofmann 1999: 103–12.
- May, R. *Apuleius and Drama: The Ass on Stage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- McClure, L. "Women and the Construction of Male Identity in Tragic Recognition." Unpublished paper.
- McEwan Humphrey, E. *The Ladies and the Cities: Transformation and Apocalyptic Identity in Joseph and Aseneth, 4 Ezra, the Apocalypse and the Shepherd of Hermas*. Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995.
- Mencacci, F. "Il sangue del gladiatore: Commodo e la doppia identità." In *Sangue e antropologia nella teologia medievale*. Ed. F. Vattioni, 2:657–82. Rome: Edizioni Pia Unione Preziosissimo Sangue, 1991.
- Misener, G. "Iconistic Portraits." *Classical Philology* 19 (1924): 97–123.
- Moles, J. L. "The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 98 (1978): 79–100.
- Molinié, G. *Du roman grec au roman baroque*. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 1995.
- Mölk, U. "Das Motiv des Wiedererkennens an der Stimme im Epos und höflichen Roman des französischen Mittelalters." *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 15 (1964): 107–15.
- Montiglio, S. *Silence in the Land of Logos*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Montiglio, S. "Going Back Home? Lucius' Journey in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* Set against the Background of Odysseus." *Materiali e discussioni* 58 (2007): 93–113.
- Morales, H. *Vision and Narrative in Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Clitophon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Morgan, J. R. "History, Romance, and Realism in the Aithiopika of Heliodoros." *Classical Antiquity* 1 (1982): 221–65.
- Morgan, J. R. (1989a) "A Sense of the Ending: The Conclusion of Heliodoros' Aithiopika." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 119 (1989): 299–320.
- Morgan, J. R. (1989b) "The Story of Knemon in Heliodoros' AITHIOPIKA." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 109 (1989): 99–113.
- Morgan, J. R. "Narrative Doublets in Heliodorus' Aithiopika." In Hunter 1998a: 60–78.
- Morgan, J. R. "Heliodorus." In Schmeling 2003b: 417–56.
- Morgan, J. R., ed. *Longus: Daphnis and Chloe*. With an introduction, translation, and commentary. Oxford: Aris & Phillips, 2004.
- Morgan, J. R. (2007a) "Achilles Tatius." In *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature*. Ed. I. J. F. de Jong et al., 1:493–506. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Morgan, J. R. (2007b) "Kleitophon and Enkolpius: Achilleus Tatius as Hidden Author." In *The Greek and Roman Novel: Parallel Readings*. Ed. M. Paschalis et al., 105–20. *Ancient Narrative*, supp. 8, 2007.
- Morgan, J. R., and S. Harrison. "Intertextuality." In Whitmarsh 2008: 218–37.
- Müller, C. W., ed. *Euripides Philoktetes*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000.
- Murnaghan, S. *Disguise and Recognition in the "Odyssey"*. 2nd ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011.
- Naber, S. A. "Ad Charitonem." *Mnemosyne* 29 (1901): 92–99.
- Nagy, G. "Sēma and Nōesis: Some Illustrations." *Arethusa* 16 (1983): 35–55.
- Newbold, R. "Benefits and Moral Development in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*." *Ancient Narrative* 3 (2003): 88–105.
- Nicolini, L. "Ad (I)usum lectoris": *Etimologia e giochi di parole in Apuleio*. Bologna: Pàtron, 2011.
- Ormand, K. "Testing Virginity in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus." *Ramus* 39, 2 (2010): 160–97.
- O' Sullivan, J. N. *Xenophon of Ephesus: His Compositional Technique and the Birth of the Novel*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995.

- Panayotakis, S. "The Temple and the Brothel: Mothers and Daughters in *Apollonius of Tyre*." In Paschalis and Frangoulidis 2002: 98–117.
- Paradiso, A. "Il motivo della voce come *kosmos* erotico in Saffo." In *Lo spettacolo delle voci*. Ed. F. De Martino and A. H. Sommerstein, 103–15. Bari: Levante editori, 1995.
- Paschalis, M., and S. Frangoulidis, eds. *Space in the Ancient Novel. Ancient Narrative*, supp. 1, 2002.
- Patterson, C. "'Not Worth the Rearing': The Causes of Infant Exposure in Ancient Greece." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 115 (1985): 103–23.
- Paulsen, T. *Inszenierung des Schicksals: Tragödie und Komödie im Roman des Heliodor*. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1992.
- Penella, R. J., ed. and transl. *Man and the Word: The Orations of Himerius*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
- Penwill, J. L. "Slavish Pleasures and Profitless Curiosity: Fall and Redemption in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*." *Ramus* 4 (1975): 49–82.
- Penwill, J. L. "On Choosing a Life: Variations on an Epic Theme In Apuleius' *Met.* 10 & 11." *Ramus* 38 (2009): 85–108.
- Perkins, J. *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era*. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Perkins, J. "An Ancient 'Passing' Novel: Heliodorus' *Aithiopika*." *Arethusa* 32 (1999): 197–214.
- Perrin, B. "Recognition Scenes in Greek Literature." *American Journal of Philology* 30 (1909): 371–404.
- Perry, B. E. *The Ancient Romances*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- Pervo, R. I. "Joseph and Asenath and the Greek Novel." *Society of Biblical Literature 1976 Seminar Papers*. Ed. G. MacRae, 171–82. Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1976.
- Pervo, R. I. "The Ancient Novel Becomes Christian." In Schmeling 2003b: 685–709.
- Philonenko, M. *Joseph et Aséneth: Introduction, texte critique, traduction, et notes*. Leiden: Brill, 1968.
- Plazenet, L. *L'Ébahissement et la délectation: Réception comparée et poétique du roman grec en France et en Angleterre aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles*. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1997.
- Plazenet, L., ed. *Héliodore: L'Histoire aethiopique*. Trans. J. Amyot. Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008.
- Pouderon, B., and C. Bost-Pouderon, eds. *Passions, vertus et vices dans l'ancien roman*. Lyon: Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée, 2009.
- Ramelli, I. *Hierocles the Stoic: "Elements of Ethics," Fragments, and Excerpts*. Trans. D. Konstan. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- Rapin, R. *Les réflexions sur la poétique de ce temps et sur les ouvrages des poètes anciens et modernes*. Ed. E. T. Dubois. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1970.
- Reardon, B. P. "Theme, Structure and Narrative in Chariton." *Yale Classical Studies* 27 (1982): 1–27.
- Reardon, B. P., ed. *Collected Greek Novels*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Reprinted with an introduction by J. Morgan, 2008.
- Reardon, B. P. *The Form of Greek Romance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Redford, D. B. "The Literary Motif of the Exposed Child." *Numen* 14 (1967): 209–28.
- Reeve, M. D. "Conceptions." *Papers of the Cambridge Philological Society* 215 (1988): 81–112.
- Reeve, M. D. "The Re-emergence of Ancient Novels in Western Europe, 1300–1810." In Whitmarsh 2008: 282–98.
- Repath, I. "Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*: What Happened Next?" *Classical Quarterly* 55 (2005): 250–65.
- Reydams-Schils, G. "Human Bonding and *Oikeiosis* in Roman Stoicism." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 22 (2002), 221–52.
- Richardson, N. J. "Recognition Scenes in the *Odyssey* and Ancient Literary Criticism." *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar* 4 (1984): 219–35.
- Robiano, P. "La scène de reconnaissance de Chariton, 'Chéréas et Callirhoé.'" *Hermes* 136 (2008): 426–37.
- Rohde, E. *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (1st ed. 1876). Reprint of 3rd ed. (1914), Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1960.
- Rousset, J. *Leurs yeux se rencontrèrent: La scène de première vue dans le roman*. Paris: Librairie José Corti, 1981.

- Ruiz-Montero, C. *La Estructura de la Novela Griega: Análisis Funcional*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1988.
- Ruiz-Montero, C. "Chariton von Aphrodisias: Ein Überblick." *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2, 34.2 (1994): 1006–54.
- Ruiz-Montero, C. "The Rise of the Greek Novel." In Schmeling 2003b: 29–86.
- Russo, J. M., et al., eds. *A Commentary on Homer's "Odyssey"*. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Saïd, S. "Les langues du roman grec." In *Le monde du roman grec*. Ed. M.-F. Baslez et al., 169–86. Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure, 1992.
- Sandy, G. N. *Heliodorus*. Boston: Twayne, 1982.
- Sandy, G. N. "Apuleius' 'Metamorphoses' and the Ancient Novel." In *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2, 34.2 (1994): 1512–74.
- Sandy, G. N. "The Heritage of the Ancient Greek Novel in France and Britain." In Schmeling 2003b: 735–74.
- Schironi, F. "Theory into Practice: Aristotelian Principles in Aristarchean Philology." *Classical Philology* 104 (2009): 279–316.
- Schlam, C. *The Metamorphoses of Apuleius: On Making an Ass of Oneself*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Schmeling, G. *Xenophon of Ephesus*. Boston: Twayne, 1980.
- Schmeling, G., ed. *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1988. Reprinted 2010.
- Schmeling, G. "The History of Apollonius King of Tyre." In Hofmann 1999: 141–52.
- Schmeling, G. (2003a) "Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri." In Schmeling 2003b: 517–51.
- Schmeling, G. (2003b), ed. *The Novel in the Ancient World*. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
- Schmeling, G., ed. *A Commentary on the "Satyricon" of Petronius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Sharples, R. W. "Implications of the New Alexander of Aphrodisias Inscription." *Bulletin for the Institute of Classical Studies* 48 (2005): 47–56.
- Shumate, N. *Crisis and Conversion in Apuleius' Metamorphoses*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
- Sidney, P. *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1977.
- Sinclair, K. V. "'Nature Trait' in Medieval French." *Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur* 89 (1979): 151–58.
- Sissa, G. "A Theatrical Poetics: Recognition and the Structural Emotions of Tragedy." *Arion* 14, 1 (2006): 35–92.
- Slater, N. W. "Space and Displacement in Apuleius." In Paschalis and Frangoulidis 2002: 161–76.
- Slater, N. W. "And There's Another Country: Translation as Metaphor in Heliodorus." In *Metaphor and the Ancient Novel*. Ed. S. Harrison et al., 106–22. *Ancient Narrative*, supp. 4, 2005.
- Smith, S. D. *Greek Identity and the Athenian Past in Chariton: The Romance of Empire*. *Ancient Narrative*, supp. 9, 2007.
- Smith, W. S. "Apuleius and the New Testament: Lucius' Conversion Experience." *Ancient Narrative* 7 (2008): 51–73.
- Söder, R. *Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten und die romanhafte Literatur der Antike*. Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1932.
- Solmsen, F. *Electra and Orestes: Three Recognitions in Greek tragedy*. Amsterdam: N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1967.
- Stadter, P. A. "Fictional Narrative in the *Cyropaideia*." *American Journal of Philology* 112 (1991): 461–91.
- Stephens, S. A., and J. J. Winkler, eds. *Ancient Greek Novels: The Fragments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Stephens, W. "Tasso's Heliodorus and the World of Romance." In Tatum 1994: 67–87.
- Sussman, L. A., trans. *The Major Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1987.
- Swain, S. *Hellenism and Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Szepessy, T. "The Ancient Family Novel." *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 31, 3–4 (1985–88): 357–65.

- Tasso, T. *Discorsi dell'arte poetica e del poema eroico*. Ed. L. Poma. Bari: Laterza, 1964.
- Tasso, T. *Gerusalemme liberata*. Ed. L. Caretti. Milan: Mondadori, 1979.
- Tatum, J. "The Tales in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 100 (1969): 487–527.
- Tatum, J., ed. *In Search for the Ancient Novel*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
- Telò, M. "Elidoro e la critica omerica antica." *Studi italiani di filologia classica* 17, 1 (1999): 71–87.
- Thompson, S. *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*. 6 vols. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955.
- Thornley, G., ed. and transl., *Daphnis and Chloe by Longus*. Revised and augmented by J. M. Edmonds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1916.
- Tilg, S. *Chariton of Aphrodisias and the Invention of the Greek Novel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Ugolini, G. "Edipo e la 'Poetica' di Aristotele in alcuni trattati del Cinquecento." *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 38, 1 (1987): 67–83.
- Van der Paardt, R. T. "The Unmasked 'I': Apuleius, *Met.* 11. 27." *Mnemosyne* 34 (1981): 96–106.
- Vannini, G., ed. *Petronii Arbitri "Satyricon" 100–115*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010.
- Vielberg, M. *Klemens in den Pseudoklementinischen Rekognitionen: Studien zur Literarischen Form des Spätantiken Romans*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000.
- Vilborg, E., ed. *Achilles Tatius "Leucippe and Clitophon"*. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1962.
- Voltaire, *Candide and Philosophical Letters*. Trans. R. Aldington, New York: Modern Library, 1992.
- Vuillemin, J. "La Reconnaissance dans l'Épopée et dans la Tragédie (Aristote, *Poétique*, chap. XVI)." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 66 (1984): 243–80.
- Vuillermoz, M. "Aspects de la reconnaissance tragique dans le théâtre français du VII^e siècle." In Heulot-Petit and Michel 2009: 21–32.
- Webster, T. B. L. *An Introduction to Menander*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974.
- West, S. "Joseph and Aseneth: A Neglected Greek Romance." *Classical Quarterly* 24 (1974): 70–81.
- Whitmarsh, T. "The Birth of a Prodigy: Heliodorus and the Genealogy of Hellenism." In Hunter 1998a: 93–124.
- Whitmarsh, T. "Reading for Pleasure: Narrative, Irony, and Erotics in Achilles Tatius." In *The Ancient Novel and Beyond*. Ed. S. Panayotakis et al., 191–205. Leiden: Brill 2003.
- Whitmarsh, T. "The Greek Novel: Titles and Genre." *American Journal of Philology* 126 (2005): 587–611.
- Whitmarsh, T., ed. *The Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Whitmarsh, T. "Desire and the End of the Greek Novel." In *Plotting with Eros: Essays on the Poetics of Love and the Erotics of Reading*. Ed. I. Nilsson, 135–52. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009.
- Whitmarsh, T. *Narrative and Identity in the Ancient Greek Novel: Returning Romance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Whitmarsh, T., and H. Morales, eds. *Achilles Tatius, "Leucippe and Clitophon"*. Trans., with notes, T. Whitmarsh. Introduction H. Morales. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Wills, L. M. *The Jewish Novel in the Ancient World*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.
- Wills, L. M., ed. and trans. *Ancient Jewish Novels: An Anthology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Winkler, J. J. "The Mendacity of Kalasiris and the Narrative Strategy of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika*." *Yale Classical Studies* 27 (1982): 93–158.
- Winkler, J. J. *Auctor and Actor: A Narratological Reading of Apuleius's "The Golden Ass"*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- Winkler, J. J. "The Education of Chloe: Hidden Injuries of Sex." In *The Constraints of Desire*, 101–26. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Winkler, M. M. "The Cinematic Nature of the Opening Scene of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika*." *Ancient Narrative* 1 (2000): 161–84.

- Wolff, S. L. *The Greek Romances in Elizabethan Prose Fiction*. New York: Noble Offset Printers, 1912. Reprinted 1961.
- Wouters, A. "Longus, *Daphnis et Chloé*: Le prooemion et les histoires enchâssées, à la lumière de la critique récente." *Les Études classiques* 62 (1994): 131–67.
- Wright, M. *Euripides' Escape-Tragedies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Zeitlin, F. I. "The Poetics of Eros: Nature, Art, and Imitation in Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*." In *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World*. Ed. D. M. Halperin et al., 417–64. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Zeitlin, F. I. "Gardens of Desire in Longus's *Daphnis and Chloe*: Nature, Art, and Imitation." In *Tatum* 1994: 148–70.
- Zeitlin, F. I. "Figuring Fidelity in Homer's *Odyssey*." In *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996: 19–52.
- Zeitlin, F. I. "Living Portraits and Sculpted Bodies in Chariton's Theater of Romance." In *The Ancient Novel and Beyond*. Ed. S. Panayotakis et al., 71–84. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
- Zeitlin, F. I. "A Study in Form: Recognition Scenes in the Three Electra Plays." forthcoming, *Lexis*.
- Zemon Davis, N. *The Return of Martin Guerre*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Zimmerman, M. *Apuleius Madaurensis Metamorphoses: Book X*. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2000.
- Zimmerman, M. "On the Road in Apuleius' *Golden Ass*." In *Paschalis and Frangoulidis* 2002: 78–97.
- Zimmermann, F. "Die Ἐφεσσιακά des sog. Xenophon von Ephesos. Untersuchungen zur Technik und Komposition. In *Beiträge zum griechischen Liebesroman*. Ed. H. Gärtner, 295–329. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1984.

This page intentionally left blank

INDEX

- Achilles
 disguised as a girl, 82, 223
 involved in recognition, 9, 239
 pursuing Hector, 113
 Theagenes's ancestor, 121, 126
Acts of Paul and Thecla, 216–17, 223
 Aeneas, 196, 197
 Aeschylus (*see also* Recognition in)
 Eumenides, 149
 Philoctetes, 26
 Seven against Thebes, 115
 Agave, 9
 Ajax, 9
 Ariosto, 7, 139
 Aristotle (*see also* Recognition in)
 Generation of Animals, 46, 88
 Nicomachean Ethics, 129
 Poetics, 12, 101, 113–14, 229
 Blood's call, 126–40, 234–38
 and animal instinct, 129–30, 133–34
 and incest, 128, 132, 133, 199
 and *oikeiōsis* (appropriation), 128–29
 in the *Aethiopica*, 126–35, 135–40, 152, 211–12, 231, 235
 in ancient drama, 132–35
 in Christian literature, 128, 211–12, 234
 in *Daphnis and Chloe*, 136, 152
 in European literature, 234–35, 236–38
 in Plato, 131–32
 Boccaccio, 233–34, 235
 Conversion
 and moral recognition, 181–85, 188, 206
 in conflict with family recognition, 15, 189, 203, 205–10, 215–22
 Corneille, *Oedipe*, 132, 235
 Cyrus (*see also* Recognition of), 19, 144
eikonismos (iconistic portrait, Identikit), 162, 176, 178
 Euripides (*see also* Recognition in)
 Alcestis, 23, 27, 33, 121, 229
 Electra, 88
 Hecuba, 110
 Helen, 32
 Ion, 89
 Iphigenia in Tauris, 155, 235
 Philoctetes, 26
 Phoenician Women, 113, 115
 Euryclea (*see also* Recognition of Odysseus by), 21–22, 49, 130, 133, 160–61, 163, 231–32
 Guarini, *Il pastor fido*, 237
 Guerre, Martin, 21, 235
 Helen (*see also* Recognition in Euripides, *Helen*), 21, 22, 28, 32, 38, 74, 113, 176, 206, 231
 Heracles, 9, 17, 167
 Herodotus, 96, 127, 144
 Himerius, 229
 Homer (*see also* Recognition in)
 as character, 145
 Iliad, 22, 32, 113, 166, 140
 Odyssey, 12, 21–22, 23, 63, 68, 128, 166, 169, 176, 201
Hysminias and Hysmine, 232
 Iamblichus, *Babyloniaca*, 85, 227–28
 Isaac and Jacob, 21
 Jocasta, as model for Calasiris's recognition, 115, 150
 Love, as recognition, 14, 37, 90–91, 118–19, 120, 146, 148, 149, 207, 225–26

- [Lucian], *The Ass* (*Onos*), 169, 184
 Lucius of Patre, *Metamorphoses*, 184
- Menander (*see also* Recognition in)
 Aspis, 90
 Epitrepontes, 90
 Perikeiromene, 89, 90
- Misidentification (*see also* Recognition, failed),
 65, 68–70, 73–74, 78, 85, 106–23, 227–28
- Name and Namelessness, 127, 144–45, 196, 202,
 215
- Odysseus (*see also* Recognition of)
 and the suitors, 116, 201–2
 disguised, 21–22, 23, 24–25, 26, 49, 72, 114,
 130, 165, 223, 233
 in the *Aethiopica*, 114, 115, 116, 125, 150, 219,
 223
 in *Apollonius of Tyre*, 195–96, 201–2
 in *Callirhoe*, 31–32, 34–35, 41–42, 43, 46,
 59–60, 82
 in the *Ephesiaca*, 63
 in Euripides
 Electra, 61
 Helen, 24–25
 in the *Golden Ass*, 165, 166, 169, 180–81, 182
 in *Leucippe and Clitophon*, 68
 in the *Satyrice*, 160–61, 162
- Oedipus: *see* Recognition in Sophocles *Oedipus Rex*,
 Recognition, failed, of Laius, of Oedipus
- Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 29, 128
- Parthenope, 84–85, 223
- Pelagia, 224
- Philip the Philosopher, 110, 142–43
- Plato
 Phaedrus, 91, 119
 Republic, 88, 131–32
 Symposium, 81, 119, 182
 in novelistic recognitions, 90–91, 118–19, 120,
 123, 142–43, 170, 223, 226
- Plautus (*see also* Recognition in)
 Amphitruo, 150
 Cistellaria, 90, 232
 Curculio, 96, 110
 Epidicus, 130, 133–34
 Rudens, 26–27, 90, 101, 134, 135, 230
- Plutarch (*see also* Recognition in), 44, 88
 On the Life and Poetry of Homer, 130
- [Quintilian], *Major and Minor Declamations*, 102,
 130–31
- Recognition
 audience to, 5, 43, 54, 106–7, 112, 112–13,
 116–17, 123, 124–25, 151, 154–56,
 156–58
- characters of ancient novels involved in
 (excluding episodes with the protagonists):
 Artaxerxes and Statira (in *Callirhoe*), 42–43
 Calasiris and his sons (in the *Aethiopica*),
 100, 113–17, 117–18, 123–24
 Callirhoe's son, 44–47
 Callisthenes (in *Leucippe and Clitophon*),
 65, 73–75, 78, 227–28
 Dionysius (in *Callirhoe*), 9, 38–40
 Giton (in the *Satyrice*), 162
 Psyche (in the *Golden Ass*), 170, 207
 a Slave (in the *Golden Ass*), 171–72
 Socrates and Aristomenes (in the *Golden*
 Ass), 165
 Theron (in *Callirhoe*), 82, 162, 171–72
 Thisbe (in the *Aethiopica*), 108–10
- clausal quality of: *see* Recognition, finality of
- crowds in: *see* Recognition, audience to
- deferral of, 78–79, 81, 139
- definitions of (*see also* Recognition in ancient
 literary criticism; in Aristotle), 8–13
- emotional responses to, 42, 48, 53, 116, 133,
 138, 148, 151, 154–55, 199, 202, 220,
 230
- failed, of
 Anthia and Hippothous (in the *Ephesiaca*),
 55–58
 Aseneth, 205–10
 Calasiris (in the *Aethiopica*), 114
 Chariclea (in the *Aethiopica*), 110–12,
 117–23, 233–34
 Chloe, 99–100
 Christian saints dressed like men, 222–24
 Clorinda (in the *Gerusalemme liberata*),
 238–39
 a girl in the *Golden Ass*, 172–74
 Ithaca by Odysseus, 180–81
 Laius, 128, 179
 Leucippe (in *Leucippe and Clitophon*)
 by Clitophon, 65, 70–76, 84–86
 by Callisthenes, 65, 74, 78, 227–28
 Lucius (in the *Golden Ass*), 164–65
 Odysseus by Penelope, 117
 Odysseus by Telegonus, 46, 128
 Oedipus, 128
 Socrates (in the *Golden Ass*), 165
- fictional quality of, 86–88, 122–23
- finality of, 41, 52–54, 55, 78, 123–24, 199
- forestalling incest, 57, 96, 173–74, 199
- forestalling violence, 5, 42, 57, 96, 103–4, 115,
 118, 123, 141, 192, 199, 228
- gods in (*see also* Recognition, providential
 quality of), 77, 93–94, 167, 190
- moral: *see* Conversion and moral recognition;
 Recognition of agency
- mutuality of, 30, 33, 40, 63, 120, 135, 175, 205,
 225–27
- naturalness of, 58, 231–32, 234

- passivity in, 61–64, 155
 providential quality of, 77, 82, 162–63,
 171–72, 220–21
 reasoning in (*see also* Recognition by
 reasoning), 153–54
 reciprocity of: *see* Recognition, mutuality of
 theatricality of, 4–5, 43–44, 112–17, 123, 154
 vertical versus circular/horizontal, 15, 170,
 207, 215, 221, 239
- Recognition and
 animal instinct (*see also* Blood's call and
 animal instinct), 164
 beauty, 58, 71–72, 84–85, 90, 95–101, 112,
 120, 204, 208–9, 223–24
 blood's call: *see* Blood's call
 change (*see also* Recognition and maturation,
 Conversion), 9, 59–60, 165, 225–26
 chastity, 77, 211, 214, 219
 children's exposure, 87–88, 89, 90, 96, 102,
 105, 134, 214–15, 229, 237
 disguise: *see* Recognition and dress
 dramatic irony, 5–6, 18, 90, 157–58, 212
 dreams, 77–78, 91–92, 93–94, 127, 136, 159,
 162, 180, 186–88, 189, 191, 193, 200
 dress (*see also* Odysseus, disguised), 70–72,
 75–76, 85, 114–15, 117, 120–21, 165, 213,
 222–24, 236
ekplēxis: *see* Recognition and shock
 epiphany, 33–37, 116, 201–2, 206–7, 208–9
 falling in love: *see* Love as recognition
 family reunion, 43–44, 44–47, 78–80,
 143, 164, 167–70, 173, 176, 190,
 198–202, 208, 211–15, 216–22
 Fortune, 12, 40, 41, 83, 174, 177, 179
 heroic deeds, 59–60, 146–47
 homecoming: *see* Recognition and return
 language, 107–8, 111, 156
 marriage, 13, 30–32, 41, 54, 94–95, 100–101,
 146, 173, 199–200, 201, 219, 225
 maturation, 90–95, 146–47
 misfortune, 81–84, 159–60, 177, 227–28, 229
 nature's voice: *see* Blood's call
 parental instinct: *see* Blood's call
peripeteia: *see* Recognition and reversal
 poetic justice, 39–40, 42, 77, 82, 159, 167,
 170–71, 228
 return, 3–4, 15, 54, 59–60, 93, 143, 165–70,
 189, 207, 210, 217, 225, 238–39
 reversal, 4, 6, 11, 12, 52, 82, 86, 104, 109, 115,
 141, 184, 200, 228
 self-styling, 66–76, 76–77, 160–61
 shock, 5, 12, 122, 155
 storytelling (*see also* Recognition by
 autobiographical narratives), 41, 44,
 60–61, 80, 164, 198
 suspense, 5–6
 sympathy (*see also* Blood's call), 18, 127, 133,
 136, 147, 237–38
 Tyche: *see* Fortune
 voice (*see also* Recognition by voice), 20–27,
 70–71, 108, 111, 121, 160, 161, 231,
 239
- Recognition by
 appearance (*see also* Recognition and beauty;
 and dress), 47, 48–49, 232
 autobiographical narratives, 15, 190–94,
 196–98, 213–14, 232, 233
 breathing, 31, 58, 232
 hair, 47–48, 51–52, 152, 155, 192
 intuition (*see also* Recognition and animal
 instinct; Blood's call), 17
membrum virile, 160–61
 memory, 50–51, 56, 192, 197
 mole, 139–40, 202, 209, 231
 passwords, 119, 120, 145
 reading, 152–53
 reasoning, 50, 51, 152, 154
 resemblance to parents, 45–46, 88, 176, 231
 scar, 22, 61, 130, 139, 140, 160, 161, 231, 232
 smell, 21, 130, 134
 touch, 21, 160–61
 voice, 20, 27–29, 47, 48–49, 58, 108, 161, 221,
 232, 233–34
- Recognition in
 Aeschylus, *Choephoroe*, 50, 51, 51–52, 53,
 152–53, 155, 193, 232
 ancient literary criticism (*see also* Aristotle), 5,
 227, 228–29, 230
 Aristotle
Poetics, 5, 6–7, 10–11, 50, 51, 122, 142, 192,
 197, 228, 232
 Euripides
Alcestis, 9, 16–18, 20, 25–26, 29–30, 33, 48,
 49, 231
Bacchae, 9
Electra, 51, 53, 61, 151, 152, 155, 232
Helen, 4, 23–25, 53
Heracles, 9
Hippolytus, 9
Ion, 4, 5, 133, 155, 192
Iphigenia in Tauris, 4, 5, 53, 141, 155, 192
 Homer
Iliad, 9, 192, 193
Odyssey, 4, 5, 21–22, 24–25, 31–32, 34,
 41–42, 43, 59–60, 125, 130, 133, 160,
 193, 200–202, 227, 228
 Menander
Aspis, 27, 231
Epitrepontes, 11, 37, 49, 89, 96, 227, 231
Perikeiromene, 11, 173
 Plautus
Captivi, 192
Cistellaria, 95–96
Epidicus, 173
Menaechmi, 51, 192, 193
 Plutarch, 4–5

- Recognition in (*continued*)
- Sophocles
 - Ajax*, 9
 - Antigone*, 9
 - Electra*, 53, 75–76, 155, 192
 - Oedipus Rex*, 5, 7, 10, 51, 132, 192, 227, 228
 - Terence
 - Andria*, 13, 132, 193
 - Heautontimoroumenos*, 11, 132–33
 - Recognition of
 - Agency, 8–9, 10, 37–40, 42, 181–85
 - Alcestis: *see* Recognition in Euripides, *Alcestis*
 - Cyrus, 45, 46, 96, 127–28
 - Electra and Orestes: *see* Recognition in
 - Aeschylus *Choephoroe*, in Sophocles
 - Electra*: *see* Euripides, *Electra*
 - Helen and Menelaus: *see* Recognition in Euripides, *Helen*
 - ignorance: *see* Conversion and moral recognition
 - Ion and Creusa: *see* Recognition in Euripides, *Ion*
 - Iphigenia and Orestes: *see* Recognition in Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauris*
 - Odysseus (*see also* Recognition in Homer, *Odyssey*)
 - by Argus, 130, 164
 - by Euryclea, 21–22, 130, 160–61, 163, 231–32
 - by Helen, 206
 - by Penelope, 31–32, 33, 42, 59–60, 201, 202, 232
 - by Telemachus, 34–35, 114–15, 116, 193, 201, 202
 - caused by memory, 50–51, 192, 197
 - Oedipus and Jocasta: *see* Recognition in Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*
 - religious truth: *see* Conversion
 - Sappho, 28
 - Satyrus, *Life of Euripides*, 230
 - Seneca the Elder, 102, 130–31
 - Sesonchoris, 226
 - Shakespeare, *Pericles, Prince of Tyre*, 194
 - Siblings
 - as disguise for lovers, 3, 107, 126, 132, 174
 - falling in love (*see also* Blood's call and incest), 57, 96, 132, 133, 173
 - Sidney, *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*, 236
 - Sophocles (*see also* Recognition in)
 - Oedipus Rex*, 128, 179, 237
 - Philoctetes*, 22, 110
 - Tasso, 7, 10, 238–40
 - Telegonus: *see* Recognition, failed, of Odysseus
 - Telemachus (*see also* Recognition of Odysseus by), 176, 231
 - Terence (*see also* Recognition in), *Andria* 90
 - Testament of Joseph*, 204
 - Tobiad Romance*, 203
 - Tokens
 - autobiographical narratives as, 192–93
 - disposal with, 58, 137, 192, 202–3, 213, 232
 - foreshadowing recognition, 95, 231
 - hasty treatment of, 103, 231, 232
 - of love, 118–20
 - used for tragic endings, 173–74, 229
 - Torch as symbol of recognition, 108, 118, 120, 148, 149
 - Tragedy versus Comedy in novelistic recognitions, 148–52, 227–30
 - Voltaire, *Candide*, 3, 236
 - Xanthippe and Polyxena*, 217
 - Xenophon of Athens, *Cyropaedia*, 19, 31